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INTRODUCTION:
MY NAME IS JONAS 




B E C O M I N G  A  P R O PAG A N DA  A RT I S T
My name is Jonas Staal, and I am a propaganda artist.1 This is not a 
confession, although it can easily come across as one. Why? Because 
the notion of propaganda art has itself been subject to propaganda, 
which tells us that propaganda art can only be one-dimensional, to-
talitarian, and at permanent risk of serving to legitimize crimes of ge-
nocidal proportions. Whether in the context of a journal article, or a 
review at art school: being labeled a propaganda artist is never a formal 
description, but by definition a negative judgment that expels the artist 
and artwork in question to the dark histories of authoritarian regimes 
and dictatorships.
I know this from first-hand indoctrination. Arriving at art school at 
the age of nineteen, it was quickly made clear to me that the purpose 
of art was to hold up mirrors to the world and show the ambiguity of 
the human condition. Everything could be questioned and all taboos 
could be broken, except one: not just to reflect on the world, but to aim 
to change it. Art that served political messages was the equivalent of 
“advertisement” or “activism,” and both were considered derogatory 
terms. Politics consisted of tedious and banal daily governance, best 
narrated by an increasingly sensational mass media. We, as artists, were 
supposed to elevate ourselves beyond such temporary current affairs. 
We were to dedicate ourselves to the ambiguities and anxieties of the 
human condition. The idea of changing the world was left to demago-
gues and idealists, whereas our task was to reflect upon it.
Around us, the world changed but the art school did not. When the 
Twin Towers collapsed, a large screen was set up in the media depart-
ment. I witnessed students applauding when the buildings came down 
while they commented on the rather poor camera work. When the 
Dutch populist right-wing leader Pim Fortuyn was murdered one year 
later, we told each other “good riddance,” although we had no idea 
about his political platform or the reasons for his widespread support. 
If we voted at all, we voted for the left, without giving much thought 
to it. In retrospect, I would say that our attitude was itself the product 
of a deep propagandistic logic. The idea that art needs to be outside 
politics to be art is exactly what has led not only to its powerlessness, 
but also to its cynicism and devastating neoliberal nihilism.
When I finished my studies in the Netherlands and the United Sta-
1  I borrow this phrasing from Stephanie Bailey, who at the Synapse 2: Rethinking Institutional Cri-
tique – A View from the South conference in Athens on Apr. 16, 2016 opened her closing remarks 
with the sentence: “My name is Stephanie Bailey, and I’m a neoliberal.” Evidently, Bailey was 
not saying that she wanted to be a neoliberal, but that, in her current predicament, she could not 
but acknowledge how the condition of neoliberalism structured and acted in her practice.
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In the aftermath of Van Gogh’s murder, Hirsi Ali’s fellow VVD MP 
Geert Wilders left his party, arguing that it was incapable of responding 
accurately to the existential threat of Islam. Through his own Freedom 
Party (PVV) – of which he is the sole member – he has called for the 
prohibition of the Quran and headscarves, closing down all mosques, 
pre-emptively bombing Iran, and building a Dutch-style Guantánamo 
Bay prison. Wilders’s proposals led to threats on his life and his being 
surrounded by permanent state security, but also rallied millions to 
his support. This resulted in his informal participation in the Rutte 
I government of 2010–2011.4 But most of all, Wilders changed the 
vocabulary and identity of Dutch politics. The myth of the country’s 
liberal-democratic “tolerant” profile was shattered. Instead, a funda-
mentalist interpretation of the freedom of speech opened the way for 
blatant and systemic racism, not just propagated by the ultranationa-
list parties, but also formerly progressive ones.5 Wilders’s dark vision of 
a renewed “clash of civilizations” between the “democratic” West and 
“backward” East turned into the dominant political narrative that it 
still is today. Through his alliances with Marine Le Pen’s Front Natio-
nal in France, Belgium’s Flemish Interest, the Italian Lega Nord, and 
Austria’s Freedom Party, Wilders became one of the leading figures of 
a new “Nationalist International.”6
This thesis deals mainly with the analysis of propaganda art in the 
21st century. It therefore seems crucial to emphasize that the Dutch 
“clash of civilizations” narrative is grounded in the body of a murdered 
artist: Theo van Gogh, great-grandson of Theo van Gogh, the brother 
of painter Vincent van Gogh. As clear from his last book, Allah Knows 
Better (2003), Van Gogh was an artist who supported the policies of 
George W. Bush and applauded the invasion of Iraq; he wallowed in 
anti-Semitic remarks, and spouted his blatant Islamophobia in obs-
cene tirades against public figures, such as Dutch Labor Party repre-
4  This was known in Dutch as a “gedoogconstructie,” which means in this case that the official 
government coalition consisted of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 
and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), while Wilders’s Freedom Party (PVV) formally 
remained in the opposition, but with the pledge to support core policies the three parties had 
agreed on. This made Wilders’s party a de facto part of the ruling government.
5  During Wilders’s closing statement during his court case for inciting hatred and violence in 
2016, the politician quoted the former Labor party leader Diederik Samson and Labor chair 
Hans Spekman, who had claimed Moroccan–Dutch had an “ethnic monopoly on violence” and 
that “Moroccan’s are to be humiliated.” The fact that the Labor party, which used to rely in a 
large part on an electorate with a migrant background, had moved so far to the right due to in-
fluence of Wilders thus turned into a key argument for the politician’s demand for acquittal. See: 
Geert Wilders, “Laatste woord Geert Wilders – Rechtbank 23 november 2016,” Website Freedom 
Party, Nov. 23, 2016, https://pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/9369-laatste-woord-geert-wilders-
rechtbank-23-november-2016.html.
6  These parties are allied in the European Alliance for Freedom faction in the European Parlia-
ment, termed by the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) a “nationalist interna-
tional.” See: DiEM25, “DiEM25’s European New Deal: A Summary” (2017), https://diem25.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/170209_DiEM25_END_Summary_EN.pdf.
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tes, I moved to the harbor city of Rotterdam. With its center bombed 
by the Nazis, Rotterdam is the result of an exceptional urban experi-
ment that provided the first large-scale experience with post-war mo-
dernist city planning in the Netherlands. A variety of plans was execu-
ted simultaneously. If you ask a citizen of Rotterdam to tell you where 
the center is, the chances are high you will get about five different 
answers, as there are about five different places that could be consi-
dered its “center.” The late Fortuyn was a Rotterdam citizen, and had 
managed to mobilize its workers into massively abandoning the for-
mer ruling Labor Party. Fortuyn’s anti-immigrant message resonated 
in this city, where more than fifty percent of residents had a migrant 
background, recruited in Turkey and Morocco as “guest workers” to 
take on unwanted jobs during the city’s post-war reconstruction.2 The 
presumption that these migrant workers would return “home” proved 
mistaken – home was now the Netherlands. In time, the lack of infras-
tructure provided by the political and business elites to support these 
migrant communities would prove disastrous. Already in the 1970s 
Rotterdam witnessed race riots in its Afrikaanderwijk neighborhood 
– shamelessly named after the first generation of Dutch colonizers in 
South Africa – when white workers literally threw migrant workers out 
of their houses.
Fortuyn’s murder in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks formed a 
fundamental breaking point in Dutch 21st-century society, even thou-
gh the fact that his killer had been a white animal rights activist did 
not match with the underlying desire to frame migrant communities – 
Muslims in particular – as a new existential threat to the “West.” This 
would change on November 2, 2004, when the anti-Islamist filmmaker 
and polemicist Theo van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bou-
yeri, a member of the later blacklisted Hofstad Group organization. 
Van Gogh’s collaboration with Dutch–Somali MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali of 
the liberal-conservative VVD on their film Submission (2004) had been 
Bouyeri’s trigger. He argued that the Dutch “masters” had found in 
her “an ally in their crusade against Islam and Muslims.”3 Bouyeri’s 
murder of Van Gogh would subsequently lead to the rise of the Dutch 
ultranationalist movement, which today has equivalents all over Europe. 
2  Inge Jansen, “Volgend jaar is de helft allochtoon,” NRC Handelsblad, Feb. 20, 2015, https://www.
nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/02/20/volgend-jaar-is-helft-allochtoon-1467853-a573815. Considering that 
this is a thesis on propaganda, it is relevant to highlight the highly problematic Dutch use of the 
word allochtoon, meaning as much as “of foreign soil.” This, however, doesn’t stop people from applying 
it to Dutch citizens even when they are born in the Netherlands. This has led to necessary debates that 
have introduced the alternative designation of “Dutch citizens with an immigrant background.”
3  The original quote in Dutch is as follows: “U steekt uw vijandigheid tegen de Islam niet onder 
stoelen of banken en hiervoor bent u door uw meesters beloond met een zetel in het parlement. 
Zij hebben in u een medestander gevonden in hun kruistocht tegen de Islam en de Moslims.” 
Source: R. Peters, addendum to specialist report “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling 
van Mohammed B.” (2003–2004), p. 35.
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support to the bombing of Afghanistan and invasion and occupation of 
Iraq, later to be expanded into foreign missions to Mali and bombings 
in Syria. It also included the rise of violent Islamophobia and racism 
at home. And this new, violent reality was constructed by cultural, if 
not artistic, warfare. Is the imagination of art, our capacity to think, 
stage, compose, choreograph, and construct the world differently not 
of crucial importance for the opposition against the construction of 
ultranationalist social reality? And should our task as artists, as those 
who have trained and specialized in representation, not be to join forces 
with those who demand a different conception of society: a society not 
divided by ethnic or class warfare, but assembled through a common 
imagination of equity? To contribute to a defiant imagination of a di-
fferent world, a world as real as we are able to imagine it to be – this is 
what began to crystallize for me as the clear artistic task ahead. It took 
the body of a murdered artist for me to realize that these words had to 
be uttered: I am a propaganda artist.
This thesis departs from a single question: Is the term propaganda 
still applicable to the 21st century, and if so, what are its implications for 
the domain of art? After the research that I conducted for this thesis, 
I have come to the conclusion that modern and contemporary pro-
paganda can be defined as a performance of power. Performance here 
has a double meaning. The first is performance as “enactment,” in the 
practical sense that powerful infrastructures such as the mass media 
or military-industrial complex are able to enact (perform) power to 
shape reality. The second is performance in the context of performan-
ce art and theater, where we speak of a bodily and often imaginative 
enactment. This is a performance not only of power as it exists, but 
as we could imagine it to be. Performance is not merely an aspect of 
propaganda, it is what defines propaganda: propaganda is the perfor-
mance of power. We will thus not speak of the “performance of pro-
paganda”, but of propaganda as a performance, which contains both 
a political and artistic component. When I claim that the aim of such 
a performance is to construct reality, that does not mean that propa-
ganda equals reality, but that it aims to shape and form reality as such. 
For example, the War on Terror – which we will discuss at length in the 
third and fourth chapter – might have started as a representation of a 
new “clash of civilizations.” But the strength of its propaganda ensured 
that this representation became a material reality, whether in the form 
of military invasions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, or in the form of 
the massive erosion of civil rights in the name of “national security” 
in the western world. Propaganda makes use of representation, but its 
core aim is to alter material reality as such. 
sentative Fatima Elatik.7 He was an artist that I ideologically oppose 
in every possible way. His murder, just like the murder of the Charlie 
Hebdo cartoonists on January 7, 2015, in Paris by Islamic State affilia-
tes, is a form of existential censorship. But we should also refrain from 
relativizing Van Gogh’s call for the illegal invasion of Iraq and the hun-
dreds of thousands of civilians that were murdered as a result, when 
assessing the cultural and artistic inheritance he left behind.
The fact that the rise of ultranationalism was facilitated by the body 
of a dead artist also contributed to my own politicization and evolution 
into a propaganda artist. The doctrines of art with which I had been 
educated and which claimed that the only way to be an artist was not 
to desire to change anything politically became untenable. And did 
Van Gogh and his allies – Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali, Wilders – not engage in 
a full-scale culture war? Even Wilders himself would transform into an 
artist of sorts, when he followed up on Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali’s Sub-
mission with his own blatantly racist and anti-Islamic film pamphlet 
Fitna (2008). These artworks perpetuated the new cultural mytholo-
gies of our time, that it was possible to return to a fictional democratic 
Dutch nation of the past, founded on humanist and Judeo-Christian 
principles, free from Islamic influence.8 Even though ultranationalism 
strongly relies on cultural mythology and visual representation to pro-
pagate its core narratives, somehow we as artists were supposed to 
stay at a distance in order for our work to remain art, while our artis-
tic competences were appropriated right before our eyes. This was the 
fundamental contradiction faced by engaged artists in the early 21st 
century in the Netherlands. Our politicians were turning increasingly 
into dubious artists and obscure actors – even filmmakers – but we, as 
artists, were not supposed to intervene for the sake of art’s perceived 
purity.
It increasingly became clear to me that exactly this narrative was the 
real propaganda at stake. Propaganda art was not the problem; it was 
the propaganda against propaganda art. The construction of reality was 
to be left to the adults in the room.9 Artists were supposed to be beau-
tiful and shut up, summarized in the famous dictum Sois belle et tais-toi. 
But the reality that we were told to stay clear of included the Dutch 
7  Van Gogh famously referred to Muslims as “goat fuckers” in the post-September 11 era: “Ever 
since 9/11, you know, the knives have been sharpened and the Fifth Column of goat-fuckers is 
marching forward relatively unhindered.” Original quote in Dutch: “‘Sinds 11 september, u weet 
wel, zijn de messen geslepen en marcheert de Vijfde Colonne van de geitenneukers betrekkelijk 
ongehinderd voorwaarts.” Source: Theo van Gogh, Allah weet het beter (Amsterdam: Xtra –
Rechtdoorzee Mijl op 7, 2003), p. 14.
8  In this context, it cannot be emphasized enough that the Dutch colonization of Indonesia had 
once provided the Kingdom of the Netherlands a territory where the majority of the population 
was Muslim.
9  A reference to Yanis Varoufakis’s Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment 
(London: The Bodley Head, 2017).
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of propaganda art, while investing in others, depending on the kind of 
reality we aim to construct. Simply put, artists instrumentalized in the 
War on Terror produce a form of propaganda art that is distinctly diffe-
rent from artists involved in popular movements that oppose the War 
on Terror. Their different claims and understanding of power generates 
different morphologies – different artistic forms.
In the following sections I will summarize the research methodo-
logy and historical narrative that led to these conclusions, but allow 
me first to elaborate how my own artistic practice has led to, and has 
further been shaped through this research. For this is not a thesis by a 
political scientist or an art historian. It is a thesis on propaganda art by 
a propaganda artist. As such, this thesis may be considered the result of 
artistic research, a term to which I will return below. The present docu-
ment is unthinkable without my intimate experiences with researching 
and developing artworks within different structures of power. To un-
derstand the specific knowledge that I add to this research through my 
own artistic practice, as well as my biases and blind spots, it is there-
fore crucial to explain clearly what kind of propaganda artist I consider 
myself to be.
P R O PAG A N DA  R E S E A R C H
My increased politicization in the period after 9/11 attacks, the start of 
the War on Terror, and the rise of the ultranationalist movements in the 
Netherlands and Europe have defined the foundation on which I have 
articulated my own practice as a propaganda artist. My aim has been 
twofold: to research the instrumentalization of art as propaganda (propa-
ganda research), and to develop emancipatory models of propaganda art 
(propaganda work).11
The focus of my propaganda research has been on the way in which 
dominant structures of power, such as ultranationalist movements, 
contemporary forms of high finance capitalism or authoritarian regi-
mes of different forms and kinds, perform power as art with the aim of 
constructing reality after its own interests.
A concrete example departing in the Dutch context is the Free-
thinkers’ Space (2010) project. The Freethinker’s Space was the first 
exhibition space in parliament founded and curated by Dutch political 
parties. In 2008, the liberal-conservative VVD and the ultranationalist 
11  An earlier endeavor is my publication Post-propaganda (Amsterdam: Fonds BKVB, 2009), which 
focuses on the post-WWII development of Dutch state subsidies for arts and culture in the context of 
“democratic propaganda.”
As we will see throughout this thesis, what we call reality from the 
modern age to the contemporary, includes a plurality of propagan-
das, each of which aims to inscribe their interests into our present and 
future. The uncontrollable interaction between these different propa-
gandas, in combination with complex social, economic and ecological 
processes, is what defines reality. Never does a single propaganda de-
fine reality as a whole, for nearly always competing propagandas exist, 
even if they are more liminal or embedded in a given regime of power. 
Of course, this leaves the question if there is such a thing as reality una-
ffected by propaganda. Philosopher Jacques Ellul for example argues 
that small communities, separated from what he terms “technological 
society,” are amongst the last to withstand the effect of propaganda. 
But in this thesis, we will see how modern and contemporary propa-
ganda have impacted many “autonomous” communities, and how the-
se communities in their turn, have developed alternative propagandas 
in response. My research is directed at the dominant propagandas that 
have enormous impact on the construction of our present-day reality, 
and on the question what alternative propagandas are emerging which 
aim to challenge and change its narratives. In other words, I aim to 
discuss not the world as it “is”, but as it is made and changed through 
propagandas and propaganda art.
Propaganda art is the result of a process through which the per-
formance of power manifests itself in the domain of form: the visual 
construction and composition of our reality.10 The aim of propaganda 
is to construct reality according to the interests of specific power struc-
tures. Structures of power can be extremely oppressive in nature, think 
for example of what we will discuss as the “expanded state” in the War 
on Terror, the merger of public and private infrastructures – state and 
corporate power – that operate largely outside of democratic control. 
But power structures can also be the result of emancipatory ideals and 
aims, as is the case with a variety of popular movements and alternative 
forms of governance, from the worldwide Occupy movement to the 
stateless democracy established in Rojava (Northern Syria). In other 
words, just like power structures are different, so is their performance 
as propaganda and propaganda art. As a result, I argue that we should 
always speak of propaganda in the plural: propagandas. Hence propa-
ganda art differs depending on which performance of power it is defi-
ned by and the kind of reality it aims to construct. The point is not to 
reject the notion of propaganda art as such, but to reject specific forms 
10  We will discuss the notion of morphology through the work of Judith Butler in more detail in the 
third and fourth chapters of this thesis. See also: Jonas Staal, “Ideology = Form,” e-flux journal, 
No. 69 (Jan. 2016).
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such continues to maintain the heritage of what I believe is a crucial 
landmark of ultranationalist propaganda art in recent Dutch history.14
The influence of right-wing or ultranationalist contemporary pro-
paganda art in constructing reality was equally at stake in my sub-
sequent project Closed Architecture (2011), which comprised research 
into the artistic background of Freethinkers’ Space co-curator Fleur 
Agema. Today Agema is second on the list of Wilders’s Freedom Par-
ty, but in the early 2000s she studied art and architecture at the AKI 
Academy of Fine Art in Enschede, where I was educated myself. The 
contrast between this anarchist bastion of art education where stu-
dents had applauded the attack on the Twin Towers and congratulated 
one another upon hearing of Fortuyn’s death and Agema’s later career 
as one of the key representatives of Dutch ultranationalism could not 
be more extreme. In the archives of the HKU University of the Arts 
in Utrecht, where Agema would eventually graduate, I was able to re-
trieve her graduation thesis from 2004, a 344-page document with the 
title Closed Architecture, containing detailed sketches and descriptions 
of a new prison model. Agema and myself had lived through a simi-
lar educational trajectory, but ended up at radically different sides of 
the political spectrum: the political artist on one side (myself), the ar-
tist-politician on the other (Agema). My propaganda research consis-
ted of a publication, a film, an architectural model, and a theater event 
in which I reconstructed, as detailed as possible, Agema’s exact prison 
design, with the aim to analyze the model both in relation to the prison 
policies of the Rutte I government which was supported by the Free-
dom Party, as well as an ideological model of her vision of society.15
In her thesis, Agema introduces a prison model in four consecutive 
phases. The first phase is called “The Bunker,” the last “The Light.” 
Designed through a modular computer-game logic, one could consider 
these different phases of Agema’s prison to be “levels.” The prisoner – 
depending on the severity of their sentence – is placed in one of these 
four levels. Subsequently, depending on good behavior, the prisoner 
may enter a next level, or is moved back to a previous one. The core 
idea is that the prisoners must liberate themselves through the prison 
model. In Agema’s vision, this game-like model is to replace the exis-
ting prison system, which – in the context of the Netherlands – gua-
rantees that being sentenced to ten years of prison does not suddenly 
14  When in 2012 the municipal Democrats 66 politician Rogier Verkroost and Green Party MP 
Jesse Klaver called for the Freethinkers’ Space to reopen, the project was continued in the Van 
Abbemuseum in Eindhoven, de Appel in Amsterdam, and KuS in Heerlen, where Verkroost, 
Klaver, Amsterdam Labor Party alderman Carolien Gehrels, and municipal Socialist Party 
politician Ron Meyer each created their own Freethinkers’ Space. The project, curated by Chris-
tiane Berndes and Nick Aikens, was titled Freethinkers’ Space Continued (2012).
15  See: Jonas Staal and Fleur Agema, Closed Architecture (Eindhoven: Onomatopee, 2011).
Freedom Party responded to a series of controversies of supposedly 
“Islamic” censorship of artworks by opening their own exhibition spa-
ce in their party headquarters. Their departure point was that contem-
porary art institutions, due to their leftist cultural-relativist bias were 
not capable of protecting the freedom of speech in the context of a 
renewed clash of civilizations.12 Instead, their Freethinker’s Space – as 
a contemporary version of the Salon des Refusés – aimed to uphold the 
liberal-democratic values of the West in the face of increasing Islamic 
censorship. At the center of the exhibition was the work of Theo van 
Gogh, whose family and friends attended the opening. And indeed, 
one can argue that killing an artist – no matter how problematic the 
context of their work – is a fundamental and existential form of cen-
sorship. But alongside the work of Van Gogh there were several other, 
more peculiar works of art, such as the paintings of Ellen Vroegh. Her 
work gained notoriety when her painting Danseuses Exotiques (2007), 
which was exhibited in the town hall of Huizen and was an orientalist 
depiction of nude tropical dancers, was moved due to complaints of a 
citizen with a presumably Islamic background. In the growing political 
and media hysteria after the murder of Van Gogh, this act of supposed 
“censorship” was mediated nationally through the right-wing news-
paper De Telegraaf, as if removing the work of this amateur painter 
had in any way the same significance as the killing of Van Gogh. The 
Freethinkers’ Space thus formed a strange hybrid of art-related media 
scandals, a staged cultural frontline aiming to reinforce the narrative 
of a clash of civilizations through art. When the two parties that initia-
ted the Freethinkers’ Space entered government in 2010, the exhibi-
tion space was closed, as party representatives claimed that freedom of 
speech would now be secured through government. Censorship by the 
leftist elite was no longer to be feared.13
My propaganda research consisted of mapping the history of the 
Freethinkers’ Space, the artworks that had been selected, the back-
grounds and motivations of the exhibited artists, the admission crite-
ria for work to be exhibited, as well as the artistic background of the 
curators, in particular Freedom Party MP Fleur Agema and current 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the VVD. This resulted in a publication 
on the Freethinkers’ Space and an exhibition in the Van Abbemuseum 
in Eindhoven. The museum subsequently purchased the work and as 
12  Wilders famously called Dutch contemporary art subsidies a “left-wing hobby,” in other words, 
a form of leftist state propaganda. Initially the quote was wrongly attributed to Freedom Party 
ideologue Martin Bosma. See: Jonathan Witteman, “Wie gebruikte de term linkse hobby’s het 
eerst?,” De Volkskrant, Jan. 7, 2011, 
https://www.volkskrant.nl/politiek/wie-gebruikte-de-term-linkse-hobby-s-het-eerst~a1789750/.
13  For the history of the Freethinkers’ Space, its participating artists and curator biographies, see: 
Jonas Staal, Freethinkers’ Space (Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum, 2010).
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ganda, in which the construction of a completely alternate reality – and 
the regulation of the behaviors of its citizen-prisoners within it – is the 
ultimate outcome.19 Power shapes artistic and architectural forms, in 
some cases the form of the artwork, in other cases the form of society 
as such. Thus, the artwork becomes equivalent to the construction of 
a reality.
The dual operation of propaganda art in both the form of the ar-
twork and infrastructure as form, was at stake in the Ideological Guide 
to the Venice Biennial (2013), a free smartphone app that I developed 
with different scholars, designers, and programmers, with the aim of 
providing insight into the political, economic, and ideological back-
grounds to each national pavilion at the 2013 Venice Biennial. Foun-
ded in 1895, the Venice Biennial was modeled after the World Fair, 
large-scale events in which predominantly colonial powers displayed 
their technological and cultural innovations to one another through 
national pavilions. What is unique in the case of Venice is that contrary 
to the World Fairs, which take place every so many years in different 
countries, the Venice Biennial is a World Fair that never left. During 
more than a century, nation-states have bought their own permanent 
pavilions in Venice, the first being the colonial powers of Belgium, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom in 1907.20 The Giardini, the central 
location of the Biennial and famous for its display of grand luxury and 
cultural omnipotence, are the prime real estate location for these na-
tional pavilions. A majority of former colonial powers reside here and 
the spatial organization of these pavilions thus often reflects not of the 
world order as it currently is, but as they desire it to be. That the na-
tional pavilions of Israel and the United States are placed right next to 
one another may be one of the most concrete examples of the Giardini 
operating as a phantasmatic representation of this idealized global po-
litical order. As such, the national pavilions at the Venice Biennial can 
be considered as a sort of an alternative world map, an allegory of the 
successful worldwide emergence of the nation-state during the 19th to 
the 20th centuries, culminating in the ever-expanding infrastructures 
of the Venice biennial.
19  The Total Work of Art, or “Gesammtkunstwerk,” was developed as an artistic concept by 
composer Richard Wagner in his two 1849 essays Art and Revolution” and “The Art-Work of 
the Future,” inspired by the Revolutions of 1848: “Only on the shoulders of this great social 
movement can true Art lift itself from its present state of civilized barbarism, and take its post of 
honour. Each has a common goal, and the twain can only reach it when they recognize it jointly. 
This goal is the strong fair Man, to whom Revolution shall give his Strength, and Art his Beau-
ty!” Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future and Other Works (Lincoln/London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 56.
20  For a more detailed analysis of the history of the World Fair and the Venice Biennial in relation-
ship to the Ideological Guide, see: Jonas Staal, “Art. Democratism. Propaganda,” e-flux journal, 
No. 52 (Feb. 2014).
turn into twenty years. In Agema’s model, liberation fully depends on 
the level at which a prisoner is willing to re-engineer their behavior by 
meeting certain learning objectives. A rejection of the education that 
would allow passing on to a next level could mean being stuck in the 
lower levels forever.16
Holding the middle between Dante’s Inferno and Deleuze’s defi-
nition of the “control society,” the first levels of the prison are dark 
with little room to move, placing the prisoner in full isolation.17 The 
second phase of the prison adds an extra window to the cell, its walls 
turn into a lighter shade of grey, and certain commodities, such as a 
private shower, become available. By the time the prisoner enters the 
fourth phase, the prison has completely changed. It is modeled after 
a suburban middle-class neighborhood, the guards have disappeared, 
and prisoners live in what look like private apartments. Twenty-four-
hour camera protection is installed, and large recreational facilities are 
introduced. Mimicking a Truman Show-type logic, the prisoners mi-
ght not even be aware that they are still in prison. Psychologically, the 
cameras no longer serve to monitor the prisoner. Instead, they now 
provide a service to the prisoner, protecting them from possible forms 
of violence or intrusion – very similar to the role that video surveillan-
ce has for those predominantly white middle- and upper class-citizens 
who consider themselves as part of the social “norm.” One could ask 
how different Agema’s fourth phase is from the gated communities 
emerging throughout the Netherlands and all over the world. Agema’s 
model is possibly best understood not as a prison design, but a design 
of society as prison.18 The ultimate iteration of Deleuze’s control society, 
in which self-monitorization results into a self-regulated citizenry.
Agema’s artistic imaginary has become a political imaginary. No 
longer focused on singular artworks, her emphasis has shifted to desig-
ning the infrastructures of power that define society itself. Society as 
prison is something of a “Total Work of Art” of ultranationalist propa-
16  A repercussion of Agema’s model may be found in a proposal of former State Secretary of Se-
curity and Justice Fred Teeven (VVD), in which he opted to subject “misbehaving” prisoners to 
the most austere regime allowed by law. As a Dutch newspaper reported: “A detention plan will 
be drafted for all detainees, featuring all kinds of behavioral characteristics. Those who end up in 
jail for the fourth or fifth time will automatically be treated under the most austere regime. The 
State Secretary ‘does not consider it justifiable to continue investing’ in repeat offenders. During 
the drafting of the plan, those convicted for heavy criminal or sexual offenses will be granted 
less privileges.” Kim van Keken and Remco Meijer, “Soberste regime voor gevangene die zich 
misdraagt,” Volkskrant Magazine, Jun. 4, 2011, https://www.volkskrant.nl/magazine/soberste-re-
gime-voor-gevangene-die-zich-misdraagt~a2441131/.
17  As Deleuze notes: “In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the 
barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished 
with anything – the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable 
states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. See: 
Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, Volume 59 (Winter 1992): pp. 
3-7, at p. 5.
18  Society as Prison was simultaneously the title of the theater play developed around a life-sized reconstruc-
tion of Agema’s prison model in Theater Frascati in Amsterdam, Dec. 21–22, 2011.
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mited to the representation of nationalist and ultranationalist power 
structures. Other works, such as Monument to Capital (2013) and Nosso 
Lar, Brasilia (2014) deal with the performance of power as art in the 
context of high-finance capitalism and urban development respecti-
vely.21 A crucial dimension of the propaganda research is the fact that 
each of these projects investigate propaganda art but are also forms of 
propaganda art in and of themselves. Propaganda research by a propa-
ganda artist appropriates one form of propaganda art and turns it into 
another. In my own practice, I do this with the aim to propagandize 
an awareness of the role of propaganda art in dominant structures of 
power that define the construction of our reality.
P R O PAG A N DA  WO R K
In the case of my propaganda work, the focus has been different, na-
mely on the performance of emerging structures of power as art, with 
the aim of constructing reality after the collective interest. One can 
think here of the role of art within emancipatory political organiza-
tions, popular mass movements, or stateless insurgencies. If, as I have 
just argued, there is a structural relation between power and form, then 
the creation of art cannot be considered outside of the powers that 
define its conditions of production, circulation, and presentation. In 
other words, the counterpoint to an ultranationalist form of propagan-
da art is not to abandon the notion of propaganda art as such; art must 
always be understood in relation to specific constructs of power. But 
there are different forms of power and artists must decide within or in 
support of what power structures they wish to operate.
In the case of “emerging” forms of power we are dealing with power 
structures that are not yet fully established, and which are in the pro-
cess of producing a counter-narrative to dominant power structures. 
As a result, my propaganda work has taken the shape of direct colla-
borations with stateless nations, social movements, and pan-European 
platforms. In each of these specific emerging power structures I have 
experienced and witnessed how my work was both informed and sha-
ped by these powers, while at the same time contributing to them. 
A crucial observation regarding propaganda work in the context of 
emerging forms of power is that art should not be understood merely 
as an instrument of power. Rather, propaganda art in this context acti-
21  The project Nosso Lar, Brasília was a multi-year research project on the relationship between spiritism 
and modernism in Brazilian architecture, and the role of city models influenced by these particular ide-
ologies. It was an early study in artistic research developed during the writing of this thesis, consisting of 
the positioning of an artwork (the merger of two city models) parallel to an academic study (theorizing 
what other knowledge the artwork could prodice). See: Jonas Staal, Nosso Lar, Brasília (Rio de Janeiro: 
Capacete and Heijningen: Jap Sam Books, 2014).
The Ideological Guide took this notion of the Venice Biennial as an 
alternative world map as its point of departure, offering users the op-
tion to plan routes between pavilions based on geopolitical alliances, 
such as the G8 or NATO, or military coalitions, such as the Coalition 
of the Willing that led the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What becomes clear 
from this spatial and infrastructural analysis is that many of the most 
powerful alliances can be located back to Giardini, whereas a route ba-
sed on the Non-Aligned Movement largely includes pavilions outside 
of this center of global power. In other words, power relations – and 
desired power relations, predominantly serving the policies of the West 
– are written into the very infrastructure of the Venice Biennial. In 
that context, the pavilions themselves could be considered as cultural 
embassies, showcasing artworks that benefit the narration of their res-
pective state interests. In the Ideological Guide users could further find 
detailed and critical information about each pavilion: the background 
of the artists, the curator they worked with, the market value of their 
work, the galleries that represented them, the ideological and political 
makeup of the country in question and its implication in political and 
economic alliances, current conflicts, and more.
The aim of the Ideological Guide was essentially to make its users 
recognize themselves as actors in a larger performance of power. Our 
bodily presence within the alternative world map of the Biennial affir-
ms the geopolitical power relations that it portrays. Starting one’s visit 
to Venice in the Giardini is a performative affirmation of the central 
importance of present-day or former European centers of power – 
China for example, is missing in Giardini – and only a minority of 
visitor-actors engage in the painstaking work of locating underfunded 
and marginalized stateless pavilions that are part of the “collateral” 
program, such as Iraq or Palestine, in the back alleys of Venice. Our 
movements narrate the desired power relations underlying the alterna-
tive world map of the Venice Biennial, our physical enactment re-affir-
ms the world not as it could be, but as dominant structures of power 
desire it to be. The Ideological Guide allows both the infrastructure of 
the national pavilions and artworks displayed within them to be un-
derstood as forms of contemporary Propaganda Art.
These three examples outline what I believe is at stake in propagan-
da research, namely the use of art to map the process in which domi-
nant structures of power are performed as art. The core objective is to 
understand how and through what means and narratives, propaganda 
art constructs our present-day reality: either through the curation of 
a propaganda art institution (Freethinkers’ Space), the creation of art 
in the form of infrastructure (Closed Architecture), or a combination 
of both (Ideological Guide). Propaganda research is evidently not li-
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sented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), and provided ju-
dicial support through our involvement of groups such as the Progress 
Lawyers Network and the Berghof Foundation. In other words, it aims 
to operate between the real and the possible, between concrete support 
to the struggles of stateless and blacklisted people, and the imaginary 
of a possible new assembly – across stateless and “stated” people – to 
emerge.24
Instead of investing in strengthening dominant structures of power, 
the New World Summit – through the space of art – has aimed at na-
rrating a history of the world, according to the stateless.25 Not the world as 
we know it, but the manifold worlds that are struggled for and emer-
ging as we speak. The New World Summit may be considered to be the 
inverse of the Ideological Guide to the Venice Biennial. Whereas the 
Ideological Guide aimed to show how dominant structures of power 
narrate themselves through art, the New World Summit aims at narra-
ting often invisibilized, emerging forms of power through art. In the 
case of the Ideological Guide, art is understood as an instrument of 
dominant power, in the case of the New World Summit as the collabo-
ration and assembly of emerging forms of power.
The exchange between the New World Summit and the organiza-
tions participating in its summits was not limited to mere facilitation. 
The conceptualization of the alternative parliaments was part of this 
exchange as well. In the case of the New World Summit – Brussels, for 
example, large-scale maps were developed with each participating or-
ganization to depict their claimed territory or the political model they 
aimed to establish. This resulted in a lengthy communication with the 
Baluchistan People’s Party (BPP), as their exact claims to ancestral 
land were disputed within the organization. This led to several border 
lines being changed back and forth many times over. Another example 
was the map of the Kurdish Women’s Movement that is active in Nor-
th- and West-Kurdistan, and who reject the form of the nation-state, 
instead proposing a form of “democratic confederalism” or “stateless 
democracy.” This led not to a territorial but an “ideological map.”
In the case of the New World Embassy: Azawad and New World Em-
bassy: Rojava, such collaborations went even further. Aimed at deve-
loping a form of “stateless diplomacy,” the design of these embassies 
were conceptualized and approved in lengthy discussions with the res-
24  With the term “stated” I refer to those administered in the context of the state, versus the 
stateless who are not.  I will further discuss this term in the third and fourth chapter. I further 
discussed the particularities of what to be considered as stated and stateless in relation to the 
Islamic State, see: Jonas Staal, “Empire’s Double: The Many Pavilions of the Islamic State,” 
e-flux journal/Supercommunity (Jul. 2015).
25  This was the point of departure of the New World Summit – Brussels (2014) that took place in 
the Royal Flemish Theater (KVS) in Brussels, Sep. 19–21, 2014 under the title “Stateless State.”
vely shapes the process in which emerging power manifests itself into 
form, and impacts the way in which we understand power through 
form: not merely as a tool to represent the world as it is, but as a way 
to present the world as it could be. In other words, art in the context 
of emancipatory politics is a transformative form of propaganda, as it 
propagates not that what is, but that what is possible if we can imagine 
it to be possible.
A concrete example of this propaganda work is my artistic and po-
litical organization New World Summit (2012-ongoing), which aims to 
develop alternative parliaments for stateless and blacklisted political 
organizations. Involving the domains of art, architecture, and design, 
the majority of these “alternative parliaments” took the form of tempo-
rary architectural installations in theaters, art institutions, and public 
spaces. They were not conceived to represent existing states but sta-
teless and blacklisted organizations, groups that have been excluded 
from our current practice of democracy.22 Created in the age of the 
War on Terror, the New World Summit develops spaces for political 
assemblies between civil society in whose name the War on Terror has 
been waged and stateless and blacklisted organizations against whom 
the War on Terror is waged. In other words, it introduces a space for 
“performative assembly” as philosopher Judith Butler termed it – what 
I call “Assemblism” – in which the common interests of both consti-
tuencies that might have more in common with one another than with 
the states that respectively claim to act in their name or fight directly 
against them can be explored.23
The New World Summit created a total of five temporary parliaments 
in Berlin (2012), Leiden (2012), Kochi (2013), Brussels (2014), and 
Utrecht (2016), one permanent parliament in Rojava (2015–17), two 
temporary embassies in Utrecht (2014) and Oslo (2016), and for a 
period of four years, its own school (2013–16). In the process, this 
“artist organization” – a concept that we will discuss in detail in the 
fourth chapter – involved more than fifty stateless and blacklisted or-
ganizations from all over the world including the Basque Country, Sa-
miland, Somaliland, Ogadenia, Oromia, Azawad, Rehoboth, Kurdis-
tan, Baluchistan, Southern-Azerbaijan, East-Turkestan, Tamil Eelam, 
West-Papua, the Philippines and the Aboriginal Nations. Apart from 
proposing a space of assembly for politicized civil society and stateless 
and blacklisted people, the New World Summit has been also a space 
of diplomatic exchange through our collaboration with the Unrepre-
22  For more detailed explorations of the concept of blacklisting and its relation to statelessness, see 
the New World Summit reader: Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei (ed.), New World Summit (Leiden: 
Utopisch Nest, 2012).
23  Jonas Staal, “Assemblism,” e-flux journal, No. 80 (Mar. 2017).
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parliament, the model, and ideals of stateless democracy by following 
the decision-making processes of stateless democracy. Osse and my 
team approached the notion of Rojavan ideology as a material form – 
we approached ideology as a morphology. Of all the works of the New 
World Summit, this one is the most crucial for understanding the exact 
interchange between emerging power and artistic imaginary in explo-
ring the possibility of a transformative propaganda art.
Osse’s idea that it was to become a public parliament – the parlia-
ment as a public space – cannot be separated from Rojava’s claim to 
recuperate democracy’s origins as found in the form of the agora of 
ancient Greece. The parliament’s circular shape derives from the form 
of the local communal assemblies, which often take the shape of infor-
mal circles. It dislocates power from a clear center in favor of an ega-
litarian social composition in which the distance between participants 
has been equalized. The large canvasses that cover the parliament’s 
roof are hand-painted fragments of flags representing organizations 
that play a key role in the Democratic Self-Administration, together 
giving shape to a new “confederate” whole. Revolutionary practice and 
revolutionary imaginary created the ideological design of the parlia-
ment through art. Its morphology is ideology materialized, emerging 
power becoming form. The People’s Parliament of Rojava is a spatial 
manifesto, it is a sculpture of an emerging power in the making, and it 
is a space to transform these imaginaries into concrete daily practice. It 
brings into being what historian Henk te Velde has called “the theater 
of politics,” connecting the history of political performance with art, 
and the theater with the parliament.28
The work of the New World Summit also shows a series of structu-
ral imbalances and inequalities. Not only am I inheritor of the Dutch 
colonial empire – whose heritage drives many stateless insurgencies up 
until today – but also much of the funding and cultural infrastructure 
that is available to me as a Swiss–Dutch artist is unavailable to my 
collaborators. Aiming to overcome the imbalances between the stated 
and the stateless does not change the fact that such historical and con-
temporary inequalities are present in the process. Nonetheless, I would 
strongly oppose the idea that the blacklisted and the stateless should 
be reduced to a position of powerlessness and victimhood. Yes, state-
lessness includes brutal oppression and downright murder of people 
28  Henk te Velde, Het Theater van de Politiek (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2003). Another rele-
vant study in this regard was developed by architect Francis Cape, who analyzed the role of the 
bench in different communalist groups in the United States. The “utopian bench” in his analysis 
becomes the visual and ideological foundation for communalist politics: the surface on which we 
organize and articulate what a community is, should or could be. Francis Cape, We Sit Together: 
Utopian Benches from the Shakers to the Separatists of Zoar (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2013)
pective representatives of the stateless nations in question. While this 
may be interpreted as an instrumental role of art in relation to politics, 
I would – from my personal experience – describe these collaborations 
as forms of mutual instrumentalization. The New World Summit is ins-
trumental for the creation of forms of mediation that support the na-
rratives of stateless and blacklisted organizations. But conversely these 
organizations are instrumental for the New World Summit to rethink 
the role of art, architecture, and design through alternative (art)his-
torical narratives that can challenge the dominant, statist conception 
of art. Through these collaborations, my team and I became aware of 
the long history of art and culture in stateless political struggles. Due 
to the absence of an independent state structure their histories and 
languages were memorized and transferred from one generation to the 
other through art – visual symbols, music, literature, theater. Instead of 
being an instrument of the state, in these cases art can be considered as 
an alternative to the state; a cultural body that defines a “people” or “na-
tion,” and as such strengthens and legitimizes their claim to self-deter-
mination in the form of a state or autonomous region.26
This profound role and agency of art within stateless political stru-
ggles was most apparent in the New World Summit’s collaboration 
between the Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava. Rojava, an 
autonomous region in northern Syria that we will discuss at length 
in the final chapter, was declared a stateless democracy by an alliance 
of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and other people from the region.27 On 
invitation of Saleh Muslim, co-president of the Rojavan Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), I traveled in December 2014 with my New World 
Summit team to the region with the aim to document the process of 
building stateless democracy and to interview artists involved in the 
process. However, a proposal of our host, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Amina Osse, turned this into yet another project, when we started con-
ceptualizing a new parliament for the stateless democracy of Rojava, 
not a temporary, but a permanent one.
More than in any other collaboration this work of New World Sum-
mit was shaped through the ideas and practices of its collaborator. 
Commissioned by Osse, the design of what would become the New 
World Summit – Rojava, locally referred to as the “People’s Parliament 
of Rojava,” was discussed with all local communes for approval, and 
the building and design process would include exchange with local 
artists, engineers, and builders. Our aim was to represent, through the 
26  I have discussed this on several occasions as the “art of the stateless state,” see: Jonas Staal, 
“Ultranationalism and the Art of the Stateless State,” e-flux journal, No. 57 (Sep. 2014).
27  My first political and cultural inquiry into stateless democracy was Jonas Staal, “Stateless De-
mocracy,” e-flux journal, No. 63 (Mar. 2015).
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as a transformative practice that translates emerging power into new 
artistic forms. My methodology may in that sense be understood as a 
comparative study and practice, that begins from the claim that diffe-
rent powers perform themselves as different propagandas and different 
forms of propaganda art.
Part of this thesis starts from propaganda research, and another 
part from propaganda work. The research component of this thesis can 
be best explained through my proposition to define propaganda as a 
“performance of power.” To arrive at this proposition, I departed from 
a multidisciplinary body of existing propaganda studies that has been 
developed in the domains of politics, the military, sociology, psycho-
logy, and mass media, among others. This is even more so the case in 
relation to the term “art,” in which case I rely on art historical sources, 
many of which are from the field that I have termed “Popular Art His-
tory,” on which I will elaborate in the final chapter.
But the aim of this thesis, to expand a 20th-century definition of 
propaganda and propaganda art into the 21st century, cannot rely on 
existing research alone, partly since the very term “propaganda” – as I 
will explain in the first chapter of this thesis – has fallen largely out of 
use in favor of terms such as “advertisement” and “public relations.” 
My approach to this terminological problem has been twofold. First, 
I introduce literature and research of authors who, although outside 
the field of propaganda studies, address issues pertinent to the study 
of propaganda in the 21st century. Second, I have relied on my own 
projects and experience as a propaganda researcher and propaganda 
artist to gain an understanding of the process through which contem-
porary power is performed as contemporary art. This means that my 
own experience as a propaganda artist has resulted into an attempt to 
define several categories of contemporary propaganda art, employing 
sources – artists, theorists, philosophers – that have so far been exclu-
ded from the domain of propaganda studies proper. In some cases, I 
discuss artists and movements of whose existence I was unaware until 
the moment I conducted my own fieldwork as a propaganda artist in 
contexts such as the Philippines, Azawad, and Rojava.
The scope of this thesis is broad. It aims to redefine modern pro-
paganda and modern propaganda art, and to expand these definitions 
into the field of contemporary propaganda and contemporary pro-
paganda art. This broad scope may lead to question the core of the 
“knowledge” that underlies my artistic practice. There have been far 
more detailed works written on the role of propaganda in the First 
and Second World War, on Adorno’s concept of the cultural industry, 
or the employment of modern art as a weapon of the Cold War – all 
topics that I will discuss in this thesis. But my modest contribution, I 
and erasure of their histories, but as Rojava has shown me, stateless-
ness through stateless democracy can in many ways also be claimed as 
a power in its own right.
These examples outline what I believe is at stake in propaganda 
work, namely to actively participate in the performance of emerging 
power as art. The core objective is to understand how and by what 
means, narratives, and forms propaganda art can contribute to the 
construction of reality through the demands of emerging powers. The 
examples of my own propaganda work highlight the relationship be-
tween particular forms of emerging power and the way they make  new 
artistic and political forms possible: the stateless parliament, the state-
less embassy, the stateless school.
The New World Summit is, however, not the only example of my 
propaganda work in relation to emerging power. Another one is my 
collaboration with former Labor alderman of art and culture Carolien 
Gehrels and artist Hans van Houwelingen in the form of our Allegories 
project (2011–ongoing), in which we aimed to create new coalitions 
between artists and progressive politicians. Another case is my work in 
the New Unions campaign (2016–ongoing) within the Democracy in 
Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), which aims at establishing a new 
Pan-European democracy.29 Each of these projects attempts to connect 
the imagination of emancipatory politics with an emancipatory art, to 
translate emerging structures of power into new emerging forms of 
propaganda art.
M E T H O D O L O G Y  O F  A RT I S T I C  R E S E A R C H
Above I have laid out the basic conditions of the methodology of ar-
tistic practice applied to this thesis. I believe this methodology is best 
explained through the following equation :
propaganda = power + performance 
This means that I define propaganda as a performance of power with 
the aim to construct reality for its interests. Propaganda equals the per-
formance of power, but the aim of constructing reality does not equal 
propaganda to reality as such: reality includes a plurality of competing 
propagandas, although one propaganda might have more impact on 
reality than another. My aim is to trace and apply the role of propagan-
da art in this process, both as an instrument of dominant power and 
29  I describe the New Unions campaign and the political concept of “transdemocratic unionizing” 
that resulted from it in: Jonas Staal, “Transdemocracy,” e-flux journal, No. 76 (Oct. 2016).
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shapes our understanding of it, and is what makes history paradoxica-
lly into a contemporary practice. History is, at the very least, as true to 
the past as it is to the interests of the present. In the case of artistic re-
search, this notion of history as material is even more prominent. The 
artist narrates the history in which he or she is participating at the very 
same time. In that sense, artistic research is the domain of propaganda 
studies par excellence, as it highlights the influence of a particular ar-
tistic interest in relation to the way a historical narrative is constructed 
to serve a contemporary objective.
Finally, writing as artistic tool and history as material, together 
translate into an objective of artistic research that is particular to my 
own practice, namely world-making. It was Upton Sinclair, who will 
frequently appear in this thesis, who called upon artists not to make 
art in the world as it is, but to “make a world.”31 Like progressive his-
torians, artistic research in this case rejects the very notion of history 
as a frozen tableau. In the way that we narrate history, and through 
the potentials that we unleash by narrating history as a contemporary 
practice, we make new engagements with our present and futures pos-
sible. Writing as an artistic tool means to interrogate, challenge, and 
activate history as a material not merely to describe the world as it is, 
but the world as it could be: the world as it could be imagined, changed, 
and made.
C H A P T E R  S U M M A RY
This thesis consists of four chapters on propaganda and propaganda 
art that cover the period of the First World War to the present day.
In the first chapter, Modern Propaganda, I will trace the notion of 
modern propaganda through the work of Philip Taylor, Garth Jowett, 
and Victoria O’Donnell from the beginning of the First World War, 
when the first modern propaganda bureau – Wellington House – was 
established in the United Kingdom. I will emphasize the importance of 
the British colonial empire in building the technological and industrial 
infrastructure that made propaganda both possible and necessary, as 
well as the fact that the birthplace of modern propaganda was not a 
so-called “totalitarian” state, but a modern democracy. The efforts of 
Wellington House to employ propaganda to get the neutral Americans 
to join the war against the “Huns” – a derogative term used for the 
31  We will discuss Sinclair’s work in more detail in the second and fourth chapter of this thesis. The 
notion of “world-making” as a verb resulted from a conversation with Maria Hlavajova, see: Ma-
ria Hlavajova in conversation with Jonas Staal, “World-making as commitment,” in Former West: 
Art and the Contemporary After 1989, ed. Maria Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press and Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 2016), pp. 667–77.
hope, has not been to rewrite histories already written, but to propose 
categories of propaganda art that can be applied to understand propa-
ganda and propaganda art in the context of our 21st century. These 
are categories that may contribute to future histories of contemporary 
propaganda art. In this respect, my paradoxical and hybrid role as an 
“artist–historian” hopefully has contributed to the expansion of exis-
ting propaganda studies by means of an equal emphasis on research 
and practice.30
This touches on the field that has become known as “artistic re-
search,” and the possibility for artists to participate in practice-based 
PhD programs. I have been a researcher in one such program and this 
thesis is its result. If the faculty of humanities were not already scorned 
by the exact sciences, then the introduction of artistic practice into the 
university has made sure of it. From an academic perspective, there 
is an ongoing discussion about what “knowledge” art adds to existing 
fields of research, such as art history. From an artistic perspective, 
there is an ongoing question as to why art should enter a space of 
discursivity at all, with the argument that art deals with experiences 
and sensibilities are contrary to those of science. I would like to share 
three aspects of my understanding of artistic research in this context 
that also apply to this thesis, namely writing as artistic tool, history as 
material, and world-making.
Writing as an artistic tool has a history of its own in the form of 
artist manifestoes, statements, and polemics, in which artists interve-
ned into the narratives created around their work by critics, historians, 
and politicians. In the case of the movement known as Institutional 
Critique, of which I will discuss some proponents in this thesis, a form 
of “parallel academia” came into being, in which artists narrated the 
unacknowledged histories and interests – political, economic, ideolo-
gical – that define the canon of modern and contemporary art. In that 
sense, artistic research, and the particular knowledges it produces in 
the visual, discursive, and performative fields were a reality far before 
they became partially instituted in the university in the form of artis-
tic research. In that light, there is no necessary conflict between the 
discursive and the visual. Rather, there might be a difference in the 
objective of the discursive output of an artist.
This touches upon the notion of history as a material. Progressive 
historians will always emphasize that writing about history also means 
making history. What is described as history and what is not actively 
30  Note that throughout this thesis, I will reference the political or advisory work of several propa-
ganda researchers, to emphasize that there is little neutrality in describing propaganda. Theoriz-
ing propaganda also inevitably means to propose and engage with models for its practice.
P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 4 3 5 I N T R O D U C T I O N
Art, in the context of 20th-century dictatorships I will propose Totalita-
rian Propaganda Art, and in the context of the United States during the 
Cold War I will propose Modernist Propaganda Art. For each of these 
models, I will try to show how different power structures have been 
performed as art. For example, in the case of Avant-Garde Propaganda 
Art I will argue through the work of Vladimir Lenin and Anatoly Lu-
nacharsky that the Soviet Union’s early claim to define its own revolu-
tionary modernity approached modern propaganda as a form of mass 
education in the process of establishing an egalitarian society. This has 
an enormous impact on artists, and constructivists and productivists 
began to include forms of technology and mass communication into 
their artistic practices. In the case of Totalitarian Propaganda Art, I will 
show through the works of Andrei Zhdanov, Boris Groys, and Igor Go-
lomstock how many of such revolutionary ideals where subsequently 
co-opted by brutal authoritarian regimes, in which art was reduced to 
its former role as instrument of ruling powers, such as in the case of 
Stalin’s
socialist realism. At the same time, I will propose the term Totalita-
rian Propaganda Art as a propagandistic instrument itself, which aims 
to define propaganda art as the sole property of totalitarian ideologies, 
while effacing the historical role of modern democracy as the origin of 
modern propaganda. In the case of Modernist Propaganda Art, I will 
trace the role of American modernist art, such as abstract expressio-
nism as theorized by Clement Greenberg, as an instrument of the Cold 
War. Propagated by means of a clandestine CIA operation in Europe, 
as analyzed in detail by Frances Stonor Saunders, its aim was to em-
phasize the contrast between the “free,” non-figurative art of the West 
and the doctrinal aesthetics of socialist realism created behind the Iron 
Curtain. The framing of a non-propagandistic modernist art proved to 
be the ultimate form of democratic propaganda; modernist art is still 
celebrated as a symbol of the free West today. Theorizing these three 
specific power structures in relation to their performance as art allows 
to differentiate different propagandas and different models of propa-
ganda art, which brings me to conclude that modern propaganda art is 
the performance of power as art in modern society.
In the third chapter, Contemporary Propaganda, I will explore to what 
extent the central characteristics of modern propaganda are applicable 
to the 21st century. I will expand Chomsky and Herman’s propagan-
da model and its limited focus on dominant structures of power to 
consider other emerging formations of power that provide alternative 
forms of propaganda. For example, the War on Terror has been one of 
the most influential factors that define the conflictual arena of the con-
temporary, which can be analyzed through Chomsky and Herman’s 
Germans – will be helpful to understand democratic propaganda as a 
largely covert operation that attempts to maintain the idea of an open 
and free society while altering information at its foundation. Throu-
gh the work of Michael Sproule, I will try to reconstruct how after 
the First World War such covert operations of democratic propaganda 
sparked a debate in the United States on the question whether demo-
cracy and propaganda are reconcilable. This will allow me to introduce 
key proponents of propaganda studies such as Walter Lippman, Ed-
ward Bernays, and Harold Lasswell. After the Second World War, the 
use of both covert and overt propaganda by Nazi Germany indefinitely 
discredited the term propaganda. Nonetheless, several thinkers and 
researchers, such as Theodor Adorno, Jacques Ellul, Noam Chomsky 
and Edward Herman, would continue to explore the term, not only in 
relation to dictatorships, but also to modern democracies. I conclude 
that modern propaganda is not exclusive to totalitarian regimes, but is 
inherent to all modern societies, no matter the structure or ideology of 
the state. This of course does not mean that all forms of propaganda 
are the same. In the same way that power structures differ from each 
other, so do different forms of propaganda. I will therefore, following 
Ellul, speak of “propagandas” in the plural. The propaganda model 
theorized by Chomsky and Herman will prove crucial throughout the 
later chapters, as they introduce a series of “filters” to understand the 
process through which dominant monopolies of power aim to manu-
facture consent among a given population. By combining their model 
with theoretical insights of other scholars such as Ellul, I will propose 
a definition of propaganda as a “performance of power” that aims to 
construct reality after its own political, economic, and ideological inte-
rests. In the case of modern propaganda, this relates specifically to the 
deployment of massive technological and industrial capacities which, 
from the First World War onward, could construct reality on a world-
wide scale. This brings me to conclude that modern propaganda is the 
performance of power in modern society.
In the second chapter, Modern Propaganda Art, I will apply this 
definition of modern propaganda to the domain of art. Through the 
work of Jacques Louis David, Immanuel Kant, and Claude Henri de 
Saint-Simon, I show how the notion of modern art is the product of 
a series of political upheavals from the French Revolution onward, 
which have defined our current understanding of art’s “freedom” and 
“autonomy.” The paradox is that what we consider autonomous art to-
day is itself the result of the revolutionary politics of the past. I will try 
to clarify this claim by proposing three different models of propaganda 
art in relation to three specific power structures. In the context of the 
Russian Revolution I will propose the term Avant-Garde Propaganda 
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spectacular forms of theater, cinema, visual art, video games, and even 
alternative forms of abstraction, has been employed to manufacture 
ever increasing forms of terror that legitimize the War on Terror and 
protect the interests of its stakeholders. In the case of Popular Propa-
ganda Art, I will introduce through the work of Upton Sinclair, Alice 
Guillermo, and Claire Bishop artists who have contributed to its per-
formative practices of assembly, and who have tried to contribute to 
their demands of an alternative egalitarian society that opposes the di-
visions promulgated by the War on Terror. Examples range from artists 
and art groups active within popular mass movements, such as Not An 
Alternative, Matthijs de Bruijne, and Decolonizing Art Architecture 
Residency, to artists who have created their own alternative models 
of political organizations, such as Ahmet Öğüt and Tania Bruguera. 
In the case of Stateless Propaganda Art, I will discuss how different 
formations of statelessness – from the demand to be recognized by 
the state to the desire to create a state of one’s own or even reject the 
notion of the state altogether – have resulted in artistic practices that 
aim to recognize statelessness as a power in and of itself. From refugee 
collective We Are Here and the work of Mazou Ibrahim Touré’s Artist 
Association of Azawad to the work of Abdullah Abdul and the Rojava 
Film Commune, we will see how these artists and art groups contribu-
te to the construction of reality departing from various conditions of 
statelessness. This process of tracing specific power structures in their 
performance as art allows us to distinguish different propagandas and 
different models of propaganda art, which brings me to conclude that 
contemporary propaganda art is the performance of power as art in contem-
porary society.
 
“ W E ”
On a final note, the reader will notice that starting from chapter one, 
this thesis is written from the perspective of a “we.” That is not a royal 
“we,” and it doesn’t lay claim to a constant agreement between writer 
and reader. Rather, this “we” is a we-in-the-making.32
This thesis proposes a discursive space of assembly around the no-
tion of propaganda art, which might make a modest contribution to 
redefining the meaning of both propaganda and art in the 21st century, 
and, more importantly, put such a new definition of contemporary 
32  The fear of positioning a “we,” a claim to a collectivity or the need for one, and the neoliberal 
propaganda that fuels this fear, is well summarized by Jodi Dean: “Collectivity is undesirable be-
cause it is suspected of excluding possibilities, effacing difference, and enforcing difference, and 
enforcing discipline. “What do you mean ‘we’?” is one slogan of this suspicion, typically lobbed 
into contexts and discussions deemed insufficiently attentive to the specificities to each person’s 
experience.” Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party (London/New York: Verso, 2016), pp. 67–68.
propaganda model. But I will also focus on the role of popular mass 
movements and stateless peoples that oppose this War on Terror, or are 
(in)directly targeted by this war, which Chomsky and Herman have 
not taken into consideration in their propaganda model. The “reversed 
propaganda model” that I propose is not focused on filters, but on co-
llective demands articulated by popular mass movements and stateless 
peoples. Rather than operating as a form of elite control, I will argue 
that the inverted propaganda model opens the possibility of egalitarian 
or collective propagandization for the collective interest. In the case of 
War on Terror Propaganda, I will try to show through the work of Joseph 
Masco how the accelerated and interconnected domains of politics, 
economy, science, and the military–industrial complex have become 
implicated in an “expanded state,” a state that operates largely outside 
of democratic control and engages in a war against forms of threat 
production – forms of terror – that are in part a product of its own ma-
king. In the case of Popular Propaganda, I will trace through the work 
of Judith Butler the process in which popular mass movements develop 
alternative and collective formations of power having the popular as-
sembly as their point of departure. In the case of Stateless Propaganda, 
I will trace – as far as my own blind spots allow – alternative forms of 
assembly through the work of Mohamedou Ould Slahi, which departs 
from the recognition of statelessness as a political condition. In the 
process of discussing the proximities and oppositions between these 
three forms of contemporary propaganda, I will not only emphasize 
their different performativities and claims to different understandings 
of power, but also their creative capacities, their aim to perform power 
and imaginative competences to create vastly different realities as a 
result. This brings me to conclude that contemporary propaganda is the 
performance of power in contemporary society.
In the fourth and final chapter, Contemporary Propaganda Art, I will 
apply this definition of contemporary propaganda to the domain of art. 
I will emphasize in the process how the changing character of propa-
ganda from the modern to the contemporary also changed the defini-
tion of art as such, increasingly expanding its reach into the domain of 
contemporary mass media and technology. I will clarify these different 
formations of propaganda art through the three main agents of the 
contemporary defined in the third chapter: the War on Terror, popular 
mass movements and stateless peoples. With each of these actors, I will 
try to show how different power structures in the contemporary – whe-
ther in the form of established or emerging forms of power – are per-
formed as art. In the case of War on Terror Propaganda Art, I will show 
through the work of Steve Bannon, Trevor Paglen, Stephen Eisenman, 
and Coco Fusco, among others, how a variety of media, reaching from 
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propaganda art to use. With this thesis, I thus hope to strengthen a 
collectivity that recognizes the importance of propaganda art for the 
construction of our shared reality, and the question of what kind of 
reality we desire to create.
Naturally, this thesis, written by a propaganda artist on propagan-
da art, is itself a work of propaganda art. It is a work of propaganda 
art that, in the tradition of conceptual art and institutional critique, 
appropriates the form of academic writing, including its entire scho-
larly apparatus, as artistic material. Te Velde has described this as a 
particular ambiguity regarding the role of art in propaganda art. Pro-
paganda art, in his view, does exactly what the artist states that he or 
she will do – in my case, writing a thesis on propaganda art, or develop 
a parliament commissioned by a stateless nation – while at the same 
time doing more.33 This “more” is defined not just by what we perceive 
visually as the art work, but by what such an artwork aims to bring into 
existence: the construction of a different reality. Just like the many pro-
paganda artists that the reader will encounter in the following chap-
ters, this propaganda artist aims to construct reality anew, or at least 
start a discussion on how we might assemble in order to do so.
Not to speak as a we-in-the-making would be a betrayal of this ob-
jective, and of my claim at the very beginning of this introduction: my 
name is Jonas Staal, and that I am a propaganda artist.
33  Noted from a personal conversation with Henk te Velde and Sven Lütticken, Royal Academy of 
Art, The Hague, Jun. 2, 2017.
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Nowadays, the concept of propaganda in popular discourse is ill-defi-
ned and its historical origins have been obscured. In popular opinion, 
propaganda is nearly always inherently related to dictatorship and 
so-called totalitarianism, whereas democracy is exempt of propaganda 
proper. The term recalls images of monumental sculptures of Hitler 
and Stalin and agitprop posters and paintings depicting hysterically jo-
yous peasants and workers celebrating their leaders and state. When we 
say, “this is propaganda,” or “that person is a propagandist,” we tend 
to mean manipulation, lies, deceit, bringing to mind the persecution of 
minorities and images of concentration camps and gulags. And at the 
same time, propaganda is considered somewhat old-fashioned; as if it 
can only refer back to totalitarianism, rather than to contemporary po-
litics. When the term is applied in newspapers or television items, it is 
in majority to regimes such as Turkey, Russia, or the so-called Islamic 
State; forms of governance and political organization whose histories 
in respectively the Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union or religious funda-
mentalism are associated with aggressive expansion, histories of mass 
persecution, and terrorist campaigns. While one can certainly make the 
argument that propaganda plays a key role in these different examples, 
the assumption that they are the ones who use propaganda and demo-
cracy does not, seems highly problematic. Rather, we will develop the 
argument that we are dealing here with different propagandas in the 
plural.1
When propaganda is occasionally applied to democracies, for exam-
ple in case of the 2003 invasion in Iraq led by the United States based 
on the false argument that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
there is still a sense that “our” propaganda is or should be of a better 
kind than the aggressive agitprop of the past.2 The 2016 election of 
Donald Trump as president of the United States and his overt attack 
on independent media and the judicial system has created something 
of an exception. His claims that critical media belong to the domain 
of “fake news” and his administration’s own counter-arguments in the 
1  The idea that propaganda should be understood in the plural is taken from the philosopher 
Jacques Ellul’s Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (1962). We will discuss Ellul’s work 
in more detail later on this chapter.
2  In a study on mass media during the War on Terror, Anthony DiMaggio remarks that “American 
corporate media has overwhelmingly taken the position that the U.S. presence in the Middle 
East is driven by a noble effort to promote self-determination, human rights, justice, and democ-
racy. Although those Iraqis who resist American occupation are attacked in papers like the New 
York Times for relying on “propaganda that has helped fuel the insurgency throughout lraq,” the 
propaganda of the American media and government are ignored. It is not considered propagan-
da, but rather “conventional wisdom” […].” Such democratic propaganda, DiMaggio concludes, 
is the result of the fact that “government and media propaganda have always been essential in 
efforts to convince citizens within democracies of the veracity of officially espoused war aims. 
The war in Iraq is only the most recent in a longstanding effort on the part of the government 
and the media to portray the U.S. as unconditionally committed to spreading justice, freedom, 
human rights, and democracy throughout the globe.” See: Anthony Dimaggio, Mass Media, Mass 
Propaganda: Examining American News in the “War on Terror” (Lanham/Plymouth: Lexington 
Books, 2009), pp. 22, 162.
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form of “alternative facts” invoke textbook methods of authoritarian 
propaganda which have been termed as part of a “post-truth” era of 
politics.3 Nonetheless, opposition politics, established media, as well 
as befriended nations remain hesitant to use the term propaganda for 
fear of being biased or losing support in the US sphere of influence.4
Far more comfort in using the term is shown in relation to one of 
the last remaining communist states in the world, such as the Nor-
th-Korean regime of Kim Jong-un. Documentary film makers are ra-
rely allowed into the country and are forced to follow the same gover-
nment-sanctioned travel routes, where they tend to point toward the 
obvious: the way the regime boasts through eerie propaganda about its 
military force, the leadership cult displayed in its media, and public 
sculptures and posters, and the massive musicals that celebrate the 
nation and its dynasty.5 But the North-Korean regime is also portra-
yed with a lot of irony, for the Western democratic citizen smirks about 
the idea that “they,” the poor North-Korean subjects of an archaic 
communist state, could really believe in the lies fed to them.6 Traveling 
exhibitions of paintings from North-Korea, displaying its heroic lea-
ders and soldiers, its phantasmatic industrial progress, and delirious 
and committed workers, travel around the world under the guise of 
informative exhibitions, but they seem more like mockeries, a strange 
variation of the Entartete Kunst exhibitions set up by the Nazi regi-
me.7 These exhibitions strengthen the idea that “we,” the West, can see 
3  The concept of “post-truth” was selected as word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries in the light 
of the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. In this re-
gard, Benjamin Tallis writes that “[Donald] Trump, [Boris] Johnson, [Michael] Gove, [Vladimir] 
Putin and other post-truthers […] play to a widespread and increasingly cynical, anti-expert 
and supposedly anti-establishment and anti-authority mood, but one that clearly also still 
craves leadership and ambition.” See: Benjamin Tallis, “Living in Post-truth: Power/Knowledge/
Responsibility,” New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East-European Politics and 
International Relations Vol. 24, No. 1 (2016): pp. 7–18, at p. 9.
4  We find exception in the case of Jason Stanley, author of How Propaganda Works (2015), who 
writes in a New York Times op-ed that “Denouncing Trump as a liar, or describing him as merely 
entertaining, misses the point of authoritarian propaganda altogether. Authoritarian propagan-
dists are attempting to convey power by defining reality. […] This campaign season has been an 
indictment of our understanding of mass communication.” See: Jason Stanley, “Beyond Lying: 
Donald Trump’s Authoritarian Reality,” The New York Times, Nov. 4, 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/11/05/opinion/beyond-lying-donald-trumps-authoritarian-reality.html.
5  Good examples in this regard are Discovery Channel’s “Children of the Secret State” (2001), 
National Geographic Explorer’s “Inside North Korea” (2007), and Álvaro Longoria’s “The Pro-
paganda Game” (2015) in which reporters place a strong emphasis on large scale sculptures of 
then North-Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his father Kim Il-sung, the mass musicals organized 
by the regime, and what many reporters consider the staged ghost town of its capital Pyongyang 
– all standard parts of their brief visitor’s tours, time and again described by reporters as totali-
tarian or dictatorial “propaganda.”
6  Wolf Blitzer, a well-known reporter for CNN’s Situation Room, for example, has covered a wide 
array of news items on the North-Korean regime, in which he displays a continuous mockery by 
implicating the last name of its current leader – Kim Jong-un – in a series of puns; for example 
in headlines such as “un-seen threat” or “un-der fire.” Blitzer’s obsession with the regime goes 
hand in hand with the ironic mockery of the archaic communist state.
7  Referring here to the famous Entartete Kunst exhibition, the display of “degenerate art” set up by 
the Nazi regime that opened on July 9, 1937 at the Archaeological Institute in Munich. The ex-
hibition was intended to show the “cultural decay” of the era before the Foundation of the Third 
Reich. Six hundred and fifty paintings were on display, including work by Max Beckmann, 
Marc Chagall, Max Ernst, Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Ernst Ludwich Kirchner, and Edvard 
through the obvious propaganda schemes, while “they,” poor subjects 
of archaic communism, live in a manufactured world of lies and de-
ceit.8 Rather than being displayed as propaganda for the North-Korean 
regime, they are displayed as propaganda for what democracy is not.9
The role of images – artworks ranging from painting to sculpture, 
monuments, and films – play an important role in the way propagan-
da is identified. Throughout this thesis, we will attempt to examine 
how modern and contemporary propaganda manifests in- and can be 
traced through art. But the aim of this first chapter is to track down 
the origins of the concept of modern propaganda, and to explore the 
relationship between propaganda and democracy, well before the very 
notion of totalitarian propaganda in relation to the regimes of Hitler 
or Stalin came into being. We will see that whereas the different mani-
festations of modern propaganda depend on the regime – on the kind 
of power – they enact, they have been continuously part of to the lives 
of citizens in highly industrialized countries from their very inception, 
and that they are therefore not the exclusive property of dictatorships.10 
Modern propaganda has served democracies just as well, to maintain 
the idea that their citizens are beyond the realm of propaganda, which 
they, as educated and conscious citizens with access to open and free 
media, are supposedly able to recognize immediately as archaic models 
of manipulation.
What we will argue throughout this chapter is that the very idea 
that one could stand outside of propaganda, recognize it, and as such 
resist it, merely because one lives in a democracy, is itself the product 
of modern propaganda. Rather than discussing propaganda as some-
thing that disappeared with the fall of the Nazi regime or the Soviet 
Union, we will thus attempt to trace modern propaganda as part of 
the emergence of modern society, as much more closely linked to the 
political model of democracy than one might like to imagine. As we 
Munch, surrounded by photos of physically or mentally disabled people. Joachim Von Halas 
(ed.), Hitler’s Degenerate Art: The Exhibition Catalogue (London: Foxley Books Limited, 2008).
8  An example was the exhibition “The World According to Kim Jong-Il,” exhibited in the Kunsthal 
in Rotterdam, Netherlands, from June 12 to August 29, under the catchphrase “Never before 
shown North-Korean art,” before touring further around the world. It consisted of about 150 
gouaches and 135 paintings on canvas. The exhibition design mimicked the agitprop aesthetics 
of the objects on display.
9  A more detailed study by Jane Portal forms a relevant exception. Although keeping in line with 
the general characterization of North-Korea as a “totalitarian” regime – mainly based on the 
work of Igor Golomstock, which we will discuss in the next chapter – she also points out to a 
broader vocabulary in North Korean art and crafts, among others in the form of more tradi-
tional contemporary landscapes in colored ink, glass, and porcelain works, and the curious and 
undertheorized practice of painterly depictions of antiquities and archeological findings. See: 
Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea (London: Reaktion Books, 2005).
10  It is important to mention here that citizens of countries with lower industrial development have 
also been made familiar with modern propaganda, often as the targets of industrialized states, 
whether through neocolonial practices or warfare. This secondary experience of industrialization 
has just as well generated particular articulations of modern and contemporary propagandas – 
such as Stateless Propaganda – which we will address in the third chapter.
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will see throughout this chapter, propaganda studies, different from 
mainstream media, largely agree that there is not only an important 
historical relationship between democracy and propaganda, but also 
that there is no reason to presume that any modern society – no matter 
its form of government – operates beyond the realm of propaganda.
It is important to emphasize here that exploring the relationship 
between democracy and propaganda does not mean that democracy 
can be equated with dictatorship. Rather, we will see that modern pro-
paganda is the product of societies that went through the process of 
industrial revolution – or that have been severely affected by it through 
colonial practices or warfare – and where a certain level of techno-
logical infrastructure and means of mass communication are present 
or within reach. This does not mean that propaganda is always used 
the same way, that it serves the same purpose, or that it is necessarily 
an “evil” phenomenon; but rather that we should understand it as an 
inherent part of modernity. Furthermore, our use of the word “demo-
cracy” will be a critical one. Historically, democracy’s egalitarian ideals 
did not stop the Athenian agora, Enlightenment age, or present-day 
Western democracies to be implicated – if not the instigators – of co-
lonialism, slavery, and brutal warfare. Democracy has always applied 
only to a relatively limited class of designated privileged citizens. The 
contemporary existence of parliamentary democracies, from Putin’s 
Russia to Erdoğan’s Turkey, or Trump’s United States, has not sto-
pped their authoritarian leaders from taking control; in many cases, 
dictatorships can very well operate with a democratic front.11 Similar-
ly, we should keep in mind that the rise of ultranationalist and even 
fascist parties in 21st-century Europe takes place within systems of 
parliamentary democracy; from the Orbán regime in Hungary to that 
of the Polish Law and Justice Party and the near win of the presidency 
by the Austrian Freedom Party in 2016, a party that was originally 
founded by Nazis. In all these examples, authoritarian leaders gained 
power through elections without having to overthrow an existing re-
gime.12 The model of parliamentary democracy also has largely failed 
11  The argument that authoritarian regimes today might work best with a democratic front and 
limited – yet functioning – democratic institutions, mirrors Slavoj Žižek’s claim that capitalism 
might function much better in the context of former communist states than in liberal-dem-
ocratic ones: “[T]he weird combination of capitalism and Communist rule, far from being a 
ridiculous anomaly, proved a blessing (not even) in disguise; China developed so fast not in 
spite of authoritarian Communist rule, but because of it.” The endeavor here is to challenge pre-
sumed oppositions between authoritarianism and democracy on one hand, and authoritarianism 
and capitalism on the other. In the case of regimes such as that of Turkey and Russia, they seem 
to be able to encompass both authoritarianism, democracy, and capitalism. See: Slavoj Žižek, 
Living in the End Times (London/New York: Verso, 2010), p. 156.
12  One could term such regimes as forms of “elective dictatorship,” originally introduced by the 
conservative Lord Hailsham in relation to what he regarded as the increasing power invested 
in British government instead of parliament during a 1976 BBC lecture. A Guardian editorial 
recently re-introduces this concept of elective dictatorship in relation to the 2017 referendum 
issued by the Erdoğan regime in Turkey with the aim of introducing a presidential system. 
in applying checks and balances to the 2008 economic crisis, leaving 
a majority of speculators and bankers unprosecuted, and millions of 
middle and lower-class peoples in often livelihood-threatening crises. 
In other words, calling oneself a democracy or modeling institutions 
after what we associate with democracy does not necessarily say much 
about the actual democratization of society. The point here is that we 
should de-mythologize democracy in the process of exploring its rela-
tion to propaganda. Democracy can often not be equated with autho-
ritarianism or dictatorship, but in some cases it most certainly operates 
as a front for them. As such, the evaluation of projected democratic 
values and their real-time practice should always remain part of critical 
case-by-case analysis.
The aim of this chapter will be to start tracing the origins of the 
term propaganda and examine its different understandings in the work 
of journalists, historians, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, 
public relations counsels, and military leaders. We will observe in the 
process the intertwinement between modern democracy and modern 
propaganda, and discuss the reason of propaganda’s exclusion from 
contemporary democratic discourse. Our objective in this historical 
exploration of propaganda will not be to narrow down the term to de-
mocracies or dictatorships, but rather to define modern propaganda as 
a performance of power that applies to all industrial and post-industrial 
modern societies alike.
We will discuss the term “performance” – a word that intimately 
connects the fields of art and politics – in more detail at the end of this 
chapter through the work of Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman. 
For now, we will be using the term as an equivalent of “enactment.” 
When we speak of “power” in the context of propaganda, we refer to 
structures of power with various components. A structure can consist 
of an actual “infrastructure,” i.e., the material dimension in the form 
of concrete industries, the military industrial complex, and so on: in-
frastructures with a capacity to construct our reality to the point of life 
and death. Naturally, there are aspects of power that cannot be grasped 
in a purely material sense: lobbyism or even rhetoric, are crucial tools 
in the social sphere to gain access to infrastructures of power or even 
to activate them. We will touch upon these different material and im-
material aspects of structures of power by means of concrete examples 
in this chapter.
See: Scott Prasser, J.R. Nethercote, and Nicholas Aroney, “Upper Houses and the Problem of 
Elective Dictatorship,” University of Western Australia Press, 2008 and “The Guardian View on 
Turkey: Beware an Elected Dictatorship,” The Guardian, Jul. 17, 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2016/jul/17/the-guardian-view-on-turkey-beware-an-elected-dictatorship.
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WHAT IS PROPAGANDA?
There is a certain consensus among propaganda scholars that human-
kind has propagandized its emerging structures of power from the very 
beginning of its existence, although this means we must retroactively 
apply the term. For example, the British communication historian Phi-
lip M. Taylor analyzed the history of propaganda, tracing it back to 
developments before the term itself became used: from cave paintings 
as the earliest means to impress a set of symbols and ideas upon a com-
munity, to Ulysses’ wooden horse used by the Greeks to convince the 
Trojans of their retreat; from the martial poetry of Sparta’s Tyrtaeus 
arousing soldiers to battle to Aristotle’s art of rhetoric; from Caesar’s 
dictate to have his portrait placed upon all Roman coins to the Po-
pe’s promise for remission of sins for those joining the massive war 
campaigns of the Crusades; and from Martin Luther who nailed his 
ninety-five Theses to the castle of Wittenberg’s church door in 1517 to 
the Counter-Reformation that brought the Jesuits to effectively profes-
sionalize its propagation of faith through printing press and massive 
campaigns.13 Throughout, Taylor’s examples feature the term propa-
ganda referring to the performance of power through symbols, rheto-
ric, literature, currency, religious symbols, and scripture. In all cases, 
these are examples that are concerned with establishing and spreading 
– propagandizing – emerging structures of power.14
Another overall consensus amongst propaganda researchers is that 
the actual origin of the specific term is rooted in the sphere of religion. 
While we might argue that humans have always propagandized in one 
way or another, until the sixteenth century the word propaganda was 
mainly confined to the field of biology, referring to the reproduction 
of plants and animals.15 Its introduction as a term that comes closer to 
our present day use dates to 1622, when Pope Gregory XV established 
the sacred congregation “De Propaganda Fide” with the task to spread 
the Roman-Catholic faith amongst non-believers, followed by Pope 
Urban VIII, who subsequently established the “Collegium de Propa-
ganda” to train missionaries in 1627.16
According to sociologist Erwin W. Fellows, who investigated the di-
13  Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the 
Present Day (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 20, 25, 27, 33, 41, 
97, 110–11.
14  We find similar assessments of such historically retroactive reading of the history of propaganda 
in many other studies, such as in Edward Bernays’s preface to his work Crystalizing Public (New 
York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1961), pp. iii–Ivi, and in Garth S. Jowett and Victoria 
O’Donnell’s chapter “Propaganda through the Ages,” in Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand 
Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 47–98.
15  Erwin W. Fellows, “Propaganda: History of a Word,” American Speech, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Oct. 1959): 
pp. 182–89, at p. 182.
16  Ibid.
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fferent uses of the term from this foundational moment onward, its 
first appearance in the English language dates back to 1718, and up to 
halfway nineteenth century it would continue to be used in a specific, 
religious framework. Fellows observes that a political and military use 
of the term becomes common practice, when in 1842 the American 
Dictionary of Science Literature and Art explains propaganda as “De-
rived from this celebrated society [for propagation of the faith], the 
name propaganda is applied in modem political language as a term 
of reproach to secret associations for the spread of opinions and prin-
ciples which are viewed by most governments with horror and aver-
sion.”17
The negative connotation of the term, according to Fellows, might 
have to do with Protestant hostility against Catholicism in Northern 
Europe and the United States. But the word propaganda would not be 
used extensively in this way until the First World War of 1914–18, when 
propaganda became associated with mass psychological and often co-
vert warfare. Fellows therefore concludes that “[i]n the case of propa-
ganda […] we have an instance of shift in meaning from a religious to 
a military and then to a political context, during a period of less than 
two hundred years. This shift may reflect a change in the institutional 
locus of power, from Church to State.”18 In other words, propaganda 
is not only the process in which power is performed in a given society, 
but the term itself is shaped by shifting formations of power structures, 
in this case from the religious to the political.
To the importance of religion and politics in the process of the 
emergence of modern propaganda, we should add the importance of 
industrialization. The First Industrial Revolution took place roughly 
from halfway the 18th to halfway the 19th century: a period that, be-
ginning in Britain, saw the inventions of “the spinning jenny, the steam 
engine [and] coke smelting,” which resulted in “factory textile produc-
tion, the shift to coal and coke in the iron industry, and the perfection 
of the steam engine.”19 Whereas the First Industrial Revolution was 
characterized by important technological innovation, the term “Tech-
nological Revolution” is generally applied only to the Second Indus-
17  Ibid., p. 183.
18  Ibid., p. 188.
19  Robert Allen emphasized the social conditions and political system that contributed to the In-
dustrial Revolution, amongst others in the form of the parliamentary control over the executive, 
the protection of individual property, maintenance of high wages, and a legal system that ben-
efited private investment in the larger context of the state’s mercantile and imperialist policies: 
“How did England maintain a high wage despite rapid population growth, while continental 
wages fell even though the population grew little? The possibilities […] include: the replacement 
of absolutist by representative government in the seventeenth century, the enclosure of the open 
fields, the productivity advantage associate with the new draperies, the growth in intercontinen-
tal trade consequent upon the British empire, and the [low] price of energy.” Robert C. Allen, 
The Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 
123.
trial Revolution, which refers to the period roughly starting in the mid-
19th century and culminating in the First World War: a period which, 
throughout the industrialized world, saw the rise of new technologies 
such as “electricity, the internal combustion engine, the production 
of petroleum and other chemicals, telephones and radio.”20 Electricity 
had an enormous impact on the process of factory electrification and 
thus on the creation of the conditions for mass production, as well as 
on the development of modern science and mass media.
Whereas the notion of modern history or modernity generally re-
lates to the European period after the French Revolution, I apply the 
notion of the “modern” in “modern propaganda” specifically in terms 
of the late-modern period which started with the First and Second 
Industrial Revolution. Taylor speaks of the era of this Technological 
Revolution also as the “Communications Revolution,” because of the 
enormous scale and scope through which technology began to inter-
connect populations of the world in an unprecedented manner. The 
First World War would push the limits of this Communications Re-
volution to even greater extends through the emergence of modern 
propaganda, a process that would continue throughout and after the 
world wars. Later on, we will see how propaganda studies gave several 
other names to the type of society that emerged through the industrial 
revolution, such as “Technological Society” and “mass society.” We 
ourselves will simply maintain the term modern society.
The First World War introduced a war between the minds and hearts 
of the peoples of industrialized countries, rather than a mere battle be-
tween nations within geographically defined areas. Mass communica-
tion created the possibilities and need for influencing and shaping pu-
blic opinion and governmental direction on an unprecedented scale. It 
is at this juncture that we encounter fundamental differences as to the 
definition and function of modern propaganda. Before discussing the-
se differences in more detail and within their proper historical context, 
I will provide a brief overview to grasp the main points of contention.
In his book Secrets of Crewe House (1920), Canadian newspaper 
magnate Sir Campbell Stuart, who ran propaganda operations from 
the British Crewe House propaganda bureau during the First World 
War – which superseded the first propaganda bureau, Wellington Hou-
se, which we will discuss in more detail in the next section – defines 
propaganda as “the presentation of a case in such a way that others 
20  Andrew Atkeson and Patrick Kehoe discuss specifically what they call the “productivity paradox” 
of the Second Industrial Revolution, with which they refer to the initial slow diffusion of new 
technologies due to the difficulty of adaption to the industries at hand. Andrew Atkeson and 
Patrick J. Kehoe, “Modeling the Transition to a New Economy: Lessons from Two Technological 
Revolutions,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Mar. 2007): pp. 64–88.
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may be influenced. […] Except in special circumstances, its origin 
should be completely concealed”21 with the aim “to reveal to the enemy 
the hopelessness of their cause and case and the inevitability of Allied 
victory.”22 In contrast, we may refer to the writings of George Creel, a 
journalist who became the head of the Committee on Public Informa-
tion – also known as the “Creel Commission” – which operated para-
llel to the British one as the propaganda bureau of the United States 
during the First World War. In Creel’s book How We Advertized America 
(1920), he chooses to speak of “advertising” rather than “propaganda,” 
and in relation to the work of the Committee on Public Information he 
claims that “Our effort was educational and informative throughout, 
for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other ar-
gument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of 
facts.”23 According to Creel, the CPI’s domestic and foreign aim was 
“to preach the determination and military might of America and the 
certainty of victory, but it was equally necessary to teach the motives, 
purposes, and ideals of America so that friend, foe, and neutral alike 
might come to see us as a people without selfishness and in love with 
justice.”24 Between Stuart and Creel, we see that their framing of pro-
paganda widely differs: between propaganda as a necessarily concealed 
operation to influence opinion and the idea of propaganda as a public 
information service of facts.
In the development of propaganda studies after the First World 
War, mainly in the United States, we subsequently see a continuing 
divergence in the analysis of propaganda within different scholarly dis-
ciplines. In response to censorship practices of the American Com-
mittee for Public Information during the First World War, journalist 
and writer Walter Lippmann, in his book Public Opinion (1922), claims 
that “[i]n order to conduct a propaganda there must be some barrier 
between the public and the event. Access to the real environment must 
be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he 
thinks wise or desirable.”25 While Lippmann essentially warns of pro-
paganda due to its creation of “pseudo-environments” benefiting the 
propagandist, a follow-up on his book by public relations founder Ed-
ward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), gives a much more 
positive reading of the possible use of propaganda after the war. Ber-
nays criticizes the treatment of propaganda as a “vaguely defined evil” 
21  Sir Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House (London/New York/Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1921), p. 1.
22  Ibid., p. 9.
23  George Creel, How We Advertized America (New York/London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1920), pp. 4–5.
24  Ibid., p. 237.
25  Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 43.
and argues that “there is probably no single profession which within 
the last ten years has extended its field of usefulness more remarkably 
and touched upon intimate and important aspects of the everyday life 
of the world more significantly.”26 Between Lippmann and Bernays we 
witness a difference in analysis of propaganda that derives from their 
various interests in the concept: for Lippmann, it concerns a limitation 
of his capacity to effectively control power as a journalist, whereas for 
Bernays, it forms an essential part of his livelihood as a public relations 
counsel.
Political scientist Harold Lasswell would become one of the lea-
ding post-World War I propaganda theorists, starting with his book 
Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927), in which he, expanding 
the importance that Lippmann and Bernays placed on public opinion, 
claimed that “Propaganda is concerned with the management of opi-
nions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion ra-
ther than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the or-
ganism”27 with the “chief function […] to demolish the enemy’s will to 
fight by intensifying depression, disillusionment and disagreement.”28 
Lasswell thus emphasizes the importance of the psychological aspect 
of propaganda within a pre-existing societal context.29
The rise of National-Socialism in Germany in many ways inten-
sified the emphasis on the shaping of public opinion and psychology 
as the main domains for defining the function of propaganda, as Nazi 
propaganda aimed not at merely influencing public opinion, but at 
creating completely new organizational models in order to ensure the 
conditions of a total propaganda equal to its desire of a total war.30 
Essentially, Nazi propaganda aimed at performing power to construct 
a completely new reality. Convinced of the idea that the Germans lost 
the First World War due to the sophistication of British propaganda – 
which in itself is a propagandistic argument – Adolf Hitler wrote in his 
book Mein Kampf (Volume I published in 1925, Volume II in 1926) 
about propaganda’s importance not merely in a psychological sense, 
26  Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, p. 12.
27  Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: Peter Smith, 1938), p. 12.
28  Ibid., p. 214.
29  This would be further elaborated by social psychologist Leonard W. Doob, who in his book 
Propaganda: Its Psychology and Techniques, argues that there are both intentional as well as 
unintentional forms of propaganda: “In intentional propaganda, the propagandist is aware of his 
interested aim; in unintentional propaganda, he does not appreciate the social effect of his own 
actions.” Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1935), p. 89.
30  This notion of total propaganda, which we encounter later on in the work of Jacques Ellul, 
resonates with the famous speech that Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda of the Nazi 
regime, gave at the Berlin Sportpalast on February 18, 1943, in which he – in the light of the 
Soviet threat on the Eastern front – asked his audience: “Do you want total war? Do you want 
it, if need be, even more total and radical than we are capable of imagining it today?” Joachim 
Remak (ed.), The Nazi Years: A Documentary History (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1969), 
pp. 91–92.
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but also in an organizational one: “When propaganda has filled a who-
le people with an idea, the organization, with the help of a handful of 
people, can draw the consequences.”31 This emphasis not just on the 
psychological, but also organizational and infrastructural dimension 
of propaganda, can be found also in the work of sociologist and phi-
losopher Theodor Adorno, who, in exile from the Nazi regime in the 
United States, had been engaged in exchange with some of the Ame-
rican propaganda researchers. Adorno, in his essay “Freudian Theory 
and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda” (1951), wrote that “[i]t may 
well be the secret of fascist propaganda that it simply takes men for 
what they are: the true children of today’s standardized mass culture, 
largely robbed of autonomy and spontaneity, […]. Fascist propaganda 
has only to reproduce the existent mentality for its own purposes.”32 
So whereas Hitler believes propaganda supports and develops through 
new organizational models, Adorno claims that these organizational 
models pre-date the Nazi regime and are rather located in the origins 
of mass culture as such.
Adorno’s insight that apart from the importance of a psychoanalytic 
reading, the concept of modern propaganda is also rooted in the con-
ditions of mass culture – i.e., the economic, political, and media condi-
tions that resulted from the industrial revolution and its technological 
achievements – is taken as the foundation of post-World War II propa-
ganda theory by philosopher and sociologist Jacques Ellul. In his book 
Propagandes (1962), he argued that “[p]ropaganda is a set of methods 
employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or 
passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psycholo-
gically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated 
in an organization.”33 But this organized group, Ellul simultaneously 
emphasized, is increasingly located in the technological and mass cha-
racter of society itself, of which propaganda is essentially the “sociolo-
gical phenomenon,” resulting in a situation in which propaganda “no 
longer obeys an ideology” except for the maintenance of technological 
mass society itself.34 A similar, although more structural analysis, can 
be found in the work of linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky and 
media analyst Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (1988), in which they proposed a model 
of propaganda analysis of mass media that should address its condi-
tions of ownership, financial interest, and government dependency – in 
31  Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Vol. II (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941), p. 851.
32  Theodor Adorno, The Culture Industry (London/New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 150.
33  Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York/Toronto: Vintage Books, 
1973), p. 61.
34  Ibid., p. 196.
short, its reliance on structures of power that have been monopolized 
by an elite of stakeholders. We will refer to such structures of power 
under severely limited elite control as “monopolies of power.” In the 
words of Chomsky and Herman: “[T]he U.S. media do not function 
in the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, 
they permit – indeed, encourage – spirited debate, criticism, and dis-
sent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppo-
sitions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so 
powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”35 Similar to 
Adorno and Ellul, Chomsky and Herman thus define modern propa-
ganda as a result of the monopolization of power in mass technological 
society, rather than being the “invention” of a specific type of regime. 
Chomsky and Herman add to this definition by means of a compre-
hensive data analysis, to come to a more precise understanding of the 
process in which monopolized power is performed in a given society 
with the aim of constructing reality after the interest of its elites: this is 
what in their eyes should be understood as modern propaganda.
By introducing the concept of “manufacturing of consent,” 
Chomsky and Herman essentially anchor their own work in the early, 
post-World War I American propaganda theory, as the concept had 
first appeared in the 1922 work of Lippmann, in a chapter entitled 
“The Manufacture of Consent.” In the following section, we will ex-
plore why and how the First World War defined a concept and practice 
of modern propaganda that has remained of such importance until our 
present day, and how it influenced the work of propaganda theorists in 
the decades in between.
Before engaging in a more detailed understanding of these at times 
wide array of definitions of modern propaganda from the First World 
War onward, let us make one observation based on this first summary 
that will remain of importance throughout this chapter:
• Definitions of modern propaganda arise from widely different 
backgrounds, ranging from government (Stuart, Creel), journa-
lism (Lippmann), public relations (Bernays), political science 
and psychology (Lasswell), philosophy and sociology (Adorno, 
Ellul), and media theory and linguistics (Chomsky and Her-
man). Based on this we may observe that both the study and 
practice of propaganda is highly interdisciplinary in nature. 
We will now start by revisiting the foundational moment of modern 
35  Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1988), p. 302.
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propaganda in the context of the First World War to understand how 
these diverging definitions of propaganda came into being.
1.2 MODERN PROPAGANDA
Philip Taylor, who served frequently as a British military advisor on 
communications,36 perceived the rise of modern propaganda to be si-
multaneous to what he termed the Communications Revolution. This, 
in turn, created the conditions for a new kind of warfare that he re-
ferred to as a form of “total war,” in which whole peoples, not just 
professional military, form a new international front line.37 In Taylor’s 
view, the manifestation of modern mass media formed a key compo-
nent of the Communications revolution, which he illustrated through 
three key events in the year 1895. That was the year Lord Northcliffe 
founded the The Daily Mail, the first newspaper for mass circulation in 
Britain; it was the year the first commercial screening of the cinemato-
graph by the Lumière brothers in Paris took place; and finally, it was 
the year Guglielmo Marconi organized the demonstration of the use of 
wireless telegraphy on Salisbury Plain:
In one remarkable year, therefore, the principal means of mass 
communication – press, radio and film – came into their own and 
the communications revolution made a quantum leap. It was the 
convergence of total war and the mass media that gave modern war 
propaganda its significance and impact in the twentieth century.38
Similar to Taylor, communication historians Garth S. Jowett and Vic-
toria O’Donnell emphasize the importance of these major historical 
shifts in communications technology at the outbreak of the First World 
War when they speak of “the potent combination of the perfect social, 
political, and economic conditions with the newly established power of 
the mass media.”39 More than other nations that would become impli-
cated in the First World War, Jowett and O’Donnell explain, the British 
were forced to use these new communication tools, as there was far 
from an overall consensus among its population on the need to enter 
the war, and “Unlike the other major powers on the continent, Britain 
did not have universal conscription into the army, and thus the deci-
sion to mobilize its armed forces was more of a political one than in 
France or Germany.”40
Modern propaganda thus began when increasingly international 
36  Obituary of Philip M. Taylor by J.R Gair on the website of the University of Leeds, 2010, http://
www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/obituaries/2010/taylor_philip.html.
37  Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the 
Present Day, p. 173.
38  Ibid., p. 174.
39  Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks/London/
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 208.
40  Ibid., pp. 209–10.
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forms of military warfare converged with the increasing international 
presence of mass media. This convergence is marked by a particular 
moment in time, when on August 4, 1914, the British ultimatum to the 
Germans ended. The first act of war by the British was performed by 
their cable ship Telconia, cutting of the submarine cables linking Ger-
many with the United States. Both Taylor and Jowett and O’Donnell 
describe that moment as a key to understanding the new conditions of 
warfare under the Communications Revolution. Although covert com-
munication and information manipulation are as old as Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War, one could argue that it was at this moment, in which con-
trolling means of mass communication at such enormous scale cons-
tituted the first act of war, that modern propaganda was born. The 
performance of power can be argued to be as old as humanity. But the 
level at which modern propaganda has proven capable of constructing 
reality to the point of worldwide wars, separates it from what Taylor 
explores as “pre-modern” propaganda. 
Different from Germany’s decision to immediately pour overt pro-
paganda materials into the United States to win them over to their 
cause, the British devised a far more sophisticated and covert model 
of propaganda. In that light, Taylor observes that propaganda “is not 
just a question of what, how, why and when you say something, and 
to whom, but also of what you decide to leave out. In propaganda, 
omission is just as significant as commission.”41 What made the cut-
ting of the submarine cables by the British crucial in this regard was 
exactly their investment in the capacity “to monitor and control the 
flow of raw information at as many points between source and tar-
get possible.”42 It is from this perspective that we should value, Taylor 
claims, the nineteenth-century development of the British global cable 
communications system, the so-called All Red Line. This network had 
been the inheritance of the British colonial Empire; its government 
had supported the work of private companies to establish the cables to 
monitor and control its colonies.43 The All Red Line as such was built 
upon and through the conquered land of colonized peoples, and subse-
41  Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 45.
42  Ibid.
43  Daniel Headrick and Pascal Griset provide a detailed account of the history of the Imperial “All 
Red Line,” explaining both the technical complexities of its creation in the late 19th century, but 
also the structural financial support of the British government for private companies establishing 
the network. Daniel R. Headrick and Pascal Griset, “Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business and 
Politics, 1838–1939,” The Business History Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Autumn 2001): pp. 543–78. 
A full chronology of the construction process of the All Red Line was assembled by George 
Johnson in 1903, explaining the importance of the All Red Line as it “bring the ends of the earth 
within speaking distance of each other, and knit all men of British blood, the whole world over, 
into a national union as effective as now prevails within the British Islands themselves.” See: 
George Johnson, The All Red Line, 1903: The Annals and Aims of the Pacific Cable Project (London: 
Forgotten Books, 2015), p. 486.
quently would serve as a system of mass communication. The cutting 
of the cable between Germany and the United States essentially meant 
that all German news and information had to use indirect cable routes 
through Scandinavia and the Iberian peninsula. Britain’s first act of 
war was therefore nothing less than the establishment of an enormous 
information filter between the Germans and the Americans, through 
which it would be able to conduct its own propaganda, made possible 
through the infrastructural inheritance of its colonial Empire.
Taylor emphasizes that modern propaganda manifested within one 
of the first modern democracies in the world, where voting rights alre-
ady existed for a substantial part of the male electorate. In 1916, mili-
tary conscription would be introduced for the first time and this essen-
tially made the road to a full male electorate inevitable. The emergence 
of mass media involved British citizens further in both a military and 
a political sense, and by the end of the war the Representation of the 
People Act of 1918 would include practically all men in the voting pro-
cess, and began to include women for the first time as well – although it 
would take until 1928 before voting rights would include the full fema-
le electorate.44 This emphasis on the particular political model within 
which modern propaganda arose, is relevant for three reasons. First, 
that modern propaganda did not emerge from so-called totalitarianism 
or dictatorship, but from the political model of democracy, one close 
to what we today would understand as parliamentary democracy. Se-
cond, that the nature of this democracy was rooted in a colonial Empi-
re, and that its capacity of industrial development and the creation of 
the international cable network allowed for the capacity to create and 
control information in modern communication and warfare. The third 
is that democracy was important as part of the self-image of Britain as 
a civilized and enlightened Empire, and as such had great impact on 
the kind of propaganda they were developing during the war. What we 
will briefly explore now is how, apart from the control of the cable ne-
tworks, the British gave form to the notion of a democratic propaganda.
To sell the hesitant British people and neutral Americans a war, 
while maintaining the public perception of an open, free, and evolving 
democracy, the British established their first propaganda bureau, which 
operated from 1914–17, supervised by writer and Liberal MP Char-
les Casterman at Wellington House in Buckingham Gate. In 1918, all 
propaganda efforts of the British were centralized under the Ministry 
of Information, including Crewe House which had superseded Wellin-
gton House and was led by Lord Northcliffe, pioneer of English popu-
lar journalism, and – as mentioned earlier – owner of the Daily Mail. 
44  Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, pp. 2–3.
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Wellington House operated under such conditions of secrecy that only 
very few members of parliament were even aware of its existence and 
operations. Its main work was focused on overseas targets, with an 
emphasis on the American elites, such as policy makers, academics, 
teachers, business, and newspapermen. Well aware of the mixed senti-
ments that existed in the United States with regard to its former ruler, 
the reasoning behind this secrecy was that the American public would 
be weary of the British calling upon their sympathies directly. There-
fore, Wellington House disseminated materials that were not direct-
ly identifiable as propaganda, but which “took the form of reasoned, 
almost quasi-academic, explanations of the issues involved, with the 
facts – even if not all the facts – presented in an objective manner 
and with measured argument.”45 This form of so-called “grey” or even 
“black propaganda” was distributed through commercial publishing 
houses, and at the founding meetings of Wellington House prominent 
academics and writers such as the likes of H.G. Wells attended.46 By 
June 1915, “Wellington House had produced some 2.5 million propa-
ganda items in 17 languages and just over 4000 photographs a week.”47 
In order to produce this amount of imagery, so-called war artists were 
involved, and Wellington also produced a documentary film, Britain 
Prepared (1915), and commissioned the film The Battle of the Somme 
(1916).48 This cultural output, however, was important but not the pri-
me task of Wellington, which maintained covert operations in the US 
and other allied and neutral countries that needed to be brought to 
support the British war effort.
There were several events that benefited the British enormously in 
their conduction of its propaganda campaigns. The German invasion 
of Belgium on August 4, 1914 had triggered far more resistance from 
within the country than expected, and the German retaliation against 
the Belgian population was effectively used by the British to shape 
the image of the barbaric German “Hun”: originally the designation 
45  Ibid., p. 36.
46  H.G. Wells was one of the British signatories of a pamphlet that appeared in the American press, 
strongly pitching the British cultural elite against the Barbaric threat of the Germans after their 
invasion in Belgium: “Whatever the world-destiny of Germany may be, we in Great Britain are 
ourselves conscious of a destiny and a duty. That destiny and duty, alike for us and for all the 
English-speaking race, call upon us to uphold the rule of common justice between civilized 
peoples, to defend the rights of small nations, and to maintain the free and law-abiding ideals of 
Western Europe against the rule of ‘Blood and Iron’ and the domination of the whole Continent 
by a military caste.” “Famous British Authors Defend England’s War,” New York Times, Oct. 18, 
1914.
47  Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, p. 38.
48  James Fox in this regard mentions how the involvement of Wellington House with the arts to 
use “exhibitions to distribute its message,” and the overall interest of the UK government in 
the role of culture in bolstering national identity, even resulted in establishing completely new 
institutions: “Museums came to be viewed as so central to national identity during the war 
that the government even formed its own such institution as a result. In March 1917 the War 
Cabinet approved the decision to form a National War Museum.” James Fox, British Art and the 
First World War 1914–1924 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 68.
of a nomadic people that for a short time had controlled large parts 
of Europe in the first centuries CE, which were now turned into the 
equivalent of a “barbaric” conqueror.49 One of the most important pro-
paganda documents in this regard was Wellington House’s “Report of 
the Committee on Alleged German Outrages,” better known as the 
“Bryce Report,” conducted by James Bryce, former British ambassa-
dor for the United States, and presented on May 12, 1915. With an 
air of seeming objectivity, the report described German atrocities ba-
sed on witness accounts of Belgian refugees, with an emphasis on war 
crimes perpetrated against the citizenry and women and children in 
particular, ranging from “the cutting of one or both hands” to “cases 
of slaughter (often accompanied by mutilation) of whole families, in-
cluding not infrequently that of quite small children” and the “use of 
women and even children as a screen for the protection of the German 
troops.”50 Graphic descriptions of group rape, random executions, and 
forms of torture are amongst the “testimonies” in the report, such as 
the following one:
23rd August. I went with two friends (names given) to see what we 
could see. About three hours out of Malines we were taken priso-
ners by a German patrol—an officer and six men—and marched off 
into a little wood of saplings, where there was a house. The officer 
spoke Flemish. He knocked at the door; the peasant did not come. 
The officer ordered the soldiers to break down the door, which two 
of them did. The peasant came and asked what they were doing. 
The officer said he did not come quickly enough, and that they had 
“trained up” plenty of others. His hands were tied behind his back, 
and he was shot at once without a moment’s delay. The wife came 
out with a little sucking child. She put the child down and sprang 
at the Germans like a lioness. She clawed their faces. One of the 
Germans took a rifle and struck her a tremendous blow with the 
butt on the head. Another took his bayonet and fixed it and thrust 
it through the child. He then put his rifle on his shoulder with the 
49  The origin to the use of the Hun derives from what is known as the “Hun Speech,” delivered 
by German Emperor Wilhelm II on July 27 1900. In his farewell to the German expedition-
ary corps that went off to fight the Boxer Rebellion in Northern-China, he said: “Should you 
encounter the enemy, he will be defeated! No quarter will be given! Prisoners will not be taken! 
Whoever falls into your hands is forfeited. Just as a thousand years ago the Huns under their 
King Attila made a name for themselves, one that even today makes them seem mighty in 
history and legend, may the name German be affirmed by you in such a way in China that no 
Chinese will ever again dare to look cross-eyed at a German.” See: Wilhelm II, “Hun Speech,” 
German History in Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.
cfm?document_id=755, translated from original German in Johannes Prenzler (ed.), Die Reden 
Kaiser Wilhelms II in den Jahren 1896-1900, 2nd volume. (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam jun., 1904): 
pp. 209-12.
50  O.M. Viscount Bryce et al., Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (New York: Mac-
millan Company, 1915), p. 50.
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child up it, its little arms stretched out once or twice.51
Translated in thirty languages, this official report, which would largely 
be debunked by journalists and propaganda theorists after the war, 
provided an effective framing of these “Hunnish” atrocities and made 
frontpage news all over the world, not the least in the United States.
Only a few days before the Bryce Report was published, on May 7, 
1915, German U-boats had sunk the RMS Lusitania ocean liner trave-
ling from New York to Liverpool. Had the outrage about this attack on 
a commercial liner not already been enormous, now the event could be 
framed further through the Bryce Report: as yet another barbaric act 
of the Huns. The fact that the Germans had warned the ship publicly 
not to travel through the British waters, which had been declared a 
war zone, and that the commercial liner was most probably carrying 
ammunition to serve the war effort of the British, proved futile “facts” 
in the light of one hundred and eight American citizens that died as 
a result of the attack and the larger outrage caused by the atrocity 
stories.52 One horror story began to amplify the other, and the propa-
ganda frame was set: the struggle was between enlightened democratic 
civilization on one hand versus barbaric conquest of the “Huns” on 
the other. This propaganda frame of a clash of civilizations will be re-
visited throughout this thesis, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. 
American President Woodrow Wilson declared war on April 6, 1917. 
Although the propaganda work of the British cannot be given the wei-
ght of being the single reason for bringing the United States to its side, 
it most certainly provided the legitimizing framework by effectively 
portraying and manufacturing evidence of German deceit and atroci-
ties that would help the American people to support Wilson’s military 
involvement.
With the weakening of the German army and major unrest within 
the country, armistice was declared November 11, 1918 and maintai-
ned until the signing of the peace treaty with Germany on June 28, 
1919. And whereas in Britain the activities of the propaganda bureaus 
would largely cease, their experiment with Wellington House and 
subsequently Crewe House would only prove to be the beginning of 
modern propaganda wars on an even more major and sophisticated 
scale, both during war and in peacetime. With the British propagan-
da bureaus disbanded, the scope of their operations and creation of 
falsehoods, especially with regard to alleged German war crimes, be-
came public knowledge. A war that cost the lives of millions proved to 
51  Ibid., p. 51.
52  Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, p. 39.
be based, in part, on sophisticated covert management of information 
and blatant lies. The modern propaganda effort in defense of demo-
cracy would prove to undermine the very legitimacy of democracy as 
such. In the next chapter, we will see how this sparked the beginning of 
public and academic debates on the importance of propaganda, and, 
more specifically, the question how these processes of manufacturing 
public opinion could ever be reconciled with the ideals of an informed 
and transparent democratic society.
In the meantime, one man in particular had become convinced that 
the Germans didn’t lose the war as the result of a military defeat, but 
as the result of a propaganda defeat. In Mein Kampf, Hitler even reca-
lled his personal encounter with British propaganda and its demora-
lizing effect on German troops.53 Hitler’s anger at what he considered 
the failure of the German propaganda effort while fighting at the front 
was compensated by what he claims to have learned from the propa-
ganda efforts of the British: “For what we failed to do in this direction 
was made up by the enemy with really unheard-of skill and ingenious 
deliberation. I learned infinitely much more from the enemy’s war pro-
paganda.”54 The German propaganda effort, Hitler claimed, failed due 
to the lack of a single, unified message:
[T]he war propaganda of the British and the Americans was psy-
chologically right. By introducing the German as a barbarian and 
a Hun to its own people, it thus prepared the individual soldier for 
the terrors of war and helped guard him against disappointment. 
The most terrible weapon which was now being used against him 
then appeared to him only as the proof of the enlightenment already 
bestowed upon him, thus strengthening his belief that his govern-
ment’s assertions were right, and on the other hand it increased his 
fury and hatred against the atrocious enemy.55
Hitler’s contempt for what he claimed to be the German scientific 
approach to propaganda, was expressed most strongly regarding what 
he considered the self-imposed guilt on the country after the war, clai-
ming that “it would have been far better to burden the enemy entirely 
with this guilt, even if this had not been in accordance with the real 
facts, as was indeed the case.”56 These conclusions would bring Hitler 
to take control of propaganda efforts himself when he joined the Ger-
man Worker’s Party after the First World War, where he further develo-
53  Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, pp. 187–88.
54  Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 228.
55  Ibid., pp. 234–35.
56  Ibid., p. 237.
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ped his theory on the importance of propaganda in relation to political 
organization. He saw propaganda not just as a message of persuasion, 
but as an effort to completely change organizational structures of so-
ciety and reality as such, starting with the party aim to take over the 
government:
Propaganda […] needs not to rack its brain about the importance 
of each individual it enlightens, about his ability, achievements, and 
understanding or of his character, while the organization has most 
carefully to collect from the masses of these elements those who 
really make possible the victory of the movement. Propaganda tries 
to force a doctrine upon an entire people; organization embraces in 
its frame only those who for psychological reasons do not threaten 
to become a brake to a further spreading of the idea. Propaganda 
works on the community in the sense of an idea and it makes it 
ripe for the time of the victory of this idea, while the organization 
conquers victory by the permanent, organic, and fighting union of 
those followers who appear able and willing to lead the fight for 
victory. The victory of an idea will be the more possible the more 
extensively propaganda works on people in their entirety.57
Propaganda and organization, Hitler thus concludes, exist in a mutual 
relationship. Apropos, Jowett and O’Donnell observe how “the enemy’s 
successful use of propaganda itself was used as a form of propaganda,” 
as it allowed for British propaganda itself to become a scapegoat for 
the German military loss: it had not been a failed military effort, but a 
failed communication effort that led a heroic people to perish.58
Before engaging in a more detailed analysis of the impact of British 
propaganda on the rise of the field of modern post-WWI propaganda 
studies and its practice, let us make the following two observations re-
garding our concise summary of the British propaganda effort:
• The British propaganda effort, according to communication his-
torians such as Taylor, and Jowett and O’Donnell, shows us that 
the technique of modern propaganda is inherent to both the de-
velopment of modern democracy and of the Second Industrial 
Revolution – also termed the “Technological Revolution” or the 
beginning of the “Communications Revolution.” Modern pro-
paganda was geared at involving mass public opinion and this 
was possible due to the emergence of mass media. The possibili-
57  Ibid., p. 850.
58  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 211.
ty of such mass communication on an international scale formed 
the inheritance of the British Empire and its effort to control its 
colonies;
• The British propaganda effort further shows us, as Taylor con-
cludes, that modern propaganda did not originate in so-called 
totalitarian regimes, as is commonly thought, but in British de-
mocracy. Its initial aim through Wellington House was to create 
a largely covert model of propaganda, and to promote the image 
to its own people and the Americans as a free, open government, 
fighting for democracy in the face of the brute atrocities enacted 
by the German “Huns.”
 
Let us now continue to explore how the British propaganda operation 
impacted the discussions on modern propaganda after the First War, 
not in the least in the United States, which had been the main target 
of the propaganda efforts of Wellington House. A specific emphasis 
will be placed on the way in which these discussions focused on the 
question whether modern propaganda could co-exist with the ideals of 
open, democratic government.
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1.3 DEMOCRACY AND PROPAGANDA
Communication historian J. Michael Sproule researched both the use 
of propaganda from the American side during the First World War, 
and, more specifically, the debates on the use and abuse of propaganda 
after the war that would give rise to the field of modern propaganda 
studies. In his study, he emphasizes that, more than in the British post-
war context, the American discussion on the compatibility between 
propaganda and democracy formed one of the key points of debate.
A week after Wilson declared war on Germany, the United States 
had established its own propaganda bureau, known as the Commit-
tee on Public Information (CPI), under the directorship of journalist 
George Creel. Different from the propaganda effort of the British, the 
output of the CPI was generally of a more overt nature known as “white 
propaganda,” predominantly directed at domestic public opinion. This 
also explains Creel’s own characterization of the bureau not as a pro-
paganda effort, but as a form of public information provision. Sproule 
described its efforts in different fields, ranging from the distribution of 
“Fifty million pamphlets,” the wide-spread “trolley posters illustrating 
all manner of ways that the ordinary citizen personally could help win 
the war” prepared by the Division of Pictorial Publicity, and its league 
of war artists, as well as an active liaison with commercial movie stu-
dios.59 “[L]eading directors such as D.W. Griffith and major producers 
such as Carl Laemmle helped rally the new medium of film to Wilson’s 
cause,” resulting in propaganda classics such as Griffith’s Hearts of the 
Worlds (1918) depicting the war crimes of Germans in French villages, 
and Rupert Julian’s The Kaiser, The Beast of Berlin (1918).60 The de-
piction of the German leadership as “beasts” in the output of the CPI 
clearly echoes the success of Wellington House’s frame of the barbarian 
“Hun.”
One of the most innovative contributions of the American propa-
ganda effort were the “Four Minute Men,” a program developed in 
late spring 1917, consisting of “75,000 CPI-sponsored local speakers 
[which] were mounting the stages of America’s movie palaces in a 
program of oratory orchestrated from Washington.”61 The efforts were 
effective in turning citizens into what Sproule calls “quasi-official agi-
tators,” and even when the armistice was declared, it was hard to bring 
expurgation to an end:
 
59  J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass 
Persuasion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 10–11.
60  Ibid., p. 11.
61  Ibid.
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Despite the CPI’s almost immediate disbanding campaigns against 
the so-called anti-Americanism of dissidents continued, not only 
in Congressional hearings on German propaganda but also when 
revulsion towards symbols of Germany was transferred to the Bol-
sheviks. This strange transmutation by which Commissar replaced 
Kaiser as the target of national ire eventually became known as the 
great postwar Red Scare [the fear of communist infiltration after 
the 1917 revolution in Russia, JS]. The panic reached its high point 
in late 1919 and early 1920.62
These descriptions are evidence of the strength that the framing of the 
barbaric “Hun” had on the public consciousness. But while the pro-
paganda machineries of the British started to be dismantled, Sproule 
describes how “American disillusionment with the propagandas of the 
Great War began in Europe, where the sentiment spread among Ame-
rican troops that atrocity stories had been false concoctions and that 
the Germans had behaved no worse than any other combatants.”63 Phi-
llip Gibbs, a prominent British war correspondent, expressed regret at 
having been complicit in the distortion of the narration of the war, and 
now began to lay bare the horrors at the frontline of combat, not in 
the least on the “anger of the Tommies themselves [a popular descrip-
tion of British soldiers, JS] at home-front propaganda that emphasized 
atrocities and sanitized the experience of war.” 64 Gibbs observed the 
hollow falsity of atrocity stories, and he pointed out the contradiction 
posed by Britain’s propaganda of saving “little Belgium” and its simul-
taneous crushing of independence efforts in Ireland. The American 
war correspondent George Seldes in his turn was so disillusioned with 
British and American propaganda, that he was actually surprised when 
some of the German atrocity stories proved to be true.65
Accusations on the side of manipulation in American propagan-
da and censorship, received reply from Creel in the form of his book 
How We Advertised America (1920), describing the work and intentions 
of the CPI: “It was the fight for the minds of men, for the ‘conquest 
of their convictions,’ and the battle-line ran through every home in 
every country.”66 He regarded critiques of censorship as false, and clai-
med the voluntary nature of self-censorship of those involved in the 
bureau’s efforts to propagate its “stainless patriotism and unspotted 
Americanism.” The work of the CPI, Creel concluded, was an effort of 
62  Ibid., p. 15.
63  Ibid., p. 16.
64  Ibid., p. 17.
65  Ibid.
66  Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 3.
providing public information, not devising propaganda:
It is the pride of the Committee, as it should be the pride of Ame-
rica, that every activity was at all times open to the sun. No dollar 
was ever sent on a furtive errand, no paper subsidized, no official 
bought. From a thousand sources we were told of the wonders of 
German propaganda, but our original determinations never altered. 
Always did we try to find out what the Germans were doing and 
then we did not do it.67
In the case of Creel, his emphasis on the support of private initiatives 
and organizations, ranging from newspapers to artists contributing to 
war exhibitions, explained his description of the work of the propa-
ganda bureau as the “world’s greatest adventure in advertising,”68 and 
showed how in the last two centuries shifting powers from church to 
state in the development of propaganda were supplemented by a third 
power, as an inherent part of the importance of industrialization: that 
of private business and marketing. Exactly this third power of private 
business entering the sphere of politics was at stake in what Sproule 
explains as the movement of “muckrakers” – what we today would 
refer to as “activist” journalists – who rose to fame in the Progres-
sive Era in America preceding the First World War. The muckrakers 
aimed at exposing corruption in government and private business, and 
the reliance of one upon the other. Creel himself, before joining the 
Ministry of Public Information, had been such a muckraker journa-
list, investigating and critiquing a grant by the Rockefeller Foundation 
that had been used to study the causes of industrial unrest.69 Sproule 
considered these muckrakers as the first manifestation of propaganda 
critique in the United States, even before the term propaganda itself 
would gain notoriety after the First World War.
Another important influence on the post-WWI discussion about 
the social influence of modern propaganda was the work that had 
been done in the fields of sociology and psychology. The way in which 
crowds had been mobilized to serve the war effort made the study of 
“group psychology” all the more poignant. Important to mention in 
this context is French sociologist and social psychologist Gustave Le 
Bon, who had become an influential figure in this debate owing to his 
book Psychologie des Foules (1895). Le Bon analyzed the unconscious 
actions of crowds and studied what he regarded as different types of 
67  Ibid., p. 13.
68  Ibid., p. 4.
69  Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, pp. 22–52.
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crowds, categorized in “heterogeneous crowds” such as street crowds, 
juries, and parliamentary assemblies and “homogeneous crowds” such 
as sects, casts and classes.70 Le Bon’s concept of the crowd would in-
fluence the widely used notion of the “herd,” which he describes as 
an “unstable flock”71 consisting of a “swarm of isolated individuals.”72 
According to Le Bon, such a flock or swarm assembled in a crowd is 
characterized by certain dynamic psychological characteristics, as its 
assembly amplifies “their heroism, their weaknesses, their impulsive-
ness, and their violence.”73 Such characteristics in the context of the 
crowd are never stable, and Le Bon considers the ease with which a 
crowd can be influenced as a proof of its barbaric nature. In the crowd, 
Le Bon saw the loss of individual thought almost as a form of collec-
tive hypnosis. It is easy to read in this description the shift of an ordi-
nary public transforming into quasi-official agitators under influence 
of propaganda as mentioned by Sproule.
In his post-war book Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (1921) neu-
rologist and founder of the field of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud – 
whose work would have similar impact on propaganda studies to that 
of Le Bon – critically examined the latter’s work on the formation of 
the crowd. It is important to mention that although the English trans-
lation of the book mentions “group psychology,” the term “Massenpsy-
chologie” is better translated as “mass psychology.” The difference in 
terminology would be that the “crowd” refers to an unorganized as-
sembly or gathering, whereas the “group” presupposes an element of 
organization. In the case of the “mass” or “masses,” we could still be 
dealing with both crowds and groups, but in a far larger scale, possibly 
with an overall organizational model or organizational element in pla-
ce. Freud, as we will see, speaks of the masses as a constellation that 
is not without an organizational component, mostly in the form of a 
leader figure.
While Freud generally approved Le Bon’s analysis, he also critically 
observers that “If the individuals in the group [Masse] are combined in 
a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond 
might be precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group.”74 Freud 
asks, for example, if a crowd indeed acts as if hypnotized, who then is 
70  Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (New York: Macmillan, 1896), pp. 
165–66.
71  Ibid., p. 219.
72  Ibid., p. 229.
73  Ibid., p. 227.
74  Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (London: The Hogarth Press and 
the Institute for Psycho-analysis, 1949), p. 7. Again, we see that, in original German, “group” is 
mentioned as Masse (crowd): “Wenn die Individuen in der Masse zu einer Einheit verbunden 
sind, so muß es whol etwas geben, was sie an einander bindet, und dies Bindemittel könnte 
gerade das sein, was für die Masse charakterisch ist.” See: Sigmund Freud, Massenpsychologie 
und Ich-Analyse (Leipzig/Vienna/Zürich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1921), p. 7.
the one hypnotizing them? In other words: what is the role of the leader 
figure, the hypnotizer? Freud adds that “in a group the individual is 
brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions 
of his unconscious instincts,”75 and, as a consequence, this can lead 
to “high achievements in the shape of abnegation, unselfishness, and 
devotion to an ideal. While with isolated individuals personal interest 
is almost the only motive force, with groups it is very rarely promi-
nent.”76 Freud thus complicates the image of the crowd as an instant 
hysteric and dangerous “barbaric” entity, incapable of any good, but 
instead breaks with such abstraction by analyzing its organizational 
model through the figure of the leader, and simultaneously highlights 
the potential transformative capacity of a mass in terms of transcen-
ding individual self-interest.
We will see how, in the approach to the question of the effects of 
propaganda, the opposing views between the crowd as a “swarm of 
individuals” and the mass as a collective formation deriving from spe-
cific, individual libidinal desires, marks a significant difference in the 
perception of the agency of the human subject.77 Is the human capable 
of individual and mass intelligence, and could it thus operate within a 
properly democratic framework; or is the human by definition shaped 
by uncontrollable desires and influences, which, both for the individual 
and for the mass, demand structural direction and control to maintain 
a secure society? One could say that herein lies the essence of respec-
tively the progressive and conservative world views that would define 
different conceptions of modern propaganda after the First World War.
As a result of the work of journalists that exposed the falsehoods of 
propaganda from both the British and American side, the early 1920s 
saw a rise in debates in the United States on the supposed power of 
propagandists over public affairs. A key exchange in this debate took 
place between the American philosopher John Dewey and writer Wal-
ter Lippman, the latter being a former muckraker journalist and a re-
pentant public supporter of American involvement in the First World 
War. Whereas Lippmann considered the media complicit in the propa-
ganda schemes of the First World War, contributing to creating “pseu-
do-realities” that benefited the propagandist, Dewey, while recognizing 
this danger, felt this was all the more reason to invest in a critical and 
75  Ibid., p. 10.
76  Ibid., p. 17.
77  Daniel Pick deepens the relation between the work of Le Bon and Freud, emphasizing the im-
portance of the latter, when concluding that the contribution of Freud’s work lies in the manner 
that he broke the idea that the individual preceded the group or crowd, and replaces it for a 
more complex interchange between group and individual formation through libidinal econo-
mies: “Before Freud’s account, it can be argued, crowd theory took the individual to precede the 
group, as concept; after Freud, we are not so sure.” Daniel Pick, “Freud’s ‘Group Psychology’ 
and the History of the Crowd,” History Workshop Journal, No. 40 (Autumn 1995): pp. 39–61.
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educational journalism so to keep ruling powers in check. Both, essen-
tially, were invested in the question of the role of modern propaganda 
in democracy.
What had sparked the debate was Lippmann’s book Public Opinion 
published in 1922. In his writing, Lippmann scorned the idea of public 
opinion as something that results naturally from a given community, 
claiming that “democracies have made a mystery out of public opi-
nion.”78 For Lippmann, the idea of democracy that was shaped in the 
Progressive Era could only be sustainable within small communities, 
whereas the Communications Revolution and its impact on the First 
World War had proved that such communalism had become comple-
tely outdated. Politics, trade, and war had become questions of geopo-
litics, which Lippmann refers to as the “invisible world,” compared 
to the pseudo-worlds constructed through propaganda. How would 
the average American, he asked, be capable of making informed judg-
ments through the democratic process when it superceded his or her 
direct self-interests? Did the invisible world and the construction of 
pseudo-realities not operate far beyond the realm of power managea-
ble within democracy? As a consequence, Lippmann makes a plea for 
a more rational understanding of the shaping of public opinion – that 
which he famously referred to as the “manufacture of consent”:
[While] democrats have been absorbed in trying to find a good 
mechanism for originating social power, that is to say a good me-
chanism of voting and representation, they neglected almost every 
other interest of men. For no matter how power originates, the cru-
cial interest is in how power is exercised. What determines the qua-
lity of civilization is the use made of power. And that use cannot be 
controlled at the source.79
The real interest of the human, in other words, is to be properly go-
verned, and for government to produce “a certain minimum of health, 
of decent housing, of material necessities, of education, of freedom, of 
pleasures, of beauty.”80 Not acknowledging this implies that one’s so-
cietal development will remain trapped in “the failure of self-governing 
people to transcend their casual experience and their prejudice,” com-
pelled to act without a “reliable picture of the world.”81 This reliable 
picture of the world, Lippmann concludes, cannot be left in the hands 
of popular media, as it suffers under the weight of producing news, ra-
78  Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 254.
79  Ibid., p. 312.
80  Ibid., p. 313.
81  Ibid., p. 365.
ther than truths, and is exposed to commercial interests, ranging from 
sales to acquiring proper advertising. Instead, Lippmann proposes an 
independent government department that should be brought into life 
to guarantee the controlled and factual access to public information, 
untouched by private interests.82 Only this would allow the best of de-
mocracy – the distribution of truthful information – to be preserved in 
the age of modern propaganda. Dewey disagreed, and responded in his 
1922 review of Lippmann’s book in The Nation:
Of course, the expert organization for which Mr. Lippmann calls 
is inherently desirable. There is no questioning that fact. But his 
argument seems to me to exaggerate the importance of politics and 
political action, and also to evade the problem of how the latter is 
to be effectively directed by organized intelligence unless there is an 
accompanying direct enlightenment of popular opinion, as well as 
an ex post facto indirect instruction.83
Dewey believed that government-sanctioned information, however in-
dependent its providers may seem to be on paper, runs exactly the 
same risks of structuring information and public opinion based on its 
own interests, and thus, while recognizing the problems of modern 
propaganda and public opinion in modern democracy, Dewey con-
tinues to emphasize the importance of journalism as a “fundamental 
general education,” which, both necessary and difficult to achieve, is 
exactly the challenge of what he terms as the “enterprise of democra-
cy.”84 Dewey would come to characterize this search as the shift from 
a Great Society to the “Great Community,” essentially declaring de-
mocracy as “the community itself,” shaped through “symbols [that] 
produced a mutuality of desire and purpose whereby energies were 
transformed into shared meanings that provided an alternative to pure 
force.”85 This shaping of the community could not be formed by voting 
alone, but needed a collective engagement in the shaping of critical, 
public opinion through journalism and education.
We see how the different portrayals of the human subject discus-
sed through the work of Le Bon and Freud are also strongly present 
in this debate. Lippmann’s belief that a community’s ideas need, one 
way or another, to be properly manufactured to facilitate participa-
82  Lippmann refers to the key protagonist of such independent government departments as the 
“disinterested expert”: disinterested here meant in the sense of being at a critical distance. Ibid., 
p. 375.
83  John Dewey, “Public Opinion by Walter Lippmann,” The New Republic, May 3, 1922, pp. 
286–87.
84  Ibid.
85  Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, p. 81.
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tion in democratic life leans on the idea of the crowd as a scattered 
and undirected entity; whereas Dewey strongly upholds the idea of the 
possibility of a mass to be developed as critical democratic force throu-
gh mass emancipation and education. One could say that Lippman’s 
perception of the community comes closer to Le Bon’s notion of the 
crowd, whereas Dewey’s comes closer to Freud’s observations on the 
potentials of the mass.
In great contrast to Dewey’s fundamental belief in the need to turn 
from the discussion of propaganda to developing models of democra-
tic general education, Lippmann’s analysis proved greatly beneficial to 
public relations founder Edward Bernays, a nephew of Freud. Bernays 
aimed at effectively commodifying the libidinal economy that Freud 
observed within Le Bon’s definition of the crowd in order to manage 
the horde. In his book Crystalizing Public Opinion (1923), published 
only a year after Lippmann’s Public Opinion, he attempted to translate 
the need for establishing new models of social order upon the horde, 
which he considered incapable of self-governing in the age of mass 
communication. In response to this incapacity he proposed the “public 
relations counsel”:
Society is made up of an almost infinite number of groups, whose 
various interests and desires overlap and interweave inextricably. 
The same man may be at the same time the member of a minority 
religious sect, supporter of the dominant political party, a worker in 
the sense that he earns his living primarily by his labor, and a capi-
talist in the sense that he has rents from real estate investments or 
interest from financial investments. […] It is from the constant in-
terplay of these groups and of their conflicting interests upon each 
other that progress results, and it is this fact that the public relations 
counsel takes into account in pleading his cause.86
Bernays himself had been employed by Creel’s Committee on Public 
Information, and what he referred to as public relations was essentially 
a proposal to introduce the strategies of propaganda developed during 
wartime to reshape what he and Lippmann considered the problems 
of democracy during peacetime: problems that Bernays considered to 
be the scattered and conflicting interests that defined modern society. 
But different from Creel, who rejected the very notion of propaganda, 
Bernays presented himself as something of a “propagandist for propa-
ganda,” claiming that modern propaganda was neither good nor evil in 
86  Bernays, Crystalizing Public Opinion, p. 143.
and of itself, but dependent on its use and intentions.87 On this transi-
tion from wartime propaganda to peacetime propaganda, he remarked 
in his book Propaganda (1928):
[T]he manipulators of patriotic opinion [in the First World War] 
made use of the mental clichés and the emotional habits of the 
public to produce mass reactions against the alleged atrocities, the 
terror, and the tyranny of the enemy. It was only natural, after the 
war ended, that intelligent persons should ask themselves whether it 
was possible to apply a similar technique to the problems of peace.88
Bernays embodied the belief that the engagement of private companies 
and corporations to develop the tools of propaganda for the American 
participation of the war essentially embodied the solution to the pro-
blems of democracy:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits 
and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic 
society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society 
constitute of an invisible government which is the true ruling power 
of our country. We are governed, our minds molded, our tastes for-
med, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. 
This is a logical result of the way in which democratic society is 
organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this 
manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.89
Rather than being in contradiction with democracy, Bernays conside-
red the work of such engineers of public opinion the solution for its 
problems. Whereas politics called upon the mobilization of the dis-
comforts, anxieties, and passions of the masses – with risk of chaos and 
revolt – the task of the public relations counsel was to pre-emptively 
anticipate the desires of the “horde,” to provide satisfying and regu-
lated forms of competition and social cohesion through commercial 
services, entertainment, and commodities. Democracy is concerned 
with the rule of the demos, the people, but Bernays essentially claimed 
– in complete opposition to Dewey – that the people could not know 
what they wanted: their self-interest was limited by the pseudo-realities 
they lived in, and just as Lippmann argued, this makes it impossible 
for them to separate their private from common interests. The public 
87  Mark Crispin Miller, “Introduction,” in Edward Bernays, Propaganda, p. 15.
88  Bernays, Propaganda, pp. 54–55.
89  Ibid., p. 37.
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relations counsel, through the invisible government of the state as well 
as corporate structures of power, was to employ mass psychology to 
understand, regulate, and engineer public opinion into manufactured 
consent. “Good government can be sold to a community just as any 
other commodity can be sold,”90 Bernays claimed. And the state nee-
ded to learn and adapt to this new invisible government that began its 
rule in the era of the free market:
Politics was the first big business in America. Therefore there is a 
good deal of irony in the fact that business has learned everything 
that politics has to teach, but that politics has failed to learn very 
much from business methods of mass distribution of ideas and pro-
ducts.91
An important contribution of Bernays in this regard was the develop-
ment of so-called focus groups, which comprised of prototypical con-
sumers – for example, American female caretakers in the household – 
were interviewed in group sessions, to map out their intimate relations 
with and possible psychological objections to consumer products. By 
using focus groups, Bernays for example found out that the lack of 
success of an all-inclusive baking powder was due to the fact that it 
instilled a sense of guilt in the caretaker in relation to her family: the 
lack of labor invested in the product that was already “all inclusive” 
to start with made her role as a care provider obsolete. A successful 
resolution was the creation of an all-inclusive backing powder where 
one only had to add one egg. The emotional investment of the egg – a 
symbol of birth and care – effectively eliminated the sense of guilt that 
had been inherent to purchasing a product that threatened to make 
care labor obsolete.92 Bernays also did groundbreaking work to create 
the necessary conditions for the development of consumer needs that 
had been previously non-existent. Famous is the example of his lobby 
among architects to include music rooms in their designs of upper-mi-
ddle-class houses, which effectively influenced the wider sale of pianos. 
By creating the presumption that a certain standard of living could not 
do without a specific commodity, he did not just promote the purchase 
of objects, but of entire, previously non-existent markets.93
For Bernays, such campaigns of psychological engineering were in 
no way conflicting with his definition of democracy. On the contrary: 
90  Ibid., p. 120.
91  Ibid., p. 111.
92  See also the essayistic four-part documentary series Century of the Self (2002) on the rise of psy-
choanalysis applied to the field of public relations produced by the BBC and directed by Adam 
Curtis.
93  Bernays, Propaganda, pp. 78–79.
they were ways of satisfying desires of the masses even before they 
themselves knew what to desire or why. Bernays’s vision of such for-
ms of engineered democracy formed the centerpiece of the New York 
World Fair, of which Bernays was the public relations director.94 En-
titled “The World of Tomorrow,” the fair featured national pavilions as 
well as corporate pavilions promoting private interests.95 At the heart 
of the fair was a massive structure called the Trylon and Perisphere: vi-
sitors entered the construction through an electric staircase, and, once 
inside, they encountered a gigantic rotating architectural model of the 
city of the future entitled “Democracity,” designed by Henry Dreyfuss 
and crafted in accordance with Bernays’s notion of invisible govern-
ment. The model embodied something of a corporate-utopian urban 
infrastructure made possible through the replacement of representati-
ve government by the public relations industry. In Democracity’s bro-
chure, writer and cultural critic Gilbert Seldes adopted the tone of real 
estate promotional materials when he wrote
Democracity is an entirely practical city […]. And there can be a 
dozen or a hundred such groups of towns and villages and centers 
in the United States, each with commercial and agricultural and in-
dustrial interests. The government exists to see that these interests 
harmonize […]. The City of Tomorrow which lies below you is as 
harmonious as the stars in their courses overhead – No anarchy – 
destroying the freedom of others – can exist here. The streets, the 
houses, the public buildings, the waterways, the parks, and the par-
king spaces – all are built in relation to all the others.96
What Bernays aimed for through his model of Democracity, was basi-
cally the replacement of the state by corporations under the control of 
public relations councils, together forming democratic entities insofar 
as they would be able to represent the desires of the masses in ways 
that governments could not. This is crucial to understand the mode of 
governance of the modern democracity, which in actuality is not a city, 
but rather a corporation in the form of a city.
94  In an address to the World’s Fair Committee on April 7, 1937 in New York, Bernays explained 
his vision as following: “This World’s Fair can help make America safe for American democracy 
in the future. The world will move forward with the World’s Fair. Let us make the values of 
Americans real to Americans. Let us sell America to Americans.” See: Edward Bernays, The New 
York World’s Fair: A Symbol for Democracy (New York: The Merchant’s Association of New York, 
1937). The small booklet was published without page numbers.
95  Trylon and Perisphere and the model for Democracity within, is documented extensively in 
Stanley Appelbaum, The New York World’s Fair 1939/1940 (New York: Dover Publications, 1977) 
and Bill Cotter, Images of America: The 1939–1940 New York World’s Fair (Charleston: Arcadia 
Publishing, 2009). See also: Paul Greenhalgh, Fair World: A History of World’s Fairs and Expositions 
from London to Shanghai 1851–2010 (Winterbourne: Papadakis, 2011), pp. 176–84.
96  Gilbert Seldes, Your World of Tomorrow (New York: Rogers-Kellogg-Stillson, 1939), p. 15.
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Bernays’s propaganda work in the realm of politics was not limited 
to engineering his vision of the future Democracity, but also exten-
ded to the export of American democracy in the domain of the mili-
tary. Apart from his governmental work in the Committee for Public 
Information during the First World War, his most notorious political 
involvement was in the overthrow of the democratically elected Gua-
temalan government of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, whose 1952 
Land Reform program had enraged wealthy planters and United Fruit 
Company officials. Bernays, who worked as a public relations official 
for United Fruit Company, effectively devised a campaign branding 
Guzman as a communist.97
In Bernays’s conception of modern propaganda we find a strong 
resonance of the Le Bon’s conception of the human. Le Bon frequent-
ly features in Bernays’s work in relation to his conviction of the need 
to develop models of group identification and persuasion through the 
invisible government facilitated by public relation counsels. But the 
methods employed to do so are strongly tied to the work of Freud, as 
regards the development of effective strategies of subconscious identi-
fication that address the libidinal drives that bring a people to purchase 
an all-inclusive baking powder, establish a new form of Democracity, 
or convince the masses of a Guatemalan communist threat to modern 
American democracy and its companies. More than any propagandist, 
Bernays articulated an all-encompassing world view ranging from po-
litics to the economy and the military, of which modern propaganda 
formed the fundament.
Whereas Bernays, compared to Lippmann and Dewey, is himself 
the unrepentant propagandist, the political scientist Harold D. Lasswe-
ll would become the main authority on modern propaganda in the 
domain of political science, and at a later stage of his life would serve 
in the Library of Congress in analyzing Nazi propaganda. The ma-
jor work that brought him to fame was his book Propaganda Technique 
in the World War (1927), strongly grounded in the work of Dewey and 
Freud. Important was his pragmatic and systematic take on the subject 
of propaganda in modern democracy. Lasswell argued that “The truth 
is that all governments are engaged to some extend in propaganda 
as part of their ordinary peace-time functions. While, therefore, the 
presumption exists against propaganda work by a democratic govern-
ment, this statement should not be taken too literally.”98 Rather than 
claiming that democracy should be protected from propaganda, which 
97  Stephen Schlesinger, Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala 
(Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 79–91.
98  Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 14.
Dewey’s analysis seemed more geared toward, Lasswell emphasized 
the idea that for democratic propaganda “there is nothing to be gained 
by concealment,” claiming that “nothing is lost, if all propaganda ope-
rations in neutral and allied countries are carried on openly.”99
In his analysis of propaganda, Lasswell stressed the importance of 
understanding the necessary preconditions for propaganda to be of any 
effect: “Successful propaganda depends upon the adroit use of means 
under favorable conditions. A means is anything which the propagan-
dist can manipulate; a condition is anything to which he must adap-
t,”100 and in this regard he mentions specifically “the communication 
network, similarities and differences in customs and institutions, in-
terpenetration of population, economic ties, relative military power.”101 
According to Lasswell, these conditions were well understood by the 
British, who were capable of gaining control over the cable network but 
also had been careful in developing methods of cultural identification 
toward the Americans. Contrary to the military appeal that the Ger-
mans made to the Americans, the “British talked about a war to pro-
tect international law and to guarantee the sanctity of treaties, and they 
fought against a monster, known as autocratic militarism, in the name 
of democracy.”102 Lasswell argued that effective propaganda meant an 
effective understanding of its proper conditions, cutting through a va-
riety of domains: technological, cultural, and psychological in relation 
to its target audience, as well as in military and economic terms. The 
psychological impact of propaganda, Lasswell claimed, was dependent 
on the understanding of the societal conditions in which it would ope-
rate and cause its effects.
Lasswell, similar to all previously discussed post-war propaganda 
theorists, took a political position toward modern propaganda, by es-
sentially advocating a democratic propaganda model, while simulta-
neously developing a model of propaganda analysis. In this light, it is 
relevant to underline that Lasswell did not seem to consider democra-
tic propaganda as a choice, but rather as an inevitability of the modern 
age:
Propaganda is a reflex to the immensity, the rationality and will-
fulness of the modern world. It is the new dynamic of society, for 
power is subdivided and diffused, and more can be won by illusion 
than by coercion. […] To illuminate the mechanisms of propaganda 
is to reveal the secret springs of social action, and to expose to the 
99  Ibid., p. 15.
100  Ibid., p. 185.
101  Ibid., p. 189.
102  Ibid., pp. 198–97.
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most searching criticism our prevailing dogmas of sovereignty, of 
democracy, of honesty, and of the sanctity of individual opinion. 
The study of propaganda will bring into the open much that is 
obscure, until, indeed, it may no longer be possible for an Anatole 
France to observe with truth that “Democracy (and indeed, all so-
ciety) is run by an unseen engineer.”
For Lasswell, propaganda studies itself was the crucial component 
for coping with the existence of modern propaganda in democracy. 
It would not disappear through education, as Dewey suggested, but it 
could be understood through education, and as such be neutralized to 
a certain extent.
What we essentially see when comparing these different analyses 
of the conditions, functions, and practices of propaganda, are sets of 
different political world views. Between Dewey for example, who seeks 
an educated democracy resilient against propaganda reminiscent of 
the Progressive Era, and Lippmann who seeks a form of democratic 
governance that could protect its public from the inevitability of pro-
paganda, we witness two different views concerning the question whe-
ther politics is even able to counter the phenomenon of modern propa-
ganda. Lasswell believes in a third way between Dewey and Lippmann 
in his hope of a transparent propaganda. Sproule nonetheless argues 
that these quests for a “democratic propaganda,” however passionately 
debated in the interwar era, would find the more progressive views of a 
democratic propaganda at the losing end: “Working separately, huma-
nist students of communication produced no theory-praxis synthesis 
strong enough to compete with the growing measurement-manage-
ment orientation in social science.”103 The dominance of quantative 
research in the field of propaganda studies regarding group formation 
and public opinion, was far removed from the political radicalism of a 
figure such as Dewey, and as such “early socialist flirtations” of propa-
ganda studies would be replaced with “a benevolent liberalism,” brin-
ging Sproule to conclude that “Generally, the measurement-oriented 
scholars reflected the classic American intellectual stance of wanting to 
see society made both efficient and democratic.”104 In sum, propagan-
da studies and propaganda practices would lean towards the Bernay-
sian worldview. As Lasswell had observed: modern propaganda thrives 
using the possibilities of a particular moment in time, and Bernays, 
more than any other protagonist of propaganda studies, had unders-
tood that in both theory and practice.
103  Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, p. 78.
104  Ibid., p. 74.
In 1941, one year after the United States had declared war upon 
Germany once more, Bernays spoke somewhat mockingly about 
Lasswell’s analysis of propaganda in the First World War, regarding the 
work as that of a “social psychologist looking back over past events” in 
an attempt to “isolate the factors of marketing.”105 Bernays felt a factual 
assessment followed by a practical application was far more relevant. 
The experience from the First World War resulted in an “engineering 
approach,” which successfully led to the “engineering of consent in a 
democracy.”106 These methods were in itself neither good nor bad, but 
a matter of choice. The United States had to choose the democratic 
path of the engineering approaches at hand, and for this, a master 
plan executed by a “psychological staff” was necessary: essentially, a 
set of public relations counsels for the effective “selling our democratic 
ideals of freedom, equality and orderly justice.”107
As sophisticated as Bernays’s modern propaganda strategies were, 
the worldview in which he had them operate was simplistic. Good 
propaganda was democratic propaganda. But the moral and ethical 
questions and objections of his contemporaries regarding who exactly 
controlled the public relations councils that were to direct the invisible 
government were cast aside. The free market and public opinion in its 
turn would judge the democratic propagandist on the legitimacy of his 
work. But this of course is a catch 22, as the manufacture of consent in 
public opinion is exactly the stated goal of the modern propagandist. 
By the time the Second World War broke out, modern propaganda had 
become a reality of modern society, and those who effectively practi-
ced propaganda had the upper hand over those attempting to catch 
up with its effects. The Second World War would, at the same time, 
come to characterize the term propaganda in popular discourse as the 
definition of evil in the hands of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, under-
mining Bernays’s positive reading of the relation between propaganda 
and democracy.
Before engaging in a more detailed account of the post-World War 
II discourse on modern propaganda, let us make the following two 
observations regarding the post-World War I debate on modern propa-
ganda in the context of the United States:
• The post-World War I debates on propaganda in the United Sta-
tes dealt with whether or not democracy was reconcilable with 
propaganda, in part through the work of Le Bon and Freud that 
105  Edward Bernays, “The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda,” Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jan. 1942): pp. 236–44, at p. 236.
106  Ibid.
107  Ibid.
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1.4 PROPAGANDA AS PERFORMANCE
Bernays’s lessons did not go unnoticed during the propaganda effort 
of the United States, once it set out for a war against the Nazi regime. 
Soldiers embarking to Europe received a pamphlet entitled What is 
Nazi Propaganda? (1944), published by the War Department, in which 
the Disney cartoon character Donald Duck describes the history, func-
tion, and effects of modern propaganda.108 The pamphlet describes the 
strategies of Hitler and Goebbels in manipulating the German people 
by mass manifestations that “hypnotized” its attendants, directing the 
resentments of the people that suffered the consequences of the Ver-
sailles Treaty on “trade unions,” “communists,” “democracies,” and, 
most importantly, the figure of the “Jew” and its league of internatio-
nal capitalism that had sold out the “Aryan” Germans after the First 
World War.109 In response to this, the pamphlet argues, a different pro-
paganda is needed, a “counter-propaganda,” for “In the struggle of 
men’s minds that is constantly being waged by propagandists there is 
[…] a fundamental difference between the propaganda of dictatorship 
and the propaganda of democracy.”110
We observe a Bernaysian touch in the claim that propaganda in a 
democracy by definition operates differently than the one in a dicta-
torship, as reflected in the pamphlet’s claims that “democratic coun-
tries must present the truth in their propaganda” and that “A free peo-
ple will soon find out the truth in spite of official suppressions and 
distortions.”111 This went even further, when the pamphlet explained 
that democratic propaganda was developed extensively in the form of 
public relations after the First World War: “Under the conditions of 
mass production and mass consumption, techniques of propaganda 
and public relations have been greatly developed to sell commodities 
and services and to engender good will among consumers, employees, 
other groups, and the public at large,”112 concluding that
national propaganda in the throes of a war is aimed to bolster the 
security of the non-aggressor state and assure the eventual well-be-
108  Something of a counter-document would be Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart’s study of the 
imperialist, capitalist and orientalist – if not colonialist – narratives of the Donald Duck comic, 
first published in 1971 during the popular government of Salvador Allende. Whereas Donald 
in What is Nazi Propaganda? claims to do nothing but “reveal” the propaganda of the enemy, 
Dorfman and Mattelart introduce an analysis of the Disney comic as a propaganda vehicle of 
United States capitalist democracy. See: Ariel Dorfman, Armand Mattelart, How to Read Donald 
Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic (New York: International General, 1991).
109  United States War Department, What is Nazi Propaganda? (London: Foxley Books Limited, 
2009), p. 5.
110  Ibid., p. 9.
111  Ibid., p. 11.
112  Ibid., p. 22.
questioned the very nature of crowd and mass formations in the 
process of manufacturing public opinion;
• The post-World War I debates on modern propaganda in the 
United States went hand in hand with the actual application of 
new models of modern democratic propaganda: the manner in 
which Creel House included models of advertising and commer-
cial campaigns in the propagation of the war effort, was further 
deepened in modern propaganda as a form of public relations 
combining business and political interests alike in an attempt to 
engineer modern democracy.
Let us now explore, in the final section of this chapter, how the Second 
World War affected the discourse on and practice of modern propagan-
da, in a way which has had a lasting effect up to our present day.
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ing and safety of its citizens. No one would deny that this kind of 
propaganda, intelligibly administered, benefits every man, woman, 
and child in the land.113
This pamphlet may well have been one of the last officially govern-
ment sanctioned documents that would pitch a democratic propagan-
da versus a dictatorial one, for the term would soon fall into disuse 
and disrepute once the Nazi regime was dismantled and the massive 
propaganda effort aimed at employing systemic violence on a grueso-
me scale came into full view of the international community. The pam-
phlet is a remnant of Bernays’s legacy and his attempt to save the term 
propaganda for democracy, but eventually, the term “public relations” 
would be the one to prevail, even though Bernays – as we have seen 
previously – considered propaganda and public relations essentially to 
be the same thing.
Just as we observed in the post-World War I debates, the pamphlet 
makes an enormous rhetorical effort to keep the notion of modern 
propaganda within the realm of democratic values. On one hand, it 
does so by explaining propaganda as part of regular peacetime ac-
tivities, such as the selling of commodities, associated with the free, 
democratic consumer society. The problem of course is that this pam-
phlet explaining propaganda is itself propaganda. The booklet is filled 
with cartoons of brave allied soldiers facing demonic Germans sedu-
cing average citizens with cakes while holding grenades behind their 
backs. We see a caricature of Goebbels literally seeding a farmland 
with “seeds of destruction” and a mad looking Hitler giving speeches 
to brainwashed and fat Nazi-soldiers while crooked Nazi-allied “Japs” 
seduce indigenous peoples it wished to conquer with jewels – the latter 
being all the more painful in the light of the massacres of indigenous 
peoples in the United States. And from beginning to end there is Do-
nald Duck: the all-American narrator of the importance of democratic 
propaganda.114
Obviously, there are fundamental differences between US demo-
113  Ibid., p. 36.
114  In the Second World War, Disney characters were employed en masse to support the war effort. 
One of the most stunning examples might be the 1942 Donald Duck cartoon “Der Führer’s 
Face,” in which Donald finds himself as a Nazi in Germany, where he works 24 hours per day in 
a Nazi weapon factory. When Donald mentally crashes due to the excessive workload, he wakes 
up in his own bed. Upon realizing it was just a dream, he suddenly sees the shadow of what 
seems to be a Nazi officer saluting him – convinced that his own country has now been taken 
over as well; Donald immediately returns the shadow’s Nazi salute. At that moment he realizes 
that he is actually standing in front of the shadow of the Statue of Liberty, and thus reassured 
he calmly returns to sleep. But at this brief moment, the Nazi salute is equated with the Statue 
of Liberty’s pose. It shows how documents of propaganda can sometimes simultaneously be 
read against the grain as propaganda critique. See further Disney’s self-produced historiography 
of its role during the war: John Baxter, Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio 
Contributed to Victory in the War (New York/Los Angeles: Disney Editions, 2014), pp. 60–64.
cratic consumer society and the German Nazi regime. In that sense, 
the models of society that are propagated cannot be unambiguously 
equated with each other. Also, the form that modern propaganda takes 
in these two countries was highly different, between the excessive uni-
formism and hierarchically imposed symbols, gestures, and slogans of 
the Nazi regime, versus the differentiated symbols of a society that 
propagates free choice in the products it consumes and the political 
parties it votes for. But neither is free from modern propaganda, and 
post-war theorists of propaganda would start to emphasize exactly this. 
The intention, means, and effects of propaganda can be framed in 
different ways, but modern propaganda, and the manner in which it 
relies on the achievements of the Second Industrial Revolution and 
its mass media, shows structural similarities across national and ideo-
logical boundaries. Rather than modern propaganda being solely the 
product of dictatorship, it has re-occurred in all highly industrialized 
nations ever since the First World War. In this final section, we will exa-
mine three important examples of propaganda analysis created after 
the Second World War. While their authors come from different tra-
ditions and geographies, they share a common investment in tracing 
the understanding of modern propaganda in relation to the massive 
technological and communication capacities of modern society.
The relation between modern mass society, American capitalist de-
mocracy, and European fascism was of specific interest to the many 
different sociologists, theorists, and philosophers connected to the 
so-called Frankfurt School, which emerged at the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Frankfurt. Although not solely inves-
ted in modern propaganda theory as such, the subject is reoccurring 
in the work of, among others, the philosophers and sociologists Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, especially with regard to the rise 
of anti-Semitism under the Nazi regime. The originally strongly Mar-
xist-oriented Frankfurt School consisted of several members of Jewish 
descent, and whereas the question of anti-Semitism at first was cast 
aside due to the fact that Marxist theory of class struggle made the 
question of Jewish identity one of secondary importance, once many 
of the members of the Frankfurt School found themselves in exile in 
America as a result of the rise of the Nazi regime, the issue became 
more poignant.115
Adorno, who had been rejected for a teaching position due to his 
Jewish father, was forced into exile for fifteen years. While working at 
Oxford University, he was approached by the sociologist Paul Lazars-
115  Martin Jay, “The Jews and the Frankfurt School: Critical Theory’s Analysis of Anti-Semitism,” 
New German Critique, Vol. 19, Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews (Winter 1980): pp. 137–49.
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feld who invited him to join a project by his Office for Radio Research 
at Princeton. Adorno accepted, but his own interests would strongly 
conflict with the project’s methodology of quantified measurement 
research. In American research these methods, as noted earlier by 
Sproule, had become common practice, but for Adorno, who was also 
a composer, this came as a shock, as he considered culture as “precise-
ly that condition that excludes a mentality capable of measuring it.”116 
This stance testifies to Adorno’s critical position both with regard to 
the fascist political system that had forced him and his colleagues into 
exile, and toward modern capitalist consumer societies and the models 
of “applied” social science that it generated.
It is in the light of Adorno’s experiences in Nazi Germany and 
American capitalist democracy that we will look at his post-World War 
II essay that we briefly mentioned before, “Freudian Theory and the 
Pattern of Fascist Propaganda” (1951), in which he assessed the he-
ritage of Le Bon and Freud in relation to Nazi propaganda. What is 
important in the essay is the fact that Adorno links Freud’s analysis of 
the importance of the leader-figure as the supplementary father-figu-
re in the formation of the masses to a Marxist analysis of the specific 
conditions of modern society that enables such a protagonist to gain 
political influence in the first place. While Freud was not connecting 
his analysis of the leader figure to the rise of fascism – he actually re-
ferenced socialist agitation – Adorno connects this analysis specifically 
to the “fascist demagogue” and considers Freud’s text as a testimony 
of someone who “foresaw the rise and nature of fascist movements.”117
Adorno joins Freud in his critique of Le Bon by stating that the 
formation of the masses are not merely “de-individualized, irrational, 
easily influenced, prone to violent action and altogether of regressive 
nature,” and further elaborates by stating that “the members of con-
temporary masses are at least prima facie individuals, the children of 
a liberal, competitive and individualistic society, and conditioned to 
maintain themselves as independent, self-sustaining units.”118 Through 
the fascist demagogue, the mass can be transformed into a unity, if it 
effectively appeals to the libidinal source of mass formation. But rather 
than presuming that the masses are primarily shaped through “pri-
mitive instincts,” Adorno concludes with Freud that the “masses are 
not primitive men but display primitive attitudes contradictory to their 
normal rational behavior.”119 Fascism is a rebellion against civilization 
116  Thomas Y. Levin and Michael von der Linn, “Elements of a Radio Theory: Adorno and the 
Princeton Radio Research Project,” The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Summer 1994): pp. 
316–24, at p. 320.
117  Adorno, The Culture Industry, p. 134.
118  Ibid., p. 135.
119  Ibid., p. 136.
not because it reoccurs as archaic, but because it actively reproduces 
the archaic with the aim of gaining power over its masses: “It is one 
of the basic tenets of fascist leadership to keep primary libidinal ener-
gy on an unconscious level so as to divert its manifestations in a way 
suitable to political ends.”120 The fascist demagogue thus represents an 
archaic inheritance that makes a passive-masochistic attitude of indivi-
duals in the masses possible and exploitable.
Adorno’s reading of the effect of propaganda seems mainly a psy-
choanalytic one, which obviously resonates with our earlier discussion 
of Freud, as well as with that of Bernays’s work, who set out to commo-
dify unconscious libidinal desires to manufacture political consent and 
to build an effective business-driven economy. But what makes Ador-
no’s text different and of importance to our further study of modern 
propaganda, is that he did not just test the relevance of Freud’s analysis 
of the masses on the fascist doctrine, but also emphasized the specific 
societal conditions which, in his perception, made fascism a possibi-
lity in the first place when addressing its growth within a competitive 
and individualistic society. He continues this analysis specifically when 
speaking about the rise of the “profession” of the fascist agitator:
Their effectiveness is itself a function of the psychology of the con-
sumers. Through the process of “freezing” [the end of progress and 
the beginning of repetition, JS], which can be observed throughout 
the techniques employed in modern mass culture, the surviving 
appeals have been standardized, similarly to the advertising slogans 
which proved to be most valuable in the promotion of business. This 
standardization, in turn, falls in line with the stereotypical thinking, 
that is to say, with the “stereopathy” of those susceptible to this pro-
paganda and their infantile wish for endless unaltered repetition.121
Adorno describes a society in which modern mass culture and adverti-
sement, as devised by public relation counsels such as Bernays, coinci-
de with the most cynical examples of the role of modern propaganda in 
fascism. While Adorno never fully equates American capitalist society 
with the Nazi regime, he obviously gears his analysis toward modern 
mass culture as the breeding ground for fascism’s violent doctrine:
Fascist propaganda has only to reproduce the existent mentality for 
its own purposes; it need not to induce a change – and the compul-
sive repetition which is one of its foremost characteristics will be 
120  Ibid., p. 137.
121  Ibid., p. 148.
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at one with the necessity for this continuous reproduction. It relies 
absolutely on the total structure as well as on each particular trait 
of the authoritarian character which is itself the product of an inter-
nalization of the irrational aspects of modern society.122
So, without equating fascism with modern society, Adorno observes 
an existent mentality, which is the product of repetition, referring both 
to the standardized mass culture that resulted from modern society, 
as well as to its instruments of mass communication and the authori-
tarian character of these mechanisms, which form the foundation that 
allows a total structure, such as the Nazi regime, to operate.
Such analysis will have left, to no surprise, many researchers with 
extremely rationalized approaches to the question of modern propa-
ganda in the United States stupefied.123 Even though we have seen in 
the previous section that engagement with the work of Freud occurs in 
the United States from Bernays to Lasswell, Adorno radically expands 
Freud’s significance by connecting the manipulation of the subcons-
cious to what in Marxist terms is called as the “substructure” of ca-
pitalist society itself. In this case, this substructure would be formed 
by aspects of the power structure of modern mass society, but whose 
effects in the superstructure cannot easily be traced back to it. Fo-
llowing Adorno, modern propaganda is not merely a question of inten-
ded propagandistic messages, but is located in the power structures of 
modern society itself. Because mass society exists, propaganda exists: 
the latter is the expression of the former. And while that expression 
might be characterized ideologically different in the case of capitalist 
democracy and fascist dictatorship, both owe their existence of this 
same substructure.
Adorno was not the only one to expand modern propaganda analy-
sis in these terms, and in the context of post-World War II modern pro-
paganda theory, some have made far more radical analogies between 
the propaganda of capitalist-democracy and fascism. One such figure 
is the French sociologist, philosopher, and theologian Jacques Ellul, 
who has written substantially on the subject of the Second Industrial 
Revolution as a Technological Revolution – resulting in what he calls 
the “Technological Society” – in relation to modern propaganda after 
the Second World War. In some instances, Ellul makes assessments of 
122  Ibid., p. 150.
123  Sproule, for example, mentions the response of sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld to some of Adorno’s 
studies in America: “Adorno treated the intrusion of the commodity market into music, arguing 
that the result had been the standardization of output, the development of commodity fetishism, 
and a pronounced regression to infantile listening. Lazarsfeld was incredulous that Adorno felt 
no compulsion to anchor such broad theoretical brush strokes with quantified data.” Sproule, 
Propaganda and Democracy, p. 79.
the relation between modern society and modern propaganda similar 
to Adorno, but he draws less from the work of Freud and more from 
the work of post-World War I propaganda studies in the United States, 
such as Lasswell’s, and, to a lesser extent, Bernays’s and Dewey’s.
Ellul’s perception of propaganda was strongly informed by his own 
engagement in the underground resistance against the Nazis during 
the French occupation, something that might explain the sometimes 
highly polemical tone of his texts. Furthermore, the very unconven-
tional nature of his research orientations, reaching from his earlier in-
vestment in Marxism to his self-proclaimed position as a Christian – 
later in his life he would become known as a theoretical protagonist of 
“Christian anarchism” – must have made it difficult to classify Ellul’s 
work historically, and, as a result, his status in contemporary propa-
ganda and communications studies is quite ambiguous.124
Ellul’s major works are the complementary volumes La Technique 
ou l’enjeu du siecle (1954), translated as The Technological Society, and 
Propagandes (1962), translated as Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s 
Attitudes. In the former, Ellul argues that “the most important feature 
of techniques today is that they do not depend on manual labor but 
on organization and on the arrangement of machines,” with the conse-
quence that “[t]echnique has become autonomous; it has fashioned an 
omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which has renounced 
all tradition.”125 Technological Society, such is Ellul’s assessment, over-
takes the spheres in which humans decide politically on their self-de-
termination: it decides for them. Ellul believes that the expansion of 
the state and the risk of extreme centralization such as he perceives in 
Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Maoist People’s Republic of 
China, is the result of the dictates of technology: for the state to remain 
in power, it has to radically consume the technical domains that have 
come to dictate human progress. Otherwise, technology will create its 
own pseudo-states giving rise to “organisms as vast and powerful as 
the state itself.”126 The pseudo-state here could be considered as the 
equivalent of Lippman’s “invisible world” and Bernays “invisible go-
vernment”: parallel structures of power that operate outside the con-
trol of democratic politics. But what stands out in Ellul’s argument is 
124  Jowett and O’Donnell, for example, write that “we find Ellul’s magnitude, especially his gener-
alizing without regard for different cultural contexts […] troublesome” (Propaganda and Persua-
sion, p. 4); Taylor refers to Ellul’s work as “one of the most stimulating conceptual examinations 
of propaganda” (Munitions of the Mind, p. 11); Sproule is by far the most appreciative, when he 
speaks of the lack and necessity of a “broad thinking about propaganda” in the interwar period, 
and mentions Ellul as an example of a thinker who was able to bring such analysis about in a 
later stage (Propaganda and Democracy, p. 89).
125  Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 14. In this regard, 
Ellul argues further upon Lasswell’s assessment of technique as “the ensemble of practices by 
which one uses available resources to achieve certain valued ends.” Ibid., p. 18.
126  Ibid., p. 235.
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that ownership over the Technological Society’s means of production 
can only be relative, as he perceives technique as that which owns the 
technician, rather than the other way around.
In several ways, we have seen how Ellul’s line of reasoning in re-
lation to the field of propaganda studies seems to resonate well: both 
Lippmann and Lasswell critically discuss the rise of propaganda in re-
lation to democracy as a discussion that is inevitable, rather than desi-
rable. This is what Ellul refers to when he speaks of the “autonomy” 
of technology, which demands that humanity alter its convictions and 
ethics to become integrated into the inevitable developments that sha-
pe modern society.127 This brings Ellul to his most radical claim in his 
discussion of the Technological Society, namely that the concept of the 
totalitarian state has been wrongly applied to the Nazi regime. This 
does not mean that Ellul is in any way relativist about the disastrous 
consequences of Nazism. However, he considers its policies of mass 
murder rather in terms of being extremely human, than inhuman. 
Consequently, he considers the “uselessness” of murder on a massive 
scale contradictory to actual totalitarianism, for under genuine totali-
tarianism
nothing useless exists, there is no torture; torture is a wasteful ex-
penditure of psychic energy which destroys salvageable resources 
without producing useful results. There is no systematically orga-
nized famine, but rather a recognition of the pressing necessity of 
maintaining the labor force in good condition. There is nothing ar-
bitrary, for the arbitrary represents the very opposite of technique, 
in which everything “has a reason” (not a final but a mechanical 
reason).128
So whereas Adorno takes from modern mass society the possibility 
of what he termed the total structure of fascism, Ellul radicalizes this 
hypothesis. He essentially claims that the real totalitarianism is yet to 
127  In regard to the “autonomy” of either the Technological Society or its propaganda, David Men-
ninger argues that for Ellul this autonomy is always relative. Even though its effects supersede 
present human intention, this does not mean that its construction is not a product of human 
necessity and desire: “In [Ellul’s] estimation, the technical phenomenon of our time is not the 
result of an alien mechanical force acting independently on history. It is the ironic creation of 
exuberant human intentions evolving into uncompromising social necessities. […] In Ellul’s 
sociology, humankind’s pride is that it forever creates its world, but its adversity lies in the 
constant threat of being overcome by its creation. The relation between individual and society 
turns out to contain a ceaseless reminder of past human choices and actions. In this situation, 
one may almost wish for alien forces to blame, but that would be submitting to illusion. Looking 
more closely at technique, this seemingly abstract and objective thing, we get a chilling sense 
of its immediacy. The phenomenon is in fact the product of dreams and choices to which we 
have surrendered ourselves. At its core, there is no other disembodiment than our own.” David 
Menninger, “Politics or Technique? A Defense of Jacques Ellul,” Polity, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Autumn 
1981): pp. 110–27, at p. 117.
128  Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 287.
come, and that the sacrifice will be the very possibility of a humanity 
that would allow for any form of doubt, inefficiency, or uselessness to 
interrupt mechanical reason. Even downright murder would be pre-
ferable, as it would still give proof of our humanity. In the endgame 
of the Technological Society, which Ellul often refers to as an “it,” as 
something with its own internal dynamic – not a will, but an inevita-
ble series of outcomes that largely stand outside of human control – a 
“new type of human being” emerges, whom Ellul describes as “mass 
man.”129
In Propaganda, Ellul continues this line of reasoning. Propagan-
da’s task in the Technological Society, Ellul argues, “is less and less 
to propagate ideologies; it now obeys its own laws and has become 
autonomous.”130 What Ellul argues throughout the book is that modern 
propaganda is a sociological phenomenon; an inevitable consequence 
of Technological Society. Propaganda for Ellul describes the process in 
which technology as it were “performs itself” in society, and in the pro-
cess, strengthens its grip on all domains of human life. For this reason, 
there is need for propagandas in the plural: an interdisciplinary arsenal 
of technological tools to integrate humans in modern society. For Ellul, 
power is performed not primarily by humans, but by Technological So-
ciety upon humans, resulting in the construction of a reality defined 
and dominated by technique. Daniel van der Velden and Vinca Kruk of 
design collective Metahaven, describe this understanding of propagan-
da as an “interface,” as a tool of mediation – of computing – between 
two or more interconnected systems. In Ellul’s logic, the substructure 
of Technological Society is technique itself, which operates humans in 
a superstructure through its own propaganda interface.131
This analysis results in Ellul’s claim that “propaganda no longer 
obeys an ideology.”132 As the Technological Society becomes omnipo-
tent, its professed ideological values differ less and less from one ano-
ther as its underlying principles – that of technique itself – will mo-
del the propagandists after the interests of propaganda. The outcome 
of this feedback loop in the Technological Society is the creation of 
what Ellul calls “total propaganda”133 and its formation of the “invisi-
ble crowd.”134 With the notion of total propaganda Ellul refers to the 
full employment of all technical means – of all propagandas – whether 
in the private sphere in the form of radio and television, in the public 
129  Ibid., p. 407.
130  Ellul, Propaganda, p. 196.
131  Propaganda overlays reality with an interface that dominates and kills what it was supposed 
to mediate.” Metahaven, “Eating Glass: The New Propaganda,” e-flux journal, 56th Venice Biennial: 
Supercommunity, August 18, 2015.
132  Ellul, Propaganda, p. 196.
133  Ibid., p.9.
134  Ibid., p. 7.
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sphere in the form of advertisement and mass manifestations, or in 
the sphere of labor, where a similar logic is employed to enforce our 
designated place as laborers in a society over which we have no longer 
any choice or saying.
We hear, in this line of reasoning, again the voice of Le Bon. But 
this time, the crowd is neither the hysterical and barbaric assembly, nor 
is this invisible crowd fully akin to Freud and Adorno’s masses guided 
by a primordial father figure. In Ellul’s totalitarian state of the Tech-
nological Society, people are compartimentalized, made efficient, re-
sulting in an invisible crowd that is simultaneously a “lonely crowd.”135 
Ellul concludes that “[b]ecause a mass society existed in western Eu-
rope at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twen-
tieth, propaganda became possible and necessary.”136 Technology has 
come to precede ideology, and in the process of feedback, becomes one 
and the same. Whereas Adorno argued that modern society created 
the conditions for both capitalist democracy and fascism, Ellul fully 
equates the two outcomes, with the risk that his own argument beco-
mes as “totalitarian” – in this case completely flattening out the actual 
differences between ideologies.
Ellul cannot but consider the choice clear-cut: “Propaganda is a 
total system that one must accept or reject in its entirety,” although 
due to his own totalizing theory, this seems problematic: for how to 
reject something that one is so utterly part of?137 Or, in the same vein, 
how can Ellul inhabit a position outside of the Technological Society 
to theorize it, if indeed it is so all encompassing as he argues? Ellul 
claims that such an outside to Technological Society is possible as far 
as one is able to form organized groups, outside or on the fringes and 
frontiers of the Technological Society. In that light, Ellul references the 
peasantry that formed some of the strongest resistance both against 
the implementation of the Nazi regime as well as the forced collectivi-
zation of their lands in the Soviet Union.138 And whereas Ellul argues 
that democracy is hardly free from propaganda, most certainly not the 
United States, he maintains that democracy can be the name of a force 
opposed to the Technological Society and its propaganda:
Propaganda ruins not only democratic ideas but also democratic 
behavior – the foundation of democracy, the very quality without 
which it cannot exist. The question is not to reject propaganda in 
the name of freedom of public opinion – which, as we well know, 
135  Ibid., p. 148.
136  Ibid., p. 94.
137  Ibid., p. 230.
138  Ibid., p. 93.
is never virginal – or in the name of freedom of individual opinion, 
which is formed of everything and nothing – but to reject it in the 
name of a very profound reality: the possibility of choice and diffe-
rentiation, which is the fundamental character of the individual in 
the democratic society.139
We will return to Ellul’s idea of resistance at the end of this chapter. 
What is important for now to take from Ellul is his elaboration of the 
specific structures of power that emerged in modern mass technolo-
gical society already hinted at by Adorno. While we will challenge the 
Ellulian notion that it does not matter in the name of which ideology 
these power structures are performed in society, his description of a 
propaganda feedback loop – propaganda as a performance of power 
with the aim of constructing a normative reality in the service of this 
very same power – will prove accurate and crucial in our task of defi-
ning modern propaganda.
A propaganda study that allows us to depart from Adorno’s and 
Ellul’s general abstractions is the book Manufacturing Consent: The Poli-
tical Economy of the Mass Media (1988) by political theorist and linguist 
Noam Chomsky and media theorist Edward S. Herman. Their work 
attempts both to define the conditions of modern propaganda and 
subsequently proposes a propaganda model, to effectively analyze the 
data that manufactures consent on a quotidian basis, both in the con-
text of dictatorships and democracies – or problematic combinations 
of the two. Chomsky and Herman refer specifically to Ellul’s analysis 
of the necessity of modern propaganda to become naturalized for the 
Technological Society to inscribe itself into everyday human beha-
vior.140 But their work additionally involves quantified data analysis, a 
methodology that both Adorno and Ellul reject, and bypasses psycho-
logical analyses of the impact of modern propaganda on individuals or 
groups.
Chomsky and Herman employ their propaganda model specifically 
to gain an understanding of the massive scale of media communica-
tions surrounding global warfare in the context of the Cold War. In 
that light, they describe the aim of their propaganda model to analyze 
the “behavior and performance” of US media, essentially what we have 
discussed so far as the performance of power in modern society which 
we define as modern propaganda.141 With the use of the term “perfor-
mance,” Chomsky and Herman do not refer to its artistic connotation, 
139  Ibid., p. 255.
140  Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1988), p. Ixi.
141  Ibid., p. 2.
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but rather use it in terms of assessing the enactment of a certain goal 
or objective, in a similar way as one might speak of the “performance” 
of a company and its employees. 
Nonetheless, we will benefit throughout this thesis from expanding 
this notion of performance to the domain of the arts, when we think 
for example of the importance of embodiment in artistic performance 
in relation to the embodiment of propaganda: the internalization by 
individuals of certain convictions and behaviors that serve a propa-
gandistic purpose. Performance scholar Erika Fischer-Lichte, defines 
performance as “events in which all the participants find themselves 
in the same place at the same time, partaking in a circumscribed set 
of activities”, which can apply to “a traditional theatre performance 
in a proscenium theater in which the actors and audience are strictly 
separated; a ‘Happening’ in which these roles are not so clearly de-
marcated; a soccer game with spectators as well as a Church mass, a 
wedding as well as a political convention; a funeral as well as a World’s 
Fair.”142 It is interesting to note that Fischer-Lichte moves effortlessly 
from defining performance in an artistic context to a political one. Si-
milarly, many propaganda studies which are not necessarily grounded 
in the arts engage interdisciplinary readings of performance, such as 
the work of Tilman Allert, who discusses the introduction of the Nazi 
salute as a form of mass performance,143 or that of Marshall Soules, 
who discusses propaganda as a form of deception in war and adverti-
sement, but effortlessly ends up discussing performative deception in 
relation to political performance art.144 
Throughout our historical exploration of propaganda, we have wit-
nessed a dual logic to propaganda as performance. If we apply perfor-
mance to the work of Ellul, for example, it relates to the performan-
ce of power by and in Technological Society; Technological Society is 
both the agent and subject of modern propaganda. Through the work 
of Freud and Adorno we have also witnessed how individuals embody 
and perform propaganda. Performance as propaganda can be used to 
simultaneously describe the process in which power is performed upon 
people on a macro-scale, but also to demonstrate the way people in-
ternalize and perform power in a micro-scale. Tillman’s book is a good 
example in that regard, as the Nazi salute was mandated from above, 
declared on July 13, 1933, as “a general civic duty (..) mandatory in 
all party and state buildings and at commemorative sites.”145 But the 
142  Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Routledge Introduction to Theatre and Performance Studies (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2014), p. 18.
143  Tilman Allert, The Hitler Salute: On the Meaning of a Gesture (New York: Picador, 2005), p. 90.
144  Marshall Soules, Media, Persuasion and Propaganda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2015), pp. 234-37.
145  Allert, The Hitler Salute, p. 30.
actual aim was that in everyday life, simple exchanges and social inti-
macies would increasingly become altered: 
Postmen used the greeting when they knocked on people’s doors to 
deliver packages or letters. Customers entering department stores 
were greeted with “Heil Hitler, how may I help you?” Dinner guests 
brought, as house gifts, glasses etched with the words “Heil Hitler”; 
children were given three-inch-tall plastic figures with pivoting right 
arms; and print shops turned out millions of copies of photographer 
Heinrich Hoffmann’s famous portrait of the Führer.146
The Hitler salute, in Allert’s words, “confiscated the act of greeting,” 
in the process in which the performance of power on a macro-scale im-
pacts its day to day practice on a micro-scale. The mandate is an impo-
sition, the day to day enactment an embodiment.147 Power is performed 
upon us, but so do we internalize and perform power. We will refer 
to this dual process as the macro-performative and micro-performati-
ve dimensions of propaganda, and through the work of Chomsky and 
Herman we will see that it is exactly this performative interplay that 
defines propaganda. In other words, propaganda does not “perform,” 
but it is itself a multi-layered performance. In the case of Chomsky 
and Herman, we will focus on the political dimension of propaganda 
as performance, whereas in our next chapter we will deepen its artistic 
dimension.
Published one year before the fall of the Berlin wall, Manufactu-
ring Consent traces the role of propaganda specifically in the domain of 
mass media in the years of the Cold War and the sphere of anti-com-
munist hysteria in the United States. Mass media in Chomsky and 
Herman’s analysis encompass far more that journalistic institutions 
and corporations, touching on larger questions of ownership in society 
and its impact on the construction of reality at large. While invested 
in questions on the relation between modern society and propaganda 
similar to those of Adorno and Ellul, the book follows the tradition of 
American muckraker activism by visibilizing unacknowledged interests 
between political, economic and media institutions.
Chomsky and Herman define mass media as “a system of com-
municating messages and symbols to the general populace,” with the 
function to “amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals 
with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them 
146  Ibid., p. 33.
147  Ibid., p. 99.
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into the institutional structures of the larger society.”148 This function 
should be understood as a systemic dimension of propaganda: due to 
the fact that the mass media are dependent on structures of concen-
trated wealth and ownership – monopolies of power – it is inherently 
limited in reporting on facts that would go counter to the interests 
of its own owners and financiers. Chomsky and Herman define the-
se limits through five “filters” that make up their propaganda model: 
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit 
orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as 
the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of 
the media on information provided by government, business, and 
“experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents 
of power; (4) “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) 
“anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.149
According to Chomsky and Herman, the elite domination of mass me-
dia is so profound that journalists and media institutions operating 
within it are compelled to internalize its interests as objective facts. A 
filter is here described as a screen of interests, largely defined by the 
agendas of mass media owners and financiers.150 As a result, “the U.S. 
media do not function in the manner of the propaganda system of a 
totalitarian state,” but rather maintain the idea of a free and critical 
media “as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presu-
ppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system 
so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”151 We can 
see some resonance between the notion of the “filter” and that what we 
discussed as Ellul’s “interface”: the mediation between a structure of 
power and the society in which this power is performed.
Ownership and advertising are not the only filters through which 
mass media propagandize a specific reality. There is also the filter that 
results from political dependency. This goes further than merely trying 
to obtain diplomatic support for the right to broadcast and distribu-
te, but also affects the acquisition of information. In order to remain 
148  Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 1.
149  Ibid.
150  Jeff Goodwin, though supportive of the definition of the five filters, remarks that these are overall 
applied by Chomsky and Herman to study the “content of the news” rather than the “journal-
istic practices” that bring this content into being. The risk, he adds, is that such a propaganda 
model becomes an “overdetermined model.” This results in “the great irony of Herman and 
Chomsky’s work” which is that “they largely eschew a careful analysis of how these mechanisms 
actually shape – and how much they shape – the everyday journalistic practices that produce the 
news.” Jeff Goodwin, “What’s Right (and Wrong) About Left Media Criticism? Herman and 
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar. 1994): pp. 101–11, at pp. 
109–10.
151  Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 1.
objective, Chomsky and Herman argue, mass media lean to official, 
government sources, as it is far more costly and difficult to obtain in-
formation from a source that might oppose state interests, for example 
in the case of a foreign war.152 Chomsky and Herman trace the increase 
of such forms of source dependency back to the operation of the Com-
mittee on Public Information during the First World War, which floo-
ded media outlets with so much official information that this would 
naturally begin to define the dominant filter.153
Furthermore, Chomsky and Herman argue that there is a varie-
ty of intersections between political and corporate interests that limit 
the mass media’s possibility to facilitate dissident opinion and critical 
information as a result of the production of “flak” by powerful lobby 
groups. A returning example in their book is that of Freedom House, 
dating back to the early 1940s, which formally operated as an NGO in 
support of democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights, but had 
“interlocks with AIM [Accuracy in Media], the World Anticommunist 
League, Resistance International, and U.S government bodies such as 
Radio Free Europe and the CIA,” operating as a “virtual propaganda 
arm of the government and the international right wing.”154 The owner-
ship of power and wealth in the hands of government and corporate 
organizations thus built a filter through which information is manufac-
tured after their interests, creating its own experts, sources, and even 
watchdogs that hardly ever moved outside of the dominant framework 
– a practice that brings to mind Wellington House’s early investment in 
engineering seemingly “independent” academic publications and ex-
pert opinions to trigger the US to join the war effort. Similarly, the use 
of such flak against supposedly communist elements shows overlaps 
with Wellington House’ framing of the German as the “Hun.” Through 
the filters of the propaganda model – ownership, advertisement, sour-
ce dependency, flak, and anti-communism – monopolies of power are 
thus performed in society with the aim to construct a new normative 
reality that supports its own interests and undermines the possibility 
for critical or dissident information or opinion.
The propaganda model proposed by Chomsky and Herman is 
strongly invested in questioning the idea of democracy as advocated 
by the United States government, its influence on mass media, and the 
double standards it practices. An important case in this regard is their 
152  As an example, they mention the Pentagon and the thousands of employees at its disposal for 
mere publicity purposes. The result is that the Pentagon, at the time of their writing, published 
over three hundred magazines at an annual costs of seventy-five million dollars: “an operation 
sixteen times larger than the nation’s biggest publisher,” leaving only the corporations with the 
“resources to produce public information and propaganda on the scale of the Pentagon and 
other government bodies.” Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, pp. 20, 21.
153  Ibid., p. 23.
154  Ibid., p. 28.
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analysis of what they term “Third World elections” in regimes that the 
US supports or which the US helped come into being, such as El Sal-
vador (in 1982 and 1984) and Guatemala (in 1984–85), and those that 
escape its realm of influence, such as Nicaragua (in 1984), which the 
Reagan administration at the time wanted to dispose of. In all cases, 
the vocabulary with which government and mass media define legi-
timate elections will be the same, namely the criteria of freedom of 
speech and assembly, freedom of press, freedom to organize, freedom 
to form political parties and absence of state terror. However, they 
observe that the application of these standards is extremely different.155
In the case of the elections in US-backed dictatorships in El Salva-
dor and Guatemala, for example, voting was obliged by law, political 
threats were made that claimed not voting was an act of treason, ID 
cards needed to be signed, ballot boxes were transparent, the govern-
ment crackdown on dissident journalists resulted in outright murder, 
the bodies of the opposition were exposed in public and the actual 
opposition in the form of left-wing popular guerrillas were by defini-
tion excluded from the elections.156 Nonetheless, the staged elections 
were praised by both the US government and mass media: in the case 
of El Salvador, Chomsky and Hermann mention the lyrical tone with 
which the massive turnout at the ballot box was reported, without 
mentioning mandatory voting and the consistent crackdown on all 
opposition,157 while in the case of Guatemala the results were hailed as 
an end to decades of “military domination” and a confirmation of the 
government’s success to curtail insurgents.158
In the case of the Nicaraguan elections, Chomsky and Herman ex-
plain, the situation was completely different. The government that the 
Reagan administration wanted to get rid of was led by the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front, a socialist revolutionary organization that 
had led the Nicaraguan resistance against US occupation in the 1930s 
and in 1979 had successfully deposed the leaders of the Somoza dy-
nasty. While threatened by border incursions of contras supported by 
the US, the conditions for proper elections, as Chomsky and Herman 
argue, were nonetheless present under the rule of this popular govern-
ment. Voting was not mandated by law, voting was anonymous, relative 
freedom of press existed – even, to a certain degree, for the contras – 
and actual opposition was allowed to participate in the elections.
Nonetheless, the US government and the mass media’s assessment 
of the elections was that of a dangerous communist state staging elec-
155  Ibid., p. 89.
156  Ibid., pp. 141–42.
157  Ibid., p. 108.
158  Ibid., p. 111.
tions to win legitimacy, while even the most minimal form of govern-
ment censorship was reported as a proof of fraud. Whereas more than 
four hundred and fifty international foreign observers were present 
during the Nicaraguan elections, giving the process favorable assess-
ments, no US observer was present, giving the government free hand 
in providing reporters information on the process. The outcomes were 
reported by the US and its mass media as a piece of theater, a pre-
dicable win for the Sandinistas and the mood of voters – contrary to 
the “massive” turnout in Guatemala and El Salvador – described as 
indifferent, while providing maximum attention to the US-supported 
contras, who predictably discredited the electoral process as a coup.159 
Chomsky and Herman describe the underlying logic of the election in 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua as follows:
In elections held in disfavored or enemy states, the U.S. government 
agenda is turned upside down. Elections are no longer equated with 
democracy, and U.S. officials no longer marvel at the election being 
held under adverse conditions. They do not commend the army for 
supporting the election and agreeing to abide by the results. On the 
contrary, the leverage the dominant party obtains by control of and 
support by the army is put forward in this case as compromising the 
integrity of the election. Rebel disruption is no longer proof that the 
opposition rejects democracy, and turnout is no longer the drama-
tic denouncement of the struggle between a democratic army and 
its rebel opposition. Now the stress is on the hidden motives of the 
sponsors of the election, who are trying to legitimize themselves by 
this tricky device of a so-called election.160
Similar to how Chomsky and Herman define “worthy” and “unwor-
thy” victims – the first consisting of highly mediated victims belonging 
to friendly or client states, whereas the unworthy ones are severely 
undermediated victims belonging to what the US regards as hostile 
states161 – we thus move to “worthy” and “unworthy” democracies, in 
159  Ibid., p. 118.
160  Ibid., p. 90.
161  An example is the manner in which mass media intensely covered the killing of a Polish priest, 
Jerzy Popieluszko, murdered by Polish police in October 1984. The murder took place in a 
Communist state, which, in the context of the Cold War, was defined as an enemy state. In 
contrast, Chomsky and Herman introduce the example of Father Augusto Ramirez Monasterio, 
father superior of the Franciscan order in Guatemala, murdered in November 1983. The killing 
took place in an American client state, and it was therefore considered a friendly state. Based 
on the excess of reporting on the first murder and an extreme lack in the case of the second, 
Chomsky and Herman conclude that a murder in an enemy state is a “worthy victim,” as it sup-
ports the legitimacy to pursue military action against them, while that in a friendly client state 
is an “unworthy victim,” as it would not be beneficiary to act militarily against one’s own proxy. 
As proof, they present the data on the reporting of Popieluszko’s murder versus Monasterio’s in 
American mass media: “The worth of the victim Popieluszko is valued at somewhere between 
137 and 179 times that of a victim in the U.S. client states.” Concretely, this means that Pop-
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which, according to Chomsky and Hermann, worthy elections are sy-
nonymous to the ones serving US policy and interest.162
Chomsky and Herman precisely trace how the convergence of po-
litical, economic, technological and military interests impact the cons-
truction of reality through the mass media.  In their examples, the 
monopolization of power is crucial, as this is what brings about the 
erosion of borders between domains that in Chomsky and Herman’s 
perception can only serve public interest if they maintain a relative 
independence. Journalism in the context of mass media is their main 
example, but one could equally think of the importance of the relati-
ve independence of labor unions, political parties and elected officials 
and the judiciary system. The less relative independence exists for the 
domains of politics, economy, technology or military, the easier the 
interests of power become manufactured as collective interest; as ma-
nufactured consent.
Assessing the performance of power through Chomsky and Her-
man’s model thus means to trace the interests of the proprietors of mo-
nopolies of power, and the multi-layered process through which they 
aim to construct reality. The macro-performative dimension of propa-
ganda relates to the activation of monopolized structures of power by 
their proprietors to direct politics, the economy, media and warfare to 
further serve their interests, whether ideological or financial in nature. 
The clandestine funding of client states in the form of US sponsored 
regimes or contras in the fight against communism to perpetrate a po-
litical-economic paradigm beneficial to its own interest, is an example 
of such a macro-performance. The subsequent micro-performative di-
mension of propaganda relates to the process in which those laboring 
and living within these monopolies, are affected in their convictions, 
attitudes, and day to day actions. The role of the mass media has been 
one of our main examples in this case, who are influenced – through 
propaganda filters – to normalize US sponsored client states as politi-
cal and ideological “democratic” allies to their day to day readership, 
ieluszko’s murder was reported between 137 and 179 times more than Monasterio’s. Chomsky 
and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 39.
162  It is important to mention that here Chomsky and Herman’s methodology was used against 
themselves in relation to their assessment of the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia. Analyzing 
media reports of massacres perpetuated by the Pol Pot led regime as well as the witness 
testimonies of Cambodian refugees, Chomsky and Herman concluded the presence of US 
media bias due to the fact that the government was a communist led enemy state, its victims 
and their testimonies were thus “worthy” as they could be used to further US policy objectives. 
See: Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the 
Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 1979), p. xi. In the course of the 
genocide perpetuated by the Khmer Rouge, it became clear that the media rather underreported 
the extent of violence. In this regard, Chomsky and Herman responded to critique of their own 
bias in favor of the Khmer Rouge by emphasizing that their analysis was based on the interests 
with which the media interpreted the events in Cambodia leaving out how the US military had 
contributed to the insurgency themselves, but that this was not the same as denying that a mas-
sacre was actually taking place. See: Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, and Charles Burton, 
“Correspondence,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Autumn 1985): pp. 495–96, at p. 495.
whereas resistance groups are framed as dangerous agents of “unwor-
thy” political ideas. In Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model, the 
more the interests of the proprietors of power are brought to converge 
with those laboring and living within its sphere of influence, the stron-
ger the impact of propaganda on constructing reality. Although we sha-
ll see later, that the way macro- and micro-performative dimensions of 
propaganda interrelate, also depends on the kind of power or claim to 
power it brings into being.
What becomes clear from Chomsky and Herman’s detailed assess-
ment of propaganda in the Cold War is that what they describe as the 
“societal purpose” of the media is to “inculcate and defend the eco-
nomic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate 
the domestic society and the state.”163 The media are free, but only for 
those who ascribe to the dominant views of its propaganda filter. They 
conclude that, in line with those voices criminalized in their attempt to 
bring into being popular people’s governments:
The organization and self-education of groups in the community 
and workplace, and their networking and activism, continue to be 
the fundamental elements in steps toward the democratization of 
our social life and any meaningful social change. Only to the extent 
that such developments succeed can we hope to see media that are 
free and independent.164
In these concluding words, we hear an idea similar to Ellul’s, when he 
speaks of those organized groups capable of resisting the propaganda 
of the Technological Society. In Chomsky and Herman’s case, these 
organized groups take the shape of communities capable of sufficient 
self-organization that can resist participating in the performance of 
monopolies of power. This indicates that Ellul, as well as Chomsky 
and Herman, is not merely describing what propaganda is and how it 
operates; they are also theorizing possible alternatives and models of 
resistance. This means that their analysis of modern propaganda and 
its abuse in democratic systems simultaneously forms a search for the 
possibility of alternative understandings and practices of democracy. 
On the one hand, their work shows us that after the Second World 
War, the concept of propaganda has become synonymous to mass ma-
nipulation and anti-democratic tendencies. On the other hand, it also 
shows us the complex fact that those who analyze propaganda, also 
tend to propagandize a model of their own: in this case, a model of 
163  Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 299.
164  Ibid., p. 307.
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1.5 CONCLUSION
What we have seen in this chapter is that the development of mo-
dern propaganda runs parallel to the emergence of new structures of 
power, monopolized by an elite of stakeholders, as we have discussed 
in relation to politics, economy, and technology (mass media). While 
humanity has always propagandized messages, modern propaganda is 
a consequence of the Second Industrial Revolution, largely indebted 
to Britain and its colonial Empire and its development as a modern 
democracy. This is what Chomsky and Herman 
discuss as the “performance” of the mass media, which is part of the 
larger performance that we call propaganda: the process in which 
power is performed through a set of filters with the aim of construc-
ting reality to benefit this same power.
What we have also seen, is that modern propaganda does not exclu-
de democracy, on the contrary. Although it is difficult to reconcile an 
idealized form of democracy as people’s self-governance with modern 
propaganda, the factual practice of British democracy stood far from 
that ideal anyway, not just because of its initial exclusion of large parts 
of the male and the entirety of the female population, but because of 
its far-reaching politics of imperial colonialism based on which, its own 
claims of being a “civilized” society were founded. This is something 
well understood by Edward Bernays, who considers propaganda as 
a solution to the problems of democracy, claiming that the invisible 
government of public relation counsels are best equipped to secure 
collective interest.  This understanding of elite rule in the majority’s 
benefit as “democracy” proves to be perfectly capable of building an 
understanding in which modern propaganda and democracy go hand 
in hand. This stands in great contrast to the intensive debates between 
Lippmann, Dewey, and Lasswell, who all remain doubtful in one way 
or another about the question whether modern propaganda is not by 
definition a threat to an open and informed society.
While propaganda studies after the First World War intensely deba-
ted the question of whether democracy and modern propaganda might 
be reconcilable, the field turns more critical toward this question after 
the Second World War up unto the Cold War. The hope for a modern 
propaganda of the common good seems indefinitely lost after the Se-
cond World War, fueled by the rigid and violent mechanisms of Nazi 
propaganda and the atrocities that it attempted to hide from public 
view.
Adorno, Ellul, and Chomsky and Herman analyze modern pro-
resistance to propaganda. In the third chapter of this thesis, Contem-
porary Propaganda, we will challenge both Ellul’s and Chomsky and 
Herman’s conviction that the only way to resist propaganda is through 
a counter-propaganda, by proposing an “inverted” propaganda model.
Before coming to a general comparison and conclusion to our ex-
ploration of the development of propaganda theory, let us make the 
following three concise observations regarding our post-World War II 
propaganda theory up until the Cold War:
• In the aftermath of the uncovering the Nazi regime and its mas-
sacres, the post-World War II theories of modern propaganda 
indefinitely turn into an assessment of modern propaganda as a 
negative force of mass manipulation and thus opposed to demo-
cracy: in the cases of Adorno, Ellul, and Chomsky and Herman 
an analysis of the dangers of propaganda at best results in pro-
positions of counter-propaganda but not of a more “democra-
tic” propaganda, as was the case in the interbellum years in the 
United States;
• The post-World War II theories on modern propaganda analyze 
a continuous relation between the modern structures of tech-
nological, political, and economic power in relation to modern 
propaganda, either in the form of mass society (Adorno), tech-
nological society (Ellul), or monopolized elite power (Chomsky 
and Herman);
• The post-World War II theories of modern propaganda argue 
that the performance of power aims to construct reality – to 
manufacture consent – in service of the stakeholders of power.
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“propaganda art” of those dictatorships stands in stark if not absolute 
contrast with the art developed in modern democratic societies. As we 
have shown, modern democracy far from excludes the presence of mo-
dern propaganda, and similarly we must explore how this affects the 
practice of art. What, for example, could we expect when applying the 
propaganda model of Chomsky and Herman to artistic production? 
Through what filters and in whose interest, is art produced, presented, 
and validated? And is there a difference in the production of propagan-
da art depending on the kind of modern society in question?
paganda from a variety of perspectives. Adorno assesses the dangers 
of modern propaganda in relation to mass society, from modern ca-
pitalism to dictatorships by means of a psychoanalytical approach. 
Analyzing the rise of the Technological Society, Ellul even declares 
that the real totalitarianism of modern propaganda is yet to come. And 
finally, Chomsky and Herman focus on the process in which modern 
propaganda in democracy operates through filters that manufacture 
consent in the interest of monopolized structures of power. Rather 
than looking for a “solution” to integrate modern propaganda in de-
mocracy, these thinkers – Ellul and Chomsky/Herman in particular 
– seek modes of resistance against propaganda. In their eyes, an al-
ternative approach to democracy cannot but result in a form of coun-
ter-propaganda.
This latter notion of “countering” modern propaganda brings us 
back to the continuous discussion of the relation between modern 
propaganda and democracy. Countering propaganda, as we have seen 
throughout this chapter, is often connected to the idea of protecting 
or articulating a more principled form of democracy, in which power 
is subjected to the continuous control of those living in its sphere of 
influence, for example in the form of radically decentralized or com-
munal governance. This presupposes that the democracies in which 
modern propaganda became operable are not reconcilable with these 
ideals of more “principled” understandings and practices of demo-
cracy. A principled democracy, as asserted by figures such as Dewey, 
Ellul, and Chomsky and Herman, is one in which organized groups 
and communities are capable of protecting their spheres of livelihood 
from the penetration of monopolies of power. Dewey emphasizes the 
importance of critical education, Ellul refers to organized groups at the 
fringes of the Technological Society, whereas Chomsky and Herman 
point to social movements and self-organized communities.
The discussion about modern propaganda as such is just as much 
the beginning of a discussion of the possibility of its alternatives. We 
will elaborate further on the work of those invested in forms of coun-
ter-propaganda or alternative, “emancipatory” propaganda throughout 
the next chapters of this thesis. Let us for now, based on this chapter, 
propose the following definition of modern propaganda:
• Modern propaganda is the performance of power in modern 
society
In the following chapter, we will observe that just as there exists a 
presumption that the concept of propaganda belongs to the domain 
of archaic dictatorships, there exists a persistent conviction that the 






As we noted at the beginning of the first chapter, the term “propagan-
da” in popular opinion has come to symbolize an archaic reminder 
of a dictatorial and “totalitarian” past. However, we have shown that 
the idea that modern propaganda is exclusive to dictatorial regimes is 
incorrect. Rather, modern propaganda has its origins in modern socie-
ties, and British democracy in particular. Of course, the fact that one 
regime or another employs modern propaganda does not necessarily 
make these regimes the same. We observed that modern propaganda 
is inherent to all modern societies – whether democracy or dictators-
hip – but that the performance of power in each of them can be diffe-
rent, which results in different propagandas. This stands in stark con-
trast with the assumption that there is an absolute opposition between 
“totalitarianism” and democracy, as modern propaganda is recurrent 
throughout the history of both.
In the previous chapter, we concluded that modern propaganda is 
the performance of modern structures of power. Modern propaganda 
relies in particular on modern technology and the means of mass com-
munication, with the aim of constructing a reality that serves the inte-
rest of the stakeholders of power. As we observed, modern propaganda 
is multi-disciplinary in nature, constructing a reality – what Chomsky 
and Herman referred to as the manufacturing of consent – that affects 
all domains of life. We analyzed this process as one with a macro- and 
micro-performative dimension. In the case of the micro-performati-
ve dimension of propaganda, people can be implicated in the perfor-
mance of power without necessarily being aware of it. Their attitudes 
and actions are shaped by interests that are not necessarily their own, 
which in the case of Adorno and Ellul we discussed as the “substruc-
tural” working of power.
In our assessment of the development of modern propaganda, we 
touched on a variety of its expressions. Covert propaganda, we saw, 
takes the form of the maintenance of systems of communication and 
of the control over information, such as the underground All Red Line 
cable network during the First World War. Overt propaganda, by con-
trast, takes the form of more explicit and identifiable messages that are 
disseminated through posters, pamphlets, publications, public mani-
festations, radio, and film.1
Especially in the case of the propaganda of 20th-century dictator-
ships, our understanding of propaganda tends to be strongly oriented 
toward the visual identification of overt propaganda. In the case of the 
Nazi and Stalinist dictatorships, for example, specific imagery comes 
1  As we have seen in the previous chapter, each of these media can of course also be used for 
covert propaganda.
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theory in the works of propaganda theorists. For modern propaganda 
is not limited to what we can see, it is also what we come to embody 
and perform, without us necessarily being aware of our own impli-
cation in the process. Furthermore, we saw that modern propaganda 
never expresses itself in a singular manner. Its multidisciplinary nature 
makes isolated case studies of a singular painting or singular film ra-
ther ineffective. Such analyses may in fact even strengthen our idea 
that we are able to understand modern propaganda by isolating one of 
its many expressions, and maintain the idea that we can be “outside” 
the performance of power. Hence, we need to look at propaganda in a 
multidisciplinary sense, and not simply aim to understand propaganda 
by exposing its effects in a given visual form. Its forms, the “art” of 
propaganda, always have to be understood in a contextual sense, mea-
ning that there is a larger set of political, economic, cultural, technolo-
gical, as well as psychological conditions, rooted in specific structures 
of power, which define its actual effect. So why, in this context, should 
we choose to speak about art? Was art not supposed to be exactly that 
which we can see and sense?
In this chapter, through an exploration of the historical definition 
of modern art and a series of examples of modern propaganda art, we 
will argue the contrary. Yes, art is partly reliant on its visibility – it is 
how we identify it as “art” – but its reliance on visibility is not the same 
as actually making things visible. When we look at a work of art, we do 
not necessarily “see” its speculative financial value, we do not “see” 
its function as a status symbol among wealthy elites, we do not “see” 
its cultural capital in relation to the social standing of an individual 
or group, and we don’t “see” its institutional use or abuse – whether 
through a museum or government – in representing specific civilizatio-
nal ideas in the culture wars of our time.
For example, do many people think about the artists implicated in 
the anti-communist witch hunt in the US when looking at a painting 
of Mark Rothko? Most will not. Rather, his works gained fame due to 
a perceived metaphysical, existential experience that results from wit-
nessing these supposedly abstract paintings. But as we will see in this 
chapter, Rothko’s work might as well have been shown in a museum 
of anti-communism: not just as modern art, but as modern propaganda 
art proper, due to its implication in the campaigns of the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom. Art is defined as much by what it reveals as by what 
it conceals, and we could say its very existence is almost paradigmatic 
for the realities that propagandas aim to construct. Power relies on 
form, on becoming manifest, recognized, sensed, admired, but at the 
same time – depending on the kind of power we are examining – it 
tends to only want to be recognized, sensed, and admired in a particu-
to mind, such as large-scale staged theatrical political events, grandio-
se architectural structures,heroic painting and monumental sculpture, 
all of which we tend to remember and identify as “propaganda.” Art 
plays a crucial role in this process, as it is by means of art and its visual 
points of demarcation and identification that these regimes can express 
their power. At the same time, since we tend to orient ourselves on vi-
sual representation, art can also be deceiving. For example, when we 
think of Nazi propaganda, we might bring to mind famous propagan-
da films such as Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), which 
chronicles the 1934 Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg and evokes 
a quasi-religious ritual set in Albert Speer’s ancient Greece-inspired 
architectural site, contributing to the myth of Hitler’s thousand-year 
Reich. One could also think of Fritz Hippler’s film The Eternal Jew 
(1940), which effectively used a method of editing that equated rats 
and vermin with the “plague” that the Nazis considered Judaism. Whi-
le we should not downplay the impact of such films when it comes to 
the effort in which Nazi ideology inscribed itself upon the population, 
it is worthwhile to note that these works are only a small fragment of 
Nazi film production.
In the twelve years of its existence, the Ministry of Propaganda and 
Enlightenment, headed by Joseph Goebbels, produced 1,097 films. 
Only ten percent of its production was directed at overt propaganda 
– such as the above examples – whereas the other ninety percent were 
“mainly escapist entertainment,” which “manipulated social expecta-
tions and helped to create a climate that made the masses susceptible 
to official propaganda,” and displayed the Nazi state as a “normal con-
dition, disoriented morality and, often unobtrusively, instilled Natio-
nal Socialist attitudes, stereotypes and conventions.”2 When it came 
to the ten percent overt propaganda films, the ministry introduced a 
mandatory screening to Nazi Party members in order to guarantee 
attendance. This example teaches us that within dictatorships citizens 
might just as well be able to detect overt propaganda as we are able 
to do in retrospect. The more frightening conclusion is that, just like 
them, the actual propagandistic value of overt propaganda is that it 
allows us to think we know what propaganda is, and thus become more 
susceptible to internalize that which we believe is mere entertainment.
This may indicate that paradoxically, the pompous artistic expres-
sions of the so-called totalitarian regimes distract us from the actual, 
more complex manifestations of modern propaganda, which touches 
upon the ongoing emphasis on psychological and psychoanalytical 
2  Lutz Becker, “Celluloid Lies,” in Dawn Ades, Tim Benton et al. (eds.), Art and Power: Europe 
under the Dictators (London: South Bank Centre, 1995), p. 277.
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time being part of a larger political campaign with a possibly complete-
ly different objective: both are part of the larger reality of modern pro-
paganda art. And that reality also changes the validation of what kind 
of media are relevant to define as art. We will see that modern propa-
ganda art still privileges certain traditional media, such as painting, 
sculpture, and monumentalism, but that the value of such classical 
artforms and the civilizational aura that they bring forth are mediated 
through the interface of modern media, such as radio and film. In the 
final chapter on contemporary propaganda art, we will come to see 
that film and even videogames equally take part in the definition of art 
in the context of contemporary propaganda.
To gain an understanding of the History of Modern Propaganda Art, 
we will first attempt to understand the way in which “modern art” and 
“propaganda art” have been defined historically. We will see that these 
two terms have often been separated, modern art being considered 
as the ultimate expression of a free democratic society, whereas pro-
paganda art would be its dictatorial counterpoint. As we by now may 
suspect, this differentiation itself has lent itself to propagandistic aims. 
Only by revisiting the origins of modern western art we will be able 
to point out this highly problematic opposition between “democratic” 
and “totalitarian” modes of artistic production, which then allows us 
to articulate three models of propaganda art that emerged throughout 
the 20th Century: Avant-Garde Propaganda Art, Totalitarian Propagan-
da Art, and Modernist Propaganda Art. Each of these three models will 
be defined by comparing a specific structure of power to specific art 
forms, as part of our endeavor to define propagandas in the plural.
Let us now explore the historical and political conditions that have 
defined our present-day conception of “modern art.”
lar way, so as not to expose its vulnerabilities that would allow demo-
cratization, change, or overthrow of its current stakeholders. To study 
Modern Propaganda through Modern Propaganda Art means that we 
will both analyze the workings of modern propaganda and the kind of 
reality it aims to construct: a reality partly visible and partly concealed 
through art.
To speak of modern propaganda art means to critically revisit and 
challenge the foundational myths of modern art, its supposed auto-
nomy and independent faculty in representing the world around us, 
rather than to look into propaganda art that aims to construct the world 
which we inhabit. It means that we must engage in a material analysis 
of the political, economic, and ideological conditions under which art 
is produced and artists are implicated in the performance of power in 
modern society. The result is that we will approach artworks as im-
plicated in the larger interface between structures of power and the 
reality these structures and their stakeholders aim to construct. The 
work of art in modern society is not simply what it “is,” but far more 
how it is mediated. As Frankfurt School philosopher Walter Benjamin 
argued in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility” (1935), that the artwork in modern society may well 
be defined by its reproduction.3 In other words, in the modern age, art 
has become part of the larger domain of mass culture – the culture 
industry that Adorno despised. As much as art continues to try to dis-
tinguish itself from mass culture,  to remain art, its means of produc-
tion, mediation, and validation rely upon it, just like any other cultural 
commodity. What we call “art” is a product of historical processes, in 
which the changing nature of power structures also impact the nature 
of art. The modern age, which made modern propaganda possible, also 
made modern propaganda art possible, and in doing so it has redefined 
what we can understand to be “art” as such. The artwork, its reproduction 
and mediation in this context, cannot be separated from one another. 
A painting is also its reproduction as a propaganda poster; it is also its 
mediation through a television program on western “high” culture; it 
is also a symbol of legitimation of ruling powers when it hangs in the 
director’s office, and so forth. One of the realities of this artwork is not 
more “true” to the artwork than the other. The painting is inherent to 
the interface through which it is produced, disseminated, validated, 
etc.
In this chapter, we will thus see how an artwork can both be consi-
dered as an image or proposition of a specific idea, while at the same 
3  Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on 
Media (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 19–55.
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In his book MammonArt: An Essay on Economic Interpretation (1925) 
writer and politician Upton Sinclair claims that the history of art as 
propaganda began with a fictional figure he calls “Mr Ogi,” supposedly 
the very first caveman–artist in human art history. Sinclair describes 
how Mr Ogi begins to inscribe symbols into the sand of a cave, invo-
king in his clan of cavemen the fear about the “magic” he unleashes by 
making silhouettes of animals appear. In Sinclair’s story, the caveman 
Mr Ogi is forced to prove to the leader of his clan that this “magic” is 
not a threat to his authority. To avoid punishment, Mr Ogi is willing 
to draw under the leader’s command, strengthening his position in the 
clan by this added “magic.” As such, Mr Ogi becomes the first court 
painter in history: the very first artist in the prehistory of mankind is 
immediately forced to dedicate his work to ruling powers to protect his 
position within the social context that he is implicated in.4 From that 
initial historical moment, Sinclair concludes that art has always been 
complicit with power and has never been able to escape the interests of 
its ruling classes, thus coining the slogan “All art is propaganda.”5 For 
Sinclair, all art is part of the performance of power.
Art historian Toby Clark makes a similar assessment, when he states 
that “the use of art in the service of politics has a deep and enduring 
history.” He explains that “[r]ulers of the city-states, kingdoms, and 
empires of the ancient world used art at a monumental scale to reitera-
te their power, glorify their victories, or to intimidate and defame their 
enemies.”6 We notice in the comment of Clark immediately that what 
he refers to as “monumental scale,” is not limited to visual art in terms 
of sculpture or painting alone, but encompasses the architectural set-
tings in which art is displayed as one of many signifiers of power. Ar-
chitecture is here an example of an ancient “interface” through which 
art is presented, activated, and validated. Most thinkers that have en-
gaged in the articulation of what we know today as modern art have 
made similar assessments; from the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau to modernist art critic Clement Greenberg. Each of them 
recognize the historical dependency and servitude of art in relation to 
dominant structures of power; they support the idea that art histori-
cally always propagandized on behalf of a ruling power, but simulta-
neously argue for a possibility of art to gain a form of “freedom,” or 
even “autonomy.”
4  Upton Sinclair, MammonArt (San Diego: Simon Publications, 2003), pp. 1–7.
5  Ibid., p. 9.
6  Toby Clark, Art and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc. Pub-
lishers, 1997), p. 9.
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Arts and Sciences (1750). In this work, Rousseau argues that the propo-
nents of the arts and sciences in society had become the prime symp-
toms of its moral corruption. Europe, which in Rousseau’s view had 
“relapsed into barbarism” after the Dark Ages in its self-perception of 
being “highly enlightened,” claimed that “scientific jargon, more des-
picable than mere ignorance, had usurped the name of knowledge, and 
opposed an almost invincible obstacle to its restoration.”11 The arts 
and sciences embodied, in Rousseau’s eyes, the decay of true human 
nature, its innocence, virtue, and “happy ignorance”12:
So long as government and law provide for the security and well-be-
ing of men in their common life, the arts, literature and the scien-
ces, less despotic though perhaps more powerful, fling garlands 
of flowers over the chains which weigh them down. They stifle in 
men’s breasts that sense of original liberty, for which they seem to 
have been born; cause them to love their own slavery, and so make 
of them what is called a civilized people.13
Rousseau argued that it was the arts and sciences that served the power 
and legitimacy of the despots, and in return for their service, they gai-
ned their protection and status. As such, the arts and sciences were no-
thing but a glorification of a world still in chains, a people of the Dark 
Ages decorated with a veil of cultivation to hide their actual enslave-
ment.14 Rousseau, instead, argued that one needed to look not at the 
philosophers and artists, who claimed the knowledge of truth, but at 
the “laborer,” where one would find “strength and vigor of the body,” 
for he believed that “[b]efore art had molded our behavior, and taught 
our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rude but 
natural.”15 Art and sciences represented a dangerous skepticism that 
repressed the ignorance and virtue located in the common man and 
suppressed its true knowledge. The artist, addicted to applause and 
luxury, was himself in chains, and as such not capable of contributing 
to the common good of society. The only true recompense, if anything, 
should be the “happiness of the peoples they have enlightened by their 
wisdom,” but as “long as power alone is on one side, and knowledge 
and understanding is on the other, the learned will seldom make great 
objects their study, princes will still more rarely do great actions, and 
11  Rousseau, Rousseau’s Social Contract Etc., p. 130.
12  Ibid., p. 136.
13  Ibid., pp. 130–31.
14  Victor Gourevitch writes in this regard: “In societies where judgments are under the sway of pub-
lic opinion and private interests, people cease to trust their taste and defer, instead, to what is 
approved by those who are supposed to know better: the great, the rich, the artists.” Gourevitch, 
“Rousseau on the Arts and Sciences,” p. 741.
15  Rousseau, Rousseau’s Social Contract Etc., p. 132.
This historical dependency of art stands in stark contrast with the 
popular and contemporary conception of art as a form of expression 
that is synonymous to freedom. The shock concerning works of art 
that have been used as propaganda has much to do with the societal 
ideals that are invested in the idea of art as something that expresses 
something “more” or “higher” than politics, most certainly in the con-
text of modern democracy. But if mankind has always propagandized 
and art has always been part of this process, how did the general as-
sumption of art as an expression of freedom or even autonomy come 
about? Somewhere in the process, art must have been “liberated” from 
this servitude, from its condition of being a tool of propagandization. 
This idea that a true art is a free art is essentially the heritage of the 
Enlightenment and the rise of modernity. It is in the establishment of 
the modern nation-state that the idea of autonomy was articulated, 
both for the citizenry at large and for art. This notion of autonomy, we 
will see, is what we associate with the concept of artistic freedom, and 
it is this artistic freedom with which we generally – and as we will see, 
mistakenly – tend to separate propaganda art from modern art.
To understand the idea of art as something that is or should be 
detached form political instrumentalization, we begin by discussing 
the work of Rousseau, who, rather than being a proponent of art, was 
skeptical of its subservience to ruling power. Rousseau’s defense of 
ignorance against the Enlightenment was rooted in his belief that an 
“unmediated or natural perception of the world is possible.”7 In his 
famous text The Social Contract, or Of the Social Contract, or Principles of 
Political Law (1762), he revolted against what he considered the “par-
ticular interest” that would come as a consequence of the rationalist 
world view of the Enlightenment, against which he posited the impor-
tance of the “general will,” which he sought in nature and the social 
construct of primitive man.8 When the general will would triumph, the 
“sovereign” would no longer be the single ruler, but be transposed by 
the general will of the peoples separated from and in control of the go-
vernment.9 The outcome is what he describes as “civil society,” which 
would establish a balance between “natural right and political right,” 
between “man and citizen,” in order to guarantee the common good.10
Rousseau’s relation to art was sharpened through polemics with 
Enlightenment thinkers, most importantly in his text Discourse on the 
7  Terence E. Marshal, “Rousseau and the Enlightenment,” Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4, Special 
Issue: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Nov. 1978): pp. 421–55, at p. 423.
8  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau’s Social Contract Etc. (London/Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons; 
New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1923), p. 22.
9  Ibid., p. 16.
10  Victor Gourevitch, “Rousseau on the Arts and Sciences,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 
20 (Nov. 9, 1972): pp. 737–75, at p. 753.
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was elected as a member of the Committee of Public Safety, which 
identified the counterrevolutionaries that the Revolutionary Tribunal 
would persecute and kill during the Reign of Terror.21 He was far from 
the only artist who would join the revolution. Amongst young artists 
and students, who were not benefiting from the highly exclusive and 
privileged position of a minority of artists that served the upper classes 
and monarchy, and who tended to marry into other rich artist fami-
lies from one generation to the other, the revolution was a chance to 
demand equality of artistic opportunity. Art historian David L. Dowd 
even speaks of the involvement of artists such as David and his less 
known comrade Antoine-François Sergent, in terms of “propagan-
dists”:
The revolutionary leaders, impelled by artist-politicians like David 
and Sergent, established a system of financial encouragement of 
painters of talent and inaugurated largescale public works projects 
to feed the artists as well as to provide effective revolutionary pro-
paganda. Many painters were employed for the fêtes nationales of the 
Revolution, and these propaganda demonstrations helped many of 
them to survive. Local authorities at the departmental, district, and 
communal levels as well as the popular societies also commissio-
ned innumerable works of art. Allegorical paintings of Liberty and 
Equality, scenes of military victories and “great days” of the Revo-
lution, representations of heroes and martyrs of the First French 
Republic, classic canvases depicting republican Greece and Rome, 
as well as appropriate decorations for public buildings, were orde-
red.22
Now that the arts gained their part in the general will as represented 
by the revolutionary government, their support did not just come from 
private patronage, but through public subsidies; the breakdown of aca-
demic barriers increased the number of female artists in the academies 
during the revolution; new public cultural institutions such as the Lou-
vre Museum, the Museum of French Monuments, and the National 
Jury of Arts were founded; and overall, after the revolution, the status 
of artists in society had changed.23 Through the work and politics of 
21  David L. Dowd, “Jacques-Louis David, Artist Member of the Committee of General Security,” 
The American Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Jul. 1952): pp. 871–92.
22  David L. Dowd, “The French Revolution and the Painters,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 1, No. 
2 (1959): pp. 127–48, at p. 143.
23  With respect to the foundation of the new museums Idzerda notes a great dilemma of the new 
revolutionary government, which on one hand wanted to protect and elevate the arts in support 
of the common good, but on the other hand were faced with an artistic heritage that had largely 
been commissioned and financed by the ancien régime. As a response, in 1790, a Monuments 
Commission (later followed by the Temporary Arts Commission) was established comprising 
David and others, who were to designate works of art that were worthy of preservation by the 
the peoples will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt and mise-
rable.”16 While Rousseau does not speak explicitly of propaganda, his 
description of the arts serving as a veil to the benefit of ruling powers, 
a tool that inscribes its specific class interests upon the societal realm, 
comes very close to what we understand as a description of propagan-
da art.17
Rousseau’s died before the French Revolution and a personality 
cult would develop around his legacy. While at first this cult mainly 
centered on his literary work, from 1789 on his concept of the general 
will gained more and more traction as the political counterpoint to the 
constitutional monarchy of king Louis XVI and as a tool to legitimi-
ze the new revolutionary government.18 It was especially the Republi-
can “Jacobin Club” that strove to establish a republic to implement 
the ideals of rational government set forward by the Enlightenment 
thinkers, which would paradoxically come to embrace Rousseau’s 
ideas, most famously in the figure of French lawyer and politician 
Maximilien Robespierre. In 1789, the Jacobin Club disposed Louis 
XVI, and established a people’s revolutionary government that would, 
in the course of history, be heavily debated both because of the foun-
dational moment of the modern state it initiated, as well as the “Reign 
of Terror” it at the same time imposed.19
This possibility of acquiring a new, “liberating” kind of dependency 
is possibly best exemplified through the work of painter Jacques-Louis 
David. David was a member of the Jacobin Club and a dedicated su-
pporter of Robespierre and the French Revolution. In the years pre-
ceding the overthrow of the ancien régime, his studio was a gathering 
place for political, intellectual, and social leaders of the day.20 During 
the radical phase of the revolution, he had a seat in the National Con-
vention and liaisons with the Revolutionary Tribunal. David himself 
16  Ibid., p. 153.
17  Rousseau’s alternative for an art that once liberated from its subservience to the despot could 
contribute to the common good was located in his ideal of the public theater festival: “The 
closest he [Rousseau] comes to a suggestion about the role the arts might play in a society 
with good morals is the recommendation that Geneva, instead of introducing a permanent 
theater, establish public festivals in which all would participate and which would provide joyous 
occasions on which everyone is both actor and spectator, fully himself and fully a member of 
the community, where all class distinctions are forgotten and all do and hold everything in 
common.” Gourevitch, “Rousseau on the Arts and Sciences,” p. 743. It is interesting to keep this 
proposition in mind when we discuss the emergence of mass cultural manifestations in the form 
of the Proletkult art groups – Proletarian Culture – in the years of the Russian Revolution below.
18  Gordon H. McNeil, “The Cult of Rousseau and the French Revolution,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr. 1945): pp. 197–212.
19  Albert Soboul, “Robespierre and the Popular Movement of 1793–4,” Past & Present, No. 5 (May 
1954): pp.54–70. Discussions on the legitimacy of the Reign of Terror continues up unto today, 
in which right-wing and conservative thinkers tend to associate it with the inherent violent 
nature of the left, whereas left-wing and revolutionary thinkers interpret it as a form of popular 
self-defense against the systemic violence imposed by the sovereign. See also: Sophie Wahnich, 
In Defence of the Terror (London/New York: Verso, 2015).
20  For a detailed assessment of David’s role in the French Revolution, see: Warren Roberts, Jacques 
Louis David: Revolutionary Artist (Chapel Hill/London: The University of Carolina Press, 1989).
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ting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest,” and only 
such object of liking can be called “beautiful.”27 Subsequently, what 
brings a universal judgment of aesthetics about is a “subjective purpo-
siveness,”28 meaning that the purpose at hand is not a functional one, 
but one that relates back to its own “autonomy.”29 As mentioned, the 
beauty of the object for Kant is not necessarily the object of art. None-
theless, Kant’s conception of a “purposeless purpose” of the aesthetic 
experience would become applied to art in the course of history; as an 
explanation and legitimization of art’s autonomy and its search for the 
sublime.30 Kant’s own view of the essence of art would neither propa-
gate the instrumental logic of elite interests, nor that of a revolutionary 
movement – its laws are of a different kind. This is crucial, as the idea 
that Kantian aesthetics are the equivalent of the aesthetics of art, laid 
the very foundation for centuries of discussion about the definition of 
the “freedom” of art: not just in terms of the rights to expression or the 
need to stand outside of political instrumentalization and its rational 
interest; it solidified the idea that outside the Kantian notion of auto-
nomy and its purposeless purpose we cannot speak of something in 
terms of art at all.31
Kant himself claims that “we should not call anything art except 
a production through freedom, i.e., through a power of choice that 
bases its acts on reason.”32 Nonetheless, this notion of the freedom of 
art is not the same as an autonomy of art. For Kant, autonomy lies in 
the aesthetic experience – maybe even in the aesthetic experience of 
an artwork – but not necessarily within the artwork itself.33 This does 
27  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), p. 53.
28  Ibid., p. 66.
29  Ibid., p. 25.
30  The sublime, different from beauty, is for Kant not what provokes contemplation, but rather that 
which supersedes our capacity of comparison. It is a “magnitude that is equal only to itself,” but, 
provoking both fright and awe in the subject, it “proves that the mind has a power surpassing 
any standard of sense.” Whereas Kant emphasizes grand and terrifying events in nature that 
provoke such experiences of the sublime, he at the same time perceives the experience of the 
sublime as a proof of the human mind’s capacity to conceptualize even infinity: an incalculable 
experience can still be captured in the realm of the senses, of aesthetic experience, leading 
him to the observation that this means that the human mind within itself holds a power that is 
“supersensible.” Ibid., pp. 105, 106.
31  Haskins points out that the paradox in the notion of purposeless purpose is that its purpose is 
exactly to define what the autonomy of art is in relation to that which it is not. In relation to 
historians and critics who followed a neo-Kantian paradigm of artistic autonomy, such as the 
American critic Clement Greenberg, she introduces the notion of “instrumental autonomism,” 
which “emphasizes the work of art’s distinctive capacity, as an object of value, to do something 
not done, or not done the same way, by other kind of objects.” In other words, the need to make 
a distinction between art’s autonomy and the realm of instrumental reason is not so much 
devoid of purpose, but rather defines a different purpose of art all together: “[W]hile strict 
autonomism presupposes that artistic value is necessarily a form of intrinsic, as opposed to in-
strumental value, instrumental autonomism permits works of art to be valuable, as works of art, 
both intrinsically and instrumentally.” We will see this more specifically in the employment of 
autonomous art in the Cold War. Casey Haskins, “Kant and the Autonomy of Art,” The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 1981): pp.43–55, at p. 43.
32  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 170.
33  As Jean-Marie Schaeffer explains, Kant considers art always compromised when it comes to 
engaging in a pure aesthetic judgement due to the added intentions of the artist: “Any human 
the artists in the revolution, a level of social equality was achieved that 
changed the role of the artists as servants or superior craftsmen into 
one recognized as fundamental to the expression of the general will.24 
Art propagated the revolution, but the artist was – embodied in the 
figure of David – also an inherent part of the revolution, among others 
through their role in developing the countless revolutionary festivals 
that were to propagate the new revolutionary calendar and the rites 
of the new “secular religion” of the Republic upon its populations.25 
This was not without risks, the death of Robespierre in 1794 under 
the same guillotine to which he and David had sent the enemies of 
their revolution became a historic paradigm of the “revolution eats its 
own children.” This paradigm will resurface in the second section of 
this chapter when we will discuss the role of artists in the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia. But let us first see how the liberation of art from 
despotic instrumentalization was to be elaborated further.
In the years of the French Revolution, the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant resided in the small Prussian town of Königsberg, 
currently known as Kaliningrad. He was an open supporter of the Ja-
cobins, which was slightly paradoxical as he was simultaneously also a 
pacifist and convinced of the moral imperative to obey the law.26 While 
inspired by the moral philosophy of Rousseau, Kant did not believe 
humankind could find morality in and of itself – that is to say, by em-
bracing its “primitive” or “innocent” nature – but rather through the 
furthering of rational social organizations in which all would be subject 
to the same set of laws.The work of Kant that concerns us primarily 
is the Critique of Judgement (1790), in which he sets out to define the 
conditions for aesthetic judgement; not just in relation to “fine art” but 
to aesthetic objects in the widest sense, predominantly in nature.
In his elaboration of aesthetic sensibility, Kant argues that while 
the notion of taste is crucial in the process of judging a specific object, 
this taste cannot be one of mere enjoyment or sensation. Rather, Kant 
claims, “[t]aste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presen-
state, whereas others were to be publicly destroyed. This iconoclasm was formally sanctioned by 
the state, and the massive mobilization that resulted from it made it nearly impossible to keep 
track of public monuments and sculptures that were destroyed in mass campaigns of the com-
munes. The commissions attempted to balance the paradox between the need for destruction 
and preservation by initiating public destructions of art works as festivities on one hand, and 
moving designated works to be protected within the new museums. This brings Idzerda to ob-
serve that “[i]t seems probable that when these works were seen in the museum, torn out of their 
cultural context, they were regarded only as ‘art’; their significance as tokens, symbols, or mana 
had been drained away because of their placement in an artificial situation, a strange milieu,” 
concluding that “the public museum may be said to have originated as both an instrument of 
and a result of iconoclasm.” Stanley J. Idzerda, “Iconoclasm during the French Revolution,” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Oct. 1954): pp. 13–26, at p. 24.
24  Dowd, “The French Revolution and the Painters,” p. 154.
25  Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 
1988).
26  Sidney Axinn, “Kant, Authority, and the French Revolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 
32, No. 3 (Jul.–Sep. 1971): pp. 423–32.
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is important for us to mention: the originally military concept of the 
“avant-garde,” which usage as part of the canon of modernity, accor-
ding to literary critic and professor of comparative literature Matei Ca-
linescu, equally “started in the aftermath of the French Revolution.”38
The ideas of the French political and economic theorist Henri de 
Saint-Simon developed his ideas about the avant-garde in the after-
math of the French Revolution. Originally known as the “duke” of 
Saint-Simon, he had rejected his aristocratic status after returning 
from his voluntary participation in a cavalry regiment in the year 1779 
of the American Revolutionary War. The rejection of hereditary privi-
lege followed his ideals of a new society for the industrial age, inspired 
both by the American Revolutionary War and the French Revolution, 
but different from Rousseau and Kant, he emphasized the possibi-
lity of furthering the human cause by embracing and expanding the 
possibilities offered by the First Industrial Revolution.39 Saint-Simon’s 
later classification as a utopian philosopher was strengthened by his 
book Système Industriel (1825), in which he espoused his vision of the 
advancement of the industrial age that would be led by a new type of 
scientist who would help the development of society and the possibility 
of a global peace.40
Later in his life, Saint-Simon’s approach to the “engineering” of 
society in industrial terms would shift from a “mechanistic philosophy 
of nature popularized in France during the Enlightenment under the 
influence of Newtonian thought” to a “Romantic idea of society as a 
kind of living organism.”41 He sought a new role of artists in society 
by “placing them at the head of an elite administrative trinity con-
sisting of artists, scientists, and industrialists-artisans.”42 In a fictional 
dialogue between the artist and the scientist from his foundational text 
L’artiste, le savant et l’industriel (1824) – either co-written or ghostwri-
tten by Saint-Simon’s disciple and friend Olinde Rodrigues –  the ar-
tist makes a plea for the unification of the three forces of art, science, 
38  Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodern-
ism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 101.
39  Saint-Simon’s vision of a new league of nations would prove to be timely. See, for example: Elliot 
H. Polinger, “Saint Simon, The Utopian Precursor of the League of Nations,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct. 1943): pp. 475–83, at p. 475.
40  Saint-Simon’s ideas in this regard have retrospectively been argued to be a kind of Marxism 
avant la lettre. But whereas Saint-Simon has often been referenced as the “Father of Socialism,” 
his own ideas were strongly influenced by liberal philosophy, in which the rationale of free 
exchange would naturally rid the idlers from the new industrial society for the common good of 
all. Nonetheless, his clear articulation of a conflict of classes and belief in industrial progress and 
the inevitability of a post-statist political and economic paradigm that would benefit the world at 
large shows clear parallels, and after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, Lenin personally sanctioned 
a statue to be erected in Saint-Simon’s name. For an early study on Saint-Simon and Marx, see 
Alice M. MacIver, “Saint Simon and His Influence on Karl Marx,” Economica, No. 6 (October 
1922): pp. 238–45.
41  Donald D. Egbert, “The Idea of the Avant-Garde in Art and Politics,” Leonardo, Vol. 3, No. 1 
(Jan. 1970): pp. 75–86, at p. 76.
42  Ibid.
not mean that fine art knows no constraints in Kant’s view. There is a 
necessary “mechanism” that forms the body – the academic form – in 
which an idea manifests itself and without which the “free spirit” of art 
would evaporate.34 This seemingly contradictory process of academic 
necessity versus the freedom of art’s spirit is explained by Kant in ana-
logy to nature: “Nature, we say, is beautiful if it also looks like art; and 
art can be called fine art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet 
it looks to us like nature.”35 Fine art must look like nature, even though 
we are aware that it is art. That which connects the seeming paradox 
between reason and nature is the figure of the genius. For the artist-ge-
nius cannot be merely contained within his training: “Nature, through 
genius, prescribes the rule not to science but to art, and this also only 
insofar as the art is to be fine art.”36 The artist’s skill is thus only partly 
academic in nature, for essentially, it is nature that expresses is beauty 
through the academic discipline of the artist:
Genius can only provide rich material for products of fine art; pro-
cessing this material and giving it form requires talent that is acade-
mically trained, so that it may be used in a way that can stand the 
test of the power of judgment.37
When trying to understand the concept of modern art, it is crucial to 
keep in mind the key terms that Kant introduces here: for it is through 
the notions of aesthetic autonomy and freedom, aesthetic sensibility 
and the sublime, as well as the emphasis on the academy and the no-
tion of the artist-genius, that modern art was founded. It was a practice 
of art that was made possible through revolutionary tendencies from 
the Enlightenment to the French Revolution, but that simultaneously 
departed from its instrumental reason and gained its relative indepen-
dence.
Before we attempt to explore how Rousseau’s plea for a libera-
tion of art from its subservience to despots and Kant’s translation of 
this agency into the notion of artistic freedom has affected the his-
tory of modern propaganda art, there is a final historical concept that 
creativity, whether artisanal or belonging to the fine arts, can be referred to a determinate 
intention (Absicht). Thus if we experience the finality in a work of art, this is in conformity of 
our expectations, since we know that such an object corresponds to a specific end, namely the 
one that guided its creator.” On the contrary, Schaeffer continues, “We do not posit such an 
intention for natural objects, and that is why, when they manifest a finality, it is a finality without 
representation of a specific end, giving rise to pure aesthetic experience”. Jean-Marie Schaeffer, 
Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger (Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), pp. 33–34, 35.
34  Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 171.
35  Ibid., p. 174.
36  Ibid., p. 175.
37  Ibid., p. 178.
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aesthetic experience.47 The introduction of the concept of avant-garde 
represented what was at stake when the artists would take their pro-
per role in advancing modernity: the objective of not merely represen-
ting and propagating, but directly shaping and transforming society 
through the faculty of art. Although that does not necessarily mean 
that modernity and the avant-garde can be conflated; Calinescu argues 
that “The avant-garde is in every respect more radical than moderni-
ty,”48 and concludes: “It is quite clear that the avant-garde would have 
been hardly conceivable in the absence of a distinct and fully develo-
ped consciousness of modernity; however, such an acknowledgment 
does not warrant the confusion of modernity or modernism with the 
avant-garde [..].”49
What we have seen from Rousseau to Kant and Saint-Simon, is 
how in mere half a century fueled by a short-lived but profound revo-
lution, a series of concepts were introduced that up until today con-
tinue to define our understanding of Western modern art. Notions 
such as the freedom of art, its autonomy, the artist-genius, the su-
blime, and the overall idea that the specific sensibilities of art pro-
vide an exceptional status that might be used for the betterment of 
society, if not in the form of an avant-garde, have become an inhe-
rent part of our understanding of modern art. Whereas we should 
shy away from imposing the term propaganda too easily on a time-
frame in which it was not in common use, we see that the dilemma 
between free and instrumentalized art, between “autonomous” and 
“propaganda art” was already present.
The crises and revolutions sweeping throughout Europe up until 
the 20th century and the rise of modern technology and industry were 
a chance to redefine the relation of art to life. New structures of power 
– and ideological and organizational visions of how to distribute and 
apply this power – also made a new art possible. The remnants of the 
autocratic institutions that heralded an art of privilege and exception 
were to be destroyed for a new world and a new art to be born
For example, the futurists, in the spirit of the imperialist, anti-de-
mocratic, and patriarchal politics of Mussolini’s fascism, famously 
47  According to Rose Frances Egan, the origins of the concept of “l’art pour l’art,” would have first 
been uttered in 1804 by the French writer, politician, and journalist Benjamin Constant, who 
was strongly influenced by German Romanticism. Writing on a meeting with a student of the 
German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, who presented him his work on Kant’s 
aesthetics, Constant writes: “Son travail sur l’Esthétique de Kant a des idées très energiques. 
L’art pour I’art, sans but, car tout but dénature l’art. Mais I’art atteint un but qu’il n’a pas.” 
Thus grounding the concept historically as an interpretation of Kant’s paradigm of art’s 
“purposeless purpose.” Rose Frances Egan, The Genesis of the Theory of “Art for Art’s Sake” 
in Germany and in England (Northampton/Paris: Departments of Modern Languages of Smith 
College, 1921), pp. 10–11.
48  Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, p. 96.
49  Ibid., pp. 96-97.
and industry, which he considers crucial for human progress, for “Qui 
pourrait satisfaire aux besoins de l’homme, ou lui procurer les jouis-
sances qui sont aussi des besoins pour lui, si les arts, l’industrie, les 
sciences, venaient tout à coup à disparaître?”43 Not the government, 
but the union between these forces was to direct a new society, for they 
“peuvent marcher d’elles-mêmes, et sans lesquelles rien ne pourrait 
marcher.”44 This new union is what holds the power to advance the 
general wellbeing of society. In the case of the artist, that means that 
the ideal world they inhabited could no longer be an exclusive domain, 
but should serve the public cause. The artist in Saint-Simon’s dialogue 
concluded that:
C’est nous, artistes, qui vous servirons d’avant-garde; la puissance 
des arts est en effet la plus immédiate et la plus rapide. Nous avons 
des armes de toute espèce: quand nous voulons répandre des idées 
neuves parmi les hommes nous les inscrivons sur le marbre ou sur 
la toile; nous les popularisons par la poésie et le chant; nous emplo-
yons tour à tour la lyre ou le galoubet, l’ode ou la chanson, l’his-
toire ou le roman; la scène dramatique nous est ouverte, et c’est là 
surtout que nous exerçons une influence électrique et victorieuse. 
Nous nous adressons à l’imagination et aux sentiments de l’hom-
me nous devons donc exercer toujours l’action la plus vive et la 
plus décisive; et si aujourd’hui notre rôle paraît nul ou au moins 
très-secondaire, c’est qu’il manquait aux arts ce qui est essentiel à 
leur énergie et à leurs succès, une impulsion commune et une idée 
générale.45
As we can see, Saint-Simon in some ways developed Rousseau’s ideas 
on the possible role of the artists by putting their imagination to servi-
ce as an avant-garde of the common good; in the words of Calinescu: 
“To Saint-Simon, the artist is the “man of imagination” and, as such, 
he is capable not only of foreseeing the future but also of creating it.”46 
Different from Rousseau, however, Saint-Simon pushed the possibility 
of a massive rational organization of society to its furthest consequen-
ce, by concentrating on the triple powers represented by the artists, 
scientists, and industrialists-artisans. Saint-Simon rejected what had 
become known as “l’art pour l’art” – an “art for art’s sake,” a popu-
lar concept which echoed Kant’s idea of the “purposeless purpose” of 
43  Henri de Saint-Simon, Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin, Oeuvres de Saint-Simon (Paris: Librairie de 
la Société des Gens de Lettres, 1875), p. 202.
44  Ibid., p. 205.
45  Ibid., pp. 210–11.
46  Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, p. 102.
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experience and freedom of art (Kant), or to form a vanguard of 
modernity (Saint-Simon).
These three conflicting ideals will guide our discussion in the following 
three sections. Let us now first explore more concretely how artistic re-
volutionary theories of the politicization of modern art tested the outer 
limits of Saint-Simon’s conception of the avant-garde of the industrial 
society through the notion of Avant-Garde Propaganda Art.
declared their “intend to liberate […] [Italy] from the countless mu-
seums that have covered it like so many cemeteries,”50 and embraced 
what they regarded as the cleansing effects of war and technology: 
“We intend to glorify war – the only hygiene of the world – militarism, 
patriotism, the destructive gesture of the anarchists, beautiful ideas 
worth dying for, and contempt for women.”51 By contrast, the Berlin 
dadaists, strongly allied with German Bolshevism, accused expressio-
nism of operating under the pretext of being “propaganda for the soul” 
preaching a “comfortable life free from content or strife.”52 In their 
unambiguous embrace of the “muddle of noises, colors and spiritual 
rhythms” that composed daily modern urban life, the dadaists decla-
red themselves as a new art movement in which even the businessman 
could be a creator and “every man is chairman and every man can have 
his say in artistic matters.”53
As different as these avant-garde movements were in their ideolo-
gical orientation, they were all marked by their willingness to embrace 
and translate the ideas of political revolution into an artistic one and 
vice versa.
But let us first make three observations based on this first summary 
of the origins of the concept of modern art:
• The age of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, gave 
rise to a conflicting set of concepts that differentiated art from 
its undifferentiated unity with the ruling powers: the politics of 
modernity created the foundation for our current conception of 
modern art;
• The different ideas that fueled the revolution and its outcomes 
resulted in different structures of power, each of which impacted 
the practice and outcomes of art differently: a process in which 
we perceive a continuous relationship between different forms of 
power and different artistic forms;
• The age of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, fur-
ther gave rise to conflicting ideals of how artistic independen-
ce was to be gained concretely in relation to new structures of 
power: either by siding with popular movements (Rousseau, Da-
vid), by differentiating itself specifically from the realm of po-
litical instrumentalization and claiming autonomy of aesthetic 
50  Filippo Marinetti, “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” in Lawrence Rainey, Christine 
Poggi, Laura Wittman (eds.), Futurism: An Anthology (New Haven/London: Yale University 
Press, 2009), p. 52.
51  Ibid., p. 51.
52  Richard Hülsebeck, “First German Dada Manifesto,” in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (eds.), 
Art in Theory: 1900-1990 (Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 254.
53  Ibid., p. 255.
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From cubism to futurism, from dadaism to constructivism, the early 
twentieth century brought about political changes and revolutionary 
tendencies that generated a variety of avant-garde movements. Of our 
specific interest are those that articulated their theory and practice in 
relation to the political realm and engaged with the notion of “propa-
ganda.” In no other context than the Russian Bolshevik Revolution 
this was done with the same rigor and political implications, and in 
no other context was the complex relation between avant-garde and 
subsequent “totalitarian art” more explicit.
The First World War of 1914–18 did not only give birth to the first 
modern propaganda apparatus in the heart of British empire, it also 
created the conditions that sparked the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, 
resulting in the establishment of the Soviet Union, bound to beco-
me the main political and ideological challenger of Western capitalist 
democracy. Similar to the French Revolution, the Bolshevik October 
Revolution was simultaneously a political and a cultural revolution. 
Lenin’s article “Party Organization and Party Literature” (1905) was 
foundational for the revolution’s perspective on the relation between 
the Party and the arts. In the text, written in the year of the gene-
ral strike when the Bolsheviks were not yet in power, Lenin calls for 
taking literature under party control, demanding that “[n]ewspapers 
must become the organs of the various party organizations, and their 
writers must by all means become members of these organizations.” As 
a consequence, “[p]ublishing and distributing centers, bookshops and 
reading-rooms, libraries and similar establishments—must all be un-
der party control.”54 At the same time, Lenin emphasizes that outside 
of the party “[e]veryone is free to write and say whatever he likes, wi-
thout any restrictions.” Within the context of the party, however, Lenin 
demands the same freedom to “expel members who use the name of 
the party to advocate anti-party views.”55
Essentially, Lenin questions the very notion of artistic freedom, as 
he claims that “[t]here can be no real and effective ‘freedom’ in a so-
ciety based on the power of money, in a society in which the masses of 
working people live in poverty and the handful of rich live like parasi-
tes.” In a context very different from Rousseau and Robespierre, Lenin 
clearly perceived that a shift to a revolutionary, egalitarian society also 
entailed a shift in the role of the arts: rather than reducing the notion 
of artistic freedom to the limited privilege of serving the tsarist regime 
54  Vladimir Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 10 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 44–49.
55  Ibid.
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vative dictate of singular monumental figures to be inserted into the 
public domain to elevate the masses, we may discern his characteristic 
pragmatism: knowing fully well that the Soviet Union, devastated by 
the First World War and the subsequent Civil War, was not yet in any 
condition to radically re-invent its public institutions, he leaned on 
existing methodologies that he wished to see cautiously transformed 
into the new revolutionary reality.
Lenin considered propaganda to be fundamentally different from 
indoctrination. Propaganda was “designed to mobilize youth and 
adults for important social and economic tasks,”62 whereas indoctri-
nation in the form of “memorization or reiteration of Marxist slogans 
and phrases” seemed to him “unintelligent and unproductive.”63 Le-
nin essentially considered propaganda to be mass education in ac-
tion. His concept of education rejected the Enlightenment belief that 
reason was a self-emancipating force, nor did he believe in Tolstoy’s 
Rousseauian rejection of educational institutions as a corruption of 
the spontaneous nature of mankind: according to Lenin, education 
was political in nature, as political revolution preceded cultural deve-
lopment. A revolutionary political consciousness would allow for the 
construction of socialism and hence the advancement of education. 
Propaganda – combining the dissemination of ideas with mobilization 
for direct action – was exactly the type of education that the still fragile 
Soviet Union needed.64
The post-revolutionary period saw a rise of different cultural 
groups engaged in agitprop (agitational propaganda), which organized 
“street festivals and mass-action dramas” stressing popular involve-
ment and deriving their material both from “festivals of the French 
Revolution” and “Russian Orthodox ceremonial processions with the 
carnivalesque styles of folk entertainment, incorporating clowns, li-
fe-size puppets, street criers, and circus acrobats as well as the Bolshoi 
Theatre.”65 During the third anniversary of the October revolution, 
cultural groups organized a reenactment of the storming of the Winter 
Place performed by a cast of thousands: a mass theater that re-staged 
the foundational moment of the Soviet Union. However, groups that 
deviated too far from the party line would be put back under party 
control. For example, Proletkult – the Proletarian cultural-educational 
organization – founded as a result of a 1917 conference organized by 
Lunacharsky, consisted of more than three hundred groups with over 
62  Frederic Lilge, “Lenin and the Politics of Education,” Slavic Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun. 1968): 
pp. 230–57, at p. 255.
63  Ibid., p. 256.
64  Ibid.
65  Clark, Art and Propaganda in the 20th Century, p. 77.
and its ruling feudal classes, a new, genuine freedom loomed, the con-
sequence of the artist’s dedication to the proletarian cause.
In 1918, a year after the Bosheviks took power, Lenin published his 
decree “The Removal of Monuments Erected in Honour of the Tsars 
and their Servants and the Production of Projects for Monuments 
to the Russian Socialist Revolution,” which called for the erection of 
“busts or full-length figures, perhaps bas-reliefs” that would depict 
“predecessors of socialism or its theoreticians and fighters, as well as 
those luminaries of philosophical thought, science, art and so forth, 
who, while not having direct relevance to socialism, were genuine he-
roes of culture.”56 Lenin had organized his list of people to be immor-
talized in monumental statues in categories varying from “Revolutio-
naries and Public Figures” which included Robespierre, Saint-Simon, 
Marx and Engels, “Writers and Poets,” such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, 
and Pushkin, as well as “Philosophers and Scientists,” “Artists,” and 
“Actors.”57 Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first Soviet People’s Commissar 
of Education was in charge of bringing the decree into practice. Lenin 
encouraged the monuments to be made of temporary materials, and 
only to represent dead people, strongly opposing the visualization of 
living Soviets, including himself.58 Lenin did not “prescribe the style 
that the statues should take; sculptors were given a free hand and thus 
the program also served as a forum for discussion about the virtues of 
different styles.”59
Lenin regarded art first of all as a propaganda tool for mass educa-
tion that could serve in tackling the eighty percent illiteracy rate in his 
country: art was to build upon the best achievements of the past – the 
selection of celebrated figures to be monumentalized was an indication 
of what these achievements were in his eyes – and in the process raise 
the cultural standards of the masses.60 In his 1920 “Rough Draft of a 
Resolution on Proletarian Culture” Lenin wrote:
Not the invention of a new proletarian culture, but the development 
of the best models, traditions and results of the existing culture, from 
the point of view of the Marxist world outlook and the conditions of 
life and struggle of the proletariat in the period of its dictatorship.61
In Lenin’s ideal of mass education combined with his rather conser-
56  Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California 
Press, 1999), p. 138.
57  Vladimir Lenin, Lenin on Literature and Art (Maryland: Wildside Press, 2008), p. 205.
58  Bonnell, Iconography of Power, p. 138.
59  Clark, Art and Propaganda in the 20th Century, p. 79.
60  Ibid., p. 76.
61  Vladimir Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 42 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 217
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first published in 1915, Malevich declares to have transformed himself 
to the “zero of form,” thrown off the oppression of the academic stan-
dard of painting, and progressed toward an “art that advances towards 
creation as an end in itself and towards domination over the forms of 
nature.”69 Malevich rejected the imperative of academic figuration as 
a “primitive” form of expression; instead he called for an embrace of 
the “new beauty of our modern life,” to create “new form,” for “[t]he 
technological side of our age advances further and further ahead, but 
people try to push art further and further back.”70 While Malevich’s 
text is not explicitly political, it embraces the possibility of a new mo-
dern paradigm through which to assess the possibilities of art.
From 1920 onward, Malevich would continue to espouse his views 
on suprematism during the Lenin years through the UNOVIS group, 
the Founders of the New Art. As a teacher at the Popular Art Insti-
tute in Vitebsk, he and his former student El Lissitzky explored and 
taught the possibility of “objects to embody ideals rather than to per-
form social function.”71 This did not exclude utilitarian applications 
of suprematist aesthetics. El Lissitzky’s famous poster Beat the Whites 
with the Red Wedge (1920), for example, which is composed of a large 
red triangle penetrating a white circle on a black background surroun-
ded by fragmented cubes and rectangles, could easily have been con-
sidered a non-objective painting in line with Malevich’s suprematist 
ideals. Lissitzky’s expansion of suprematism added to the image its 
title, essentially its slogan, clarifying that the red wedge symbolizes the 
revolutionary Bolsheviks, who are penetrating and defeating their Whi-
te movement opponents during the Russian Civil War. Lissitzky thus 
merged the development of the visual vocabulary to construct a new 
world with the propagation of that new world at the same time.
In Lissitzky’s text “Suprematism in World Construction” (1920), the 
artist explains how suprematism brought the possibility of a “recons-
truction of life,” rejecting the historical subservient role of the artist as 
“a moralist, as a story-teller, as a court-jester” and instead turning to 
“the rebuilding of life cast[ing] aside the old concept of nations, classes, 
patriotisms and imperialism.”72 Just like his former teacher Malevich, 
Lissitzky believes that the artistic exploration of technology serves this 
“reconstruction of life” beyond the models that molded the old world, 
either in the form of academia in art, or in tsarist autocracy in politics. 
69  Kazimir Malevich, “From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism,” 
in John E. Bowlt (ed.), Russian Art of the Avant-Garde: Theory and Criticism 1902–1934 (London: 
Thames and Hudson), pp. 118–19.
70  Ibid., 120–21.
71  Victor Margolin, The Struggle for Utopia (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 
p. 10.
72  El Lissitzky, “Suprematism in World Construction,” in Bowlt, Russian Art of the Avant-Garde, p. 
153.
four hundred thousand members aimed at generating working class 
culture from the grassroots.66 Many of the large cultural events after 
the October Revolution had been their initiative. But the wish of Pro-
letkult organizers to give autonomous direction to the cultural life of 
the Soviet Union clashed with the principles that Lenin had laid out in 
Party Organization and Party Literature, as he considered their claim to 
autonomy to be a “separatist” tendency.67 Lenin’s hostility to the Pro-
letkults seems somewhat paradoxical, due to its effective investment 
in developing a cultural practice from direct worker participation, but 
had much to do with his long residing conflict with former Bolshevik 
member and co-founder of Proletkult Alexander Bogdanov. Whereas 
Lenin believed that political and economic revolution had to prece-
de cultural revolution – propaganda was the means through which to 
achieve that process, to politicize through culture before culturalizing 
the country as such – Bogdanov believed that proletarian culture could 
precede and guide these necessary changes through “fraternal solidari-
ty, the cooperative spirit and work rhythm of human labor in large-sca-
le enterprises.”68
Despite his own more conservative preferences for figurative monu-
mentalism, Lenin allowed in the early days of the revolution a relative 
cultural pluriformity that generated a variety of avant-garde move-
ments loyal to the Bolshevik Party line to flourish. While briefly dis-
cussing some of the most prominent examples, we will keep in mind 
Lenin’s propaganda paradigm with regard to the role he saw for art in 
the new Soviet Union.
At the foundation of the Russian avant-garde that would come to 
pledge support, if not full loyalty, to the Bolsheviks we find the work of 
the painter Kazimir Malevich. Departing from European avant-garde 
movements invested in the relation between the construction of the 
image and technological change, such as the cubists and futurists, Ma-
levich established the concept of “suprematism,” which formed a land-
mark for the pre-Soviet avant-garde. Rejecting figuration in its totality, 
Malevich set out to establish an art of pure “non-objective” sensation, 
represented by geometric shapes, of which the most famous example 
was inevitably the Black Square (1914–15). In his manifesto “From 
Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism,” 
66  In the words of McKenzie Wark, “Proletkult created a network of studios in both the arts and 
the sciences (although they worked best in the arts). The aim was self-governed activity on the 
part of workers rather than propaganda or consciousness raising. Proletkult sought liberation 
from fetishes such as authority, subjectivity, and property. Bogdanov even thought this might be 
easier in Russia, where everyday life was barely touched by bourgeois norms.” McKenzie Wark, 
Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene (London/New York: Verso, 2016), p. 35.
67  Wim Beeren, Marja Bloem, Dorine Mignot (eds.), The Great Utopia: The Russian Avant-Garde 
1917–1932 (Amsterdam: Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, 1992), p. 79.
68  Ibid., p. 253.
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actively contributed to the building of a propaganda interface, instead 
of merely participating in it.75
The political and artistic revolutionaries, had defined a new mo-
dern paradigm, a revolutionary modernity that separated itself radi-
cally from capitalist modernity. Its propaganda, as Lenin had wished, 
embodied a desire to directly act and serve revolutionary ideals and 
tasks. Tatlin’s Monument was as much a celebration of the industrial 
and technological progress, as it was a public signifier that served con-
crete dissemination of the Party’s views. We can observe a similar am-
bition to combine sculptural constructivist aesthetics with practical 
applications in the domain of propaganda in the work of Gustav Klut-
sis and his Propaganda Kiosk (1922), which took the form of temporal 
public sculptural constructions that combined a platform for public 
speeches, radio amplification through loudspeakers and distribution 
channels for revolutionary books and newspapers. In Klutsis’s work, 
the creation of art and the creation of a new propaganda infrastructure 
are part of one and the same endeavor: the work of art is both a carrier 
of propaganda, and a tool through which to perform propaganda by its 
users. In a Marxist sense, in the context of Avant-Garde Propaganda 
Art, we could say that the border between what used to be the covert 
substructure of power and its elite ownership versus the overt supers-
tructure of the normative reality this power aimed to construct was 
lifted. The proletariat, at least in theory, was to be made co-owner of 
the means of production and performance that define propaganda. In 
other words, the multi-layered performance of power – its macro and 
micro-performative dimension – become part of the project of proleta-
rianization: sender and receiver are to operate equally. The macro-per-
formative dimension is defined by the collective seizing of the means 
of production, and the micro-performative dimension is defined by the 
process in which the Soviets bring about the process of redistribution 
in daily self-governance. No longer is the macro-performative defined 
by elite interest, but by collective interest. At the risk of being reduc-
tive, we could roughly say that the different relationship between the 
macro- and micro-performative dimension in propagandas is characte-
75  Tatlin drafted a proposal together with the painter Dymshits-Tolstaia in a response to Lenin’s 
decree on the erection of new public monuments in June 1918, in which they suggested – 
contrary to the relatively chaotic manner in which commissions for the monuments were handed 
out at that moment – a structural involvement of young and revolutionary artists that had been 
ignored by the old tsarist regime. Rather than repeating the stylistic character of 19th-century 
public sculpture and monuments, Tatlin and Dymshits-Tolstaia imagined the monuments to 
function as “street platforms” from which “new and vital words rousing mind and consciousness 
of thought would fly forth into the masses.” They further proposed a democratization of the 
creation process, by first showing models of the monuments to the public at large for them to 
select the final design. See: Vladimir Tatlin and Sofia Dymshits-Tolstaia, “Memorandum from 
the Visual Arts Section of the People’s Commisariat for Enlightenment to the Soviet of People’s 
Commissars: Project for the Organization of Competitions for Monuments to Distinguished 
Persons,” Design Issues, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 1984): pp. 70–74, at p. 73.
After the violence of the First World War, Lissitzky writes, the world 
saw the destruction of the possibility of technology to contribute to the 
reconstruction of life, but then “came communism and extolled work 
as the true source of man’s heartbeat.”73 For Lissitzky, art has a central 
role in this process; the task to develop a new language that redirects 
the relation of humans to the world as its “master-builders,” no longer 
subjected to the raw laws of nature but as the ones that define its laws 
through revolutionary artistic and political practice:
The artist’s work lies beyond the boundaries of the useful and the 
useless. It is the revolutionary path along which the whole of crea-
tion is striding forward and along which man must also bend his 
steps. “Artistic work” is but an obstacle on this path and in conse-
quence a counter-revolutionary concept. The private property as-
pect of creativity must be destroyed, all are creators, and there is no 
reason of any sort for this division between artists and non-artists.74
This introduction of the notion of the master-builder replacing that of 
the artist is considered a foundational moment of the subsequent mo-
vement of constructivism: a shift away from the suprematist ideas that 
the painting could in and of itself form the legitimate outcome of an 
artistic process. Lissitzky, sympathetic to suprematism, pushes its po-
tential and arrives at considering its geometric vocabulary as building 
blocks in which his ideal of the artist as the master-builder of a new 
world expresses itself. His famous Prouns series (1919–24) that began 
to transform suprematist aesthetics into more three-dimensional de-
pictions that could be associated with architectural and industrial te-
chnical drawings are emblematic for his ideal to expand suprematism 
into the domain of revolutionary industrial engineering. Similarly, we 
can see this outcome in the work of constructivist artist Vladimir Tat-
lin and his Monument to the Third International (1919–20): a tower in 
the shape of stacked transparent rotating cylindrical structures meant 
to facilitate political offices, a radio station, loudspeakers, as well as a 
platform for public lectures – although Tatlin himself always refrained 
from the constructivist label. Combining both Lenin’s call for a public, 
educational, and monumental propaganda art, as well as Malevich’s 
and Lissitzky’s ideas of a necessary correlation between technology 
and new forms of art, Tatlin’s Monument, even though it was never rea-
lized, has become a historical symbol of the conditions in which poli-
tical, artistic, and technological revolution converged. In this work, art 
73  Ibid., p. 154.
74  Ibid., p. 158.
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artist Alexander Rodchenko who criticized the suprematists for their 
obsession with the “mystique of the material.”80 Rodchenko rejected all 
former associations and bonds to the idea of a pure art, and declared 
a commitment to the domain of industry. Productivist art was focused 
on the formation of “useful objects,” the true expression of the ideas 
that had remained theory in the domain of constructivism.81 For Rod-
chenko new designs of productivism reached beyond the realm of aes-
thetics and formed a “synthesis of ideological, theoretical, and practi-
cal factors,” that took the form of publications, film titles, advertising 
posters, furniture, film, and theatrical sets. They were produced accor-
ding to Rodchenko’s conviction that “certain materials would signify 
communist values by their reference either to communist purpose or 
methodological construction; that is, carved wooden furniture would 
not be appropriate, but machined mass-produced pieces would.”82 
With his characteristic poetic and bombastic language full of capitals 
and italics, Rodchenko, in his 1921 manifesto “Slogans,” declares art 
as “one of the branches of mathematics,” and states that “ART which 
has not entered life” is to be “handed over to the archeological museum 
of ANTIQUITY”:
THE FUTURE doesn’t build monasteries for the ROMAN PRIESTS, 
PROPHETS, and HOLY FOOLS of art.
Down with ART as a bright PATCH on the mediocre life of a proper-
tied man.
Down with art as a precious STONE amid the dirty, dark life of the 
poor man.
Down with art as a means TO ESCAPE A LIFE that isn’t worth living.
LIFE, a conscious and organized life, capable of SEEING and CONS-
TRUCTING, is a contemporary art.
A PERSON who organizes his life, work, and himself is a CONTEM-
PORARY ARTIST.
WORK FOR LIFE and not for PALACES, TEMPLES, CEMETE-
RIES, and MUSEUMS.
Work in the midst of everyone, for everyone, and with everyone.
DOWN with monasteries, institutes, ateliers, studios, offices, and is-
lands.
Consciousness, EXPERIMENT, goals, CONSTRUCTION, technology, 
and mathematics – these are the BROTHERS of contemporary ART.83
80  Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship and Beyond (London/
New York: Verso, 2011), p. 24.
81  Margolin, The Struggle for Utopia, p. 82.
82  Ibid., p. 89.
83  Alexander N. Lavrentiev (ed.), Aleksandr Rodchenko: Experiments for the Future (New York: The 
Museum of Modern Art, 2005), pp. 142–43.
rized by either a vertical or horizontal structure of power. The fact that 
such a schema is far from absolute, is characterized by the swift chan-
ges from the early Russian revolution to Leninist and finally Stalinist 
rule, in which the Soviet Union from an aspired horizontal structure 
quickly transformed to a vertical one. But the ideological intention 
of a vertical or horizontal model of power – whether successful in its 
implementation or not – does help in our attempts to differentiate pro-
pagandas; or, in the case of the Soviet Union: to analyze the different 
phases in which one propaganda model turns into another.
In his article “Revolution and Art” (1920–22), Anatoly Lunachars-
ky, the first Soviet People’s Commissar of Education, expressed his 
ideal of a coalition between party-loyal artists and their artistic expe-
riments in relation to the revolutionary government, when he posed: 
“For a revolutionary state, such as the Soviet Union, the whole ques-
tion of art is this: can revolution give anything to art, and can art give 
anything to revolution?”76 Just like Lissitzky, Lunacharsky claims that 
the revolution is accompanied by new “ideas of remarkable breadth 
and depth,” and subsequently that “if revolution can give art its soul, 
then art can give revolution its mouthpiece.”77 Just as the French Re-
volution aspired, Lunacharsky continues, art now joins the masses and 
adorns popular holidays and manifestations with art, song, and poetry: 
“it will unite everything in a common act.”78 The revolutionary artist 
and Lunacharsky both believe in the unification of art and life. Not 
only did revolutionary artists propagandize the ideals of the revolutio-
nary government through their work, they educated themselves throu-
gh the communist ideals just the same. In other words, it was not just 
the imagery of art that changed, but the very conditions of artistic pro-
duction and the understanding of the institution of the artist as such. 
As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, propaganda redefined 
what was to be understood as art in the first place.
As an example of such a “new artistic soul” that emerged through 
the revolution, Lunacharsky refers to poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, edi-
tor of LEF, the journal of the group Left Front of the Arts (later on, 
Novyi Lef). LEF was mainly organized around the Institute for Artistic 
Culture (INKhUK) situated within the People’s Commissariat for En-
lightenment, which “urged artists and theorists to join economic coun-
cils and go into the factories to design new products.”79 The Left Front 
of the Arts in its turn pushed the limits of constructivism toward the 
subsequent movement of productivism, with a prominent role for the 
76  Anatoly Lunacharsky, “Revolution and Art,” Ibid., p. 190.
77  Ibid., p. 191.
78  Ibid., p. 193.
79  Margolin, The Struggle for Utopia, p. 10.
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ganda is devised by Lenin as a means to educate through politiciza-
tion, in building the necessary base to achieve an idea of revolutionary 
modernity. Propaganda emerges simultaneously with the endeavor of 
constructing modern socialism. Theoretically at least, this is a different 
form of modern propaganda than that of the British. Rather than being 
an expression of the height of imperial modernity, propaganda beco-
mes part of the process in constructing a counter-modernity based on 
revolutionary ideals.
In Lenin’s ideals of propaganda as mass education we can discern 
the real possibility of a propaganda of mass education and emancipa-
tion. Just as the avant-garde rejected the separation between art and 
life, this model of propaganda rejects the separation between the one 
who creates propaganda and those who are merely subjected to it, 
what Lenin considered mere “indoctrination.” Mass, communal pro-
paganda, on the other hand – a collective performance of power – is a 
propaganda of politicization and equalization: socialism is constructed 
through the common, revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. 
Its avant-garde leads, but in the process, aims to merge with the true 
master-builders and constructors of the new world, the revolutionary 
entity of the people.
This brings us back to a fundamentally important observation in 
the work of Ellul and Chomsky and Herman: namely the idea that 
only strongly organized groups that can resist the apparatus of mo-
dern propaganda have a chance to build alternatives to its dominan-
ce. While Ellul and Chomsky and Herman consider this as a form of 
“counter-propaganda” in their wish to reject the very notion of propa-
ganda altogether, it would in the context of the Soviet Union and its 
aim to establish a revolutionary modernity in opposition to capitalist 
modernity be more precise to speak of a fundamentally different form 
of modern propaganda. Whereas Ellul would certainly not agree with 
such an assessment – he considered Lenin responsible for the later 
horrors of Stalinism – we would do well here to take his proposition 
of discussing propagandas in the plural literally. Although Ellul used 
the term propagandas to clarify the fact that the technological society 
uses a variety of propagandas to further its aim to establish “Total Pro-
paganda,” we will here part with his absolutist claim on the notion of 
propaganda as something that should be resisted by definition, and ob-
serve in the early Soviet Union the possibility of defining a completely 
different type of propaganda that Ellul’s model is unable to accommo-
date. Again, this does not mean that this is by definition a “better” pro-
paganda. However what we want to stress here is primarily that we are 
dealing with a different propaganda, following from our earlier analysis 
that different structures of power generate different propagandas.
At this stage of Rodchenko’s writing, the Soviet Union was still far 
from an industrially developed country – its own revolutionary mo-
dernity remained a mere ambition rather than a reality – making Rod-
chenko’s idea of productivism as means to mass-produce constructivist 
aesthetics into the large public domain limited in scope. Nonetheless, 
he made significant contributions, for example the USSR Worker Club 
(1925), which is exemplary of his philosophy. It is a multifunctional 
space that offered workers a communal table for discussion, study and 
play, surrounded by new technologies such as a screen for educational 
materials and a speaker, as well as a corner dedicated to Lenin’s ideals 
of mass literacy and active workers’ engagement in social and political 
life. Exhibited as part of the Soviet pavilion at the 1925 “Exposition 
Internationale des Arts Décoratifs” in Paris, it formed a testimony to 
the Avant-Garde Propaganda Art production in the years dominated 
by Lenin’s and Lunacharsky’s cultural policies. In the USSR Worker 
Club, we find an artwork transformed into a full infrastructure for po-
litical and social activity; the artwork facilitates and provides tools for 
furthering revolutionary consciousness and practice. The artwork per-
forms revolutionary modernity and simultaneously provides the means 
for its users to perform and apply its possibilities on their own terms.
By the time Rodchenko presented the USSR Worker Club, the peak 
of the artistic avant-garde had already passed. Lenin had died a year 
earlier, and the leadership of the Communist Party would direct the 
country into a model of radical and violent authoritarian and dictato-
rial policies. The avant-garde, which had embraced the revolutionary 
moment of the October Revolution and which had claimed a position 
at the forefront of reconstructing life in the new revolutionary Soviet 
Union, would be among the first to experience this setback. But before 
we explore the history of the decline of this artistic experiment, let 
us attempt to summarize what essentially defined this early model of 
Avant-Garde Propaganda Art.
As we discussed in the first chapter, modern propaganda is the per-
formance of power in modern society. In the context of the early years 
of the Soviet Union, we have observed the demand of the revolutio-
naries to modernize the country, but in a way that ran contrary to 
the politics of the Western world. Rather than replicating its model of 
capitalist modernity, it aimed at establishing a revolutionary moder-
nity that would make the construction of socialism and subsequent 
stateless communism a reality. As such, the Soviet Union attempted 
to return to some of the initial ideals of the French Revolution, while 
avoiding what it perceived as the subsequent decline in the form of the 
bourgeois state.
In the context of the Russian Revolution, the possibility of propa-
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ject-audience) are aimed to become equalized: egalitarian.
In the years following Lenin’s death, the importance of art remained 
acknowledged by the subsequent Stalin regime, although its politiciza-
tion would take a different turn compared to Lenin’s aim of a modera-
ted process of industrialization through the New Economic Policy and 
the relative pluriformity of cultural life that developed in parallel. We 
will now explore how, contrary to the ideals of an Avant-Garde Pro-
paganda Art, the Soviet Union after the death of Lenin witnessed the 
emergence of what would become known as Totalitarian Propaganda 
Art: a complex concept that served very different political functions 
and operated in a significantly different way.
We should not idealize the early years of the Soviet Union and 
Lenin’s strong emphasis on party discipline and the centralization of 
power within the party, leading to alternative cultural and political ini-
tiatives to be considered by him as “separatist.” This authoritarian and 
harsh party line might have well contained the seeds of the decline of 
the revolutionary project in the years after Lenin’s death, although we 
will leave that ongoing debate to the many historians interested in this 
question. For us the main importance is to conclude that the attempt to 
construct a revolutionary modernity – and its partial successes – pro-
vides us with the possibility of articulating different models of modern 
propaganda as a result of the different character of the structures of 
power that defines their modus operandi. Whereas British capitalist 
modernity produced a model of covert propaganda in service of elite 
interests, the Soviet’s engagement with a revolutionary modernity ai-
med to produce a model of overt propaganda in service of and prac-
ticed by the proletarian masses. A different distribution of power – a 
different structure of power – can thus result in a different model of 
modern propaganda.
Before continuing our exploration of the role of art and propagan-
da in the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death, let us first summarize the 
definition of Avant-Garde Propaganda Art as we have discussed it in 
this segment:
• Avant-Garde Propaganda Art is characterized by a practice of 
mass education – of mass performance – in which art had to 
align itself with the vanguard of the Party if it aimed to partici-
pate in its revolutionary objectives;
• Avant-Garde Propaganda Art aims at a synthesis between art 
and life through revolutionary practice, and as such aims at re-
building the structures of power in a given society: by changing 
the structure of power, a different propaganda becomes possi-
ble as well;
• Avant-Garde Propaganda Art demanded of artists not merely 
to illustrate political causes, but to alter the very conditions of 
artistic practice as such: the privileged autonomy of the indivi-
dualist bourgeois artist was to be rejected in favor of the artist 
as builder or constructor of a world that would benefit the auto-
nomy of the proletarian collective as a whole;
• Avant-Garde Propaganda Art contributes to changing the 
structure of power in a given society and propagates its redis-
tribution, leading to the possibility of a collective propaganda, 
in which the unequal powers between the knowledgeable sen-
der (the propagandist-artist) and its ignorant receiver (the sub-
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In his book The Total Art of Stalinism (1987), the Russian philosopher 
Boris Groys discusses the development of the concept of “socialist rea-
lism,” which was officially declared as the Stalin-sanctioned artistic 
doctrine of the Soviet Union by Andrei Zhdanov, the Head of the Pro-
paganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, during 
the First Congress of the Writer’s Union in 1934.84 This declaration of 
socialist realism followed the dissolution of all existing and competing 
art groups in 1932, and was aimed at shaping Stalinist cultism and his 
return to political nationalism, putting an end to the relative pluralism 
of art movements that had existed during the years of Lenin’s rule.85 
Groys explains that the notion of “realism” in socialist realism had litt-
le to do with the idea of an accurate representation of objective reality, 
but was rather “oriented to that which has not yet come into being but 
which should be created.”86 In other words, painters, designers, sculp-
tors, filmmakers, and architects who had now been placed under total 
control of the state were not supposed to show the world as it was, or 
as they thought they saw it, but according to the Party line dictated by 
Stalin. In his Speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers, Zhdanov stated 
that “[i]n our country the main heroes of works of literature are the 
active builders of a new life – working men and women, men and wo-
men collective farmers, Party members, business managers, engineers, 
members of the Young Communist League, Pioneers.”87 Stalin called 
upon writers as “engineers of the soul,” declaring that the task of the 
artist was “knowing life, so as to be able to depict it truthfully in works 
of art, not to depict it in a dead, scholastic way, not simply as ‘objective 
reality,’ but to depict reality in its revolutionary development.”88
Socialist realism was thus a realism located in socialist engineering 
objectives, which would bring about the inevitable communist future 
that Stalin was guiding the country toward. Its realism was the realism 
of the Party’s objectives, the inevitable development from feudalism to 
bourgeois capitalism, and from socialism to communism.89 It is in the 
84  Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism, p. 36. The departure from the internationalist artistic avant-gar-
de ran parallel to the increasing nationalist policies of the country, most exemplary through 
Stalin’s maxim of “Socialism in one country” in 1924, claiming that “the working class, in 
alliance with the laboring peasantry, can deal the finishing blow to the capitalists of our country 
and build a socialist society, even if there is no victorious revolution in the West to come to its 
aid.” Josef Stalin, J.V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 8 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1954), 
p. 101.
85  Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism, p. 33.
86  Ibid., p. 51.
87  Andrei Zhdanov, “Speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers,” Harrison and Wood (eds.), Art in 
Theory 1900–1990, p. 420.
88  Ibid., p. 411.
89  “Because Socialist Realism was a method of creation rather than a style or aesthetic system, its 
theorists concentrated on abstract definitions of the kind of political consciousness that all the 
arts had to reflect and through which their success or failure could be judged. The first of these 
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their accessible figurative and naturalistic depictions, their engagement 
with the actuality of social reality was most certainly not: their means 
were now employed to represent a romanticized and desired future rea-
lity dictated by Stalin, rather than the social devastation of his ruthless 
policies.
For the former Russian avant-garde, the shift of power proved di-
sastrous. Already in 1926, an article “A Monastery on a State Subsidy” 
had been published, critiquing the work of Malevich and his collea-
gues at the State Institute of Artistic Culture (GinKhuK). It was sub-
sequently closed and Malevich was arrested and convicted to three 
months’ imprisonment on the charge of being a German spy.92 This 
proved to be the beginning of the denunciation of what came to be 
regarded as the “formalist” art of the suprematist, constructivist, and 
productivist movements. In 1928, an article in Sovetskoye Foto attac-
ked Rodchenko, accusing his photographic work as plagiarizing the 
“formalist” aesthetics of foreign non-Soviet photographers, initiating a 
debate that over the following years would develop, in an increasingly 
eerie way, into the most narrow definition of the “correct” depiction 
of reality.93For example, in 1933 a student asked Rodchenko about a 
photograph he had taken of a young pioneer from a low perspective: 
“Why does the pioneer look upwards? It is not ideologically correct. 
Pioneers and the youth of the Komsomol must look ahead.”94 Under 
the Stalinist regime, whose paranoia had generated a permanent witch 
hunt for all “revisionists” that appeared to even marginally deviate 
from his established Party line, such accusations of formalism and in-
ternationalism could lead to death. LEF editor and poet Vladimir Ma-
yakovsky became another target. His replies and counter-articles on 
formalist accusations were to no effect, leading him to commit suicide 
in 1930. Artists such as Lissitzky, Rodchenko, and Klutsis saw them-
selves forced to compromise, publicly apologize for their “formalist” 
tendencies, and retreat from the public eye while taking on socialist 
realist commissions following the outlines of Stalin’s cultural policies. 
In some cases, this proved not sufficient to take away the suspicion of 
their revisionist tendencies, and Klutsis, after having produced a series 
of posters and other propaganda materials according to the new crite-
ria of socialist realism – many in collaboration with artist Lyubov Ser-
geyevna Popova, also his life partner – was executed during the Great 
Purges on Stalin’s orders in 1938.
Despite the fact that there seems to be a clear difference between 
92  David Elliott, “The End of the Avant-Garde,” in Dawn et al., Art and Power, p. 195.
93  Ibid., pp. 195–96.
94  Ibid., p. 197.
light of this “realism” that we should consider famous paintings such 
as Sketch for Stalin’s Speech at the 16th Congress of the Communist Party 
(1933) by Alexander Gerasimov, depicting the fatherly figure of Stalin 
guiding his Party; To Mother for the Next Feed (1935) by Taras Gapo-
nenko, showcasing joyous peasants working modern machinery in an 
overabundant harvest; or A Relay Race Around the “B” Ring (1947) by 
Alexandr Deineka, representing healthy young Soviet athletes running 
the main streets of Moscow. Few will know the names of these artists, 
and few will be able to bring to mind the specific imagery of their work, 
but many will be able to immediately add more of these stereotypical 
and artificial images in their imagination in the form of heroic fighters 
of the Soviet army and committed workers of its industry. Similar to 
the art of Nazi Germany, these are the archetypical images that have 
come to define our association with the cultist dimensions of propa-
ganda art in dictatorships – and therefore propaganda art in general. 
They are the product of Stalin’s attempt to centralize and standardi-
ze all cultural production, rejecting the internationalist and egalita-
rian objectives of the early Soviet confederacy structured by the Party, 
oriented toward a relentless claim to power around his single person as 
father of the glorified Soviet nation. From Avant-Garde Art as a form 
of mass performance we move to an attempt of a singular performance 
of the state, directed by Stalin – which Groys refers to as the “Total 
Art of Stalinism.”90 The macro-performative dimension of propaganda 
in this case, is again enacted from the position of monopolized power.
Stalin had come to favor figurative art with a romantic air above all 
else, which benefited conservative art groups such as The Association 
of Artists for a Revolutionary Russia (AKhRR), whose work hearke-
ned back to the prerevolutionary movement of the Peredvizhniki, the 
“Wanderers” or “Itinerants.” This 19th-century group of painters who 
opposed the tsarist regime had moved to the countryside, and its trave-
ling exhibitions depicted both the proud ethos of the peasantry as well 
as its hardships.91 But whereas the aesthetics of the socially engaged 
Wanderers were adopted owing to their radical historical heritage and 
rules of thumb was narodnost’ (based on the word for ‘people’ and ‘nation’) which was centered 
around the relationship of the work to popular ideas and sentiments as well as to the ethnic or-
igins of the people it depicted. Klassovost’ related to the class awareness of the artist which had 
been heightened during the Cultural Revolution and to how he or she depicted such concerns. 
Partiinost’ was the expression of the central and leading role of the Communist party in all 
aspects of Soviet life as well as membership over the party; and ideinost’ was the introduction of 
new thinking and attitudes, of course first approved by the party, as the central content of the 
artwork.” David Elliott, “Moscow: Introduction,” in Dawn Ades et al. (eds.), Art and Power: 
Europe under the Dictators (London: South Bank Centre, 1995), p. 187.
90  The performance of the state in the form of forced industrialization under Stalin was extensively 
documented by Novosti Press Agency for national and international purposes, see: Mark Hol-
born and Torsten Nyström, Propaganda: Photographs from Soviet Archives (Chichester: Bonnier 
Books, 2007)
91  Clark, Art and Propaganda in the 20th Century, p. 85.
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was presumed by the avant-garde, was not explicitly represented 
in avant-garde artistic practice, and it set this myth in the center 
of its entire social and artistic life. Like the avant-garde, Stalinist 
culture continues to be oriented toward the future; it is projective 
rather than mimetic, a visualization of the collective dream of the 
new world and the new humanity rather than the product of an in-
dividual artist’s temperament; it does not retire to the museum, but 
aspires to exert an active influence upon life.97
As mentioned, we find similar ideas to those of Groys in the work of 
Russian art historian Igor Golomstock, who authored a standard work 
on the role of art and culture in dictatorships, Totalitarian Art (origina-
lly published in 1990, revised in 2011). Golomstock, a former member 
of the Union of Soviet Artists, concurs with Groys that totalitarianism 
made the “political ideas of total revolution and social transformation” 
of the avant-garde into a “ready-made,” translating them “into their 
opposite and forges from them a weapon with which to destroy their 
enemies – including the very creators of these ideas.”98 In his view too, 
the avant-garde had a role in proposing the necessity of a synthesis 
between art and life which, in the hands of the dictator-artist, found its 
true expression in Stalin’s totalitarian project.
Different from Groys, however, Golomstock introduces the notion 
of “totalitarianism.”99 His attempt is to define the notion of Totalitarian 
Propaganda Art as a specific model of artistic production dictated by 
the same principles and aesthetic doctrines in the Soviet Union, Nazi 
Germany, fascist Italy, and Maoist China. Golomstock is convinced 
that the Russian revolution forms the reoccurring cultural blueprint 
for each of these regimes. While his study proves enlightening in terms 
of the specific characteristics of state-sanctioned art within the fascist, 
Nazi, and Stalinist regimes, we will see that his attempt to argue for 
a singular and overall homogeneous existence of a Totalitarian Art is 
untenable.
Golomstock takes the work of the American Lewis Mumford, who 
introduces the notion of the “megamachine” in his book The Myth of 
the Machine (Vol. I 1967, Vol. II 1970) as a starting point for his defini-
tion of the “laws” of totalitarian art. Often compared to the apocalyptic 
97  Ibid., p. 113.
98  Igor Golomstock, Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, The Third Reich, Fascist Italy, and the People’s 
Republic of China (New York/London: Overlook Duckworth, 2011), p. xvi.
99  A term which, according to Rasmussen, was “first put into use by opponents of Mussolini’s 
fascist government in the early 1920s – Mussolini was critiqued for giving excessive power to the 
fascist party […]. For Mussolini the term expressed the primacy of the political over all other so-
cial spheres as well as the state’s integration of and control over all aspects of social life.” Mikkel 
Bolt Rasmussen, “Approaching Totalitarianism and Totalitarian Art,” in Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen 
and Jacob Wanberg (eds.), Totalitarian Art and Modernity (Aarhus/Copenhagen: Aarhus Universi-
ty Press, 2010), p. 109.
the Leninist and Stalinist policies in both politics and culture, there 
have been many theorists and historians who suggest a subsequent 
relationship. Groys, for example, argues that socialist realism in some 
respects is a continuation of the ideals of merging art with political 
life as espoused by Avant-Garde Propaganda Art. Art historian Igor 
Golomstock, whose work we will discuss below, goes even further by 
suggesting that the Leninist paradigm of modern propaganda art was 
a foundation even for Hitler’s cultural policies in the Third Reich. We 
will continue to explore at what level these claims are correct, and 
how one can distinguish Avant-Garde Propaganda Art from socialist 
realism.
Whereas the events following Lenin’s death may suggest a stark 
contrast between the Russian avant-garde in the Lenin era and the Sta-
linist regime, Groys’s analysis of socialist realism instead argues for an 
art-historical relation between the Russian avant-garde’s declaration 
of being the new master builders and artist–constructors, and Stalin’s 
demand of artists to become the engineers of the soul of the Soviet 
citizenry. Groys criticizes the “myth of an innocent avant-garde,”95 and 
argues that whereas the avant-garde might have been naive in believing 
that they would be allowed to shape the cultural policies of the early 
Soviet Union, they had themselves aggressed competing art groups – 
such as the Association of Artists for a Revolutionary Russia, which 
they considered counter-revolutionary – in their hopes of constructing 
a new world from scratch. And, within the avant-garde, the struggle 
for power among its various art groups had been present as well. In its 
turn, as the regime began to espouse its preferences toward a conser-
vative and romanticized figurative doctrine of culture, the avant-garde 
now found itself – unsurprisingly – aggressed by the very groups they 
had wanted to exclude from the cultural life of the Soviet Union. But 
the essential issue at stake, Groys argues, is not the conflict between 
the avant-garde and the Stalinist regime, but rather its continuity, for 
“the Stalin era satisfied the fundamental avant-garde demand that art 
cease representing life and begin transforming it by means of a total 
aesthetic-political project.”96 Rather than a break, Groys sees Stalin 
as the one who took over the avant-garde project, becoming not just 
a political leader but also an artist-engineer who modeled society by 
means of brute force, industry, technology, and his cultural apparatus 
according to his will:
Stalinist culture brought in to the open the myth of the demiur-
ge, the transformer of society and the universe, which, although it 
95  Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism, p. 8.
96  Ibid., p. 36.
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ler has become the ultimate embodiment of Golomstock’s totalitarian 
art.102 In Golomstock’s words: “Hitler saw himself as the architect of 
the Third Reich.”103
Different from Groys, Golomstock considers the organizational 
foundation of totalitarian art that demands total cultural control under 
a single party to be rooted in the works of Vladimir Lenin, and most 
particularly his text Party Organization and Party Literature (1905), 
which we discussed above. According to Golomstock, Lenin’s view on 
the relation between party and art formed through the German com-
munists Hitler and Mussolini’s indirect inspiration for the forging of a 
cultural propaganda model, and a direct inspiration in the case of Mao 
Zedong.104 Despite the relative freedom that Lenin preached for artists 
outside of the Party, and the cultural lenience toward the party-loyal 
avant-garde, Golomstock perceives Lenin’s orientation on the Party as 
the main tool of governance as the inevitable foundation for further 
cultural centralization and control that would find its ultimate expres-
sion in the late years of the Stalinist era.
Golomstock’s comprehensive comparative study of art production 
within dictatorships attempts to structurally show organizational and 
aesthetic overlaps. What strikes us in the propaganda art of dictators-
hips, he explains, are the reoccurring figures of heroic leaders, heroic 
soldiers, heroic factory workers, heroic peasants, depicted in styles 
that reassert the aesthetic models of a glorified past. In Nazi Germany 
particularly in reference to ancient Greece, in the case of fascist Italy 
the Roman Empire, and in the Stalinist Soviet Union the bizarre con-
flation between the romantic aesthetics of the pre-revolutionary rural 
painters and the tsarist might that these very same artists opposed. 
This rewriting of history to serve the politics of the present and to pro-
ject an even more heroic future upon the populace, involved a perma-
nent falsification of history. It depicts Hitler visiting military fronts at 
102  We find a very similar approach to the notion of the artist-dictator in the work of Tzvetan Todor-
ov, who argues that Hitler’s fascination for the composer Richard Wagner was at the foundation 
of his understanding of his own role in “directing” the Third Reich as his own Gesamtkunst-
werk, or “total work of art.” The notion of the total work of art was elaborated in Wagner’s 1848 
essay “Art and Revolution,” in which he took the European revolutions of the time as a starting 
point to argue for the possible for a “communist” gathering of all creative forces in a single inter-
disciplinary play. For Wagner, the total work of art was something of a staging of a prefiguration 
of the possibility of revolution through art. Wagner’s later political conservatism and anti-Semitic 
writings cast a dark light upon his artistic heritage, which Todorov regularly highlights, for ex-
ample in his essay “Artists and Dictators,” in which he writes: “It is common knowledge that the 
Führer reserved a special place for Wagner who incarnated in German-speaking countries the 
concept of the artist not as a figure among others in society but as the very model for society,” 
after which he continues to mention Hitler’s correspondence with Wagner’s son, the fact that 
Hitler recited Wagner by heart and claimed to have “attended 30–40 performances of Tristan 
and Isolde” as well as the fact that Wagner’s overture of Rienzi was “played regularly at Nazi 
party congresses.” See: Tzvetan Todorov, The Limits of Art (London/New York/Calcutta: Seagull 
Books, 2010), pp. 36–37.
103  Golomstock, Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, p. 166.
104  Ibid., p. 32.
vision of modern technological totalitarianism elaborated by Jacques 
Ellul, Mumford describes this “megamachine” as an “invisible struc-
ture, composed of living, but rigid, human parts, each assigned to his 
specific office, role and task, to make possible the immense work-ou-
tput and grand designs of this great collective organizations.”100 For 
Golomstock, this paradigm of the megamachine embodies the laws of 
the totalitarian state where Totalitarian Propaganda Art gains its effect. 
Just like Ellul, Golomstock considers the question of ideology to be 
secondary. It is the radical centralization of the state apparatus and 
its attempt to engineer and control all aspects of social, political, and 
economic life, that is the true creation of totalitarianism, and its art 
is merely shaped in the image of this mechanical reality. According to 
Golomstock, the one-party state of totalitarianism defines the doctri-
nes of its art:
The foundations of totalitarian art are laid down at the same time 
and place as those of the one-party State:
1. The State declares art (and culture as a whole) to be an ideologi-
cal weapon and a means of struggle for power.
2. The State acquires a monopoly over all manifestations of the 
country’s artistic life.
3. The State constructs an all-embracing apparatus for the control 
and direction of art.
4. From the multiplicity of artistic movements then in existence, the 
State selects one movement, always the most conservative, which 
most nearly answers its needs and declares it to be official and obli-
gatory.
5. Finally, the State declares war to death against all styles and mo-
vements other than the official ones, declaring them to be reactio-
nary and hostile to class, race, people, Party or State, to humanity, 
to social or artistic progress, etc.101
Following these principles of totalitarian art, Golomstock explains 
how in Nazi Germany this resulted in the foundation of the Reich Cul-
ture Chamber (Reichskulturkammer), the Fascist Academy and the 
National Syndicate of Fascist Visual Art in Italy, the Central Commit-
tee’s Section for Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) and the USSR 
Union of Artists in the Soviet Union, and the Union of Art Workers 
in the People’s Republic of China. These institutions became instru-
ments of a single dictator–artist, of whom the failed-artist-turned-ru-
100  Golomstock, Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, p. xvi.
101  Ibid., p. xiii.
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socialist realism, disappear; the mega-machine of totalitarianism itself 
– not even Stalin as the ultimate performer, as Groys argues – is the 
sole creator of dictator and propaganda artist alike. According to Go-
lomstock, this totalitarian condition, generated by war and revolution, 
stands in absolute opposition to modern democracies: “This monster 
[the Soviet totalitarian state] functions according to laws unknown in 
democratic societies, where artistic styles usually emerge spontaneous-
ly and only then engender new structures and new forms of organi-
zation of artistic life.”108 The ultimate example, he concludes, can be 
found in the works of former British Prime Minister Winston Chur-
chill, who “himself an artist […] also wrote a treatise on art” and in 
Churchill’s entourage “we find no architects, artists and writers like 
Rosenberg, Speer, Goebbels and Shirach – the leader of the Hitler 
youth and self-styled outstanding lyrical poet of National Socialism.”109
Golomstock’s remarks are crucial for understanding the political 
implications of the concept of Totalitarian Art, for here, through the 
writings of Churchill, it becomes clear that the term serves to establish 
an absolute opposition between Totalitarian Art and Democratic Art. 
Churchill being as an exemplary leader of a “democratic” society, his 
essay “Painting as a Pastime” (1921-22) is the most important exam-
ple of a mode of artistic production that is non- or even anti-totalita-
rian. In this text, the future British Prime Minister, who would lead his 
country in the Second World War against the Nazis, elaborates on one 
of his private cultural passions, landscape painting. Explaining his pas-
sion as a military leader in the medium of painting, Churchill writes:
In all battles two things are usually required of the Comman-
der-in-Chief: to make a good plan for his army and, secondly, to 
keep a strong reserve. Both of these are obligatory upon the painter. 
To make a plan, thorough reconnaissance of the country where the 
battle is to be fought is needed. Its fields, its mountains, its rivers, 
its bridges, its trees, its flowers, its atmosphere – all require and re-
pay attentive observation from a special point of view.110
Apart from Churchill’s evident militaristic perspective on studying a 
landscape – seemingly evoking the same gaze, whether going to war or 
when merely painting its environment – there are at least two troubling 
elements to the opposition with which Golomstock ends his thorough 
elaboration on art and dictatorship.
108  Ibid., p. 216.
109  Ibid., p. 136.
110  Winston S. Churchill, Painting as a Pastime (London: Unicorn Press, 2013), pp. 48–49.
locations he never went to; masses of Bolsheviks storming the Winter 
Palace even though in reality the palace was empty and only a handful 
of revolutionaries had participated; and making political opponents of 
the regime disappear to the benefit of the new leaders who appear to 
have always been present.
But Golomstock also observes differences. For example, the empha-
sis on the rural quality of the romantic depictions of peasant life in the 
Stalinist Soviet Union versus the more rigid neo-classicist tendencies 
of Nazi art. Or the near absence of nudity in socialist realism, as the 
singular naked body would deny its collective social essence, whereas 
in the work of the Nazi artists the nude body gave proof of the purity of 
the racial Aryan and as such was a singular “prototypical” model to be 
followed and aspired to by the collective. But also on an organizational 
and infrastructural level Golomstock emphasized that especially fascist 
Italy was never successful in establishing an “iconographic canon,” as 
it never declared a clear fascist cultural doctrine and allowed relative 
artistic freedom as long as artist groups did not oppose Mussolini’s 
rule. For instance, the futurist avant-garde exhibited at the same time 
as the more traditional Novecento group, and architectural expressions 
varied between high modernist aesthetics and more regressive classi-
cist themes derived from the height of the Roman Empire.105 In the 
case of the Maoist People’s Republic, which receives only a minimal 
treatment in the book as the “Chinese variant,” Golomstock declares 
Mao’s ideals of a “New Democratic Culture” that was to be “nationa-
list in form, socialist in content”106 as a mere “second-hand” copy of 
the cultural model of the Soviet Union.107
The problem with Golomstock’s conclusion is that all notions of 
authorship, from the diversity of cultural movements in the early Rus-
sian avant-garde to Stalin’s supposed integration of these concepts in 
105  Ibid., p. 251.
106  Ibid., p. 128.
107  Ibid., p. 122. The claim that Stalinist and Maoist art production can be conflated is strongly 
refuted by art historian Christof Büttner in his discussion of the sculpture group “Rent Collec-
tion Courtyard” (1965), which consisted of 114 dry-clay, life-sized figures. During Maoist rule 
the installation was copied five times due to its enormous popular acclaim. In seven scenes the 
sculpture depicts the exploitative politics of landlord Liu Wencai, and shows how farmers deliver 
their harvest as a form of tax, but are tricked and forced to hand over even their daughters to 
provide breast milk to the opium-addicted, weakened Wencai. The sculpture group is exhibited 
in the former house of the landlord, Anren, in the district of Dayi, and was realized by a worker’s 
collective that, basing themselves on the cultural theories of Mao Zedong, refused to place any 
signature on the work and based their depictions of the scene on studying and discussing with 
the people having lived through the pre-revolutionary politics in the region. The theatrical use of 
the sculpture group, its collective production by professionals and amateurs alike, and the rejec-
tion of pedestals or durable materials, distinguishes the work strongly from the thesis of socialist 
realism. Büttner states that “[i]t is a work of art that is so convincing that many interpret it to be 
the simple, unimaginative depiction of a real event and held it in disdain for exactly that reason. 
That was all the more true when Western art historians labeled it Socialist Realism and, even 
worse, stigmatized it as propaganda art for the Cultural Revolution.” Christof Büttner, “The 
Transformations of a Work of Art – Rent Collection Courtyard, 1965–2009,” in Esther Schlicht 
and Max Hollein (eds.), Art for the Millions (Munich: Hirmer Verlag, 2009), p. 38.
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became clear that modern propaganda finds its origins in the imperial 
democracy of the British, whose heritage Churchill would later on de-
fend against the Nazi regime? Here, it becomes clear that our study fa-
ces not a distinction between totalitarian propaganda and democratic 
freedom, but of two propagandas with overlaps and differences.
In short, there is something propagandistic about the notion of 
Totalitarian Propaganda Art as such, both that it would be wholly 
“other” from art produced under democratic regimes, and that it is a 
logical continuation of the avant-garde experiment to merge art with 
life. Through the notion of Totalitarian Propaganda Art, we essentially 
define what is free art; making all regimes that do not fit the radical 
label of totalitarianism automatically the potential protectors of artis-
tic autonomy. Not only does this deny the actual differences between 
various dictatorships and their cultural apparatuses, it also denies the 
reoccurring role of propaganda art in modern democracy, while fully 
rejecting the very idea that the notion of democracy may in fact very 
well serve “totalitarian” objectives. As such, the concept of Totalitarian 
Propaganda Art serves a dual function: it offers a “complete” descrip-
tion of the role of art within specific 20th-century dictatorships on the 
one hand, but on the other also serves to create the myth of democratic 
exceptionalism when it comes to the use of propaganda. 
Before continuing our exploration of the role of art and propaganda 
in the context of democracies – those that define the propaganda art of 
others as “totalitarian” – let us first summarize the definition of Totali-
tarian Propaganda Art as we have discussed it in this section:
• Totalitarian Propaganda Art is the category which describes the 
centralization of art and cultural production under extreme au-
thoritarian regimes: we think of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Rus-
sia when it comes to the enforcement of narrowly defined scripts 
through which the artists unambiguously have to contribute to 
the cult of dictator and dictatorship alike;
• Totalitarian Propaganda Art is at the same time meant to con-
ceal both the differences between the art of various dictatorships 
– think of the relative cultural differences tolerated under fas-
cism compared to the total subjugation of “Aryan” artists under 
Nazism – and as such aims at defining totalitarianism as radica-
lly opposed and irreconcilable with modern democracy;
• Totalitarian Propaganda Art is a dualistic term: on the one hand, it 
is a category with which to describe the art produced under control 
of 20th-century dictatorships, while on the other, the term totalita-
rianism serves political regimes to distinguish themselves as oppo-
sed to dictatorial influences of the past – and therefore “free”;
The first is the equation of avant-garde art in the Soviet Union 
with Stalinist-sanctioned socialist realism. Neither Groys nor Golom-
stock claim that they are exactly the same, but they both argue that the 
aim to create a synthesis between art and life was introduced by the 
avant-garde and formed the cultural blueprint of Stalinism. In other 
words, Stalin realized what the avant-garde was only dreaming of. Gro-
ys is right to say that there was no “innocent” avant-garde; they were 
employed in politics and the shaping of new structures of power. But 
the engagement of the avant-garde with the question of power in ega-
litarian terms radically differed from Stalin’s authoritarian, nationalist, 
and bureaucratized dictatorship. Totalitarian Propaganda Art under 
Stalinist rule meant a rejection of proletarian, collective dictatorship in 
favor of a singular and cultist nationalist rule by Stalin himself. There 
is no point in idealizing the October revolution and its stated objectives 
of classless communist society that were always far from reality, but 
Stalin rejected the very possibility of this thesis and repurposed art as 
propaganda back to its role as a servant tasked with the glorification of 
the tsar. Again, we should avoid here a moral judgment that declares 
the avant-garde “innocent” and the art of dictatorships “guilty,” but 
rather, we should emphasize the explicit difference in the structures 
of power that each represents as well as the clearly conflicting artistic 
outcomes that are their result.
The second problem, mainly related to Golomstock, is the question 
how “total” the notion of “totalitarianism” has to be? Mussolini’s cul-
tural apparatus, according to Golomstock, was not “total enough,” and 
the “Chinese variant” too much of a copy to be as “total” as the Soviet 
one. Without ignoring the absolute and evident brutality of the Stalinist 
or Nazi regime, how does this notion of totalitarianism actually help 
us to gain an understanding of its cultural and propaganda machinery 
other than through the term “dictatorship”? The term totalitarianism 
seems to be devised in this case to declare something of a “sublime 
evil,”111 which, in the words of Golomstock, knows its own laws, and 
no creator except for itself. This in turn generates something of an art 
beyond analysis, a totalitarian monstrosity that exists under its own 
laws, in its own time, and which is irreconcilable with the “laws” of our 
democratic present. But how then does such a thoroughly propagan-
distic art relate to our exploration in the previous chapter, in which it 
111  Slavoj Žižek, who often returns to the mechanisms of Soviet politics and propaganda in his work, writes 
in this regard: “Throughout its entire career, ‘totalitarianism’ was an ideological notion that 
sustained the complex operation of […] guaranteeing the liberal-democratic hegemony, dis-
missing the Leftist critique of liberal democracy as the obverse, the ‘twin’, of the Rightist Fascist 
dictatorship. […] [F]ar from being an effective theoretical concept, [totalitarianism] is a kind 
of stopgap: instead of enabling us to think, forcing us to acquire new insight into the historical 
reality it describes, it relieves us of the duty to think, or even actively prevents us from thinking.”
 
Slavoj Žižek, Did Someone Say Totalitarianism? (London/New York: Verso, 2001), p. 3.
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Whereas the notion of modern art applies to different and conflicting 
art movements around the world that sought to define an artistic voca-
bulary in relation to the political, industrial, and technological changes 
throughout the 19th and 20th century, the concept of modernist art 
became closely defined within the paradigm of capitalist democracy 
in the United States. It curiously combines Kantian and Saint-Simo-
nian terminology in an attempt to define an art that fits the ideal of 
American political and cultural exceptionalism. We find the results of 
this endeavor most precisely articulated in the work of one of the most 
influential art critics of the interwar and post-World War II era in the 
United States, Clement Greenberg.
When Greenberg published his essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” 
(1939) in the Marxist-oriented journal Partisan Review, he essentially 
laid out a theoretical framework of modernist art that assembled all 
concepts mentioned in the first section of this chapter, ranging from 
notions such as artistic freedom, beauty, the sublime, genius, autonomy, 
and the avant-garde. In his essay, Greenberg discusses the appearance 
of “avant-garde culture” as a result of Western bourgeois society, and 
refers to it as a “superior consciousness of history.”112 Greenberg ar-
gued that through avant-garde culture bourgeois society had proved 
itself to be “not an eternal, ‘natural’ condition of life, but simply the 
latest term in a succession of social orders.”113 Avant-garde artists such 
as Picasso, Braque, Mondriaan, Miró, Kandinsky, Brancusi, and even 
Klee, Matisse, and Cézanne had parted from the distracting turmoil 
of their times to dedicate their work to an “art for art’s sake” of “pure 
poetry”:
The avant-garde poet or artist tries in effect to imitate God by crea-
ting something valid solely on its own terms, in the way nature itself 
is valid, in the way a landscape – not its picture – is aesthetically 
valid; something given, increate, independent of meanings, similar 
or originals. Content is to be dissolved so completely into form that 
the work of art or literature cannot be reduced in whole or in part 
to anything not itself.114
Greenberg thus conjoins Saint-Simon’s idea of the artist as the 
avant-garde of society with Kant’s aesthetic vocabulary – while bypas-
112  Clement Greenberg, Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 4.
113  Ibid.
114  Ibid., p. 6.
• Totalitarian Propaganda Art is thus both a descriptive term as 
well as a form of propaganda in and of itself: as a form of demo-
cratic propaganda it is used to define the universe of democracy 
and totalitarianism as radically oppositional, and thus risks at 
leading to a blindness to the existence of propaganda in modern 
democracies: as such this use of Totalitarian Propaganda Art can 
also be considered as part of the vocabulary of Modernist Propa-
ganda Art
For many years after the collapse of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s regimes, 
the Soviet Union would serve as the Evil Empire against which Wes-
tern democracy could position itself. The cultural legacy of Stalin’s so-
cialist realism functioned as its very own counter-propaganda, and was 
extensively used by democratic regimes as a proof of the cultist and 
“totalitarian” aesthetics of their opponents. In the following, final sec-
tion of this chapter, we will explore how this discourse was in fact part 
of a propaganda effort best described as Modernist Propaganda Art.
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portant “living culture” of his time.121 But in terms of patronage, he did 
not have to hope for a future socialist government, as the success of 
the abstract expressionists had skyrocketed in the sphere of private co-
llectors, galleries, and museums. After all, it turned out that American 
capitalist democracy had given birth to the elite that Greenberg had 
hoped for. Thus, the critic who only a decade earlier published a ma-
jor article in a Marxist journal became one of the prominent voices in 
defining the meaning of this new culture, which he would increasingly 
define as a true American contribution to the progress of art history. 
Greenberg’s essay “American-Type Painting” (1955) is exemplary for 
this new endeavor.
Greenberg saw the answer to what he considered to be the retro-
grade mannerisms of the European avant-garde, in the work of the 
New York abstract expressionists. Whereas he thought that artists such 
as Arshile Gorky and Willem de Kooning were still clinging to a cer-
tain European cubist vocabulary, artists such as Clyfford Still, Barnett 
Newman, Mark Rothko and – most of all – Jackson Pollock were li-
berating themselves from the European heritage, and advancing the 
cause of a truly autonomous art. Greenberg emphasized in their work 
the importance of “flatness,” the absence of spatial depiction, but the 
full recognition of the painterly object as a reality per se – the painting 
as nothing more or less than the painting itself.122 Pollock became the 
embodiment of the project of abstract expressionism: jumping around 
his studio or in the open air, “dripping” industrial paint upon canvas-
ses, which, instead of being mounted on the wall, were placed on the 
floor. Aggressively approaching the canvas from all sides, Pollock’s “ac-
tion painting” had a ritual, spontaneous side while being at the same 
time rigorously conceptually planned. His practice perfectly embodied 
the Greenbergian paradigm of the neo-Kantian modernist artist: the 
avant-garde did not form a break with history, but rather wanted to 
advance it, resulting in a new culture of American modernist art.
Kant, Greenberg would further argue in his essay “Modernist 
Painting” (1965), was essentially the “first real Modernist,” as he 
had articulated the process through which art was able to engage in a 
self-critical process; and it was this process of questioning one’s “own 
foundations” that Western – and in this case, specifically American – 
society had progressed the furthest.123 The shift from modern art to mo-
121  Ibid., p. 21.
122  Ibid, p. 226.
123  Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Art & Literature, No. 4 (Spring 1965) reprinted in: 
Charles Harrison & Paul Wood, Art in Theory. 1900-1990. An Anthology of Changing Ideas. 
(London: Paul Chapman, 1982): pp. 754-760, p. 754. It is interesting to note that Greenberg 
named Jacques-Louis David as an important contributor to the rise of modern art, not because 
of his revolutionary work – for this could only implied an instrumentalization of art which would 
make it mere kitsch – but because of David’s plea to differentiate painting specifically from the 
sing the latter’s emphasis on autonomy in relation to aesthetic expe-
rience, rather than the autonomy of art itself. The artist stands at the 
forefront of society by employing what Greenberg calls the artist’s “re-
lative values,” which are essentially the “values of aesthetics” through 
which the “absolute is invoked.”115 Greenberg here refers to the New 
York artists that would become known as the abstract expressionists, 
who abandoned the domain of figurative representation in favor of the 
non-figurative.
In “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Greenberg claims that this avant-gar-
de is at risk of being abandoned; for art that seeks an “experience to 
expression for the sake of expression”116 – and that is what he conside-
red the project of abstract expressionism to be – generates a sense of 
alienation with its former patrons, those to which the artist has always 
been “attached by an umbilical cord of gold.”117 The avant-garde needs 
a social basis, and this basis is to be found in a ruling class. But the ru-
ling class seemed all too easily drawn to the “rear-guard,” what Green-
berg considers the rise of “kitsch.”118 Kitsch, in Greenberg’s view, takes 
on a manifold of forms in popular and commercial culture, operating 
as a market devised for the masses of urbanized Western Europe and 
America who are incapable of engaging with “genuine culture.”119
Greenberg observed that kitsch was winning the sentimental su-
pport of the masses and, in order to gain political support of the po-
pulace, that elites embraced and encouraged kitsch as a legitimate cul-
ture, instead of resisting it: “The encouragement of kitsch is merely 
another of the inexpensive ways in which totalitarian regimes seek to 
ingratiate themselves with their subjects.”120 He considered the rejec-
tion of avant-garde art by the regimes of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
Union, and fascist Italy the first signs of such cultural decay. For fas-
cists and Stalinists avant-garde art was too complex to employ as a 
tool of propaganda; for this purpose kitsch was far more effective, so 
Greenberg argued. What remained, he claimed, was the hope that in 
opposition to totalitarian states and modern capitalism, a genuine so-
cialist state would arise that would be able to support and establish a 
“new culture” in defense of the avant-garde, and thus, of civilization 
as such.
In the fifties, Greenberg had assembled a canon of artists who re-
presented this new culture, those whom he considered the most im-
115  Ibid.
116  Ibid., pp. 7–8.
117  Ibid., p. 8.
118  Ibid., p. 9.
119  Ibid., p. 10.
120  Ibid., p. 19.
2 .  M O D E R N  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T1 8 4 1 8 5 2 . 4  M O D E R N I S T  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
deral government, which received direct policy orders from the White 
House, reaching millions of listeners worldwide. As we may recall from 
the first chapter, this was the very same period that the CIA engaged 
in a series of covert operations to establish client regimes abroad. The 
art historian Meyer Schapiro, for example, had chosen not to join the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom explicitly for this reason.128
In 1951, Greenberg publicly attacked the journal The Nation, which 
he claimed to be pro-Soviet, leading to Republican Congressman 
George Dondero – a prominent supporter of McCarthyism and iro-
nically a fervent opponent of modernist art – to include Greenberg’s 
accusations against the journal in the Congressional Records that do-
cumented possible pro-Soviet subversives in the United States.129 Art 
historian Francis Frascina, who researched Greenberg’s implications 
in the Red Scare, concludes that the critic was more than aware of the 
fact that he was operating in the interests of a government-funded, 
unofficial “Ministry of Culture”:
[B]y the 1950s Greenberg had become an anti-communist not least 
because he saw communism as dominated by a tendency that was 
not self-critical and which had forced art and literature to be cri-
ticized and altered by outside agendas. But, equally, organizations 
and institutions in the United States, such as the ACCF [American 
Committee for Cultural Freedom], the USIA [United States Infor-
mation Agency, a diplomatic agency involved in the propagation of 
American culture], and the State Department had their agendas; 
those of a ruling elite, backed up by overt and covert funding. With 
“Modernist Painting” Greenberg was attached to this elite by an 
umbilical cord of gold.130
This does not mean that Greenberg was necessarily aware of the extent 
to which his plea for a modernist art of American exceptionalism was 
being instrumentalized, certainly not to the level of the CIA. While 
rumors of governmental involvement in intellectual and artistic cir-
cles had been continuous, it was not until democratic Senator Mike 
Mansfield called for a wide-ranging congressional investigation into 
all clandestine financing of the CIA and the subsequent Katzenback 
Committee’s 1967 report, that a large scale debate ensued on a range 
of American covert operations, including cultural ones.131 It was that 
128  Francis Frascina, “Institutions, Culture, and America’s Cold War Years: The Making of Green-
berg’s Modernist Painting,” Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003): pp. 71–97, at p. 76.
129  Ibid.
130  Ibid., p. 92.
131  Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, p. 405.
dernist art meant for Greenberg that this process of self-exposure had 
reached a historical culmination in the new American culture it was 
establishing. This process of self-criticism and self-interrogation led 
to a true “purity” of appearance, one that formed the “guarantee of its 
standards of quality” as much as its “independence.”124
As it became clear that a growing capitalist elite was eager to pro-
vide all the necessary support to the booming market of American 
abstract expressionism, Greenberg’s defense of modernist art became 
increasingly characterized by an explicit sympathy for liberal politics, 
which would turn into an active aversion to Marxist ideology. This is 
exemplified by his membership of the American Committee for Cul-
tural Freedom in the early 1950s, an organization that aimed at rein-
vesting in the project of political liberalism, discrediting ideology, and 
campaigning against communism.125 This organization was symptoma-
tic for the beginning of the Cold War, and the rise of McCarthyism – 
named after US senator Joseph McCarthy, who became notorious for 
fueling the so-called Red Scare, the fear that the Soviet Union would 
attempt to infiltrate and subvert the US government. Greenberg would 
serve as a prominent member of the American Committee for Cultural 
Freedom in 1952–53, and the level at which he sympathized with the 
organization’s agenda is expressed by his fall-out with fellow member 
and historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, whom Greenberg accused of be-
ing too soft by merely proposing to defend cultural freedom, rather 
than actively pursuing anti-communist activities.126 He was also one 
of the core members of the organization who refused to denounce the 
anti-communist campaigns of Senator McCarthy.127
The American Committee for Cultural Freedom was affiliated with 
the CIA-backed Congress for Cultural Freedom, and was as such 
an entity with a clear political and ideological purpose. During the 
Cold War, the Congress for Cultural Freedom had the task of covert-
ly propagating abstract expressionist – modernist – art in Europe to 
win sympathy for the American cause by highlighting its exceptional 
avant-garde culture, engineered as a counterpart to the production of 
state-sanctioned socialist realism in the Soviet Union. Characteristic 
of Greenberg’s implication in this propagandistic effort was his speech 
“Modernist Art” for an international broadcasting emission of the Voi-
ce of America, the official external broadcast institution of the US fe-
practice of sculpture: a first step in questioning the reality of one’s own medium, and thus a first 
step toward an art that would become its own primary subject.
124  Ibid, p. 755.
125  Nancy Jachec, “Modernism, Enlightenment Values, and Clement Greenberg,” Oxford Art Jour-
nal, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1998): pp. 123–32.
126  Ibid., p. 125–26.
127  Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta Books, 2000), p. 199.
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The most detailed account of this cultural Cold War was published by 
historian Frances Stonor Saunders under the title Who Paid the Piper? 
(1999). Essentially, Saunders’s book is a detailed reconstruction of the 
operations initiated by the CIA in the domain of cultural warfare from 
1950 until 1976 under the umbrella of Congress for Cultural Free-
dom, which “had offices in thirty-five countries, employed dozens of 
personnel, published over twenty prestige magazines, held art exhibi-
tions, owned a news and features service, organized high profile inter-
national conferences, and rewarded musicians and artists with prizes 
and public performances.”136
The Congress for Cultural Freedom originated from the post-war 
years in Berlin, which after its division became the site of political 
contestation between the Americans and Soviets. Cultural policy was 
crucial in winning over the hearts and minds of the Europeans, and in 
that regard the Americans lagged far behind. In the field of what Saun-
ders refers to as the “Kulturkampf,” the Soviets were experienced in 
appealing to international intellectual and cultural elites, and as early 
as 1945 they had opened a State Opera in Berlin, followed in 1947 by 
a House of Culture: “Thanks largely to Russian propaganda, America 
was widely regarded as culturally barren, a nation of gum-chewing, 
Chevy-driving, Dupont-sheathed philistines.”137 Whereas from 1948 
onward the Marshall Plan offered financial credits and material assis-
tance to strengthen Western European countries in their future role as 
valuable NATO alliances, the educated and cultured classes were still 
to be won over. The CIA, which had been founded in 1947 through 
the National Security Act, was going to prove crucial to this endeavor.
A key figure in the American cultural offensive was the Esto-
nian-American Michael Josselson, who, with much of his family killed 
by the Bolsheviks, held a strongly anti-Communist position. Enlisted 
at first in the US army to assist the denazification process and as a 
cultural advisor, Josselson was approached by the CIA to join its Ber-
lin station for Covert Action in 1949. After a disappointing Ameri-
can counter-conference to the successful Soviet “World Congress for 
Peace” that had taken place on April 20, 1949, launching Picasso’s 
lithograph La Colombe (The Dove) as its permanent icon, Josselson, in 
his new position as a CIA operative, proposed to his superiors the es-
tablishment of a permanent structure to organize intellectual resistan-
ce. This proposal became the foundational document of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom (codename QKOPERA), the new CIA-backed 
136  Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, p. 1.
137  Ibid., p. 19.
same year that Ramparts magazine published a lengthy investigative 
report on CIA covert operations, exposing the range of seemingly 
independent, private, and philanthropic organizations that had been 
operating as fronts for its activities.132
The role of art in Cold War propaganda would famously become the 
topic of the 1974 Artforum essay “Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of 
the Cold War” by art historian Eva Cockcroft. Cockcroft’s essay speci-
fically focuses on the structures of “self-perpetuating boards of trustees 
composed primarily of rich donors,” which often form “the same ‘pro-
minent citizens’ who control banks and corporations and help stage the 
formulation of foreign policy.”133 She mentions the Museum of Modern 
Art (MoMA) in New York, which from the early 1940s onward had su-
pported war-related cultural programs, and now, in the context of the 
Cold War, had expanded its activities overseas through Porter McCray, 
MoMA’s head of international programs and former employee of the 
Office of Inter-American Affairs during the Second World War. Cock-
croft describes that abstract expressionist artists were of great importan-
ce to McCray, who displayed them prominently in international exhibi-
tions such as The New American Painting (1958–59), which also toured 
eight different European countries. According to the introduction to the 
show’s catalogue by art historian and former MoMA director Alfred H. 
Barr, the abstract expressionists “defiantly reject the conventional values 
of the society which surrounds them, but they are not politically engagés 
even though their paintings have been praised and condemned as sym-
bolic demonstrations of freedom in a world in which freedom connotes 
a political attitude.”134 For Cockcroft, this ideological reading of moder-
nist American art as “non-ideological” is exactly what made it so effecti-
ve in the Cold War policies opposing the figurative doctrines of Stalinist 
socialist realism. While the MoMA might not have been directly tied to 
the government and CIA Cold War effort, there were certainly suspi-
cions of mutual interests, due to its private donors and former political 
affiliations of some of its employees, as well as their shared ideological 
project of promoting American exceptionalism in Europe:
[T]he Abstract Expressionists succeeded in creating an important new 
art movement. They also contributed, whether they knew it or not, to 
a purely political phenomenon – the supposed divorce between art and 
politics which so perfectly served America’s needs in the cold war.135
132  Ibid., p. 382.
133  Eva Cockcroft, “Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War,” Artforum, Vol. 12, No. 10 
(Jun. 1974): pp. 39–41, at pp. 174–48.
134  Ibid., p. 153.
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nonetheless draw leftist cultural classes closer:
The real objectives of the Congress were clarified. It was not to 
be a center for agitation, but a beachhead in Western Europe from 
which the advance of Communist ideas could be halted. It was to 
engage in a widespread and cohesive campaign of peer pressure to 
persuade intellectuals to disassociate themselves from Communist 
fronts or fellow travelling organizations. It was to encourage the in-
telligentsia to develop theories and arguments which were directed 
not at a mass audience, but at a small elite of pressure groups and 
statesmen who in turn determined government policy.142
Under the guidance of Josselson, the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
embarked on a great diversity of cultural projects. It established para-
llel institutions, such as the Italian Association for Cultural Freedom, 
the British Society for Cultural Freedom and the American Commit-
tee for Cultural Freedom. It published cultural and literary magazines 
such as Preuves in France, Encounter in England, and Tempo Presente in 
Italy – the latter literally copying the title of Les Temps Modernes, edited 
by arch-enemy, philosopher, and Communist sympathizer Jean-Paul 
Sartre. But its publications also reached beyond Europe with the jour-
nals Cuadernos in Latin America, Quest in India, Quadrant in Australia 
and Jiyu in Japan, and later on integrated existing journals such as the 
American Partisan Review into its organization.143 The congress further 
initiated public and cultural manifestations, notably the “Masterpieces 
of the Twentieth Century” in Paris, 1952, presenting works by Samuel 
Barber and Igor Stravinsky. The music-oriented events were orchestra-
ted largely by Russian-American composer Nicolas Nabokov, who had 
been tasked with controlling musical manifestations in Germany on 
possible Nazi influences, and gained historical fame when confronting 
the Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich.144 Nabokov also took char-
ge of “The International Conference of Twentieth Century Music” in 
Rome in 1954, which presented young composers that created atonal 
and dodecaphonic composition, music that was despised by the Stali-
nist regime. Remarkable was also the CIA’s clandestine book program 
142  Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, pp. 98–99.
143  Ibid., p. 160.
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ference for World Peace” in New York on March 25, 1949. Confronted by Nabokov’s question 
whether the composer agreed with the denunciation of “formalist music” by the Soviet regime, 
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cultural arm of the American Cold War machinery.138 However, to 
be successful, it was crucial that the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
would uphold an image of utmost independence. Josselson was the 
only CIA-operative in the core group, and, formally, his colleagues 
were unaware of the exact sources of the funding transferred to the 
organization through a complex series of seemingly private American 
initiatives and foundations that supported the promotion of democra-
tic cultural values in response to the Soviet threat.139 Here, the newly 
developed covert “civilian” structures of the CIA came to being, and 
Saunders effectively describes them as the American counterpoint of 
the Cominform – its very own “Deminform.”140
On Monday June 26, 1950, the first five-day Congress for Cultural 
Freedom opened in the Berlin Titania Palast in the presence of pro-
minent American figureheads such as US senator Schlesinger, writer 
Tennessee Williams, actor Robert Montgomery, as well as strategica-
lly selected prominent “black” figures, such as journalist Max Yergan, 
who were chosen to counter the Soviet critique of American’s failure 
to ensure civil rights for its African-American population. Part of the 
British delegation were composer Peter de Mendelssohn and historian 
Hugh Trevor-Roper and the French provided philosopher and socio-
logist Raymond Aron as well as the writer André Malraux, who would 
later become the Minister of Cultural Affairs under De Gaulle, a role 
in which he would continue to support and appear in the projects of 
the Congress. These figures give a sense of the variety of international 
intellectual and cultural key players that in the course of more than 
two decades after would be paid to participate in the many activities of 
Josselson’s organization.
While the American administration considered the congress a suc-
cess, receiving praise from President Truman himself, doubts had risen 
about its intentions: the impressive scale of the congress was unique to 
impoverished Europe and raised suspicion.141 And though suspicions 
around the Congress would never fully disappear, Josselson forged an 
organizational strategy that henceforth would include dissident opi-
nions that the American government itself might reject, but that would 
138  Ibid., p. 72.
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[F]or them, it [modernist art] spoke to a specifically anti-Commu-
nist ideology, the ideology of freedom, of free enterprise. Non-fi-
gurative and politically silent, it was the very antithesis to socialist 
realism. It was precisely the kind of art the Soviets loved to hate. 
But it was more than this. It was, claimed its apologists, an explicit-
ly American intervention in the modernist canon. As early as 1946, 
critics were applauding the new art as independent, self-reliant, a 
true expression of the national will, spirit and character.150
Saunders also argues that the modernist artists were not as “depoliti-
cized” and unaware of the instrumentalization of their work as is often 
claimed. Apart from the painter Ad Reinhardt, who, unlike most abs-
tract expressionists who had espoused Marxist sympathies, remained 
loyal to his leftist political orientation, and who was the only one of the 
group to participate in the March on Washington in support of black 
rights in 1963, many of the artists had direct and voluntary links to 
the anti-Communist movement.151 Barnett Newman had no problem 
to speak publicly of his work as a reflection of the “new America,”152 
Motherwell and Pollock – just like Greenberg – were members of the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom. In 1940, Rothko and 
Gottlieb even helped to establish the Foundation of Modern Painters 
and Sculptors, “which started by condemning all threats to culture 
from nationalistic and reactionary political movements,” but in later 
months became an active agent in the anti-Communist movement by 
“exposing Party influence in various art organizations” with the aim to 
“destroy all Communist presence in the art world.”153
From this point of view, Pollock’s “drippings” suddenly demand a 
fundamentally different contextual reading than the one preferred by 
Greenberg. Rather than being questionable neo-Kantian culminations 
of radically self-interrogating autonomy, the figure of Pollock becomes 
a performer in a much larger geopolitical construct: his work opera-
tes within the micro-performative dimension of propaganda, directed 
through the macro-performative dimension of the Cold War. His wild 
dances around his canvasses while throwing paint in all directions are 
not merely an attempt to arrive at a truth located within the act of 
painting itself, but should rather be understood as a ritual performan-
ce of the doctrine of freedom espoused by the structures of power 
Limits of Modernist Art as a ‘Weapon of the Cold War’: Reassessing the Unknown Patron of 
the Monument to the Unknown Soldier,” Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997): pp. 68–80, 
at p. 80.
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152  Ibid., p. 275.
153  Ibid., pp. 276–77.
that used fronts in the form of independent publishers and literary 
agents to distribute books from American figures such as T.S. Eliot as 
well as Soviet writers, such as Boris Pasternak, whose novel Dr Zhivago 
(1957) was prohibited in his own country due to its critical relation to 
the state. These books were produced and distributed under the aus-
pices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and under the guidance 
of the CIA T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets (1943) was even translated and 
airdropped into Russia.145 And naturally, when the Russians invaded 
Hungary in 1956 and Sartre for the first time fully distanced himself 
of the Communist Party in an article in L’Express, the Congress made 
sure to have thousands of copies distributed instantly.146
Through progressive culture, the Soviet enemy could be exposed in 
its barbarity, both politically and culturally. But precisely here one of 
the great paradoxes of the Congress for Cultural Freedom is evident, 
namely that its preference for modernist art was far more progressive 
than any other, overt national program of the United States itself. For 
example, “President Truman articulated a view held by many Ameri-
cans that linked experimental, and especially abstract art to degenerate 
or subversive impulses.”147 And under Senator McCarthy’s witch hunt 
for Communist conspirators this sentiment was only strengthened. 
McCarthy’s close ally, Dondero, even proclaimed that “[a]ll modern 
art is Communistic,” claiming cubism, futurism, dadaism, expressio-
nism, abstractionism, and surrealism to be “primitive,” “insane,” and 
“in denial of reason.”148 But the Congress for Cultural Freedom, in 
line with the writings of Greenberg, saw in the work of the modernist 
artists something entirely different, and supported the dissemination 
of its works in the form of large-scale touring exhibitions such as Mo-
dern Art in the United States (1955) and The New American Painting 
(1958–59) – a campaign that Saunders describes as a form of “reverse 
Entartete kunst,” meant to show that “modernism owed its survival – 
and its future – to America”149:
145  Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, p. 248.
146  Ibid., p. 306.
147  Ibid., p. 252.
148  Ibid., p. 253.
149  Ibid., p. 119. David Caute challenges Saunders’s research on the international work of the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom, when he writes that while the CIA “certainly involved itself 
in clandestinely promoting literary magazines, music festivals, and orchestral tours, along with 
much else in the United States, the financing of American art exhibits abroad was largely the 
work of the Rockefellers, the Whitneys, and the Guggenheims,” claiming that “Western attention 
post-1967 has been so fixated by the machinations of the FBI, and the KGB, that no historical 
episode is now deemed worthy of attention unless some clandestine agency of the state can be 
shown to be at the back of it.” What Caute bypasses is that Saunders does not argue for some 
“totalitarian” cultural apparatus of the CIA, but rather lays out the much more complex and 
decentralized structures through which American exceptionalism was promoted in the Cold 
War period. Her research is not so much one of “guilt by association,” but an exposé of the 
many different levels of involvement and different grades of awareness of actors involved in the 
process. See: David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 540–41. See further: Robert Burstow, “The 
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or complicit to dictatorship and totalitarianism?154
In the case of Totalitarian Art, socialist realist artworks are rare 
items in international museum collections, except when concerning 
the work of acknowledged avant-garde artists that had been forced to 
dedicate their talents to the Stalinist cult. Socialist realist works of art 
only travel in exhibitions that take the form of Entartete Kunst displays, 
inviting spectators to witness the horrors of totalitarianism, rather than 
to genuinely study the process through which these artworks came into 
being and the larger social and political context in which they opera-
ted. In the case of both Avant-Garde Propaganda Art and Totalitarian 
Propaganda Art, the political subtext of the works is emphasized as a 
means of defining their historical place. Hardly ever are they presented 
as autonomous art in the Greenbergian sense of the word.
In complete contrast, Modernist Propaganda Art is present in every 
major museum collection of the United States and most museum co-
llections in and outside Europe. Only with the greatest exception, 
when shown in exhibitions with a very specific political investment, do 
we find any reference to the anti-Communist political orientation of its 
artists or its use as Modernist Propaganda Art. This absence of any po-
litical context shows us the all-encompassing success of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom. Even though we know, or could easily know, 
the implications of these works as Modernist Propaganda Art at a time 
in which the CIA and the American Government were implicated in 
gruesome military takeovers of democratic and popular governments, 
those works are still not acknowledged for the propaganda that they 
are. In our mind, the drippings of Pollock remain abstract; they do not 
“depict” heroic American leaders or evil communists, even though, in 
fact, they do. In essence, there is nothing non-figurative about the wor-
ks of Modernist Propaganda Art: it offers figurative representations of the 
freedom supposedly inherent to non-figurative representation.
Modernist Propaganda Art represents the capitalist democratic 
imaginary of what liberation is supposed to be. We might not directly 
recognize the heroic American soldiers and tragic victims of Commu-
nist violence, but presented within the right context, they are inevita-
bly present in Pollock’s drippings – as inevitably as they are present 
in each and every work of Soviet socialist realism. But our museums 
still decide differently: Modernist Propaganda Art is not exhibited in 
154  Jonathan Jones’s recent comments on an exhibition of Soviet avant-garde art at the occasion of 
the 100-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution are exemplary, when he writes: “It is a lazy, 
immoral lie to keep pretending there was anything glorious about the brutal experiment Lenin 
imposed on Russia – or anything innocent about its all-too-brilliant propaganda art.” It would 
be hard to imagine any such similar critique regarding overviews of Modernist Propaganda Art. 
See: Jonathan Jones, “We cannot celebrate Russian art – it is brutal propaganda,” The Guardian, 
Feb. 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2017/feb/01/revolu-
tionary-russian-art-brutal-propaganda-royal-academy.
in capitalist democracy, a doctrine to which Pollock himself declared 
his loyalty through his membership of the American Committee for 
Cultural Freedom, a doctrine that further connected him with an-
ti-Communist leagues of the United States through an “umbilical cord 
of gold.” The privilege that resulted from this political affiliation can-
not be underestimated. While Pollock’s works would gain international 
fame and win the artist great financial success, an artist like Reinhardt, 
who was unwilling to distance himself from his political convictions, 
remained largely ignored until the 1960s. Pollock’s works might be 
criticized by American conservatives at home, but in the international 
sphere they were successfully capitalized as the embodiment of Ame-
rican exceptionalism and the doctrinal freedom it wished to export to 
the rest of the world.
Pollock’s work means little as propaganda, but this is essentially 
true for every work of propaganda art. As we saw in the first chapter, 
modern propaganda always demands a larger political, economic, and 
technological structure in which singular gestures become of impor-
tance in propagating a larger set of power interests. In this context, 
Greenberg’s notion of a modernist autonomy of purposeless purpose 
clearly shows its limits: Pollock does not perform in relation to the 
canvas alone, but in relation to the entire apparatus that guarantees 
the circulation and financial and ideological validation of his work as 
a cultural weapon in the Cold War. From the perspective of the CIA’s 
avant-garde, the purposeless purpose of modernist art thus becomes 
of true purpose in its merger of art with the reality of capitalist-demo-
cratic life. In declaring modernist art as the ultimate culmination of 
modernity, Greenberg opened the way for the avant-garde of the CIA 
to translate these ideas into the construction of a new reality.
Nonetheless, even though the general public today has been made 
aware of the use of Modernist Propaganda Art in the Cold War for 
several decades, the omnipresent faith in modernist art remains uns-
haken, in stark contrast to the fate of Avant-Garde Propaganda Art and 
Totalitarian Propaganda Art. The work of the Soviet avant-garde has 
certainly been recognized in the historical canon as one of the most 
important alternative histories of modern art, and its works well repre-
sented in international art institutions. Yet they continue to be exhibi-
ted with caution. The works tend to be politically contextualized, and 
the implication of the artists in the relation to the regimes of their time 
and their tragic end as propagators or victims of Stalinism is usually 
mentioned – often with a moral question hanging in the air: were the 
artists of the avant-garde ultimately at the side of democratic change 
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In the first chapter, we concluded that modern propaganda is the per-
formance of power in modern society; in this second chapter, we have 
traced the process in which modern propaganda performs power as 
art. We have done so not by analyzing artworks in and of themselves, 
but by contextualizing them within specific political, economic, and 
technological developments, beginning with the very origins of mo-
dern art in the period surrounding the French Revolution. Through 
the work of Rousseau, Kant, and Saint-Simon we observed that this 
revolutionary moment allowed for a liberation of art from its subser-
vience to ruling powers, although the exact form of a “free art” proved 
to be subject to very different interpretations. From the notion of an 
“autonomous” aesthetic experience as elaborated by Kant to the role 
of art in furthering the common good as described by Rousseau, and 
the more radical stance of Saint-Simon, who rejected “art for art’s 
sake” and emphasized its role as an avant-garde of society in service of 
revolutionary ideals located in mass industrialization and the rejection 
of the state.
We continued this specific political reading of the foundations of 
modern art in the context of the Russian Revolution and its attempt to 
contribute to the creation of a revolutionary modernity in opposition 
to western capitalist modernity. From these contextual readings of the 
role of art in modern propaganda, we observed that different structu-
res of power are performed as different models of propaganda art. For 
example, the modern propaganda of imperial British democracy privi-
leged an elitist approach, in which the figure of the propagandist and 
its public are clearly distinct, whereas in the early years of the Russian 
revolution these distinctions were – at least in theory – rejected in favor 
of an educational or “emancipatory” propaganda enacted through an 
avant-garde but aimed for and by the masses. In the latter case, politi-
cal alliances between the Bolshevik Party and the Russian Avant-Gar-
de, advanced a distinctively different form of conscious politicization 
by artists and art movements, which we discussed as Avant-Garde Pro-
paganda Art. We have noted that such differences impact the interplay 
between the macro- and micro-performative dimensions that define 
propaganda.
We also investigated the conflation of different developments in art 
in modern propaganda through the concept of Totalitarian Art, propo-
sed by Igor Golomstock. We tried to show how his usage of the concept 
of totalitarianism obfuscates both the differences between specific cul-
tural doctrines of dictatorships – from fascist Italy to the Third Reich 
– but also between different political and cultural developments within 
a dark corner of propagandistic Entartete Kunst, but at the very heart 
of museums, as the true backbone of Western democracy and capi-
talist modernity. Even when we are told that these images are propa-
ganda, and that their makers openly endorsed the ideological warfare 
for which they were used, we somehow remain deeply convinced that 
they are not, or otherwise, that it is a mere mistake. In the face of Mo-
dernist Propaganda Art, we enact democratic freedom. For democra-
cy’s intentions must be different, such is our presumption. That makes 
Modernist Propaganda Art, more than any of the art in the past, still 
effective and operational. Visible as art, invisible as propaganda: that is 
the core of the enormous success of Modernist Propaganda Art.
Before arriving at a general comparison and conclusion to our ex-
ploration of categories that help us to define the history of modern 
propaganda art, let us first summarize the definition of Modernist Pro-
paganda Art as we have discussed it in this section:
• Modernist Propaganda Art is a form of modern propaganda em-
ployed by Western capitalist democracies which propagandizes 
ideals of individualist and “purposeless” freedom in contrast to 
the dogmatic, collective, and instrumentalized nature of Totali-
tarian Propaganda Art;
• Modernist Propaganda Art demands of the artist a visual voca-
bulary that can be effectively positioned as the absolute opposite 
of Totalitarian Propaganda Art and thus at first sight must not 
be associated with any specific political objective, but instead 
suggest an internal autonomy that defines its reason of being in 
the world;
• Modernist Propaganda Art functions through the use of images 
not associated with propaganda, and as such is a propaganda 
that propagates liberation from all forms of propaganda as such: 
its rejection of all overt political messages is part of its core po-
litical message;
• Modernist Propaganda Art is visible as art and invisible as propa-
ganda: our incapacity to recognize it as propaganda, even when 
we are made aware of its use as such, is the essence and proof of 
its persistence and continuous value in embodying, performing, 
and thus propagating the doctrines of capitalist democracy.
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should not be, and that Modernist Propaganda Art is the only one that 
in theory and image remains fully operational today.
The process through which we investigated different structures of 
power and art thus allowed us to differentiate models of modern pro-
paganda art. This allows us to speak even more concretely of propa-
gandas in the plural. Let us for now, based on this chapter, propose the 
following definition of Modern Propaganda Art in general:
• Modern propaganda art is the performance of power as art in 
modern society
Now, our challenge will be to translate our definitions of modern pro-
paganda, as well as modern propaganda art to the current, 21st cen-
tury. As we have now concluded that modern propaganda and demo-
cracy do not exclude one another, and that democracy’s impact on the 
domain of modern propaganda art continues to affect our present era, 
our task will be to analyze both the heritage of modernity and modern 
art in our present time, and to locate the dominant – and often conflic-
ting – structures of power that define our current condition: that which 
we refer to as the contemporary. We will do so by testing how our de-
finition of modern propaganda relates to what we will now define as 
contemporary propaganda. Our aim will be to analyze three structures 
of established and emerging powers that have a particularly prominent 
impact in our time, in the form of the War on Terror, popular mass 
movements, and stateless peoples. Subsequently, in the final chapter, 
we will explore how the structures of power that define contemporary 
propaganda shape contemporary propaganda art.
the Soviet Union; for example, between the relative freedom provided 
by the Bolshevik Party in relation to the Russian Avant-Garde and the 
radical, state-imposed doctrine of socialist realism under the Stalinist 
regime. We concluded that the concept of Totalitarian Propaganda Art 
in this respect, is not just a term used to describe art within dictator-
ships, but used to obscure its differences. Golomstock’s insistence on 
an absolute distinction between Totalitarian Propaganda Art and art 
created in modern democracies further serves as a reminder that our 
critical capacity to analyze the implications of modern democracies in 
propaganda analysis can be undermined, and proves to be a propagan-
distic mechanism in and of itself.
This led us to the final analysis of Modernist Propaganda Art, 
as theorized by Clement Greenberg. Here we became aware of the 
complex and decentralized usage of modernist art as propaganda by 
the CIA in service of American exceptionalism during the Cold War 
period. We saw how through covert channels, reminiscent of the de-
velopment of propaganda in imperial British democracy, movements 
such as abstract expressionism served as a cultural counterpoint to 
Soviet-sanctioned socialist realism, with the goal to build support for 
American capitalist democracy as the new safe haven of modernity. 
Crucial in this regard is the detachment between what an artwork de-
picts and how it is deployed: we noted the non-figurative nature of the 
works that were privileged in the CIA’s investment in Modernist Pro-
paganda Art, which represented an abstracted notion of depoliticized 
freedom and non-ideological expression. Although these Modernist 
artists were not completely aware of the overall apparatus in which 
they operated, we also highlighted the direct and willful implication of 
a number of them in anti-Communist activities.
Although the history of Modernist Propaganda Art is today known 
to the public, its artists and their works remain insulated from the 
history of Totalitarian Propaganda Art and displayed publicly without 
mention of their implication in some of the most devastating US-led 
wars and covert operations in history. Therefore, Modernist Propa-
ganda Art is recognizable as art, but invisible as propaganda, and thus 
continues to be one of the most effective forms of modern propaganda 
in history. Whereas Avant-Garde Propaganda Art and Totalitarian Pro-
paganda Art are always politically and historically contextualized, Mo-
dernist Propaganda Art remains largely free from such critical inquiry 
and continues to express the idea of an a-historical and non-ideologi-
cal freedom of expression and artistic autonomy, born from capitalist 
democracy in the United States. From these three historical models 
of modern propaganda art, we may conclude that Totalitarian Propa-
ganda Art remains effective in terms of defining what a democratic art 






The notion of the contemporary indicates what happens in our present, 
carrying within it the obvious paradox that defining a present turns 
it instantly into history – in fact into a different history. Art historian 
Sven Lütticken considers the contemporary rather as something of an 
arena or theater, as he writes that “the contemporary should be seen 
as a contested terrain, as asynchronic coexistence of different contem-
poralities, ideologies, and social realities.”1 In this context, Lütticken 
speaks of the contemporary as “history in motion.”2
As we will explore throughout this chapter, in our present century, 
the conflicts between different claims on history and, consequently, its 
impact on our present and future, have become increasingly prominent. 
The western project of the War on Terror has been enacted through mi-
litary and technological means by declaring a “clash of civilizations”3 
– a war that stages an opposition between Western, 21st-century “de-
mocratic progress” and Muslim fundamentalist “sealed time.”4 We can 
also think of the claim of the Islamic State, whose self-declared global 
caliphate proposes itself as a new Ummah for Sunni factions all over 
the world, modeled after the year 1 of its prophet.5 Or we can think of 
the warnings of environmentalists and activists like Naomi Klein, who 
refer to our geological age as the anthropocene – part of a timeframe 
that extends far beyond past and future date-keeping, in which human 
technology has irreversibly altered the ecology and geology of the pla-
net – forcing us to face a future in which there might not be any history 
left.6 It is this conflictual theater of the contemporary – this theater 
1   Sven Lütticken, History in Motion: Time in the Age of the Moving Image (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 
2013), p. 25.
2   Ibid.
3   The words of Samuel Huntington, who developed the notion of the clash of civilizations in the 
years preceding the War on Terror, would become paradigmatic in the global warfare of the 21st 
century: “Law and order is the first prerequisite of Civilization and in much of the world — 
Africa, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Asia, the Middle East — it appears to 
be evaporating, while also under serious assault in China, Japan, and the West. On a worldwide 
basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of 
an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity.” Samuel 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), p. 321.
4   The concept of sealed time is borrowed from Lütticken, with which he aims to describe the car-
icature made of Islamic civilization supposedly counter-posed to progress. See: Sven Lütticken, 
Icons of the Market: Modern Iconoclasm and the Fundamentalist Spectacle (Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2009), p. 65.
5   In the words of Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī, leader of the Islamic State: “O Muslims in all places, 
rejoice, take heart, and hold your heads high! For today you have, by God’s bounty, a state 
and caliphate that will renew your dignity and strength, that will recover your rights and your 
sovereignty: a state joining in brotherhood non-Arab and Arab, white and black, easterner and 
westerner; a caliphate joining together the Caucasian, Indian, and Chinese, the Syrian, Iraqi, 
Yemeni, Egyptian, and North African, the American, Frenchman, German, and Australian.” 
Quoted from Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” 
The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 19 (Mar. 
2015): p. 41.
6   In the words of Naomi Klein: “Fundamentally, the task is to articulate not just an alternative 
set of policy proposals but an alternative worldview to rival the one at the heart of the ecological 
crisis – embedded in interdependence rather than hyper-individualism, reciprocity rather than 
dominance, and cooperation rather than hierarchy. This is required not only to create a political 
context to dramatically lower emissions, but also to help us cope with the disasters we can no 
longer to avoid. Because in the hot and stormy future we have already made inevitable through 
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subsequently was to direct the micro-performative dimension in the 
form of the abstract expressionists “enacting” their liberation of figu-
ration: the grand variety of cultural workers proclaiming their artistic 
freedom at the many iterations of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 
and the public at large, which was to internalize the absolute cultural 
distinction between the symbols of freedom (liberated abstraction), 
and oppression (indoctrinated figuration). 
It is important to emphasize that although both examples follow 
a vertical structure of power, the models are still very different. The 
existence of democracy in the context of the United States, however 
compromised or contradictory, defines a different relative freedom of 
its citizens, but also shapes a different propaganda. Whereas the Sta-
linist regime has little need to separate propaganda from governance, 
the legitimacy of the United States was dependent on maintaining an 
absolute separation between democracy and propaganda, although ac-
tually, it was in need of both. We already mentioned that the notions 
of the vertical and horizontal are far from absolute, but moreover, one 
can dissect a variety of propaganda models both within vertical and 
horizontal structures of power. 
In the case of Avant-Garde Propaganda Art, we have seen how the 
revolution initially aimed at redefining the performance of power that 
is propaganda, by turning the macro-performative dimension of pro-
paganda into collective action of which the micro-performative dimen-
sion is a direct continuation, with the aim of equalizing the relation 
between sender and receiver. The macro-performative dimension in 
this case is defined by a collective demand for the seizure and re-dis-
tribution of power. The micro-performative dimension is defined by 
the self-governance of the Soviets, that were to secure the redistribu-
tion of power on a day to day basis. Avant-Garde Propaganda Art is 
the result of this horizontal model of power. The shape and form of 
constructivist and productivist art is shaped by the macro-performati-
ve dimension of the revolution, but simultaneously provides tools for 
the furthering of its micro-performance in the form of its propaganda 
kiosks and workers clubs, that turns workers in both senders and recei-
vers of propaganda.
In this chapter, we will further elaborate on these different workings 
of propaganda through two models. The first is the rebooted propagan-
da model of Chomsky and Herman that focusses on the performan-
ce of monopolies of power in which the distance between sender and 
receiver is maintained and strengthened. The second is an inverted 
propaganda model, which focusses on emerging powers with an egali-
tarian objective in length of the early stages of the Russian Revolution, 
that aim at unifying sender and receiver.
where a variety of histories find itself in motion and the “contempo-
rary” manifests itself through radically different conceptions of time – 
that we will analyze in this chapter through the prism of contemporary 
propaganda.
In the previous two chapters, we have been able to define some key 
terms in our analysis of propaganda. We have defined propaganda as 
a performance of power, and in the context of different modernisms – 
from Western capitalist modernity to Soviet revolutionary modernity – 
we concluded that as structures of power differ, so do propagandas. We 
have sometimes referred to the material dimension of these structu-
res of power as “infrastructures.”7 In Totalitarian Propaganda Art and 
Modernist Propaganda Art, we have seen how the macro-performative 
dimension of these infrastructures relates to the aim of constructing 
reality according to the interests of its proprietors, which is sustai-
ned by the micro-performative dimension of propaganda in which the 
performance of power acts through the bodies of society at large. Our 
examples were the Stalinist regime and the United States in the Cold 
War, which are relevant case studies as both operate as “vertical” struc-
tures of power, but in very different ways. 
In the case of the Stalinist regime, we witnessed a near “sovereign” 
macro-performative dimension of power in which art, through the pa-
radigm of socialist realism, was employed to represent and shape reali-
ty after the interest of a singular ruler. The micro-performative dimen-
sion is embodied by those who labor for socialist realism to come into 
being. Whether artist, factory worker or farmer, each were to embody 
a reality they themselves were simultaneously tasked to create. In the 
case of the United States, which aimed to uphold democracy in the 
face of the Soviet Union, such overt centralized direction of art was 
unthinkable. Similar to the earlier model of democratic propaganda 
that we discussed in relation to the British Wellington House, a co-
vert propaganda in the form of the CIA-backed Congress of Cultural 
Freedom was needed to counteract the Soviet Union on the cultural 
frontlines, without scrutinizing the idea of democracy as a model free 
of propaganda. This macro-performative dimension of propaganda, 
our past emissions, an unshakable belief in the equal rights of all people and a capacity for deep 
compassion will be the only things standing between civilization and barbarism.” Naomi Klein, 
This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate (Canada: Penguin Random House, 2014), 
p. 399.
7   Nato Thompson in this regard speaks of “infrastructure of resonance,” which he explains as “the 
set of material conditions that produces a form of meaning. It is, to put it as directly as possible, 
the collection of structures (newspapers, social networks, academic institutions, churches, etc.) 
that shape our understanding of any given phenomenon – including ourselves. Anything that 
circulates is thus a part of an infrastructure of resonance.” In Thompson’s definition of power, 
the infrastructure of resonance is key: “If we want to change meaning in the world, we simply 
need to diagram an infrastructure, visit it, and radically alter it.” Nato Thompson, Seeing Power: 
Art and Activism in the 21st Century (Brooklyn/London: Melville House, 2015), pp. 60, 61.
2 0 4 2 0 53 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A
the East–West divide was already questionable, but its fragile conste-
llation is now under severe threat from the Trump administration due 
to its propagation of a “Muslim ban” to the United States in the form 
of Executive Order 13780, targeting countries such as Iran, Libya, So-
malia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.14
Despite Obama administration’s attempt to stage a new spirit of 
transnational cooperation, the neocolonial War on Terror has relent-
lessly continued to reintroduce a false divide between the “free” West 
and the “barbaric” East, allowing profoundly racist rhetorics to define 
both domestic and foreign policy in Western states – a divide that is 
further deepened and exploited by the Trump administration. The War 
on Terror, designed as a never-ending war, further established com-
pletely new para-legal realities, in which civil rights became suspen-
ded through ongoing declarations of states of exception, allowing the 
unprecedented surveillance and detention of civilians, while legalizing 
torture and extralegal killings through assassinations and drone war-
fare. The passing of the “Patriot Act” by the Obama administration, 
which will inevitably be continued if not worsened by the Trump ad-
ministration – was a legislative foundation for increased surveillance 
and the trespassing of civil privacy, thus becoming a piece of legislation 
that was mainly successful in annulling others.15
Contemporary propaganda has been essential in the aim of cons-
tructing this particular reality in the 21st century. But we should add 
that contemporary propaganda has been equally important to the mi-
llions of people that rose to the streets opposing the war effort, pro-
testing against far more fundamental existential crises in the domains 
of economy and climate change. This holds even more for the millions 
of people murdered in the ongoing war, those declared stateless – if 
they were not so already – and their families, friends and communi-
ties. Those opposing the war effort within Western societies, and those 
against whom the war effort is directed – also attempt to engage their 
own models of contemporary propaganda, which as we will see, are 
different from the propaganda models of the War on Terror.
In the first section of this chapter, we will – as mentioned – begin 
to revisit Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model. We will not only 
attempt to update and revise their propaganda model, but also propose 
an “inverted propaganda model,” aimed at recognizing forms of power 
14   “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” was signed as 
Executive Order 13780 on March 6, 2017. Retrieved from the website of the White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-for-
eign-terrorist-entry-united-states
15   The Patriot Act passed on Oct. 26, 2001, as H.R. 3162 with the aim to “To deter and punish 
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investiga-
tory tools, and for other purposes.” Retrieved from the website of the United States Congress, 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf.
What defines the scale and acceleration of the Technological So-
ciety in the 21st century and, as we will trace in the beginning of this 
chapter, also the scale and acceleration of contemporary propaganda 
is the so-called “War on Terror.”8 The War on Terror is a war declared 
by the first George W. Bush administration, when on September 11, 
2001, nineteen hijackers operating under the name of the organization 
Al-Qa’ida (The Base), managed to gain control over four commercial 
airplanes crashing them into four different sites. As the United States 
war effort increased in its aftermath, the September 11 attacks were 
increasingly framed as an attack on the Western world itself; an attack 
on the “values” of capitalist democracy, not only on individual free-
dom, but also consumer freedom.9 The War on Terror persuaded many 
Western nations, including the United Kingdom, and my own country, 
the Netherlands, into a “Coalition of the Willing.”10 These wars defied 
international law – not in the least the United Nations Charter – in a 
variety of ways.11 The two Barack Obama administrations that succee-
ded Bush’s felt obliged to continue the efforts of the War on Terror in 
Iraq and Syria to stop the rise of the Islamic State – itself the product 
of the Iraq War12 – now in the form of the more soberly titled “An-
ti-ISIS Coalition,” strategically including additional Middle-Eastern 
allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Turkey, in order to 
diminish the neocolonial appearance of the war effort.13 This attempt 
to create the general guise of a broad multi-national coalition beyond 
8   President George W. Bush read his State of the Union on September 21, stating: “Our war on 
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group 
of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” “Text of George Bush’s Speech,” The 
Guardian, Sep. 21, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13.
9   This was expressed most famously by Bush, when calling upon the responsibility of the Amer-
ican people to support the war effort by keeping the economy going, stating: “I encourage you 
all to go shopping more.” “President Bush’s News Conference,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/washington/20text-bush.html?_r=0.
10   Operation Iraqi Freedom was not supported by the United Nations, leaving the administration 
of President George W. Bush to assemble its own coalition. Although it would eventually involve 
about sixty nations, some of these countries supplied little more than nominal assistance, the 
majority of the war effort being financed by the United States and the United Kingdom. For a 
governmental perspective on the members of the Coalition of the Willing and their contributions 
to the invasion see: Stephen A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Wash-
ington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2011).
11   In 2004, then United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan, declared Operation Iraqi Freedom 
“illegal” based on the UN founding charter. Although the first article of the charter states the 
right “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,” Annan ar-
gued that the claim of the United States and United Kingdom for the legitimacy of the invasion 
as a form of “pre-emptive self-defense” would lead to a breakdown of the international order. 
See: Ewen MacAskill and Julian Borger, “Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says 
Annan,” The Guardian, Sep. 16, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.
iraq.
12   Journalist Patrick Cockburn, reconstructing the emergence of the Islamic State, writes in this 
regard: “It was the US, Europe, and their regional allies in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, 
and United Arab Emirates that created the conditions for the rise of ISIS. They kept the war 
going in Syria, though it was obvious from 2012 that Assad would not fall.” Patrick Cockburn, 
The Rise of the Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London/New York: Verso, 2015), p. 
9.
13   See: Kathleen J. McInnis, “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State,” Congres-
sional Research Service, Apr. 13, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf.
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taken away and supposed terrorist suspects imprisoned in high securi-
ty complexes and secret prisons or “black sites” around the world, as 
well as blacklisted groups designated as “terrorist organizations.” Sta-
teless peoples, in a variety of forms and through different ideological 
motives, resist – out of conviction or by necessity – the War on Terror.
So how do the expanded state, popular mass movements, and stateless 
peoples relate to one another in the contemporary global theater of the 
War on Terror? While the expanded state argues that its war efforts are 
waged in defense of democracy and its civil society, popular mass mo-
vements reject this claim, as embodied in the famous anti-war slogan 
“Not in our name.” In other words, the expanded state and popular 
mass movements stand in an antagonistic relationship. Nonetheless, 
popular mass movements that consist of actors of civil society, still 
have a certain access to certain rights and protections that the expan-
ded state allows for, although these are relative to the kind of citizen 
in question: white Americans that oppose the war, for example, will 
generally be able to claim more protection from the expanded state 
than people of color, even when the latter formally hold the same kind 
of citizenship.19 In the case of stateless peoples, these rights and protec-
tions are non-existent altogether. While undocumented migrants and 
19   A report of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) de-
scribes how so-called “stop-and-frisk” policies enacted by law enforcement radically increased in 
the aftermath of 9/11, as the attacks seemingly legitimized the profiling of Arab peoples, peoples 
of color in general, as well as LGBTQI+ communities: “In the post 9/11 era, as it became 
publicly acceptable to racially profile certain communities again, profiling impacted policing 
in all communities and efforts to promote community policing and improve relations between 
communities of color and police were greatly scaled back.” See: “Born Suspect: Stop-and-Frisk 
Abuses & the Continued Fight to End Racial Profiling in America,” NAACP, Sep. 2014, p. 5, 
http://action.naacp.org/page/-/Criminal%20Justice/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf.
and propaganda largely ignored by the original model. Through the 
work of Joseph Masco, Judith Butler, and Mohamedou Ould Slahi, 
we will identify in the next three sections three main actors that have 
emerged on the global stage of the contemporary, strongly shaped by 
the War on Terror. These three actors mark the ideological divides and 
political contradictions in our 21st century and can be analyzed throu-
gh an update of the original propaganda model on the one hand, and 
our proposition of an inverted propaganda model on the other.
The first of these three actors is what we will discuss as the expanded 
state, which emerged as the foundational power structure of the War 
on Terror, whose war efforts, some argue, should themselves be con-
sidered as a form of state terror.16 With regard to the expanded state 
we speak here of the government-driven military-industrial complex 
and the private economies it includes, which have shaped the massi-
ve infrastructures of the War on Terror.17 The second actor consists of 
popular mass movements, large mobilizations of politicized civil society 
– although not necessarily majorities – which organized themselves in 
various protests against both the War on Terror and the social inequali-
ties and ecological destruction. As artist Dave Beech argues, we should 
consider such manifestations of the popular will neither as purely a 
“radical and subversive version of the people,” nor as “the people as 
the collective addressee of the state,” but rather think of them dialec-
tically, as a new, emergent collectivity that we will discuss as a people-
in-the-making.18 Beech considers the notion of the people not as an 
entity that appears at once, due to a revolutionary insurgency in the 
name of the people or of a designation as a “people” by a state. In his 
reading, the very notion of the people, is a transformative category in 
the continuous process of becoming. The third actor are stateless peo-
ples, which consist of refugees and undocumented migrants fleeing the 
wars and social instability created by the War on Terror, stateless chil-
dren born in refugee camps, whistleblowers whose nationality has been 
16   The history of colonialism, imperialism, and contemporary intervention is theorized in a series 
of conversations between novelist and philosopher Andre Vitchek and Noam Chomsky in an 
attempt to establish a historical genealogy to posit the notion of “western terrorism,” i.e., state 
– or in our case, “expanded state” – terrorism. See: Noam Chomsky and Andre Vitchek, On 
Western Terrorism: From Hiroshima to Drone Warfare (New York: Pluto Press, 2013).
17  Throughout this chapter we will note different concepts used to describe the infrastructures of 
the War on Terror, such as “black world” and “secret geography.” Another popular term has been 
that of the “deep state,” borrowed from Turkish analysts. The deep state is described by Peter 
Dale Scott as assignments “handed off by an established agency to organized groups outside 
the law.” Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed describes such practices as “a novel but under-theorized 
conception of the modern liberal state as a complex dialectical structure composed of a public 
democratic face which could however be routinely subverted by an unaccountable security 
structure.” Although properly theorized in some domains, it is also a term popular in conspiracy 
theories, which brings us to maintain the more formal description of the expanded state. See Pe-
ter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road 
to Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Roman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 2, and Nafeez Mosaddeq 
Ahmed, “Capitalism, Covert Action, and State-Terrorism: Toward a Political Economy of the 
Dual State,” in The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex, ed. 
Eric Wilson (London: Ashgate, 2012), p. 53.
18   See: Dave Beech, “Modes of Assembly: Art, the People and the State,” in Maria Hlavajova and 
Simon Sheikh (eds.), Former West: Art and the Contemporary after 1989 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2017), p. 563.
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cinct, just like the period with which we will work: from the declaration 
of the War on Terror in the early 21st century until our present day. 
While there are many propaganda studies that deal with the past cen-
tury, there are few that deal with our present one. As a result, we will 
be working with what some readers might consider an unconventional 
selection of sources: Masco’s Theater of Operations, Butler’s Towards a 
Performative Theory of Assembly and Precarious Life, and Ould Slahi’s 
Guantánamo Diary, which we will closely read in the next sections. We 
have selected these for two reasons. First, since each gives a profound 
– if not embodied – testimony of the meaning of propaganda in the 
context of the three actors that we just identified. Second, because they 
strongly resonate with the domain of art – not a narrow understanding 
of art, but an expanded theory of art that will prove crucial as a basis 
for our next chapter Contemporary Propaganda Art. We are dealing here 
with analysis of the imaginative dimensions of the War on Terror (Mas-
co), the performative stagings in political mass movements (Butler), 
and the desperate cultural output of a stateless prisoner of war (Ould 
Slahi). This selection here is not simply defined by the already existing 
body of propaganda studies we discussed earlier. It rather follows the 
interest of a practicing propaganda artist: namely me, the writer of this 
thesis.
We will now begin by updating Chomsky and Herman’s propagan-
da model of and propose our own elaboration in the form of an inver-
ted propaganda model to deepen our understanding of the process in 
which the three actors we have just introduced have defined the mea-
ning and practice of propaganda in our 21st century.
refugees can be deported immediately, with few laws protecting them, 
subjects considered potential terrorists face indefinite detention, even 
torture, if not imminent destruction – a condition elaborated by philo-
sopher Giorgio Agamben as a form of “bare life.”20
Considering that stateless people are considered non-citizens, or 
even non-human entities in the case of so-called terrorists, the pro-
cedures of deportation, indefinite detention, or destruction, can be 
applied by the expanded state with hardly any repercussions at all. 
Nevertheless, while there is no overlap between the expanded state 
and stateless peoples – they exist in complete opposition – there is 
an overlap between popular mass movements and stateless peoples; 
between the ones in whose name the War on Terror is waged and that 
stand in an antagonistic relation to it, and the ones against whom the 
War on Terror is waged. Both are faced with a condition of precarity, 
although in highly different degrees. But in both cases their precarious 
lives can be related back to the expanded state: an opposing force that 
potentially allows overlaps or alliances between the different categories 
of politicized civil society and stateless peoples. As we will see below, 
much is at stake in the overlap between the latter two categories, when 
it comes to the challenge of opposing and overcoming the War on Te-
rror and its capacity to construct reality in the 21st century. We will 
note here that stateless peoples can of course organize themselves in 
the form of popular mass movements as well, or join popular mass mo-
vements organized by civil society. But we will be using the designation 
of popular mass movements here predominantly to discuss the role of 
civil society actors, those who might oppose the regime of a given state, 
but through their citizenship still hold a status of relative privilege or 
protection within it.
These three actors – the expanded state, popular mass movements, 
and stateless peoples – form three different subjectivities through 
which we can understand the oppositions that define the contempo-
rary global theater of the War on Terror, and from which we will be able 
to distill three different concepts of contemporary propaganda: three 
different propagandas.
Different from the first chapter, which covered the development of 
propaganda from the First World War to the end of the Cold War, in 
which we attempted to provide an overview of both historical and con-
temporary propaganda studies, our present chapter will be more suc-
20   Agamben relates the notion of bare life to the Roman concept of the homo sacer, a figure without 
rights, who, throughout history, has been essential to constituting the rights of others – for example, in the 
reduction of Jewish peoples by Nazism to bare life, to affirm the absolute rights of the supposed Aryan 
race: “Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is 
included solely through an exclusion.” See: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 13.
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As we may recall, Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model from 
1988 is defined through five “filters” that “manufacture consent,” i.e., 
operate as a kind of interface for the performance of power. These five 
conditions can be summarized as ownership, advertising, source control, 
flak (distortion), and anti-communism. Written just before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and predating the massive rise of new communication 
media in the digital realm – how much of these five filters that define 
modern propaganda retain their validity in our 21st century? Or, in 
other words, can we gain a first understanding of contemporary pro-
paganda by revisiting the Chomsky–Herman propaganda model, from 
the perspective of both the expanded state, and its opposition in the 
form of popular mass movements and stateless peoples? In his article 
“The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective” (2000), Herman counters 
decades of critique that accused him and Chomsky of leftist bias and 
conspiracy theory and re-affirms the formal criteria of their model of 
quantified data analysis:
The model does describe a system in which the media serve the 
elite, but by complex processes incorporated into the model that 
involve mechanisms and policies whereby the powerful protect their 
interests naturally and without overt conspiracy. This would seem 
one of the model’s merits; it shows a dynamic and self-protecting 
system in operation.21
He continues to argue that “the communications industries and poli-
tics over the past dozen years have tended on balance to enhance the 
applicability of the propaganda model”22, and ends with a challenge: 
“We are still waiting for our critics to provide a better model.”23 While 
that model is yet to emerge, communication researcher Brian Michael 
Goss did endeavor to systematically revisit the five filters of the propa-
ganda model in his Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Mo-
del in the 21st Century (2013). According to Goss, the normative reality 
that is created by dominant monopolies of power through propaganda, 
follows the contemporary doctrine of neoliberalism, which he – in ac-
cordance with anthropologist and geographer David Harvey – defi-
nes as a political project of mass privatization of public infrastructures 
(from schools to hospitals and transport) while simultaneously emplo-
21   Edward S. Herman, “The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective,” Journalism Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
(2000): pp. 101–12, at p. 108.
22   Ibid.
23   Ibid., p. 111.
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nerating counter-narratives, often by producing information later on 
validated by mainstream media, Goss argues that this is not the same 
as altering the increased monopolization of the media. Rather, he su-
ggests, the Internet should be considered as an important site of po-
tential “disturbance” of the existing media order, with figures such as 
activist-journalist Glenn Greenwald in its vanguard. Greenwald in that 
regard is a perfect example, as he gained notoriety through his work 
with former National Security Agency (NSA) operator Edward Snow-
den, who leaked a series of documents to Greenwald offering insight 
into the extent of surveillance on the civil population, media, and the 
political class, both foreign and domestic. Greenwald would seem to 
agree with Goss that while alternative digital media already form a cru-
cial site of disturbance, they have not yet been able to fundamentally 
alter the monopolies on information that they have made visible, thus 
leaving the dominant filter of ownership as proposed by Chomsky and 
Herman intact in the context of contemporary propaganda.32
Nonetheless, we find here a potentially weak spot in Chomsky and 
Herman’s propaganda model. For while the five filters effectively defi-
ne the construction of reality through propaganda from the perspective 
of dominant monopolies of power, a second interpretation of the pro-
paganda model might be elementary to understand emerging structu-
res of power in the form of digital activism in practices such as those 
of Greenwald, as well as much broader popular mass movements that 
have manifested themselves in the past 15-odd years. For the emerging 
structures of power, the possibilities of new digital media are amongst 
the most important entry points to impact a broader public domain.33 
This fact does not necessarily contest a propaganda model that focuses 
on majority ownership, but at least indicates the need for a second pro-
vaccines are part of a masterplan for increased government control. Not only has InfoWars massively 
increased its audience since the rise of Trump, there are legitimate claims that Jones operates as an 
informal consultant to the American president. Jim Rutenberg, “In Trump’s Volleys, Echoes of Alex 
Jones’s Conspiracy Theories,” The New York Times, Feb. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/
business/media/alex-jones-conspiracy-theories-donald-trump.html. 
32   Greenwald in this regard specifically discusses the failure of media to effectively apply checks 
and balances to the government due to its various tied interests and mutual dependency, thus 
connecting the danger of data monopolization by the state with information monopolization of 
the media: “The theory of a ‘fourth estate’ is to ensure government transparency and provide a 
check on overreach, of which the secret surveillance of entire populations is surely among the 
most radical examples. But that check is only effective if journalists act adversarially to those 
who wield political power. Instead, the US media has frequently abdicated this role, being 
subservient to the government’s interests, even amplifying, rather than scrutinizing, its messages 
and carrying out its dirty work.” See: Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the 
NSA and the Surveillance State (London: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 179.
33   This is at stake in the work of documentary film maker Neville Bolt, who attempted to re-ac-
tualize the anarchist concept of the “Propaganda of the Deed” with regard to the creation of 
violent images, “advertised” by insurgents across the digital realm, with the aim of mobilizing 
resistance against- or even overthrow of the state: “Recognizing that politics is played out in the 
global mediaspace, revolutionaries now use the weight of the media against the media. It is thus 
a form of political marketing […] thereby positioning it in terms of wider societal gain.” See: 
Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries (London: Hurst 
& Company, 2012), p. 257.
ying state subsidies to provide tax cuts for corporation and companies 
and securing elite interests through a massive security apparatus, one 
that excessively targets disenfranchised classes, peoples of color, and 
the poor.24 This neoliberal doctrine characterizes the type of owner-
ship that regulates mass media nowadays. While Goss observes that, 
different from the period of Chomsky and Herman’s writing, the cult 
of the media mogul is now slowly but steadily disappearing, it has 
been replaced by the “financial interests of the investment class”25 who 
gain “about 75 percent of revenue from ad accounts” while “about 65 
percent of newsprint space”26 is devoted to them. Considering the fact 
that ad buyers wish to publish their commercials for a target audience 
with financial capacity to purchase the commodities and services they 
advertize, this inevitably influences both the stories being published 
and the audience addressed. The poor are not a consumer class, so why 
publish for them?
The expansion of news in the form of digital media is significant, 
although, according to Goss, this has not fundamentally altered the 
monopolization of news through ownership. A printed medium con-
tinues to produce twenty times more revenue than a digital one27 and 
“[s]eventeen of the 25 most visited online news sites are organs of in-
cumbent news firms.”28 These are simultaneously the sources that are 
also most cited, copied, and linked through non-mainstream digital 
platforms and which consequently leave the pre-Internet “news ecolo-
gy” intact.29 Goss’ analysis risks to disregard the massive impact of for-
merly fringe platforms such as Breitbart News – home of the so-called 
“alternative-right,” or “alt-right” in short – in the election of Donald 
Trump, as documented recently by writer Angela Nagle30; although 
one could make a case that while Trump both during his campaign and 
his presidency actively cites and borrows from fringe digital platfor-
ms of conspiracy theories, it is partly through Trump’s own monopoly 
of the media and the vast power exerting through his own business 
empire, that marginal materials from the so-called “deep web,” enter 
into the mainstream.31 Although the Internet has been capable of ge-
24   Brian Michael Goss, Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2013), pp. 20–23. Echoing the work of Chomsky and 
Herman, Harvey speaks of the effort of the War on Terror as one to “manufacture consent,” this 
in regard to the neoliberal economy that made the war possible and from which the war would 
benefit at the same time. See Chapter 2, “The Construction of Consent,” in David Harvey, A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford/New Work: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 39–63.
25   Goss, Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First, p. 36.
26   Ibid., p. 43.
27   Ibid., p. 54.
28   Ibid., p. 56.
29   Ibid.
30  Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars from 4Chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-
Right (Winchester/Washington: Zero Books, 2017).
31  Most notorious is the case of conspiracy theorist and host of the online tv-channel InfoWars 
Alex Jones, who thrives on claims that the attacks of September 11 were an “inside job,” and states that 
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Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Ei-
ther you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day 
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.37
To understand the historical, political, and ideological foundation of 
this dichotomy, Goss calls upon the concept of orientalism, as develo-
ped by the Palestinian-American philosopher Edward Said. In his book 
Orientalism (1987), Said identifies “[n]ineteenth-century Orientalism” 
as “the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient – its sensuality, 
its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inac-
curacy, its backwardness.”38 Articulated through the work of colonial 
regimes, through the work of scientists, novelists, and philosophers, 
these characteristics were in fact turned into a powerful imperialist and 
racist trope, that continues to structure the perceptions of the Orient 
or the East up until today. In Said’s words:
My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doc-
trine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the 
West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness.39
The contemporary Us/Them dichotomy, Goss argues, is the continua-
tion of the Occident/Orient divide. Saddam Hussein, as Goss argued, 
was to play the role of the backward tribal leader that maintained his 
innocent, uneducated peoples in a state of oppression. Removing him 
became the equivalent of liberating Iraq. The orientalist personaliza-
tion of Hussein as Iraq was countered by the heroic media portrayal 
of the modern crusader in the form of George W. Bush embodying the 
West, completing the Us/Them dichotomy.40 Goss comments that “[t]
he paired exaltation and denigration of Our and Their leaders perhaps 
mutually summon each other into being”: the more barbaric the por-
trayal of one, the more liberational that of the other.41
We only have to think today of the extremist language introduced 
by Donald Trump, or the manifold ultranationalist, if not blatantly fas-
37   “Text of George Bush’s speech,” The Guardian.
38   Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 205.
39   Ibid., p. 204.
40  The question how much of the “West” was simultaneously embodied by Hussein himself – once 
a US ally in the Iran–Iraq War – is asked through Paul Chan’s collection of the dictator’s writing 
on democracy, in which Hussein writes: “Democratic practice should be permanently part of 
our policies as it constitutes a basic part of the Arab Baath Socialist Party’s ideology, which 
considers the individual as high value but not the absolute value: for the outcome of the higher 
value is not the individual alone as an independent entity, but rather all the interacting central 
objectives at which our Party aims.” See: Saddam Hussein and Paul Chan, On Democracy (Ath-
ens/New York: Deste Foundation for Contemporary Art/Badlands Unlimited, 2012), p. 71.
41   Ibid., p. 104.
paganda model that takes emerging powers as a starting point. We will 
elaborate upon this further below.
Continuing his analysis of Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda 
model, Goss argues that the propaganda filter of ownership is direct-
ly interrelated with that of source dependency. The pressure on news 
production, further amplified by digital readership, makes journalists 
increasingly dependent on official government sources. The powerful 
public relations apparatus of the government, in the spirit of Bernays 
often outsourced to private agencies, further allows for a broad pre-
sence of secondary official representatives to produce flak (distortion) 
aimed at undermining opposition voices, ranging from the recruitment 
of retired army personnel acting as “independent” experts on talk 
shows to positively affirm the successes of the War on Terror in Iraq,34 
to pseudo-scientific think-tanks that produce seemingly academic pa-
pers and data contesting the existence of climate change, followed by 
campaigns to discredit the work of independent researchers who argue 
that climate change is very real indeed.35 Essentially, Goss’s assess-
ment of the first four filters of Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda 
model – ownership, advertising, source control, and flak – is that while 
profound modifications in the landscape of Technological Society may 
have occurred – the media mogul transforming into the investor class, 
the realm of print enlarging into that of the digital – these changes have 
rather amplified and expanded the reach and capacity of Chomsky and 
Herman’s propaganda model than altered the basic conditions of the 
contemporary performance of power. One point of difference stands 
out prominently though, and that is Chomsky and Herman’s condi-
tions of “anti-communism as a control mechanism.” Regarding this 
point, Goss does not merely expand the propaganda model into the 
present, but re-contextualizes it both historically and in its contempo-
rary manifestation. Goss argues that, unlike in the Cold War, the fifth 
filter of the propaganda model in the context of the War on Terror, 
is transformed into the broader conception of the “Us/Them” dicho-
tomy, re-introduced by the George W. Bush administration.36 We may 
remind ourselves in this context of the first State of the Union address 
after the attacks of September 11, in which Bush declared:
34   Goss, Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 63–65.
35   Ibid., pp. 146–48. An interesting contribution in this regard comes from John O’Loughlin, who 
discusses the “new realities of academic work in an age of terrorism” in the form of post-9/11 
academia that classifies its sources just like the governmental agencies enacting the War on Ter-
ror itself. More than mere falsification, this creates a realm in which an academic claim becomes 
sourceless as such – as true or false as the writer claims it to be. See: John O’Loughlin, “The War 
on Terrorism, Academic Publication Norms, and Replication,” The Professional Geographer, Vol. 
57, No. 4, (November 2005): pp. 588–91, at p. 589.
36   Goss, Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First Century, p. 97.
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ments have no power whatsoever. In the case of the protests against the 
Iraq War and the incoming Trump administration, they are clearly in a 
minority when it comes to fully subverting the structures of power 
through which the propaganda of the expanded state operates, but 
they are a rather massive minority. If we move away from the context 
of the United States for a moment, and take a more global perspec-
tive, one could observe that during the first one and a half decades 
of the 21st-century, we have witnessed an enormous variety of often 
interconnected popular mass movements of surprising size and scale. 
From the manifold manifestations stretching from Tunis to Egypt and 
Syria known as the “Arab Spring,” to the emergence of the M15/Los 
Indignados movement in Spain, Catalunya, and the Basque Country, 
the worldwide Occupy movement, the Anti-Austerity protests in Gree-
ce, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, the Umbrella Movement in Hong 
Kong, Black Lives Matter, Nuit Debout in Paris, and Standing Rock, 
as well as assemblies in the form of collective hunger strikes in war pri-
sons such as Guantánamo Bay, the public manifestations of the disen-
franchised, the dispossed, the undocumented migrants and refugees, 
the LGBTQI+ movements, the university occupations by students, or 
even the online mobilization to massively petition against or hack into 
a given regime, including the work of whistleblowers and activist jour-
nalists.45 In these manifold popular mass movements we witness emer-
ging structures of power.
What is important is how these different movements become inte-
rrelated: communicating with one another through alternative media, 
building temporary and sometimes lasting infrastructures aimed at ad-
dressing issues bypassed by dominant monopolies of power: reaching 
from the necessity of building alternative structures of democratic go-
vernance, creating publicly owned media, platforms for free education, 
cooperative models of economy, collectivized healthcare, sustainable 
energy resources, and so on.46 Of course, it is too general a statement 
45  Sidney G. Tarrow in this regard observes how shared global crises generate different forms of 
popular movements shaping a field of “contentious politics,” but that the kind of movements – 
from democratization movements to extreme conservative action groups and so-called terrorist 
organizations – manifest themselves in widely different and often irreconcilable ways in response 
to these same crises: “[D]espite globalization – societies do not respond in lock step to the same 
stimuli. The countries surveyed above responded to the Wall Street crisis with different combi-
nations of transgressive and conventional contention: As Greek anarchists torched the center of 
Athens, the French used the austerity crisis as a pretext to demonstrate for broader social issues, 
the Spanish unions struck around narrower issues, the Germans heckled their Chancellor, the 
American Tea Party was industriously backing rightwing candidates in the 2010 congressional 
elections, and the British turned away in distaste.” See: Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: 
Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p. 261.
46   The chapter “Radical Internet Use” in John Downing’s work on alternative media networks 
– including artistic intervention and cultural action – for example focuses specifically on the 
attempts to socialize the Internet as part of the popular mass movement, notably from the 
perspective of the indigenous Mexican Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), which 
was a key inspiration to the early 2000s alter-globalization movement in the United States. See: 
cist, parties and regimes emerging throughout Europe, to understand 
how the orientalist notion of “Them” has come to include peoples of 
color, Muslims, refugees, as well as protesters and dissidents. What 
Chomsky and Herman defined as “unworthy victims” has been expan-
ded and multiplied in the context of the 21st century via an orientalist 
trope.42 It provides us with the knowledge that the War on Terror is, in 
a variety of ways, a neocolonial war, that reduces potentially dissident 
bodies – both within the sphere of the West and outside – to uncivilized 
and dangerous subjects.
But what about the societal opposition against the expanded state 
and its War on Terror? The way in which ownership, advertising, source 
control, and flak in their interrelation shaped the media spectrum in 
the period of the Iraq War was, Goss observes, at the same time effec-
tive as a radical form of societal censorship. This was not just a cen-
sorship of basic facts that could have undermined the Iraq invasion, 
but a censorship also of popular mass movements opposing the war 
that emerged throughout the United States and Europe. On February 
15, 2003, the largest worldwide antiwar protest in history was organi-
zed, characterized by a major clash between the expanded state and 
its effort to impose a narrative that would legitimize the Iraq invasion, 
and the emerging power of popular mass movements that attempted 
to debunk this narrative. The strength of the propaganda of the War on 
Terror generated an effective “effacement of popular dissent” keeping 
the “lines of Us/Them conflict stark and largely unblurred.”43 The in-
vasion of Iraq, marking the beginning of a War on Terror without end, 
proceeded as planned. A similar form of societal censorship emerged 
when the Trump administration attempted to propagate through its 
own channels and loyal media outlets the factual falsehood that the 
2017 inauguration of the new president drew a larger crowd than the 
2009 Obama inauguration, while simultaneously downplaying the lar-
gest domestic demonstration against a new administration that took 
place a day later in the form of the Women’s March on Washington.44
Although War on Terror is extremely powerful, as we have been able 
to see from the changes in government and warfare in the past one 
and a half decade, we should not suppose that popular mass move-
42   In the Netherlands, for example, the leader of the ultranationalist Freedom Party (PVV) Geert 
Wilders began to refer to street violence enacted by Dutch citizens with a migrant background as a form 
of “street terrorism.” This conflation of what we call terrorism with regard to organized political violence 
enacted by non-state actors, and minor acts of violence in the form of harassment, theft, or street riots, 
evidently opens up the possibility of engaging aspects of the state apparatus meant to operate in crisis for 
permanent use in peacetime.
43   Goss, Rebooting the Herman & Chomsky Propaganda Model in the Twenty-First Century, p. 111.
44   This brought the New York Times to publish factual counter-information through crowd analysis, see: 
Tim Wallace, Karen Yourish and Troy Griggs, “Trump’s Inauguration vs. Obama’s: Comparing the 
Crowds, Jan. 20 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-inauguration-crowd.html?_r=0.
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To identify such emerging structures of power, we will add to the exis-
ting propaganda model an inverted propaganda model. This inverted 
propaganda model is not based on what Chomsky and Herman called 
“filters,” which presuppose the control over a given structure of power, 
but on re-occurring demands that presuppose a claim made to power 
brought forward by mass popular movements. For example, whereas 
the original propaganda model includes the filter of ownership – of 
monopolization – a re-occurring demand within popular mass move-
ments ranging from the Occupy movement to the Arab Spring is that 
of democratization: simply put, the demand to re-distribute power in a 
more egalitarian way. This again raises the question of whether a de-
mand could actually be realized, if a movement were to control power 
– but we can most certainly conclude that, at least as a rhetorical de-
mand, democratization is the opposite of monopolization. Something 
similar is the case for the second filter of the propaganda model, na-
mely advertising, which in the case of popular mass movements tends 
to be opposed to grassroots mobilization: messages are not circulated 
through elite interest and access, as is the case with advertising, but 
through supposedly egalitarian constituencies that form the basis of a 
given movement. In opposition to the filter of source control, we see 
the demand for public knowledge, just as flak is opposed with the de-
mand for transparency. Whether it is the demand of Black Lives Matter 
for full public recognition of the excessive and illegal killing of black 
people by police forces, or the whistleblowers’ platforms demand for 
full access to the interests of monopolies of power, or the anti-auste-
rity movement’s demand for equal taxes paid by corporations as by 
citizens, we see how the filters of the propaganda model are countered 
with the demands of an inverted propaganda model that re-occur in an 
various popular mass movements. That is most certainly the case with 
the final filter of the original propaganda model, namely that of an-
to say that all of these examples have the same aims or that they neces-
sarily stand in absolute opposition to dominant monopolies of power. 
The mere fact that they emerge from different precarious conditions 
does not make them homogenous, or necessarily democratic. The Arab 
Spring is one such example, which at times was appropriated by sub-
sequent regimes. Conflicts within social movements can be rampant, 
and challenging an existing power does not mean that the power that 
would replace it is necessarily better, even when it was articulated as 
“democratic” or “liberational” in the process. Our aim is not to dis-
cuss propaganda in absolutist terms of “good” and “evil,” but to di-
versify structures of power and the plurality of propagandas emerging 
from them. Surely what we can factually observe is that the precarious 
forces that assemble in popular mass movements are different from 
dominant monopolies of power, often because they have less actual 
power, recognition, and access to construct realities that would benefit 
their constituents. Furthermore, whether purely rhetorical or not, the 
claims through which these various popular mass movements emerge, 
tend at times to demand an oppositional kind of power. They emerge 
not simply with the demand to take over power as such but they cha-
llenge the very organization of power under which they are governed 
and regimented.
While we will discuss in further detail popular mass movements un-
der the rubric of Popular Propaganda and Stateless Propaganda below, 
it is helpful to posit an alternative paradigm of propaganda to unders-
tand the difference in manifestation and possible differences in propa-
gandas between those employed by the expanded state and those by 
popular mass movements and stateless peoples. As mentioned before, 
this demands an expansion of the Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda 
model, which is tailored to existing monopolies of power, and not to 
emerging structures of power. Their propaganda model privileges sca-
le, allowing us to identify the main proprietors that construct our cu-
rrent reality. But it risks at censoring out competing realities, referenced 
by both Herman and Chomsky and Ellul as smaller-scale communities 
and networks that introduce alternative principles of political organiza-
tion, media, and overall infrastructure to make a different performance 
of power and a construction of a different reality possible. Rather than 
discussing these as mere “counter-propaganda,” we need to recognize 
these emerging power structures as potentially different propagandas.
Tamara Villarreal Ford and Genève Gil, “Radical Internet Use,” in John Downing, Radical Me-
dia: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2001), pp. 201–34.
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3.2 THE EXPANDED STATE & WAR ON TERROR PROPAGANDA
In the context of the War on Terror, the scale and scope of the inter-
sections between politics, economy, media, social life, (bio)technology, 
and the healthcare sector are studied and analyzed in the book of an-
thropologist and social scientist Joseph Masco, The Theater of Opera-
tions (2014).48 According to Masco, gaining an understanding of power 
structures of the expanded state in the War on Terror means unders-
tanding the politics, infrastructures, and propaganda models employed 
during the Cold War.49 While he discusses, like Chomsky and Herman, 
anti-communism as a control mechanism, his main focus is on tech-
nology and its culture, as it emerged through the invention of nuclear 
weapons:
In the White House, nuclear fear was immediately understood to 
be not only the basis of American military power, but also a means 
of installing a new normative reality in the United States, one that 
could consolidate political power at the federal level by reaching 
into the internal lives of citizens. […] By focusing Americans on an 
imminent end of the nation-state, federal authorities mobilized the 
bomb to create the Cold War consensus of anticommunism, capita-
lism, and military expansion.50
The image of social destruction through a Soviet nuclear bomb is to-
day expanded through the dangers emanating from the Us/Them di-
chotomy, with Them including an endless variety of terrorist dangers 
that have replaced the Soviet Union as sole representative of imminent 
destruction. Masco refers to the social effect of these images of apo-
calyptic destruction as a negative “social contract,” a fearful enforce-
ment of a sense of community created by the continuous message that 
this same community can, at any moment, be destroyed. It was a social 
contract thus “enabled and structured by the affective power of atomic 
weapons.”51 And it is exactly this negative social contract that laid the 
48   The title derives from what Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz famously termed the “theater 
of operations” in his book On War, published posthumously in 1832: “The country – its physical 
features and population is more than just the source of all armed forces proper; it is in itself an 
integral element among the factors at work in war – though only that part which is the actual 
theater of operations or has a notable influence on it.” See: Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ox-
ford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18.
49   Note that in this regard, Masco speaks of the “counterterror state,” a term we will not adopt, 
as we will encounter several positions that claim that the War on Terror is itself a form of “state 
terrorism,” thus making the claim of a “counterterror state” rather ineffective.
50   Joseph Masco, The Theater of Operations (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2014), p. 48. 
The impact on the physical, psychological, political, economic, technological, ecological, and 
finally geographic landscapes of the Cold War are discussed in detail in Masco’s The Nuclear Bor-
derlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico (Princeton/Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).
51   Masco, The Theater of Operations, p. 126.
ti-communism, in our current times continued as the Us/Them dicho-
tomy: the opposite to which we will discuss in the inverted propaganda 
model as the demand for collectivity.47
Democratization, grass roots mobilization, public knowledge, trans-
parency, and collectivity are thus the demands that define the inverted 
propaganda model that we will be engaging with to understand the 
nature of the alternative realities constructed through the oppositional 
propaganda of popular mass movements and stateless peoples.
• Let us make the following three observations regarding our first 
exploration of contemporary propaganda:
• The contemporary can be understood through different actors 
and their simultaneous claims on constructing competing reali-
ties; we have discussed three examples in the form of the expan-
ded state, popular mass movements, and stateless peoples;
• The dominant monopoly of power of the expanded state and its 
War on Terror can be analyzed through an updated – or “reboo-
ted” – version of Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model;
• The emerging power of popular mass movements and stateless 
peoples are to be analyzed through a different model, that we 
name the “inverted propaganda model”
Having assessed the value of the rebooted Chomsky and Herman’s 
propaganda model and proposed an inverted propaganda model, we 
will now proceed to define the different propagandas that both domi-
nant and emerging powers in the 21st century create. We will begin 
with the expanded state and its War on Terror Propaganda.
47   Of course, the reversed propaganda model could possibly be used for examples of popular 
mass movements from the past century just as well. The reversed propaganda model is thus not 
exclusive to the 21st century, although we have developed and employ it for that reason. In the 
process of using the reversed propaganda model, we are of course aware of the bias that is inher-
ent in the use of a term such as “democratization,” which might not be applicable to each and 
every popular mass movement, especially those critical of exactly the misuse of the democratic 
vocabulary for colonial and imperialist purposes.
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through the mobilization of threat.”56
What used to be citizens turned cold warriors, now are the citizens 
turned “counterterror warriors,” which are demanded to lie to their 
environment to “protect their own classification level in everyday inte-
ractions throughout the system, and thus […] distort their social rela-
tions to protect the system of secrecy.”57 And while citizens implicated 
in this “secret society” are partly aware of the variety of war efforts the 
United States is engaged in through covert operations and drone stri-
kes, the majority of the population is forced to live in a culture of fear 
created by images of an imminent destruction.58 Average “U.S. citizens 
[without security clearance] have no insight into U.S. covert actions 
around the world” and thus “retaliatory acts appear to the American 
public as without context and thus irrational.”59 The hijacked airpla-
nes of 9/11 that flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
as well as other attempted assaults post-9/11, all seem to materialize 
out of thin air, enforcing the public image of the “irrational” and “un-
civilized” nature of the terrorist, of Them, although most of the time 
they can be explained as acts of retaliation by their perpetrators. In 
an attempt to explain to the American people the historical context 
that brought him to sanction the attacks of September 11, Osama bin 
Laden stated:
The American people are the ones who pay the taxes which fund 
the planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and 
destroy our homes in Palestine, the armies which occupy our lands 
in the Arabian Gulf, and the fleets which ensure the blockade of 
Iraq. These tax dollars are given to Israel for it to continue to attack 
us and penetrate our lands. So the American people are the ones 
who fund the attacks against us, and they are the ones who oversee 
the expenditure of these monies in the way they wish, through their 
elected candidates.60
Bin Laden thus calls upon U.S. society’s repressed awareness of its 
sanctioning of “unjust wars.” In the same letter, he also draws attention 
to other existential threats, when he writes that “[y]ou have destroyed 
nature with your industrial waste and gases more than any other nation 
56   Ibid., p. 114.
57   Ibid., p. 136.
58   The radical capacity to imagine apocalyptic threats and the capacity to create the weaponry 
to actually make such apocalyptic threats a by oneself, is discussed by Masco in “The End of 
Ends,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Fall 2012): pp. 1107–24.
59   Ibid., p. 134.
60   “Full Text: Bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America,’” The Guardian, Nov. 24, 2002, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver. See also: Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli 
(eds.), Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2008).
foundation for the political, military, technological, and cultural infras-
tructures through which the Cold War could be accelerated into the 
much more radical and global War on Terror. Masco shows how close 
the power stuctures of the Cold War touch upon the power structures 
of the War on Terror through a legislative example that concerns the 
political culture of secrecy, foundational for both wars:
With the 1946 Atomic Energy Act and the 1947 National Security 
Act, the United States effectively removed huge areas of govern-
mental affairs from citizen’s purview. These acts formally installed a 
new security state in the United States, constituting a fundamental 
change in the nature of American democracy. The Atomic Energy 
Act created the first kind of information – nuclear weapons data – 
that did not need to be formally classified: it was “born” that way. 
The National Security Act then created a wide range of new gover-
nmental institutions – most prominently, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the first of what would become seventeen intelli-
gence agencies in the United States – that by charter would not be 
publicly accountable to citizens.52
The emergence of state information that is by definition secret, Masco 
argues, was not simply about “protecting technological secrets in a glo-
bal competition with the Soviet Union,” but equally a “means of con-
verting American society into a countercommunist state at the level of 
institutions, economies, politics, and emotions.”53 The War on Terror 
accelerated this culture of secrecy through the introduction of a wide 
variety of formal directives and executive orders to control public in-
formation, by removing access in the name of national security, which 
resulted in about “nine million classification decisions in 2001 but 
over sixteen million in 2006.”54 Taking into consideration that roughly 
four million people in the US hold security clearances to information 
removed from the otherwise public domain,55 we can realize the scale 
of a “secret society” in which “state power rests to an unprecedented 
degree on the ability of officials to manage the public–secret divide 
52   Ibid., p. 124.
53   Ibid., p. 128.
54   Ibid., p. 129. A relevant comparative study pitted National Security Agency (NSA) data centers 
that withdraw information from the public to the domain of classified information, with the data 
center of the self-declared state of Sealand, the latter situated near the English coast. Sealand 
is not only a microstate, but also presents itself as a data safe-haven where information can 
be stored outside of international law, as Sealand is positioned in extraterritorial waters. Both 
examples are about the control over information, though both abandon the ideal of public 
information – of the library, material or digital – as a remnant of the past. See: Mél Hogan and 
Tamara Shepherd, “Information Ownership and Materiality in an Age of Big Data Surveil-
lance,” Journal of Information Policy, Vol. 5 (2015): pp. 6–31.
55   Masco, The Theater of Operations, p. 125.
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tropical storm, neither its causes, effects, nor future preemption are 
addressed. Instead, the threat is transposed to another, more politically 
beneficial enemy in the form of the supposed terrorist, or Them. The 
culture of secrecy that censors existential threats to introduce fictional 
ones defines the imaginative force of the War on Terror, in Masco’s 
words, “the ability to create new realities.”64
A final striking example in this regard is Masco’s analysis of the 
anthrax letters sent to news media and elected officials between Sep-
tember 18 and October 8, 2001, in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks. While there is only a minor history of biological attacks in the 
United States, the George W. Bush administration decided to invest 
massively in the study and prevention of possible bioterrorism attacks, 
only to find out in 2008 – after an enormous and expensive operation – 
that the sender had been most probably one of their own anthrax spe-
cialists working in a government laboratory.65 This did not stop the de-
velopment of new laboratories, but rather turned health services into 
new front lines in the War on Terror, identifying viruses – such as SARS 
– as possible future terror threats. These financial boosts for industry, 
Masco clarifies, are also inherently tied to Cold War military-industrial 
practices “in which building technologies for early warning of nuclear 
attack also produced revolutions in computers, telecommunications, 
satellite systems, and electronics, all of which eventually filtered into 
the commercial arena.”66
We should understand the type of warfare created by the Cold War 
and augmented through the War on Terror as connecting a variety of 
industries, military or otherwise, with their own products as potential 
terrorist weapons, replicating and imagining an endless arsenal of new 
dangers: from the nuclear bomb to the microbe. This fact also provides 
a link between Masco’s analysis of the expanded state in the War on 
Terror and Goss’s theory of contemporary propaganda, which empha-
sized the importance of neoliberalism in understanding Chomsky and 
Herman’s propaganda model in the 21st century. The War on Terror is 
not merely a war waged by the state; it is enacted through a large set of 
private industries mobilized and paid by the state.67
64   Ibid., p. 138.
65  Ibid., p. 190.
66   Ibid., p. 160.
67   The most notorious example of the privatization of the War on Terror took the form of the 
“Blackwater” mercenary army founded in 1997 by former Navy SEAL officer Erik Prince, 
renamed “Xe Services” in 2009 and “Academi” in 2011. It gained public attention mainly due 
to the 2007 Nisoun Square Massacre in Baghdad, when its militia members killed 17 civilians 
for unclear reasons. While four militia where finally tried in 2015, the lawless character of Black-
water – contracted privately, and thus beyond regular army law – obstructed the proceedings 
severely. A thorough albeit polemic analysis of the political and economic dimensions of this 
mercenary industry is provided by journalist Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s 
Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007).
in history,” something that did not bring the United States to sign the 
Kyoto agreement.61 While Bin Laden’s narrative obviously should be 
challenged, Masco argues that the paradox of the culture of secrecy is 
that the actual threats to public safety and planetary survival such as 
“collapsing national infrastructure (roads, highways, levies, and dams), 
the devastating effects of unregulated capitalism (on jobs, housing, and 
pensions), or the destabilizing effects of toxic industrial substances on 
the environment (from polluted air and water to climate change)” re-
main unaddressed, or even censored from the public debate in favor of 
the much less existential danger of non-state terrorism.62 Masco intro-
duces the following example of such form of threat censorship:
As counterterror emerged as the primary concern of the adminis-
tration, government reports on climate change were edited by fede-
ral officials to downplay evidence of human contributions to global 
warming and to emphasize uncertainty in climate models. Research 
by government scientists pursuing a link between climate change 
and intensifying hurricanes were restricted, and the nationwide sys-
tem of technical research libraries run by the EPA was closed, alle-
gedly due to federal budget cuts – an act that drew protests from 
10.000 scientists in 2006. In 2008 a survey of EPA scientists found 
that the majority of them had felt pressure from political appoin-
tees in the Bush administration to distort or censor environmental 
assessments.63
Even in the case of evident manifestations of violent weather, such as 
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina that left the city of New Orleans utterly de-
vastated, public framing by both government officials and mainstream 
media was in reference to the dangers of so-called weapons of mass 
destruction, not climate change. If a government cannot even protect 
its citizens from violent weather, how could it ever protect them from 
(nuclear) terrorism? Here we see the immediate effect of what Masco 
explains as the accelerated culture of fear built on the heritage of the 
Cold War. While an actual threat is at our doorsteps in the form of a 
61   Ibid.       
62   Ibid., p. 27. As Naomi Klein argued notoriously, the use of shock and awe strategy through 
warfare and the projection of imminent danger, also generates opportunity to benefit from a 
paralyzed public to implement new political and economic structure outside of democratic 
control: “[T]he original disaster – the coup, the terrorist attack, the market meltdown, the 
war, the tsunami, the hurricane – puts the entire population into a state of collective shock. 
The falling bombs, the bursts of terror, the pounding winds serve to soften up whole societies 
much as the blaring music and blows in the torture cells soften up prisoners. Like the terrorized 
prisoner who gives up the names of comrades and renounces his faith, shocked societies often 
give up things they would otherwise fiercely protect.” Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise 
of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), p. 17.
63   Masco, The Theater of Operations, p. 105.
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In the radicalized propaganda model of the War on Terror, exis-
tential dangers are fully co-opted into imaginary ones, mostly against 
enemies that the Cold War and War on Terror have created themselves. 
“The War on Terror […] is unique,” says Masco, “in that it is a conflict 
that cannot be bounded spatially or temporally, or won.”68 It is a war 
without limits, with the aim to “engineer a world without events.”69 
It is a twisted utopia, in which the expanded notion of biosecurity 
created through the War on Terror “promises a world without terror 
via the constant production of terror,” creating “a potentially endless 
recursive loop of threat production and response.”70 The counterterror 
state’s “commitment to constant revolutionary change across experts, 
technologies, and administrative abilities,” Masco claims, will have “a 
deep hold on the twenty-first century.”71
Placing Masco’s analysis next to Chomsky and Herman’s reboo-
ted propaganda model, we see that ownership, advertisement, source 
control, and flak, continue to play interrelated roles in the economy of 
the expanded state’s War on Terror. The ownership of war is common 
to a public–private partnership, which enacts its advertisement throu-
gh corporate media, maintains its source control through massive sta-
te-administered databases that are largely confidential, and generates 
the necessary flak through the continuous image of imminent (self-)
destruction, which forces the public to ignore actual threats such as 
economic crises and climate change. This economy of the War on Te-
rror is subsequently politically and ideologically framed through the 
Us/Them dichotomy (formerly the anti-communist doctrine), legi-
timizing new infrastructures of control, which subsequently lead to 
new conflicts and self-engineered dangers. We should therefore refer 
to the economy of the War on Terror as an actual financial economy. 
The endless recursive loop of threat production and response is what 
strengthens the ownership, the legitimacy, and the expansion of this 
economy. As such we need to understand the expanded state’s War on 
Terror as simultaneously an organizational model of power and the 
propaganda for that model.
We thus conclude that War on Terror Propaganda is a contemporary 
propaganda defined by a performance of power that acts through the 
neoliberal public–private infrastructures of the expanded state. This 
propaganda takes the form of a recursive loop of threat production and 
response, to create a new reality structured on the Us/Them divide. 
The performativity that defines this propaganda is characterized by an 
68   Ibid., p. 197.
69   Ibid., p. 194.
70   Ibid., p. 156.
71   Ibid., p. 196.
existing claim to dominant monopolies of power.
What we lack at this stage of Masco’s analysis is essentially the 
perspective of those who concretely live through the War on Terror, 
the bodies implicated in these emerging infrastructures of War on Te-
rror Propaganda, whether these are the politicized millions of citizens 
downplayed by mainstream media when taking to the streets against 
the Iraq invasion, or the non-citizen captured and kept by force in the 
War on Terror’s various black sites and extralegal prisons. We will now 
explore the role of politicized civil society and its resistance against 
War on Terror Propaganda, and analyze the conditions of a different 
kind of propaganda, which we will call Popular Propaganda.
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3.3 POPULAR MASS MOVEMENTS & POPULAR PROPAGANDA
As we observed earlier, the age of the War on Terror is also the age of 
a growing politicized society, which organizes in the form of popular 
mass movements, often connecting the struggles of documented ci-
tizens to those of undocumented and stateless peoples. These popu-
lar mass movements are often related to or sparked by antiwar move-
ments, but can also be broader in nature: demanding democratization, 
economic equality, and climate justice. In this section, we will analyze 
how the manifestation of politicized civil society in popular mass mo-
vements can be understood as a form of Popular Propaganda, and in 
what way Popular Propaganda aims to overcome the Us/Them divide 
by constructing a new “Us”: a new popular collectivity. We will do 
so through the work of the American philosopher Judith Butler, who 
has given voice to a politicized civil society that opposed the War on 
Terror, and was a frequent participant in the popular mass movements 
that were fueled by antiwar convictions, as well as economic and envi-
ronmental concerns. Our first focus will be her book Towards a Theory 
of Performative Assembly (2015) in which she attempts to analyze and 
theorize models that emerged from worldwide popular mass move-
ments in the early 21st century, which she refers to as “performative 
assembly.”
The first question in this regard is why certain bodies assemble in 
ways that become meaningful to discuss as a potential collectivity. But-
ler opts here for the rubric of precarity, arguing that this term describes 
a contemporary condition that is a result of the massive neoliberal 
privatization of common infrastructures – an inherent consequence of 
the expanded state, as we discussed under War on Terror Propaganda 
– and which “brings together women, queers, transgender people, the 
poor, the differently abled, and the stateless, but also religious and 
racial minorities.”72 Butler’s claim is that, although conditions of pre-
carity differ, the term precarity as such describes the falling away of a 
necessary collective infrastructure of life support, which can relate to a 
lack of economic security, absence of political representation, a refusal 
to provide safety from bodily harm, absence of healthcare or educa-
tion, the breaking down of structures that protect from discrimination 
and prosecution, and so on. Butler argues that precarity might operate 
“as a site of alliance among groups of people who do not otherwise 
find much in common and between whom there is sometimes even 
72   Judith Butler, Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2015), p. 58.
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it is a form of “bare power,” sustained only through the bodies and fra-
gile emerging infrastructures of those who assemble.76 Different from 
what Le Bon considered as the barbarity of the crowd, or what Freud 
considers the potential of the mass to dedicate itself to a higher ideal 
through a leader figure, performative assembly as discussed by Butler 
as the emancipatory potential that emerges in the process of the gathe-
ring of bodies.
In Butler’s Precarious Life (2004), written in the years following the 
attacks of September 11, she theorizes how the manifold violence of 
the War on Terror simultaneously provides the possibility – even the 
necessity – to think collectivity differently, and to connect a diversity of 
precarious peoples in a new kind of popular assembly. Butler’s assess-
ment of the War on Terror begins in the period of a war characterized 
by an amplification of patriotism and anti-intellectualism. Butler ob-
serves that even asking questions about the reasons the United States 
was attacked, the identity of the attackers and their motives, the pre-
history of the War on Terror in terms of US military operations abroad, 
were equaled to a form of national betrayal, not just from the side of 
radical conservatives, but also from supposed progressives:
It is not only the conservative Republicans who did not want to hear 
about “causes.” The “just war” liberal Left made plain that it did 
not want to hear from “excuseniks.” This coinage, rehabilitating the 
Cold War rhetoric about Soviet Russia, suggests that those who seek 
to understand how the global map arrived at this juncture through 
asking how, in part, the United States has contributed to the making 
of this map, are themselves, through the style of their inquiry, and 
the shape of their questions, complicitous with an assumed enemy.77
The global map that Butler mentions is what Masco referred to as 
the contemporary Theater of Operations. And the issue of “unders-
tanding” refers to the nature and constitution of the Them in the Us/
76   While an undocumented person might not be able to join a popular mass movement due to the 
risk of immediate deportation, civilians participating in popular mass movements – while stand-
ing in an antagonistic relation to a given regime – often still benefit from a relative, even when 
nearly non-existent, form of recognition. There is, in other words, still a reoccurring capacity 
to appear in one form or another. We thus emphasize again that we discuss the popular mass 
movement largely – albeit not exclusively – as a model of emerging power related to politicized 
civil society.
77   Butler, Precarious Life, p. 9. Butler here refers to an article by Edward Rothstein, cultural critic of The 
New York Times, written in the direct aftermath of the attacks of September 11, in which he states: “One 
can only hope that finally, as the ramifications sinks in, as it becomes clear how close the attack came to 
undermining the political, military, and financial authority of the United States, the Western relativism 
of [postmodernism] and the obsessive focus of [postcolonialism] will be widely seen as ethically perverse. 
Rigidly applied, they require a form of guilty passivity in the face of ruthless and unyielding opposition.” 
Edward Rothstein, “Attacks on U.S. Challenge Postmodern True Believers,” New York Times, Sep. 22, 
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/22/arts/22CONN.html?pagewanted=all.
suspicion and antagonism.”73 In other words, the precariat could be a 
potential class construct in which one could group a variety of peoples, 
beyond divisions imposed through the Us/Them dichotomy.74
In Butler’s work, the first step in understanding the process in 
which the precariat articulates such a new collectivity lies in the use of 
the body as the foundation of the social architecture that we call “as-
sembly.” Butler here emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
body not as an isolated entity, but instead argues that “[w]e cannot talk 
about a body without knowing what supports that body, and what its 
relation to that support – or lack of support – might be.” That means 
that the collective gathering of bodies in popular mass movements is 
an inherent act of resistance against the lack of life support that a gi-
ven regime provides to these bodies. When masses of people lose their 
houses due to a predatory mortgage system and assemble with their 
tents in a park, then this is a response to a dysfunctional or completely 
lacking collective infrastructure. The assembly is a direct expression of 
this condition of precarity while simultaneously being a protest to it.
Here we touch upon the paradoxical core of what we will define as 
Popular Propaganda. On the one hand, the reason why popular mass 
movements emerge – following Butler – is due to their collective ex-
perience of precarity, a threat to their life support, which essentially 
means that power has been taken away from them. But by gathering, by 
assembling, an emerging power manifests itself, bringing forward de-
mands to reclaim or redefine power itself. In this regard, Butler writes 
that “the performative emerges precisely as the specific power of the 
precarious – unauthorized by existing legal regimes, abandoned by the 
law itself – to demand the end of precarity.”75 This passage is crucial for 
our understanding of Popular Propaganda. In the original Chomsky 
and Herman propaganda model, we saw that the concept of perfor-
mance relates to the procedure through which dominant monopolies 
of power are performed in society with the aim of constructing a nor-
mative reality that benefits its proprietors. What Butler argues is that in 
the case of Popular Propaganda, the concept of performance is the very 
definition of power. The demands of the inverted propaganda model are 
enacted, to make an emerging power a reality. But at that moment of 
performance, the enactment of the demand is the main power present; 
73   Ibid., p. 27
74  Our use of the term precariat here derives from the work The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class 
(2011) by economist Guy Standing. Although Standing definesmore narrowly than as Butler, it 
shows substantial overlap. Standing argues the precariat is not so much “a class-for-itself, it is a 
class-in-the-making, increasingly able to identify what it wishes to combat and what it wants to 
construct.” Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London/New York: Blooms-
bury Academic, 2011), p. 155.
75   Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Cambridge/
Malden: Polity Press, 2013), p. 121.
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der the conditions of legitimacy, the form of power that guarantees 
the representative status of political institutions,” but sovereignty as 
“a lawless and prerogatory power, a ‘rogue’ power par excellence.”82 
Resurrected sovereignty is thus a new type of neo-monarchial power 
articulated most clearly in the infrastructure of the “new war prison.”83
These new war prisons – which will also be central to our next 
section on Stateless Propaganda – are developed in the form of ex-
tralegal “black sites,” such as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
in Afghanistan – a prison of which the public initially was not even 
supposed to know its existence – or the Guantánamo Bay detention 
camp, in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, which became a symbol of the resu-
rrected sovereignty of the expanded state in the War on Terror. Priso-
ners in Guantánamo Bay await trial in special military tribunals, whose 
decisions can be overruled at any moment by an executive order, thus 
sidestepping the very meaning of a tribunal in terms of the necessary 
guarantee of an independent judiciary.84 Situated at a naval base in 
Cuba outside of United States territory, Guantánamo Bay embodies 
what Butler describes as the “lawless” or “rogue” domain of resurrec-
ted sovereignty, applied through the War on Terror.85
To give this emerging rogue state legitimacy, the Bush administra-
tion tirelessly worked to build a sphere of symbols that mimicked the 
image of just authority, for example in the way in which representati-
ves of the administration provided it legitimacy through speech acts. 
The government, for example, pointed out that the form of detention 
imposed in Guantánamo Bay – no evidence, no charges, no trial – was 
actually a rather common procedure, and could be found in most so-
cieties in the form of “involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill people 
who pose a danger to themselves and others,” reasoning that “[t]he 
terrorists are like the mentally ill because their mind-set is unfatho-
mable, because they are outside of reason, because they are outside 
of ‘civilization.’”86 Here again, we see an overlap with aspects of the 
Orientalist trope discussed by Goss re-emerging in the core of the War 
82   Ibid., p. 56.
83   Ibid., p. 53.
84   In the words of Michael C. Dorf: “[C]laiming that Taliban, al Qaeda, and other irregular 
fighters in Afghanistan and elsewhere were entitled neither to the procedural protections of 
the criminal justice system, nor to the humanitarian protections of the Geneva Conventions, 
the Bush administration asserted an entitlement to hold detainees indefinitely, subject them 
to harsh methods of interrogation, and try them, if it chose not to simply hold them, before 
specially constituted military commissions. Moreover, the administration eventually claimed, the 
civilian courts were powerless to rule on the legality of such measures.” See: Michael C. Dorf, 
“The Detention and Trial of Enemy Combatants: A Drama in Three Branches,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 1 (Spring 2007): pp. 47–58, at p. 47.
85   On the intersection of two contradictory legal geographies, that of Cuba and the United States, 
necessary to create the extralegal framework of Guantánamo Bay and its contestations, see: Der-
ek Gregory, “The Black Flag: Guantánamo Bay and the Space of Exception,” Human Geography, 
Vol. 88, No. 4 (2006): pp. 405–27.
86   Butler, Precarious Life, p. 72.
Them dichotomy living at the outer edges of this global map. In the 
face of loss, Butler argues, we must attempt to engage a process of 
“hearing beyond what we are able to hear”: We should not consider an 
attack on the West as an isolated event, but attempt to engage the loss 
of others elsewhere in relation to our own loss.78 To engage in the pro-
cess of “hearing beyond what we are able to hear,” means to act against 
the persistent construction of Us, and therefore an engagement with 
the excluded articulated in the form of Them. It means dislocating 
oneself from the presupposed dichotomy central to the War on Terror.79
To understand how War on Terror Propaganda is capable of pro-
ducing the conditions of life beyond recognition – one could say, life 
beyond assembly – Butler turns to the French philosopher Michel Fou-
cault and his concept of “governmentality,” which he considered vital 
to the existence of the modern state in the way political power manages 
and regulates populations and goods.80 This notion of governmentali-
ty stands in contrast with the executive power invested in the figure 
of the singular sovereign, because contemporary democracies tend to 
claim the legitimacy of governmentality through the sovereignty of a 
given people, meaning a constituency of voters; it is through claiming 
the people as sovereign, that the state retains its legitimacy. But Butler 
observes a fundamental shift created through the politics of War on 
Terror, located in the capacity of the state to suspend the rule of law in 
cases of so-called terrorism, by bypassing international law when inva-
ding other countries, bypassing civil privacy through mass monitoring 
and detention of civil and foreign populations, removing information 
from public access, and so on. This suspension of the rule of law throu-
gh the state of exception, Butler argues, allows for the “convergence of 
governmentality and sovereignty.”81 Butler describes this convergence 
as “resurrected sovereignty,” a sovereignty not of “unified power un-
78  Butler, Precarious Life, p. 18.
79  Butler implicated herself directly in such dislocation when she and several of her colleagues 
requested to be added to the “Campus Watch” blacklist which was part of the post-September 
11 witch hunts on academics in the field of Middle-Eastern studies, initiated by historian and 
pro-Israel lobbyist Daniel Pipes. See: http://www.campus-watch.org/. See further: Tamar Lewin, 
“Web Site Fuels Debate on Campus Anti-Semitism,” New York Times, Sep. 27, 2002, http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/09/27/us/web-site-fuels-debate-on-campus-anti-semitism.html.
80   Foucault writes: “We live in the era of a ‘governmentality’ first discovered in the eighteenth 
century. This governmentalization of the state is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon, since 
if in fact the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have become the 
only political issue, the only real space for political struggle and contestation, this is because 
the governmentalization of the state is at the same time what has permitted the state to survive, 
and it is possible to suppose that if the state is what it is today, this is so precisely thanks to 
this governmentality, which is at once internal and external to the state, since it is the tactics of 
government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private , and so on; thus the state 
can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of govern-
mentality” See: Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), p. 103.
81   Butler, Precarious Life, p. 55.
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on Terror. This trope replaces due trial by framing the subjects con-
cerned beyond the category of humanity proper, legitimizing the use 
of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques or “torture lite.”87 Just 
like Goss, Butler expands this trope, by showing that around the core 
figure of the dark savage – the “Terrorist” – an assembly of other poli-
tical opponents can be added that resist full adherence to the construct 
of Us, such as public intellectuals, critics of the Israeli occupation, 
antiwar protestors, critical diplomats, LGBTQI+ communities, and 
even the mentally ill.
As Butler states: “[T]he notion of the world itself as a sovereign 
entitlement of the United States must be given up, lost, and mourned, 
as narcissistic and grandiose fantasies must be lost and mourned.”88 
The result of such endeavor, at least initially, means that one is to lea-
ve the space of privilege invested in the notion of Us, and to assemble 
with the ever-expanding concept of Them: a Them that does consist 
not only of the supposedly “primitive” Other, but also of the incri-
minated public intellectual, the queer activist, the whistleblower, the 
mentally ill – the precariat. This position means becoming Them to create 
a new egalitarian definition of Us, thus dis-identifying from the core 
conditions that define the successful performance of power in War on 
Terror Propaganda. This act of dis-identification, of the loss of privi-
lege, and the subsequent possibility of incrimination by the expanded 
state, must be understood as a crucial part of demanding collectivity 
in Popular Propaganda.
In Butler’s work, we observe a call for such collectivity to arise 
through a new kind of assembly, an assembly not based on supposed 
sameness, but on shared loss and grief. It means to build a popular 
assembly between politicized civil society so far claimed as part of Us, 
and non-citizens aggressed as the constituents of Them, and thus to 
articulate a notion of communality that goes beyond the script impo-
sed by War on Terror Propaganda. This procedure that joins different 
precarious conditions – whether in the form of politicized civil society 
in whose name the War on Terror is waged, or the non-citizens against 
whom it is waged – is what is manifested and performed, however fra-
gile and conflictual, by the manifold popular mass movements that 
have arisen in parallel to the War on Terror, both in opposition to its 
policies, and as a living reminder of other forms of existential threats 
87  In the words of Jessica Wolfendale: “The language of torture lite […] corrupts public discourse 
by creating the illusion that there exists a special category of torture that is professional, re-
strained, and far removed from the brutal practices of authoritarian and tyrannical regimes. This 
illusion allows us to replace the question of whether we should use torture with the question of 
what kinds of torture we should use.” Jessica Wolfendale, “The Myth of Torture Lite,” Ethics and 
International Affairs vol. 23, no. 1 (2009): pp. 47–61, at pp. 58–59.
88   Ibid., p. 40.
to our common live support.
We thus conclude that Popular Propaganda is a contemporary de-
fined by the performance of power through the assemblies of popu-
lar mass movements – the concept of performance signifying simul-
taneously an expression of loss of power and a claim to power – with 
the aim of creating new realities based on a demand to collectivity. 
The performativity of this propaganda is characterized by an emerging 
claim to power.
We will continue now by exploring the role of stateless peoples and 
their relation to the War on Terror and popular mass movements, and 
discern the conditions of Stateless Propaganda.
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Before we begin to define the notion of Stateless Propaganda, it is 
important to acknowledge the factual limitations of an academic ex-
ploration of statelessness from the perspective of what we could call 
the “stated,” those who from the moment of birth, have had the pri-
vilege of being protected by their government. Being a Swiss–Dutch, 
white cis male who has been proposing the construction of a “we” 
throughout this thesis, my analysis of statelessness that I direct towards 
cannot but be inherently flawed, for the concrete knowledge of the 
world that defines statelessness can only be forcefully acquired by being 
stateless. Our proposed definition of Stateless Propaganda must thus by 
definition be problematized, something that we will further elaborate 
upon when discussing Stateless Propaganda Art in the next chapter.
As we have seen so far, there is an overlap between the categories 
of the expanded state and its War on Terror Propaganda and popu-
lar mass movements and their Popular Propaganda. The former lays 
claim on the latter for its political legitimacy, whereas the latter aims to 
dis-identify from the first. But there is also an overlap between Popular 
Propaganda and what we will now discuss as Stateless Propaganda. 
We already saw how Butler attempted to theorize the notion of the as-
sembly between precarious popular mass movements and non-citizens 
aggressed by the War on Terror. But Butler evidently is not a stateless 
subject herself. Her experience of precarity is still that, of a US citizen 
and is relatively protected as a result. What we will now explore is a 
precarity of a radically different kind, namely of those who are fully ex-
cluded from the very notion of the civil, or of the human for that mat-
ter – Them – and the kind of power and assembly that they lay claim to.
On March 26, 2010, an op-ed entitled “A Terrorist Lawyer, and 
Proud of It” appeared in the New York Times. It was written by Nancy 
Hollander, a criminal defense lawyer who represented terrorist sus-
pects prosecuted under the Patriot Act.89 In her article, Hollander des-
cribes the confrontation with attitudes similar to those mentioned by 
Butler: “When I defended someone charged with raping a baby, no 
one thought I might have raped my own,” she recalls, and “when I 
defended those accused of espionage for attempting to sell America’s 
nuclear secrets, no one questioned my loyalty to my country,” but “[n]
ow that I am defending those accused of terrorism, some people as-
89   Her clients over the years varied from the non-profit Holy Land Foundation, which gathered 
funds for the reconstruction of war-damaged parts of Gaza and which was accused of material 
support to terrorist organizations with livelong sentences for its three founders as a result, to 
prisoners in Guantánamo Bay to whom she delivered pro bono legal support. See Hollander’s 
lecture Representing the Holy Land Foundation at the New World Summit – Berlin, May 4, 2012, 
https://vimeo.com/64942274.
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to include the censorship of the United States government into the 
printed book, rather than trying to circumvent its black rectangles, pa-
radoxically both removes information from the eyes of the viewer, but 
simultaneously adds information to the document as well. It shows the 
institutional effort to stop us from “reading beyond what we are able 
to read” and as such informs us about a specific performative effort of 
the government. This censorship and its motive, is most telling when a 
black rectangle appears in the following description of a conversation 
between Ould Slahi and one of his guards:
“No worry, you gonna back to your family,” he said. When he said 
that I couldn’t help breaking in        .  Lately, I’d become so vulnera-
ble. What was wrong with me? Just one soothing word in this ocean 
of agony was enough to make me cry.97
In his extensive editorial footnote apparatus, Siems notes that “It 
seems possible, if incredible, that the U.S. government may have here 
redacted the word ‘tears.’”98 So it appears that in the name of national 
security, censorship is applied to the emotional reality of an impriso-
ned human being. Censorship here is applied to the evidence of the 
fact that Ould Slahi is a human subject capable of experiencing and 
expressing emotions. It is a censorship also of the affective dimension 
a reader might experience when reading Slahi’s words.
Mohamedou Ould Slahi had left Mauritania to study and work 
in Germany and Canada. A crucial episode while living in Germany 
would turn out to be his trip to Afghanistan in 1991 to join the mujahe-
din – the Muslim Afghan militia – that fought what they considered the 
illegitimate communist government supported by the Soviet Union. 
At the end of his training, Ould Slahi swore loyalty to Al-Qa’ida, an 
organization which at that time was considered an ally of the United 
States government in its fight against communism.99 During a second 
trip to Afghanistan in 1992, Ould Slahi witnessed the toppling of the 
communist government, resulting in internal power struggles of Al-
Qa’ida and other resistance factions, something Ould Slahi refused to 
be part of, and he left the organization. But during a brief stay in Ca-
Legal Black Hole,” The Guardian, Dec. 28, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/
dec/28/guantanamo-bay-usa.
97   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 229.
98   Ibid.
99   John Prados discusses the War on Terror in Afghanistan by directly tracing its key figures to the 
outcomes of the American involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89) when he states that 
“the CIA’s Afghan campaign is obviously closely related to current events. Osama bin Laden, 
as a rebel fighter from the CIA’s secret war who is suddenly at the heart of the new terrorism, is 
the clearest example.” See: John Prados, “Notes on the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan,” The 
Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 2, History and September 11: A Special Issue (Sep. 2002): pp. 
466–71, at p. 470.
sume that I have stepped over an imaginary line and become ‘soft on 
terrorism’ or worse, that I support terrorism and am providing aid and 
comfort to the enemy.”90 But if that is what it takes to defend the rule 
of law in the face of the War on Terror Hollander concludes, then “I am 
a terrorist lawyer, if that means I am willing to defend those accused of 
terrorism.”91 Being a “terrorist lawyer” thus becomes the consequence 
of “defending the United States Constitution and the laws and treaties 
to which it is bound.”92 Hollander essentially describes the final con-
sequence of what Butler introduced as “rogue law”: the moment that 
defending the law becomes a crime in and of itself.93 Hollander became 
part of a unique alliance with writer and editor Larry Siems and the 
Mauritanian Guantánamo Bay prisoner Mohamedou Ould Slahi, au-
thor of Guantánamo Diary (2015); a unique alliance – or an assembly 
– between members of politicized civil society and a de facto stateless 
person.
Guantánamo Diary was written by Ould Slahi during the second part 
of 2005 in the form of a 466-page handwritten document. At the time 
of writing the book, Ould Slahi was imprisoned in a segregation hut in 
Camp Echo, one of seven detention camps that make up the extralegal 
prison of Guantánamo Bay. Every single one of Guantánamo Diary’s 
pages had to be put up for review to the United States government, a 
system that Ould Slahi’s editor Siems describes as the “strict protocols 
of Guantánamo’s sweeping censorship regime.”94 When it was finished, 
the document was instantly classified as secret: “every page he wrote 
was considered classified from the moment of its creation.”95 When 
finally edited and published by Siems in 2015, black rectangles of cen-
sorship littered the pages, for what had finally been released was still a 
censored version of Ould Slahi’s original text.96 The decision of Siems 
90   Nancy Hollander, “A Terrorist Lawyer and Proud of It,” New York Times, Mar. 26, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/opinion/24iht-edhollander.html?_r=0.
91   Ibid.
92   Ibid.
93   Chelsea Manning, a former soldier in the United States Army and client of Hollander who 
was sentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment for leaking documents and videos showing, 
among others, war crimes committed by the United States, argued in a similar way that pursu-
ing justice in some cases means acting against the interests of the state: “I wanted the American 
public to know that not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be neutral-
ized, but rather people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what 
we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response in the media 
and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team video [in which innocent civilians 
are killed]. As I hoped, others were just as troubled – if not more troubled that me by what they 
saw.” See: “Bradley Manning’s Personal Statement to Court Martial: Full Text,” The Guardian, 
Mar. 1, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/01/bradley-manning-wikileaks-statement-
full-text.
94   Larry Siems, “Introduction,” in Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary (New York: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2015), p. xvii.
95   Ibid.
96   See for the full (il)legal history of Guantánamo Bay and the legal struggles against its policies, 
Liz Ševčenko’s online database Guantánamo Public Memory Project, that traces the exceptional 
juridical and political status of the war prison to 1903, when the United States was given full jurisdiction 
and control over the base, while the territory formally remained part of sovereign Cuban land, http://
gitmomemory.org/. See also: Liz Ševčenko, “Guantánamo Bay’s Other Anniversary: 110 years of a 
3 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A2 4 0 2 4 1
he was an active Al-Qa’ida operative, who could expose the organiza-
tion’s network. From Jordan, Ould Slahi was flown to Bagram Airbase 
in Afghanistan on July 19, 2002, and finally on August 4 that same 
year to Guantánamo Bay detention camp, Cuba. From the moment 
of his rendition on November 28, 2001 until his release on October 
17, 2016, Ould Slahi would remain in custody. While severely mis-
treated in Amman and Bagram through beatings, intimidation, and 
humiliation, a full-scale torture procedure would only be implemented 
in Guantánamo Bay, where under direct authorization of Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld he was subjected to a “special project” 
consisting of months of continuous sleep deprivation, stress positions 
(positions in which great amount of weight is placed on just a few mus-
cles), extreme cold, beatings, sexual abuse by guards, exposure to loud 
music, white noise and excessive light, permanent disorientation, sen-
se deprivation, starvation, being subjected to staged rendition flights, 
being stripped from religious rights, denial of privacy, and suggestions 
of violent retaliation against his family members and friends, including 
the rape of his mother.104
Ould Slahi addresses the Us/Them dichotomy throughout his book. 
For example when he writes that “President Bush described his holy 
war against the so-called terrorism as a war between the civilized and 
barbaric world,” but “his government committed more barbaric acts 
than the terrorists themselves.”105 These contradictions in the democra-
tic legitimation of brutal acts of state violence reach deep into Ame-
rican society itself. Ould Slahi remarks that “Christian terrorist orga-
nizations such as Nazis and White Supremacists have the freedom to 
express themselves and recruit people openly and nobody can bother 
them,” while “as a Muslim, if you sympathize with the political views 
of an Islamic organization you’re in big trouble.”106 At the heart of that 
contradiction is the Orientalist belief that peoples of the Muslim re-
ligion, peoples of color, peoples related to the African continent or 
what is called the Middle-East still are to be understood as savages, 
something which Ould Slahi described as a “false picture” that is the 
result of propaganda, and which sustains the idea that Arab peoples are 
inherently “savage, violent, insensitive, and cold-hearted.”107 For Ould 
Slahi, his place in the Us/Them dichotomy is a historical re-enactment 
of a previous colonization, and situates his own story in the broader 
context of slavery:
104   See Larry Siems’s online project “The Torture Report: An Investigation into Rendition, Deten-
tion and Interrogation under the Bush Administration,” http://www.thetorturereport.org/.
105   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 241.
106   Ibid., p. 261.
107   Ibid., p. 359.
nada, his contacts with Al Qa’ida were proven to be enough reason for 
the authorities to link him to the so-called Millennium Plot, a series of 
failed Al-Qa’ida-linked attempted assaults on civil and military targets 
planned in the period of the 2000 millennial celebrations. In spite of 
the complete lack of evidence – Ould Slahi was in sporadic contact 
with Al-Qa’ida members, but was not working for the organization as 
such – he was placed under surveillance, and decides to return to Mau-
ritania. In Ould Slahi’s words: “The only thing we had done together 
was make a trip to Afghanistan in February 1992 to help people figh-
ting against communism. And as far as I was concerned that was not a 
crime, at least in Mauritania.”100 Adding that: “For Pete’s sake, the U.S. 
was supposedly on our side!”101
After reuniting with his family and living a year in Mauritania while 
working as a computer specialist, Ould Slahi was called in for ques-
tioning by FBI twice and held in custody. On November 28, 2001, 
he was flown to Jordan through the CIA’s rendition program.102 Ould 
Slahi writes about the moment in which he enters the limitless domain 
of rogue law: “November 28th is Mauritanian Independence Day; it 
marks the event when the Islamic Republic of Mauritania supposedly 
received its independence from the French colonists in 1960,” after 
which he subsequently remarks:
The irony is that on this very same day in 2001, the independent 
and sovereign Republic of Mauritania turned over one of its own 
citizens on a premise. To its everlasting shame, the Mauritanian go-
vernment not only broke the constitution, which forbids the extra-
dition of Mauritanian criminals to other countries, but also extradi-
ted an innocent citizen and exposed him to the random American 
Justice.103
The CIA rendition flight marked the beginning of the nearly fourteen 
years that Ould Slahi was forced to reside in the hands of secret police, 
at black sites, and in extralegal prisons – fourteen years in which he 
was treated as a de facto stateless person. He was to be subjected to 
endless interrogations based at first on Ould Slahi’s supposed invol-
vement in the Millennium Plot, but which later in the process would 
start to implicate him in the attacks of September 11, suggesting that 
100   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 92.
101   Ibid., p. 102.
102   Extraordinary rendition is government-orchestrated abduction and extrajudicial displacement 
of an individual from one country to another, used extensively by the CIA in the War on Terror 
to torture, interrogate and imprison suspects outside of any judicial oversight. See for a detailed 
analysis of extraordinary rendition in the War on Terror: Trevor Paglen and A.C. Thompson, 
Torture Taxi: On the Trail of the CIA’s Rendition Flights (New York: Melville House Publishing, 2006).
103   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 132.
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of the Earth,” which we will discuss further below. In a core reflection 
in his book, he interrogates the War on Terror propaganda of the Us/
Them divide, only to come to a full reversal of its logic:
Many young men and women join the U.S. forces under the mislea-
ding propaganda of the U.S. government, which makes people be-
lieve that the Armed Forces are nothing but a big Battle of Honor: 
if you join the Army, you are a living martyr; you’re defending not 
only your family, your country, and American democracy but also 
freedom and oppressed people all around the world. […] But the 
reality of the U.S. forces is a little tiny bit different. To go directly 
to the bottom line: the rest of the world thinks of Americans as a 
bunch of revengeful barbarians. That may be harsh, and I don’t be-
lieve the average American is a revengeful barbarian. But the U.S. 
government bets its last penny on violence as the magic solution for 
every problem, and so the country is losing friends every day and 
doesn’t seem to give a damn about it.114
In a full reversal of the Orientalist trope, it is not Them that represents 
the barbaric savage, but rather, the barbaric savage is the agent produ-
cing the very articulation and violent enactment of the Us/Them divi-
de as such: the barbarian is Us. It is the “unjustly treated individuals” 
with whom Ould Slahi engages in collective hunger strikes in the war 
prison, and in whose mourning he finds solace and community.115 And 
although Ould Slahi writes that “I would like to believe the majority 
of Americans want to see Justice done, and they are not interested in 
financing the detention of innocent people,” and that only “a small 
extremist minority […] believes that everybody in this Cuban prison 
is evil,” his writings nonetheless clearly call for a societal responsibility 
toward his condition, and for the need for a collective societal self-inte-
rrogation when it comes to the acceptance of the Us/Them dichotomy 
produced by War on Terror Propaganda.116
Guantánamo Diary can be understood as a form of Stateless Pro-
paganda that operates on two levels. First is the process of self-re-
cognition, and therefore the recognition of the stateless as a political 
community. Even in the unbearable conditions of war prison, this can 
lead to formations of assembly and collective action, for example in 
114   Ibid., p. 339.
115   Our perception of political assembly as an act of people who visibly gather in a public space 
limits our understanding of other, more fragmented or more complex choreographed forms of 
assembly, such as the case of Ould Slahi and his fellow prisoners engaging in a collective hunger 
strike. We will explore such alternative understanding of political assembly further in the context 
of Assemblism in the final chapter.
116   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 372.
I often compared myself with a slave. Slaves were taken forcibly 
from Africa, and so was I. Slaves were sold a couple of times on 
their way to their final destination, and so was I. Slaves suddenly 
were assigned to somebody they didn’t choose, and so was I. And 
when I looked at the history of slaves, I noticed that slaves someti-
mes ended up an integral part of the master’s house.108
At some point, all of Ould Slahi’s means of resistance within the war 
prison are exhausted; he gives in to the interrogations and provides 
whatever information is asked, true or false, to satisfy the guards and 
gain some form of minimal protection by winning their sympathy.109 
But even when gaining that minimal protection, becoming part of the 
master’s house only aims to affirm the master/slavery divide. For exam-
ple, Ould Slahi recounts that he is allowed to watch the movie Black 
Hawk Down (2001) with his guards. This Ridley Scott film recounts in 
a heroic vein the involvement of the U.S. in a United Nations peace-
keeping mission in Somalia, during which two of their helicopters were 
shot down by Somali militias.110 “The guards almost went crazy emo-
tionally because they saw many Americans getting shot to death,” wri-
tes Ould Slahi, “[b]ut they missed that the number of U.S. casualties 
is negligible compared to the Somalis who were attacked in their own 
homes.”111 This structural dehumanization of the Somali victims on 
screen and Ould Slahi off screen, however, did not stop the guards and 
their prisoner from “slowly but surely [becoming] a society and [star-
ting] to gossip about the interrogators and call them names.”112 But 
Ould Slahi’s political alliance is not to his master’s house, but drawn 
from the “warm breath of […] other unjustly treated individuals,”113 
those that Franz Fanon described as the community of the “Wretched 
108   Ibid., p. 314.
109   On the ineffectiveness of such “confession” retrieved through torture see Philip Rumney, “Is 
Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective? A Response to Bagaric and Clarke,” 
University of San Francisco Law Review 40 (2006): pp. 479–513, at pp. 483–84
110   Released Dec. 28, 2001, the representation of United States military in Scott’s film was of 
explicit interest to the Bush administration. Ashley Dawson describes how high-profile neocon-
servatives attended its preliminary screening, and how Scott explicitly voiced his patriotism in 
his desire to display the mission in a heroic manner. Ashley Dawson notes how the setting of 
the film makes the director’s ideological commitment manifest when she writes “in Blackhawk 
Down, The Mog, as the film’s Special Forces troops call the city, is a ramshackle megacity 
whose residents are armed to the teeth with the military detritus of the Cold War. Mogadishu is 
thus made to embody the new Heart of Darkness, a stateless urban world of vicious Hobbesian 
war of all against all. This view of Africa as the vanguard of anarchy is shared by a significant 
segment of the elite in the global North, who see the criminalization of the state in Africa as a 
direct threat to U.S. interests. It is from such feral zones, these analysts hold, that future threats 
to American society are likely to originate.” See: Ashley Dawson, “New World Disorder: ‘Black 
Hawk Down’ and the Eclipse of U.S. Military Humanitarianism in Africa,” African Studies Re-
view, Vol. 54, No. 2 (September 2011): pp. 177–94, at p. 180. We will discuss similar case studies 
further in the final chapter in the segment War on Terror Propaganda Art.
111   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, p. 320.
112   Ibid., p. 327.
113   Ibid., p. 87.
3 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A2 4 4 2 4 5
3 . 5  C O N C L U S I O N
The contemporary in our 21st century is defined both by the increase 
of technological and military infrastructure and their integration into 
global engineering projects like those of the War on Terror, as well as 
by the actors that operate in opposition to these structures of power. To 
understand the contemporary as an arena of competing realities – as 
histories in motion in the words of Lütticken – we have identified three 
of such actors, in the form of the expanded state, popular mass mo-
vements, and stateless peoples, each of which brings about a different 
propaganda through a different performance of power.
In the case of War on Terror Propaganda, we are dealing with the 
performance of the public–private power structures of the expanded 
state. Through the work of Masco, we have analyzed the imaginative 
capacities of this by far most influential of contemporary propagandas, 
to the point of its ability to construct a completely new reality ba-
sed on the Us/Them dichotomy. By projecting an image of imminent 
destruction upon its populations, War on Terror Propaganda deepens 
this dichotomy with the aim of turning citizens into counter-terror 
warriors with full-scale secret societies, comprised of citizens holding 
security clearances, as a result. The projection of imminent destruction 
operates as a form of societal censorship, by withholding archives and 
undermining awareness of actual existential threats such as climate 
change. This endless loop of threat production and response – from 
the nuclear bomb to the microbe – does not only shape an industry 
in and of itself, but also protects the interests of the proprietors of the 
expanded state.
In the case of Popular Propaganda, we are dealing with the perfor-
mative assembly of precarious politicized civil society and its popular 
mass movements throughout the world. As we analyzed through the 
work of Butler, the emerging power of popular mass movements is 
defined by performativity itself: the gathering of bodies in response to 
the increasing threats to their life support – threats inherently tied to 
the neoliberal character of the expanded state – which articulates new 
possible alliances between different precarious constituencies. Perfor-
mative assembly challenges the Us/Them dichotomy, by allying civil 
society on the basis of collective demands that are not represented by 
the expanded state. This process in which a new definition of “Us” – a 
new collectivity – is articulated may include undocumented or state-
less peoples, thus embracing part of “Them.” Through performative 
assembly, popular mass movements bring about new conceptions of 
collectivity as well as precarious infrastructures to construct reality to 
the benefit of its constituents.
the form of the hunger strike. The second is the process of recogni-
tion by others, and therefore the initiation of coalitions and forms of 
assembly between the stateless and the stated, such as that between 
Ould Slahi, Siems, and Hollander, in order for society at large to ac-
knowledge the struggles of the stateless community and its equality 
to the stated. Guantánamo Diary, as a form of Stateless Propaganda, 
enacts both. As a testimony, it recognizes the stateless as a political 
community (self-recognition), and through  the alliance with Siems 
and Hollander and the process of making the document public, it rea-
ches society at large (recognition by others). It is important to em-
phasize that this recognition is the result of self-recognition, and not 
the other way around. Ould Slahi sets the terms of his equality; it is 
not an equality that is “given” as charity, but that is the result of a 
political demand that he voices on behalf of the stateless community. 
 The stateless in this particular case are radically excluded from the 
existing monopolies of power of the expanded state, but they are not 
powerless. The power of self-recognition and of political assembly in the 
form of the hunger strike result from extreme forms of violence and de-
privation, but the stateless recognize themselves as a political communi-
ty and enact political actions and demands. The impact of Guantánamo 
Diary, which turned into an international bestseller, further proves the 
potential influence of the assembly between the stated and the stateless. 
The “power” of the stateless might be extremely precarious – to the 
point where one’s body belongs to the war prison – but it is a power no-
netheless, and one that stands in full opposition to the expanded state. 
 We will for now, within the given limitations of the stated, conclu-
de that Stateless Propaganda  is a contemporary propaganda defined 
by the performance of precarious power of a community of stateless 
peoples. This performance can take the form of a self-recognition of 
the stateless as political community on the one hand, and performa-
tive assembly between the stated and the stateless on the other. The 
performance of this precarious power stands in full opposition to the 
expanded state and demands a reversal of the Us/Them dichotomy, 
with the aims of constructing reality accordingly. Further examples of 
such forms of stateless politics and governance – from the creation of 
new independent states, to the initiation of stateless democracies – will 
be presented in the final chapter.
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In the case of Stateless Propaganda, we are dealing with people 
fully excluded from all relative privilege and protection of the expan-
ded state. Different from politicized civil society and its popular mass 
movements, the power of stateless peoples in some cases does not go 
further than a claim on their very bodily presence, and even this – in 
the case of the war prison – can be denied. As we analyzed through the 
work of Ould Slahi, the extreme condition of statelessness nonetheless 
is not equivalent to powerlessness. The self-recognition of the stateless 
community connects peoples around the world, in opposition to and 
rejection of the barbarity of “Us.” It can also take the form of alternative 
forms of assembly, such as a hunger strike or an alliance with stated in-
dividuals of politicized civil society. In the next chapter, we will discuss 
more far-reaching forms of stateless assembly and autonomism, which 
start from the condition of statelessness as a collective condition and 
even as a possible power in its own right.
In this chapter, we have observed how each of these three actors 
and their propaganda show crucial overlaps as well as oppositions. The 
expanded state might seek to incorporate popular mass movements to 
maintain its legitimacy, and popular mass movements might experience 
relative privilege or protection of the expanded state as a result, even 
though the two stand in opposition. Popular mass movements and state-
less peoples might seek for possible forms of alliance and assembly, even 
though their experience of precarity may be extremely different. The 
antagonism between the expanded state and stateless peoples, is most 
profound and, as we will see in the next chapter, can be the foundation 
for stateless peoples to demand full separation and autonomy from the 
expanded state altogether. We also observed that the kind of power at 
stake in contemporary propaganda is different in nature. In the case of 
the expanded state we dealt with an existing monopoly of power, in the case 
of popular mass movements and stateless peoples we are dealing with 
emerging power. In the case of the stateless, this emerging power further 
results from a process of self-recognition, i.e., the alternative paradigm of 
power that might be inherent to the condition of statelessness as such.
Let us now, based on this chapter, propose the following definition 
of contemporary propaganda:
• Contemporary propaganda is the performance of power in con-
temporary society
Having arrived at a first understanding of contemporary propaganda in 
the 21st century and three conceptions of different propaganda models, 
let us begin to deepen our understanding of each of these propagandas, 






2 5 12 5 0
As we discussed in the second chapter, propaganda art consists of what 
it makes visible and invisible at the same time: while it shows one thing, 
it conceals another. What are the scales and stakes of art’s role as pro-
paganda as we move from the modern to the contemporary?
In the context of Modernist Propaganda Art, the abstract expres-
sionists aimed to create images that transcended traditional artistic 
representation. But at the same time, abstract expressionism – as we 
have shown – was highly figurative as propaganda art. In the context of 
Europe, it represented American freedom, a liberation from figurative 
representation that contrasted with the aesthetic regime of Soviet so-
cialist realism. This effect of abstract expressionism as propaganda art 
was not limited to the object of the painting, but was mediated through 
a larger technological interface: from newspaper articles to television 
reportages and Greenberg’s speeches on the Voice of America radio. 
We thus came to understand modern propaganda art not just as an ob-
ject, but as a larger body of mediation through which the performance 
of power as art, was manifested.
At the same time, we have seen how Avant-Garde Propaganda Art 
during the early Russian revolution aimed at overcoming these proces-
ses of concealment. Rodchenko’s productivist art aimed at making the 
means of production of propaganda – the substructures of power – vi-
sible through his work. He followed Lenin’s paradigm of a propaganda 
for a revolutionary modernism as part of mass education and eman-
cipation. Furthermore, Rodchenko fully abandoned the separation of 
his work as “art” from the larger aims of industrialization: he aimed 
for his work to be part of it, to mobilize its capacities, and to imagine 
a new world – and a new art – through it. Rodchenko consciously 
expanded the notion of art through the industrial and technological 
interface. His work was art, architecture, design, worker’s club, library, 
radio station, conference room: none of which excluded another. From 
capitalist modernity’s Modernist Propaganda Art to revolutionary mo-
dernity’s Avant-Garde Propaganda Art we face two radically different 
propagandas and thus two different forms of propaganda art: the first 
conceals the larger interface of technology and industry to maintain 
the idea of a Greenbergian “autonomous art,” whereas the second in-
cludes the interface of technology and industry, declaring it part of an 
expanded revolutionary art practice.
In the previous chapter on Contemporary Propaganda, we have 
come to understand the further acceleration of technological society in 
the 21st century as a heritage of the Cold War and the nuclear-indus-
trial complex. The technological interface of propaganda has broade-
ned, and as such, the propaganda filters defined by Chomsky and Her-
man in the late 1980s have increased their capacity to construct reality 
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As we discussed in the second chapter, what we call “art” is a pro-
duct of historical processes, in which the changing nature of power 
structures impact the nature of art. In our contemporary age of acce-
lerated technology and expanded interconnected industries described 
by Masco, this is more than ever before the case. We will observe this in 
particular with regard to the media of art privileged by contemporary 
propaganda. Dominant monopolies of power – such as those at work 
in War on Terror Propaganda – have largely abandoned the beaux arts 
that we inherited from the French Revolution. Different from the Nazi 
regime or the United States during the Cold War, fine art is no longer 
the dominant tool with which to communicate cultural superiority and 
civilizational legitimacy to the masses. Instead, we will observe that 
in the case of War on Terror Propaganda Art a variety of new cultural 
forms have been included in the expanded definition of art in propa-
ganda. Next to more traditional forms of theater, visual art, and film, 
we encounter (video) games and completely new visual forms such as 
abstract “voids” that conceal archives and even whole territories and 
peoples from the public eye: a contemporary abstraction that repre-
sents the power of the expanded state in controlling the very visibility 
of the reality it constructs.
In the context of emerging structures of power this is different, be-
cause the access to large technological infrastructures is far more li-
mited. Whereas we will still encounter new media in the form of video 
and film in both Popular Propaganda Art and Stateless Propaganda 
Art, we will note that we will only encounter the traditional media of 
painting and sculpture in the context of the latter. Whereas for a long 
time, fine arts were the exclusive property of ruling power, they might 
now have become the most accessible and – paradoxically – democratic 
of available media. The counterpoint to this is also that their reach 
tends to be far more limited, compared to the enormous technologi-
cal interfaces and industries available to War on Terror Propaganda 
Art – although that does not by definition mean they are ineffective or 
incapable of playing a role in large-scale mobilization.
Let us now begin to explore the history, styles, artists, and artworks 
that belong to the first category of contemporary propaganda that we 
have defined as War on Terror Propaganda, in the form of War on Te-
rror Propaganda Art.
after the interests of dominant monopolies of power. At the same time, 
we expanded the propaganda model through what we proposed as an 
“inverted propaganda model”: one that was not merely focused on 
dominant structures, but on emergent structures of power or unrecog-
nized forms of power, such as popular mass movements and stateless 
peoples. As a result, we have been able to articulate three different ac-
tors that define the conflictual arena of the contemporary in the form 
of the War on Terror, popular mass movements, and stateless peoples, 
each of which bring about their own particular structures of power and 
propaganda: War on Terror Propaganda (which we analyze through the 
propaganda model), and Popular Propaganda and Stateless Propaganda 
(which we analyze through the inverted propaganda model). Throu-
gh a close reading of the work of Masco, Butler, and Ould Slahi, we 
already grasp some of the cultural – even artistic – dimensions of the 
process in which these different propagandas aim to construct reality. 
We discussed the imaginative dimensions of the War on Terror (Mas-
co), the performative stagings in popular mass movements (Butler), and 
the desperate cultural output of a stateless prisoner of war (Ould Slahi).
Masco, Butler, and Ould Slahi thus contributed to our final endea-
vor, namely to define Contemporary Propaganda Art, and the expanded 
definitions of the concept of “art” that it puts forward. Our aim will be 
to define the performance of power in the domain of art as War on Te-
rror Propaganda Art, Popular Propaganda Art, and Stateless Propaganda 
Art. Within each of these categories of contemporary propaganda art, 
we will try to define the expanded histories of art that brought them 
about, the artistic styles and practices that they instituted, the artists 
and artworks they realized within these categories, and their overall 
role in constructing reality for the interests of their proprietors (War on 
Terror Propaganda Art) or the collective demands of their constituen-
cies (Popular Propaganda Art, Stateless Propaganda Art).
We will do so by highlighting, in each different category, the relation 
between art and the structure of power at hand, the process in which power 
is performed as art, and the reality that this performance of power aims 
to construct. As War on Terror Propaganda, Popular Propaganda, and 
Stateless Propaganda each have their own art histories, styles, and ca-
tegories, the structure of each section will be different, but this basic 
methodology, which could be summarized as propaganda = power+per-
formance, will form our continuous guideline. Different from the pre-
vious chapters, in which we attempted to define the general framework 
of modern propaganda, modern propaganda art, and contemporary 
propaganda, we will also provide additional details on a variety of con-
temporary works of propaganda art to understand how our historical 
exploration of propaganda shapes our present-day reality.
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4 . 1  WA R  O N  T E R R O R  P R O PAG A N DA  A RT
In the previous chapter, we discussed through the work of Masco how 
the power structures of the expanded state have a creative capacity of 
some kind, something which the American curator Nato Thompson 
even describes as an actual “cultural turn” in the US military-indus-
trial complex during the War on Terror.1 In Masco’s work we can thus 
find hints of something that we might be able to expand further into 
an “art history of the War on Terror,” which will be the main aim of 
this section. We will explore Masco’s different examples of the creative 
capacity of the expanded state, and build upon them to argue for a 
category of art proper: that of War on Terror Propaganda Art. We will 
explore the interdisciplinary character of this War on Terror Propagan-
da Art and try to map its institutions and its artists. We will do so by 
discussing and analyzing War on Terror Propaganda Art as comprising 
two distinct styles.
The first of these two styles is expanded state realism, which is es-
sentially the practice through which the image of imminent societal 
destruction is created, staged, and witnessed. It is a realism that aims 
at constructing a concrete social reality, but it stands far from what 
we know in art history as “social realism.”2 For whereas social realism 
originated from the social struggles of lower-class people in order to 
mediate suffering and oppression that ruling classes ignored or even 
actively maintained, the mass theatrical and cinematic spectacles that 
engage American families in enacting or witnessing their own potential 
destruction are of an entirely different kind. It is a form of realism that 
largely benefits the interests of the state rather than its population, as it 
stages the threat necessary to institutionalize a dependency on specific 
industries, legitimizes a politics of secrecy, and promotes the inevitabi-
lity of perpetual warfare. As such, the realism projected by the nuclear 
state is much closer to what we have discussed in the second chapter 
as socialist realism than to social realism, as it projects reality not from 
the perspective of struggling lower classes, but reality as it ought to be 
in the perspective of a specific elite. This notion of realism also shows 
1   Thompson starts from US lieutenant general David Petraeus’s rewriting of a “forgotten military 
document: the counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.” Thompson observes that in the revision 
of the document “gun toting shock and awe-style methods” were replaced by emphasis on “the 
transforming of popular perception as a supplement to straightforward killing,” resulting in 
what Thompson calls a “cultural turn in the U.S. military.” Nato Thompson, Culture as Weapon: 
The Art of Influence in Everyday Life (Brooklyn/London: Melville House, 2017), pp. 127–28. 
An earlier draft of Thompson’s chapter that appeared as an essay in e-flux journal was criticized 
by Rijin Sahakian, former director of Sada in Baghdad, who argued that Thompson’s focus on 
the cultural turn in the period of the Iraq invasion made “no mention of the massive cultural 
cleansing campaign that took place in Iraq during and after the occupation.” Rijin Sahakian, “A 
Reply to Nato Thompson’s “The Insurgents, Part I,” e-flux journal, No. 48 (Oct. 2013).
2   The history of social realism, starting with the realists in the 19th century, will be further elabo-
rated through the work of art historian Alice Guillermo in the section Popular Propaganda Art.
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growing awareness of certain military agencies of the danger of clima-
te change, something frighteningly ignored by the dominant political 
classes, which are more occupied with the next elections than long-
term survival.4 In other cases, governmental agencies might even oppo-
se a government, for example in the case of the CIA’s investigation of 
possible Russian ties of the present Trump administration.5 Another 
example are private corporations that try to undermine instrumenta-
lization by a state, for example by resisting access to their clients’ user 
data demanded by governments in the name of national security.6 In 
other words, the public–private infrastructures of the expanded state 
are conflictual among themselves, but that does not mean that in the 
context of the War on Terror they have not created dominant, reoc-
curring narratives in relation to the domain of art that we can trace. 
Defining such master narratives forms our key objective here – but we 
will keep in mind that arguing for the existence of such master narrati-
ves in the process in which the expanded state constructs reality is not 
the same as claiming that the expanded state is a homogeneous entity.7
Finally, when we use the term “art” in the context of War on Terror 
Propaganda Art, we refer back to the interdisciplinary nature of pro-
paganda that we discussed in previous chapters. In the context of pro-
paganda, the morphological and imaginative practice we term art, can 
never be understood in an isolated manner or as a single medium. For 
propaganda to construct reality through as many domains and media as 
possible, propaganda must by definition be interdisciplinary. We will try 
to show how visual art, cinema, games, theater, and so on, will have to 
be understood as interrelated. Although we will discuss different styles 
and media of War on Terror Propaganda Art in sequence, we will conti-
nue to emphasize their interconnected nature.
Let us now begin to discuss the practice of War on Terror Propaganda 
in the form of expanded state realism and its interdisciplinary output.
4   As noted by my colleague Younes Bouadi, who at my request attended the Future Force Confer-
ence, organized by the Dutch Ministry of Defense at the World Forum, The Hague, Feb. 9–10, 
2017.
5   The cause of the conflict lies in the CIA investigation into Trump’s campaign team for possible 
collusion with Russian secret services, as elaborated by Michael J. Morell, former deputy direc-
tor of the CIA. See: Michael J. Morell, “Trump’s Dangerous Anti-C.I.A. Crusade,” The New York 
Times, Jan. 6, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/trumps-dangerous-anti-cia-crusade.html.
6   As a result of growing public pressure, massive corporate social media such as Facebook and In-
stagram have been adopting increasingly strict privacy policies. See: Sam Levin, “Facebook and 
Instagram Ban Developers from Using Data for Surveillance,” The Guardian, Mar. 13, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/13/facebook-instagram-surveillance-priva-
cy-data.
7    In his analysis of spectacular Hollywood cinema in the period following the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, Terence McSweeney argues that “[e]ven if the traumatic event is highly contested, 
a master narrative soon emerges, which is a collective understanding of the incident. It is one 
that appears on the surface to be ideologically neutral, but is, in actual fact, highly politicized.” 
Terence McSweeney, The ‘War on Terror’ and American Film: 9/11 Frames Per Second (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 10.
overlaps with what writer and theorist Mark Fisher has discussed as 
capitalist realism: the cultural output that normalizes the economic, so-
cial, and environmental disasters of contemporary capitalism as the 
only realistic order, co-opting all real social alternatives in its wake.3
We should therefore understand the type of realism produced by 
the Cold War as a form of state realism, and today, in the context of the 
War on Terror, as a form of expanded state realism, because it concer-
ns a realism that is created to benefit the public–private infrastructures 
through which the War on Terror is waged. We will discuss the practice 
of expanded state realism in the domains of three of its dominant me-
dia, namely those of theater, games, and television and cinema, and its 
impact in the form of extended performance, in which all three come to-
gether through the perpetration of torture and warfare upon the bodies 
of those who are considered non-citizens.
The second style of War on Terror Propaganda is expanded state abs-
traction. With this term, we refer to the creation of blank spots and 
abstract voids in our political, economic, and legal system, but also in 
the domain of public knowledge in the form of libraries, the Internet, 
mainstream media and – as we will see – visual art. As we have dis-
cussed earlier, the War on Terror operates through classification, by 
turning public domain information into state secrets. This secrecy is 
manifested in abstractions: through black censorship rectangles and 
the disappearance of information what is present becomes absent. This 
abstract absence, in turn, strengthens expanded state realism, which 
gains the sole monopoly on the visualization of threat. When expanded 
state abstraction classifies our own history, what is taken from us is the 
chance to understand why the world is manifested – visualized – the 
way it is: whether in the form of a terrorist attack or the building of a 
war prison. Expanded state realism defines the image and reason be-
hind imminent threats for us. As such, one could argue that in War on 
Terror Propaganda Art realism and abstraction exist in a state of inter-
dependence. They structure one another in the creation of a new reality 
that benefit the expanded state.
Although such claims might come across as rather conspirational, 
we emphasize that we are not approaching the expanded state as a sin-
gular actor – as some kind of a “deep state” that has one common drive 
for domination. State and corporate agencies, while possibly sharing 
more interests in power monopolies than not, are not a homogeneous 
mass. In some cases, some parts of the state may be more consistent 
in addressing actual existential threats than others, for example the 
3   In Fisher’s words, “[c]apitalist realism […] entails subordinating oneself to a reality that is 
infinitely plastic, capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment.” While capitalist realism claims 
its legitimacy by rejecting the so-called totalitarianism of past socialist and communist regimes, 
Fisher perceives a form of “market Stalinism” in its hyper-bureaucratic and target-oriented 
bureaucracy, opening up the possibility of comparisons between socialist realism and capitalist 
realism. See: Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester/Washington: O 
Books, 2009), pp. 54, 42.
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division of social labor and the organ of class domination.”12 But as we 
discussed earlier, the expanded state is defined through public–private 
ownership under the doctrine of neoliberalism – it is not just the state 
alone that holds power, but its expanded infrastructures controlled by 
the realm of private capital as well.
Lütticken claims that the contemporary spectacle under the doctri-
ne of neoliberalism should rather be redefined as “performative spec-
tacle.”13 For under the “regime of immaterial labor” of post-Fordist 
neoliberalism, the worker has become a service provider working under 
flexible contracts, which turn the worker himself into a “living commo-
dity”14 forced to live in a condition of “perpetual performance.”15 So 
whereas the notion of the spectacle is suitable for the condition of the 
Cold War state, the performative spectacle suits the expanded state of 
the War on Terror. Human life is the raw performative capital imported 
into War on Terror Propaganda Art to make its imaginaries of immi-
nent societal destruction into a new reality. Or, in other words, citizens 
in the expanded states are forced to provide their performative labor to 
uphold the reality of the War on Terror. They “work” for the expanded 
state, without contracts and, of course, without actual payment.
Masco traces how the spectacular theater of the Cold War has been 
translated into new contemporary forms. He discusses, among others, 
the post-September 11 two-yearly exercises organized by TOPOFF 
(Top Officials), consisting of contemporary mass theatrical spectacles 
focused on attack scenarios involving so-called weapons of mass des-
truction used by supposed terrorist agents: “[I]n 2003, a dirty bomb 
was imaginatively detonated in Seattle and a biological weapon used 
in Chicago; in 2005, a car bombing, a chemical attack, and an unk-
nown biological warfare agent were acted out in New Jersey and Con-
necticut; and in 2007, nuclear materials were theatrically detonated 
in Portland, Phoenix and Guam.”16 The first TOPOFF spectacle had 
already taken place in 2000, in Denver and Portsmouth, but its impor-
tance and scale were amplified after the attacks of September 11.17 The 
TOPOFF 2 spectacle involved eight thousand participants in Seattle 
and Chicago and was the first in the post-September 11 era. The choi-
ce for Seattle was not coincidental. The city that had witnessed the 
massive anti-globalist protests of 1999, also known as the “Battle of 
Seattle,” and had been the site of arrest of Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian 
12   Debord, Society of the Spectacle, §24.
13   Lütticken, Idols of the Market, p. 169.
14   Ibid.
15   Lütticken, History in Motion, p. 189.
16   Ibid., p. 165.
17   US Department of State, “Top Officials” (TOPOFF) information page, http://2001-2009.state.
gov/s/ct/about/c16661.htm.
E X PA N D E D  S TAT E  R E A L I S M : T H E AT E R
The first medium of War on Terror Propaganda Art that we will discuss 
is rooted in the cultural practices of the Cold War: the mass rehearsals 
of fictional nuclear detonations, evacuations of cities and duck-and-
cover drills, which Joseph Masco describes as “detailed renderings of 
theatrically rehearsed mass violence,” manifested in the form of “pu-
blic spectacles.”8 The notion of the spectacle here will be important 
throughout our analysis of War on Terror Propaganda Art. Situationist 
writer Guy Debord famously defined the notion of the spectacle in his 
Society of the Spectacle (1967) as follows:
The spectacle, grasped in its totality, is both the result and the pro-
ject of the existing mode of production. It is not a supplement to 
the real world, an additional decoration. It is the heart of unrealism 
of the real society. In all its specific forms, as information or pro-
paganda, as advertisement or direct entertainment consumption, 
the spectacle is the present model of socially dominant life. It is the 
omnipresent affirmation of the choice already made in production 
and its corollary consumption.9
This definition seems particularly appropriate to the theatrical spec-
tacles that Masco discusses in the context of the Cold War, in which 
an imagined threat becomes the foundation for organizing a society. 
Theater historian Tracy C. Davis even emphasized the importance of 
such mass rehearsals as actual theater in her claim that the choreo-
graphic categories of “civil defense,” “civil preparedness,” and “emer-
gency measures” that were central to these theatrical spectacles and 
were enacted in perfect synchronicity between “governing bodies, lea-
derships and chains of command, bureaucrats, public servants, tech-
nicians, laborers, and families,”10 defined this cultural heritage of the 
Cold War as “the proper provenance of a theatre historian.”11
Just as the Cold War created the foundations for the War on Terror, 
the Cold War’s state realism created the foundations for expanded sta-
te realism. This shift was also characterized by a changing economic 
reality. For example, in 1967 Debord still wrote that “[t]he generalized 
cleavage of the spectacle is inseparable from the modern State, namely 
from the general form of cleavage within society, the product of the 
8   Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 47.
9   Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black & Red, 2005), §6.
10   Tracy C. Davis, “Between History and Event: Rehearsing Nuclear War Survival,” The Drama 
Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2002): pp. 11–45, at p. 14.
11   Ibid., p. 38.
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the Bush administration’s expansion of the government’s reach, but 
they were also supposed to show the government as a trustworthy part-
ner in regulating the ruins of society after the act. Dent rightly asks 
who in this staging of reality through spectacular theater is actually 
the audience: “the virtual citizens of Seattle? The government officials 
in-play? The real-time media? The would-be terrorists?”22 The answer, 
located in this spectacular theater of expanded state realism, seems to 
be all at the same time, but they are not only spectators, but actors as 
well – they are “spect-actors” as the progressive Brazilian theorist and 
theater maker Augusto Boal termed it.23 In the process of collectively 
enacting and witnessing one’s own destruction the new reality of the 
War or Terror are established. We witness in TOPOFF 2 a spectacle so 
extreme and detailed, and so inclusive of all segments of society, that it 
literally transforms an existing reality into a new one through a totali-
zing spectacular theater – through art. In this performative spectacle of 
War on Terror Propaganda Art’s expanded state realism, all of society 
labors in a perpetual performance.
To summarize, in the case of spectacular theater in the style of 
expanded state realism, we observe how War on Terror Propaganda 
consists of a performative spectacle, in which citizens and officials co-
llectively enact the fantasy of their own imminent destruction and pos-
sibility of survival. Citizens literally act themselves, but in a new rea-
lity whose outcomes benefits the public–private infrastructures of the 
expanded state. We define performance in this context as the physical 
theatrical enactment of scripts with the aim to construct reality after 
the interests of the expanded state.
E X PA N D E D  S TAT E  R E A L I S M : G A M E S
A second spectacular form of War on Terror Propaganda Art discus-
sed by Masco are games. While these also call upon the performative 
involvement of their players, they concern much smaller groups than 
spectacular theater. Whereas a game can of course be played by many 
different people at the same time – even in the millions in the case of 
22   Ibid., p. 126.
23   The concept of “spect-actor” is theorized by Boal as part of his famous concept of the Theater 
of the Oppressed (1974). The central idea is that participants stage their own external and inter-
nalized conditions of oppression, acting out their oppression, while being spectators to it at the 
same time. As Boal writes: “The members of the audience must become the Character: possess 
him, take his place – not obey him, but guide him, show him the path they think right. In this 
way the Spectator becoming Spect-Actor is democratically opposed to the other members of the 
audience, free to invade the scene and appropriate the power of
the actor.” Boal thus proposes his methodology as a transgressive theater practice, which in the con-
text of War on Terror Propaganda is radically perverted. Here spect-actors are supposed to enact 
a disaster and witness its impact to transpose their agency to that of the expanded state, rather 
than to claim this agency themselves. See: Augusto Boal, Theater of the Oppressed (London: Pluto 
Press, 2008), p. xxi.
al-Qaeda member who formed one of the key protagonists in the failed 
Millennium Plot. It was a city whose identity was characterized by a 
confrontation with what many consider a form of “leftist terrorism” 
as well as a near-September 11 experience, both of which provided 
additional legitimacy for the city council to wholeheartedly embrace 
TOPOFF 2.18
Performance theoretician Michelle Dent witnessed TOPOFF 2 di-
rectly as a writer and spectator, describing how the scenario began 
with a fictional Middle-Eastern terrorist network known as GLO-
DO (Group for the Liberation of Orangeland and the Destruction of 
Others) enacting a large scale radiological attack.19 Dent notes that 
very different from the mass spectacles staged in the Cold War, TOPO-
FF 2 was marked by the fact that the attack for which participants were 
supposed to prepare themselves had essentially already happened, as, 
“TopOff2 was performed in the shadow of 9/11.”20 Simultaneously, the 
TOPOFF 2 spectacle happened to take place simultaneously to the 
bombing of the American embassy in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia, bringing 
actual officials to raise the terror alert in real time while officials par-
ticipating as actors in TOPOFF 2 were raising the terror alert as part 
of their spectacular theater in defense against GLODO. The parallel 
presence of these different events and non-events – the Millennium 
Plot that did not happen; September 11 that did happen; TOPOFF 
2 as exercise; the Riyadh bombings in real time – are connected in 
the theatrical spectacle. TOPOFF 2 becomes a site where realities and 
fictions merge. For how much is TOPOFF 2 about exercise, and how 
much is it about constructing a new reality altogether through specta-
cular performance?
Dent notes that during the performance of TOPOFF 2’s two-hun-
dred-page script within the dramatic decors of scenery production 
house Production Support Services, officials leading the spectacle 
continuously told journalists assembled at the TOPOFF 2 Venue Con-
trol Center “that everything is going smoothly, that all the players are 
doing an outstanding job, that there have not been too many mistakes, 
and that the citizens of Seattle need not worry that terrorists will use 
this information against them.”21 The journalists present were suppo-
sed to enact a dual role: they were to photograph and document the 
decors of a destroyed city to show the terrifyingly real threat of a te-
rrorist attack through weapons of mass destruction, thus legitimizing 
18   Michelle Dent, “Staging Disaster: Reporting Live (Sort of) from Seattle,” The Drama Review, 
Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 2004): pp. 109–34, at pp. 128–30.
19   Ibid., p. 109.
20   Ibid., p. 114.
21   Ibid., p. 123.
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nations during a summit meeting in Washington D.C.”31 Current or 
former senior government leaders played the role of heads of state as-
sembled at the summit when the terrorist attack is first reported, with 
former United States secretary Madeleine Albright playing the Pre-
sident of the United States, and former Foreign Minister of Canada 
Barbara McDougall playing the Prime Minister of Canada.32 Gathered 
around a large oval mock-summit table, an LCD screen is placed in 
front of the leaders, displaying a newsflash of the fictional global news 
channel GNN. A news anchor going by the name of Peter Elliott an-
nounces the first victims of the attack in Europe, and historicizes the 
smallpox disease as having caused three hundred million deaths in the 
twentieth century, noting that “[t]hat is more than twice the number 
of military and civilians killed in all the wars of the past century.”33 The 
message of the game scenario, manifested in summit props and mock 
news is clear: the combination of disease and terrorism poses a threat 
greater than all the wars of the past century combined. After having 
played the high-tension game of unfolding disaster in real time from 
9:00 to 16:00, Sir Nigel Broomfield, a former English ambassador who 
played the role of Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, concluded 
that “[i]n the world that’s coming up […] we will need such organi-
zations [as the World Health Organization] which have pre-allocated 
powers and responsibilities”.34 In other words, the staged threat of bio-
terrorism in the Atlantic Storm game successfully embedded the World 
Health Organization in a new, real frontline of the War on Terror.
The difference, Masco notes, between the war games in the Cold 
War and the War on Terror, is that the Atlantic Storm scenario had 
no possible good outcome. There was no scenario in Atlantic Storm 
in which the unfolding global disaster could in any way be contai-
ned, and as such it was “designed to demonstrate the contemporary 
limits of federal governance and to create a productive panic among 
security professionals charged with preempting collective dangers.”35 
This “productive panic” is a result of the experiences of the Bush Ad-
ministration in the direct aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 
which we discussed above. Rather than aiming at rational governance 
or diplomacy, the Atlantic Storm game cultivates a scenario in which 
only the most drastic responses are imaginable: radical securitization, 
31   Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 173.
32   Bradley T. Smith et al., “Navigating the Storm: Report and Recommendations from the Atlantic 
Storm Exercise,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 3, No. 
3 (2005), pp. 256–76, at p. 258, http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/our-work/events/2005_at-
lantic_storm/pdf/Atlantic%20Storm%20After-Action.pdf.
33   See the video reconstruction of the “Atlantic Storm” exercise, including the full GNN item, 
on the UPMC Center for Biosecurity website, http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/our-work/
events/2005_atlantic_storm/flash/flash.htm.
34   Smith et al, “Navigating the Storm,” p. 263.
35   Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 175.
multiplayer online video game platforms – the experience of the game 
is a more individual one. We will look at so-called scenario exercises 
and tabletop games – expansions of the board game – but also at the 
rise of the virtual game and video game industry.
Masco claims that the increased scale and professionalization of 
spectacular theater and spectacular games have their origins in the 
Cold War. He discusses games as elaborate theatrical means for prepa-
ring for nuclear disaster, and how they were developed by the RAND 
Corporation, an American nonprofit global policy think tank foun-
ded in 1948 to provide research to the United States Army.24 RAND 
Corporation pioneered political war games, which Cold War historian 
Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi describes as “role-playing crisis games and 
man-machine simulations,”25 aimed at the “cadres of the military, de-
fense industry, universities and opinion makers.”26 The role-playing 
crisis games were staged in seminar rooms. One such scenario from the 
late forties enacted the consequences of Stalin’s looming death.27 The 
man–machine simulations consisted of far more elaborate simulations, 
staged in the early fifties in exact replicas of the Tacoma air defense 
radar station.28 The essence of these various scenarios was always roo-
ted in potential geopolitical shifts in the Cold War that could lead to 
nuclear disaster. According to Masco, RAND Corporation games were 
focused on “tested outcomes and modeled tactics in an effort to give 
leaders more options in a time of nuclear crisis.”29
The character of these games in the context of the War on Terror 
changed due to the acceleration of threat production. The Soviets were 
no longer the only more or less contained enemy, now Them – the 
terrorist or the microbe, or a terrifying combination of the two – had 
become the basis of ever-multiplying forms of possible danger and des-
truction. In that light, Masco discusses the Atlantic Storm game, which 
was staged by the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsbur-
gh Medical Center in 2005 as a ministerial table-top exercise.30 Atlantic 
Storm took as its starting point “a terrorist use of smallpox on multiple 
24   R. Kent Weaver notes that “[t]he Rand Corporation […] is essentially a contract researcher for 
the Department of Defense, although it does some research for other government agencies and 
for foundations.” R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep. 1989): pp. 563–78, at p. 566. Currently, the RAND Corporation 
presents itself as “widely respected for operating independent of political and commercial 
pressures. […] RAND’s research is commissioned by a global clientele that includes government 
agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms.” http://www.rand.org/about/history.html.
25   Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 
1960s,” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr. 2000): pp. 163–223, at p. 169.
26   Ibid., p. 170.
27   Ibid., p. 173.
28   Ibid., p. 179.
29   Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 175.
30   Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, “Atlantic Storm” infor-
mation page, http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/our-work/events/2005_atlantic_storm/flash/
index.html.
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bollah organization, such as Special Force (2003) and Special Force 2: 
Tale of the Truthful Pledge (2006), in which the killing of Israeli soldiers 
is graphically depicted, the enemy in America’s Army is rather abstract, 
wearing non-descriptive black uniforms resulting in “faceless enemy 
avatars” upon which the player can project any possible future enemy 
of the US.41 The success of America’s Army has been enormous: “By 
the summer of 2013, over thirteen million people had played the game, 
accumulating around 260 million hours of combined gameplay.”42 A 
study from 2008 showed that “30 percent of all Americans age 16 to 
24 had a more positive impression of the Army because of the game 
and, even more amazingly, the game had more impact on recruits than 
all other forms of Army advertising combined.”43
Exploited commercially through the Microsoft X-Box game system 
and other game consoles and mobile carriers, America’s Army became 
internationally successful in promoting its “honor system”: different 
from popular games such as Grand Theft Auto, which award criminal 
behavior, players in America’s Army get more points through coope-
ration with their team, and an indefinite online ban is imposed when 
killing another player through “friendly fire” – essentially transposing 
an instant military tribunal into the digital sphere.44 The game is em-
blematic for the militarization of the game industry, turning the mas-
sive constituency of gamers into potential army recruits, while projec-
ting a positive image of the United States Army honor system abroad. 
And, vice versa, the military industrial complex learned from the game 
industry as well. Unmanned flying vehicles such as drones are often 
operated through game-like consoles, and digital training spans much 
further than America’s Army alone; the army developed games to train 
not only drone pilots and soldiers, but also to practice the removal 
of mines, train the prevention of sexual harassment and abuse, and 
to provide therapeutic support of veterans with post-traumatic stress 
syndrome.45 What is presented by the United States Army as free en-
tertainment is actually a site of concrete propaganda labor of its users, 
which provide recruits and familiarizes masses of civilians, both in the 
abstract and recognizable enemy. Robertson Allen notes that, in order for the army not to come 
across as prejudice or racist, it was crucial to design an abstract enemy figure, without too many 
specific ethnical, physical, or external features: “The unreal enemy is an enemy with minimal 
cultural, linguistic, or ethnic indicators and therefore one which is simultaneously anonymous 
yet potentially anyone. Everywhere and nowhere at once, the unreal enemy is a tabula rasa on 
which any enemy can be extrapolated.” See: Robertson Allen, “The Unreal Enemy of America’s 
Army,” Games and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2011): pp. 38–60, at p. 52.
41   Marcus Schulzke, “America’s Army,” in Pat Harrigan and Matthew G. Kirschenbaum (eds.), 
Zones of Control: Perspectives on War Gaming (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2016), p. 307.
42   Ibid, p. 303.
43   Singer, “MEET THE SIMS … and Shoot Them,” p. 93.
44   Ibid. Another form of punishment described by Schulzke is that “[p]layers who attack civilians 
or teammates are penalized and repeat offenders can be sent to a virtual prison cell in Leaven-
worth.” See: Schulzke, “America’s Army,” in Zones of Control, p. 304.
45   Singer, “MEET THE SIMS … and Shoot Them,” pp. 94–95.
a disregard of any previously existing law, militarization of public heal-
th infrastructures, unlimited patriotism and nationalism to protect at 
least part of one’s own population. In other words, from the perspec-
tive of Atlantic Storm the world is no longer governable. Destruction is 
imminent and absolute, and that means that a proper response is one 
of immediate defense, which by definition must bypass the morals and 
rules of the old world. And because destruction is imminent, Butler’s 
resurrected sovereignty must be also made imminent, to make survival 
– not governance – possible.
We find the civil equivalent of Atlantic Storm in the enormous con-
temporary industry of videogames, in which the United States military 
itself has become stakeholder, particularly in a domain that Roger Sta-
hl calls “militainment.”36 A 2016 budget request by the United States 
Department of Defense asks for fifty-five million dollars in the domain 
or war gaming, including that of videogames, stating:
Recognizing the immense value that war gaming has historically 
had in strengthening our force in times of strategic, operational, 
and technological transition – such as during the interwar years be-
tween World War I and World War II, when air, land, and naval war 
gamers developed innovative approaches in areas like tank warfare 
and carrier aviation – this budget makes significant new investments 
to reinvigorate and expand war gaming efforts across the Defense 
Department.37
One of the most telling products of this policy is America’s Army (2002), 
a free multi-player shooter game conceived by Colonel Casey Wardy-
nski, and developed as a recruiting and training platform for the army, 
followed by several sequels, up until its latest iteration America’s Army: 
Proving Grounds (2013).38 Tapping into the approximately three hun-
dred and fifty million gamers that existed by the time of the release of 
its third chapter.39 The game requires players to log in through the ar-
my’s recruitment website and places them in wartime scenarios based 
on actual – although sanitized – experience of soldiers in war zones of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, reconstructed into fictional regions such as the 
country of Czervenia.40 Different from games developed by the Hez-
36   P.W. Singer, “MEET THE SIMS … and Shoot Them,” Foreign Policy, No. 178 (Mar./Apr. 
2010): pp. 91–95, at p. 92.
37  Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Submitted Statement – House Appropriations Commit-
tee-Defense (FY 2017 Budget Request),” Washington, DC, Feb. 25, 2016, http://www.defense.
gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/672855/submitted-statement-house-appropria-
tions-committee-defense-fy-2017-budget-reque.
38  America’s Army, https://www.americasarmy.com/.
39  P.W. Singer, “MEET THE SIMS … and Shoot Them,” p. 92.
40  The creation of these types of inexistent countries in America’s Army, which nonetheless sounds 
particularly real and invoke actual conflicts past and present, goes hand in hand with a similarly 
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cities with established Middle Eastern American populations” who 
provide the setting for soldiers to exercise in “guerilla combat, convoy 
ambushes, IED (improvised explosive device) encounters, and tele-
vised beheadings.”50 From there, the step to an actual battlefield has 
become imperceptibly small.
The practice of War on Terror Propaganda in the style of expanded 
state realism – through the spectacular theater or the game – shows a 
constant alternation of reality: staged wars run parallel to real wars. 
This proves that the War on Terror constructs a new reality, rather than 
that it repeats an existing one.
To summarize, in the case of spectacular games in the style of expan-
ded state realism, we observe how War on Terror Propaganda consists 
of a performative spectacle, in which citizens and policy makers reen-
act themselves in simulations staging imminent destruction. Citizens 
act themselves, but in the form of virtual identities in a new reality 
whose outcomes benefit the public–private infrastructures of the ex-
panded state. We define performance in this context as the virtual en-
actment of scripts with the aim to construct reality after the interests 
of the expanded state.
E X PA N D E D  S TAT E  R E A L I S M :
T E L E V I S I O N  A N D  C I N E M A
A third form of War on Terror Propaganda, also discussed by Masco, is 
cinema, in particular the spectacular Hollywood disaster blockbuster, 
to which we will add some case studies of televized spectacles. Just like 
the spectacular theater and game, the spectacular cinema of War on 
Terror Propaganda is grounded in the heritage of Cold War cinema, 
which spectacularized nuclear disaster, embracing both the destruc-
tion of society and the strengthening of the nation in films such as 
Duck and Cover (dir. Anthony Rizzo, 1951) and the TV production The 
Day After (dir. Nicholas Meyer, 1983). The spectators of such televized 
spectacles were, paradoxically, also its actors, as they “watched from 
homes and apartments that were the explicit models for the test city, 
and saw mannequin families posed in casual everyday moments (at the 
kitchen table, on the couch, in bed – or watching TV) experience the 
atomic blast.”51
Spectacular cinema in the War on Terror is not limited to a nuclear 
threat or all-out attack of the Soviets, but instead conceives of highly 
50   Scott Magelssen, “Rehearsing the ‘Warrior Ethos’: ‘Theatre Immersion’ and the Simulation of 
Theatres of War,” The Drama Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 2009): pp. 47–72, at p. 48.
51   Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 57.
United States and abroad, with the honor system of the military.
The fact that the United States Army is an actual stakeholder in the 
video game industry allows it to deal with its more prominent competi-
tors, such as the Call of Duty franchise published by Activision Blizzard. 
When Call of Duty game developer Dave Anthony left the company, he 
was contacted by former Pentagon official Steve Grundman, who was 
impressed by the depiction of a “second Cold War conflict in 2025” set 
in Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 (2012), which was based on a scenario in 
which “the conflict is defined not by mutually assured destruction via 
nuclear missiles, but rather by system-crashing cyber-attacks, capable 
of toppling the Stock Exchange or turning a fleet of drones against 
their own country.”46 Consequently, Anthony was offered an unpaid fe-
llowship at the neoconservative Washington think tank Atlantic Coun-
cil. The game designer describes his task as “to advise outside-the-box 
thinking on the nature of future threats, and propose proactive solu-
tions to mitigate against them.”47 This professional switch from imagi-
ning future warfare for the game industry to imagining future warfare 
for the United States Army is not surprising. Anthony had already gai-
ned direct help from military advisers in developing Call of Duty: Black 
Ops 2, praising them for “[t]heir wisdom and experience” which “ad-
ded a great deal of authenticity to the games.”48 Explaining his mission 
as an artist working for Atlantic Council, he explains:
As a director and writer, my job is to break expectations and esta-
blished thinking without fear of failure in order to create new and 
fresh ideas. […] It’s timely as the threats we face today don’t play by 
established rules. Our enemies are starting to use our own techno-
logies and systems faster and more efficiently than we are.49
The switch from game developer to government advisor is potentially 
as small as the one between a gamer and a soldier. The relation between 
the war industry and the game industry is one of interdependency ra-
ther than antagonism, making it easy to imagine how a virtual user of 
America’s Army would end up in what is known as the “Sandbox,” a 
physical reconstruction of an Iraqi province in the Mojave Desert in 
California. Here, the spectacular video game switches to a spectacular 
theater, with an elaborate set consisting of townspeople “portrayed by 
Arabic-speaking Iraqi expatriates from Detroit, San Diego, and other 
46   Simon Parkin, “Call of Duty: Gaming’s Role in the military-Entertainment Complex,” The 
Guardian, Oct. 22, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/22/call-of-du-
ty-gaming-role-military-entertainment-complex.
47   Ibid.
48   Ibid.
49   Ibid.
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detailed images of catastrophes. Indeed Masco observes that “[i]f the 
September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington felt strangely 
familiar to many U.S. citizens, it was because American society has 
been imaginatively rehearsing the destruction of these cities for more 
than three generations.”54 Film director Roland Emmerich, creator of 
another pre-September 11 film, Independence Day (1996) – in which 
the Twin Towers are destroyed by aliens – questioned his own com-
plicity when stating that “I had this feeling that there is some terrorist 
watching my movie in some cave and saying he should do it like the 
aliens.”55 But the disasters that have been rehearsed through theaters, 
games, and cinema before September 11 are far greater and far more 
detailed in their gruesome impact than the actual disasters of real life. 
Although the attacks of September 11 were documented through live 
television, compared to the cinematic splendor of disaster cinema the 
actual murder of thousands seemed rather modest. That did not stop 
disaster cinema from becoming even more spectacular after Septem-
ber 11. Think of the planet-wide high-resolution destruction of films 
such as Emmerich’s The Day After Tomorrow (2004) and 2012 (2009), 
Michael Bay’s Transformers franchise (2007–2017), or Zack Snyder’s 
Superman film Man of Steel (2013) and subsequent Batman Versus Su-
perman: Dawn of Justice (2016). By contrast, pre-September 11 disaster 
cinema – which seemed extreme compared to the actual terrorist at-
tack in New York and Washington – has now been turned into the new 
normal. Expanded state realism’s display of excessively detailed disas-
ter in War on Terror Propaganda Art subsequently normalizes the War 
on Terror itself. Compared to the planetary state of exception displa-
yed in spectacular disaster cinema, the indiscriminate employment of 
nuclear weapons by the expanded state and the selection of the fittest 
that have to rebuild the post-disaster world, the War on Terror itself 
seems like a rather modest, contained, and even rational endeavor. The 
excess of disaster that we rehearse and witness through spectacular ci-
nema turns the actual disaster enacted in our name in the present into 
the negligible incidents of the new normal.
In his book War, Politics and Superheroes (2011), English and film 
scholar Marc Dipaolo discusses how “fictional heroes” in the realm 
of disaster films and superhero movies have “the potential to influen-
ce decisions made by real people in the real world.”56 A prominent 
54  Masco, Theater of Operations, p. 73.
55   McSweeney, The ‘War on Terror’ and American Film, p. 7. It seems relevant to note both Emmer-
ich’s overestimation that everyone – including Al-Qa’ida militants – would want to watch his 
films, while simultaneously underestimating these militants in his presumption that terrorists 
live in caves. Goss’s reference to the Orientalist framing – the terrorist as caveman – seems 
highly accurate in this regard.
56  Marc DiPaulo, War, Politics and Superheroes (North-Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2011), p. 
200.
realistic digital renderings of an endless series of “fearsome life-ending 
asteroids, alien invasions, earthquakes, floods, and wars” that continue 
to allow “Americans to rehearse the destruction of their nation-state 
much as their parents and grandparents did in the 1950s and 1980s.”52 
The theatrical element of the rehearsal here lies in either the mass 
collective witnessing of one’s own destruction in the cinema, or within 
the family unit at home. The creation of the spect-actor succeeds only 
when the closest possible proximity between those watching and those 
watched is established: when the civilian on-screen becomes the full 
embodiment of the one off-screen.
Masco invokes pre-September 11 disaster cinema such as Arma-
geddon (dr. Michael Bay, 1998) and Deep Impact (dir. Mimi Leder, 
1998), in which gigantic asteroids threaten all life on earth. In both 
scenarios, nuclear weapons prove to be the only means to protect the 
earth, thus replacing the Soviet threat with a natural one that can only 
be overcome by the benevolent use of American nuclear force. Both 
scenarios also made sure that some smaller asteroids manage to hit the 
earth, in the case of Deep Impact resulting in gigantic tidal waves that 
destroy the whole of New York City. In these instances, digital tech-
nology allows for a heightened visual realism to showcase the detailed 
destruction and death resulting from the natural disaster. In such spec-
tacular films, disaster helps society to overcome dysfunctional families 
and broken communities, while simultaneously forcing them into de-
pendency on the state. Family conflicts or race divisions seemingly be-
come futile when the whole planet is faced with destruction, and only 
the expanded state has the means to sustain survival. At the same time, 
scientists, doctors, and average citizens turn into heroes and instant 
recruits of the state as they contribute their knowledge and bravery as 
civil defense. The spectacular disaster film thus simultaneously destro-
ys society and rebuilds it in the interest of the state, through a state of 
emergency.53
This continuous imaginative rehearsal of destruction of Western ci-
vilization from the Cold War to our present day has provided absurdly 
52   Ibid., p. 69.
53   With regard to the changing politics displayed in disaster films from the Cold War to the 
present, Despina Kakoudaki observes a shift from negotiable threats to un-negotiable ones: “If 
negotiation is possible, in the case of a human enemy, a purposeful aggressor or a sentient and 
reasonable alien, for example, then the disaster premise highlights issues of responsibility both 
for the enemy, for threatening or causing the disaster, and for the human negotiators, for work-
ing to avert it. This is the primary modality of nuclear threat films of the 1950s and 1960s, in 
which the threat of destruction is translated into narratives of political choice, ethical obligation, 
and public and private responsibility. If, on the other hand, the agent of the disaster appears to 
be non-sentient, a non-sentient alien, a zombie, an insect or a natural force such as a comet, 
earthquake or volcano, then the focus shifts to questions of response: since there is no way to ne-
gotiate with the agent of the disaster or to avoid the destruction altogether, all we can do in these 
stories is launch a merely reactive counter-attack.” Despina Kakoudaki, “Representing Politics 
in Disaster Films,” International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, Vol. 7, No.3 (2011): pp. 
349–56, at p. 351.
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Justice Antonin Scalia came to Bauer’s rescue, saying:
Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles […]. He saved hundreds of thou-
sands of lives […]. Are you going to convict Jack Bauer? Say that 
criminal law is against him? […] Is any jury going to convict Jack 
Bauer? I don’t think so.61
Similar but more subtle TV series would be developed in the wake 
of 24, such as Homeland (2011–ongoing). In Homeland, protagonist 
Carrie Mathison, a CIA agent with bipolar disorder, uncovers internal 
plots in her agency. Although the series seems to strike a more critical 
tone towards the expanded state, the madness of its narrative is that it 
takes a rogue bipolar agent to uncover terrorist plots and agency cons-
piracies. Homeland’s more “liberal” setup, including “good” American 
Muslims working for the CIA dedicating themselves to foreign inter-
ventions, extralegal abductions, and drone killings, might have been 
the reason for former president Barack Obama’s praise.62 But its core 
narrative is not a critique of the system through which the War on Te-
rror is waged, but rather that an even more extreme “bipolar” policy is 
necessary to increase its brutal efficiency.
Bauer and Mathison were not the only figures who formed the 
bizarre new avant-garde of fictional protagonists promoting excessi-
ve forms of legalized state violence. DiPaolo observes a whole variety 
of superheroes who began to embrace torture and radicalization of 
the policies of the War on Terror in the post-September 11 era. While 
the universes of comic book heroes from DC to Marvel are filled with 
moralistic insertions of family values and enduring friendship, DiPao-
lo notes that “very few American superheroes consistently stood firm 
against the excesses of the Bush administration, passionately opposing 
torture, the Iraq invasion, the Patriot Act, and even Bush’s disastrous 
environmental policy.”63 At the heart of this, DiPaolo notes, lies the 
fact that a variety of American superheroes were conceived in the pe-
riod of the fight against the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, as all 
61   DiPaulo, War, Politics and Superheroes, p. 198. Mike Dillon further describes broad and prom-
inent support for Bauer: “In November, 2006, conservative commentator Laura Ingraham 
argued on Fox News’ The O‘Reilly Factor that the popularity of the hit series 24 (also on Fox) 
was sufficient evidence that the average American approved using torture on terror suspects if it 
assured victory in the War on Terror. […] [O]ther prominent conservatives – including former 
Fox host John Gibson, former CNN and Fox host Glenn Beck – have similarly invoked 24‘s 
frequent representations of ‘justifiable’ torture as indicative of the need for an aggressive foreign 
policy that cannot, must not, waver in saving American lives. Conservative economist Stephen 
Moore has insisted that ‘Jack Bauer justice’ is both what the country demands and what policy-
makers should implement.” See: Dillon, “Bauer Power.”
62   Michael D. Shear, “Obama’s TV Picks: Anything Edgy, With Hints of Reality,” The New York 
Times, Dec. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/30/us/obamas-tv-picks-anything-edgy-
with-hints-of-reality.html?_r=0
63  DiPaulo, War, Politics and Superheroes, p. 205.
example in this case is the by now notorious figure of Counter Terro-
rism Unit agent Jack Bauer, played by Kiefer Sutherland in the eight 
seasons of the Fox TV series 24 (2001–2010) – the same Fox network 
that is part of Rupert Murdoch’s media empire that supported the in-
vasion in Iraq. By the end of this post-September 11 TV series, agent 
Bauer has “prevented the nuclear destruction of Los Angeles, halted 
the release of the deadly Cordilla virus, and stalled a neoconservative 
conspiracy to push the U.S. into a war with a country under false pre-
tenses.”57 While it might seem that Bauer’s effort to stop a conservative 
conspiracy for foreign invasion was 24’s critique of the Bush adminis-
tration’s invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the excess of state violence 
displayed in the series rather serves to display Bush’s war as a modest 
and rational – even democratic – endeavor. The most important indi-
cation of this is that Bauer, to prevent the endless sequence of threats 
to the United States, relies on a great variety of torture techniques to 
acquire the necessary information to locate a given terrorist suspect.58 
More often than not, via caricatures of terrorists, depicted as Muslims 
and/or peoples of color.59
The excesses of Rumfeld’s state-sanctioned torture in 24 in fact led 
the U.S. military to ask 24’s producers to tone down their depictions 
in order not to inflict damage on the country’s image abroad.60 This 
request allowed the U.S. military to project itself as rather modest, 
compared to the exaggerated depiction in 24. The torture employed 
in the War on Terror suddenly came across as measured compared to 
Bauer’s extremist disregard of any law, foreign or domestic. Fiction 
blended with reality when a Canadian judge at a 2007 law conference 
in Ottawa voiced criticism at the figure of Bauer and the kind of legal 
disregard he embodies, when none other than the late Supreme Court 
57  Ibid., p. 196.
58   Mike Dillon notes that “Bauer’s ability to withstand torture becomes one of the program’s key 
methods of distinguishing ‘America’ from enemy entities that always prove less resistant to phys-
ical pain. This, I argue, helps to establish categorical distinctions between good and evil, moral 
superiority and inferiority, that mirror neoconservative discourses around the moral stakes of 
torture. Jack Bauer’s body is an integral object for understanding the life-affirming and life-de-
nying valuations that underwrite 24.” See: Mike Dillon, “Bauer Power: 24 and the Making of an 
American,” Reconstruction, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2011), http://reconstruction.eserver.org/Issues/114/
Dillon.shtml.
59   Parvin Sultana, “Essentialising the Other: Representing Muslims in media post 9/11,” The 
Indian Journal of Media Studies, Vol. 7, Nos. 1–2 (2013): pp. 63–71.
60   A New Yorker article describes how US Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, dean of the 
United States Military Academy at West Point, flew to Southern California to meet with the 
team of 24 to “voice their concern that the show’s central political premise—that the letter of 
American law must be sacrificed for the country’s security—was having a toxic effect. In their 
view, the show promoted unethical and illegal behavior and had adversely affected the training 
and performance of real American soldiers.” See: Jane Mayer, “Whatever It Takes: The Politics 
of the Man behind ‘24,’” The New Yorker, Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2007/02/19/whatever-it-takes. Finnegan’s meeting with Hollywood producers has been 
documented by human rights advocate David Danzig in his article “Countering the Jack Bauer 
Effect: An Examination of How to Limit the Influence of TV’s Most Popular, and Most Brutal 
Hero,” in Screening Torture: Media Representations of State Terror and Political Domination, pp. 
21–33 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
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that benefit its aims is carefully orchestrated in order not to disrupt the 
democratic ideal of film directors’ freedom of expression. Instead, as 
Robb shows, the Film Liaison Unit at the Pentagon, with offices in the 
Pentagon and Los Angeles, can be contacted voluntarily by film direc-
tors that are in need of military arsenal. Their scripts are subsequently 
reviewed based on the terms and conditions laid out in A Producer’s 
Guide to U.S. Army Cooperation with the Entertainment Industry:
Millions of dollars can be shaved off a film’s budget if the military 
agrees to lend its equipment and assistance. And all a producer has 
to do to get that assistance is submit five copies of the script to the 
Pentagon for approval; make whatever script changes the Penta-
gon suggests; film the script exactly as approved by the Pentagon; 
and prescreen the finished product for Pentagon officials before it’s 
shown to the public.69
Essentially, the Film Liaison Unit “lends” its materials but only when 
the military is represented in a way they consider accurate. As Phil 
Strub, entertainment liaison at the Department of Defense since 
1989, states: “We’re after military portrayal and they’re after our equi-
pment.”70 Critical Vietnam War films, such as Francis Ford Coppola’s 
Apocalypse Now (1979) and Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986) were denied 
support. In Strub’s words, these films were unrealistic, for “every time 
soldiers and marines went out into the field, they murdered officers, 
massacred civilians, they took drugs,” leading to what he claims to be 
a “quite inaccurate portrayal.”71
The Pentagon is not the only government organization engaged in 
such revisionist processes as Tricia Jenkins points out in The CIA in 
Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes the Movies 2012), in which she hi-
ghlights the work of the CIA’s entertainment liaison. As the CIA does 
not have the same material means available to “sponsor” script chan-
ges, the agency focuses instead on getting involved in the early stages 
of script writing, and in return for “accurate portrayal” offers access 
to its campus and officers – otherwise considered as classified.72 An 
69  David L. Robb, Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors the Movies (Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 2004), p. 25.
70  Chapter 4, noot 70 moet zijn: Al Jazeera Empire reportage “Hollywood and the War Machine,” 
Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2010/12/2010121681345363793.
html. Phil Strub’s filmography on the IMDb database brims with spectacular cinema favoring 
the US military, such as Deep Impact, Day After Tomorrow, Transformers, Iron Man, and Man 
of Steel. See Phil Strub’s complete filmography on IMDb: http://www.imdb.com/name/
nm0835243/.
71  Robb, Operation Hollywood, p. 25.
72   Tricia Jenkins, The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Film and Television (Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, 2012), p. 134.
American super-soldiers that would contribute to the war endeavor. 
Figures such as Tony Stark, the hero of Marvel’s Iron Man franchise, 
conceived his first battle suit to escape from a Communist prison camp 
in South-Vietnam,64 and returned in the post-September 11 age to be-
come President Bush’s Secretary of Defense in the comic book Iron 
Man: The Best Defense (2004). He was then rebooted in the realm of 
post-September 11 cinema as a supporter of American forces by suc-
cessfully pacifying an insurgence in Afghanistan, with no civil casual-
ties – “collateral damage” – as a result.65 Similarly, the figure of Bat-
man returned to shape the post-September 11 consciousness through 
a series of films directed by Christopher Nolan, Batman Begins (2005), 
The Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight Rises (2012). The films 
depict multi-billionaire Bruce Wayne enacting rogue law, dressed up 
in a bat-shaped high-tech outfit. He fights against the Arab members 
of the League of Shadows – who writer David S. Goyer stated were 
modeled after Osama Bin Laden66 – who threaten to decimate Gotham 
City with weapons of mass destruction. All the while, Batman applies 
torture methods far beyond the limits of enhanced interrogation tech-
niques against his nemesis, the anarchist terrorist Joker.67
As former journalist David L. Robb argues in his extensively docu-
mented Operation Hollywood (2004), the interdependency between the 
expanded state and the production of spectacular disaster and torture 
television and cinema is not only ideological, but also material in na-
ture. From state-produced war cinema such as the World War II film 
series Why We Fight (dir. Frank Capra, 1942–45) or Vietnam cinema 
such as The Green Berets (dir. Ray Kellogg, John Wayne, and Mervyn 
LeRoy, 1968), there is a long history in which Hollywood supported 
and promoted the war effort. The national post-Vietnam trauma and 
the critical films emerging from it formed a brief period of exception 
that would be quickly overcome through Tony Scott’s Top Gun (1986), 
featuring Tom Cruise as a handsome all-American fighter pilot. Ci-
nemas screening Top Gun also installed recruiting booths of the Ame-
rican military resulting to Air Force enlistment to grow five hundred 
percent.68 The involvement of the Pentagon in the production of films 
64  Ibid., p. 12.
65  Ibid., p. 57.
66   McSweeney, The ‘War on Terror’ and American Film, p. 117.
67  Slavoj Žižek discusses the paradox of the scene in which Batman (rogue law) tortures the Joker 
(the anarcho-terrorist), arguing that the Joker is actually not wearing a mask, whereas Batman 
is. The latter tries to use violence upon the former, only to affirm the schizophrenic character of 
his own being. In this reading, the torture reflects the truth of Batman, not the Joker: “He [the 
Joker] is not a man without a mask, but, on the contrary, a man fully identified with his mask, a 
man who is his mask – there is nothing, no ‘ordinary guy,’ beneath it. This is why the Joker has 
no back-story and lacks any clear motivation: he tells different people different stories about his 
scars, mocking the idea that some deep-rooted trauma drives him.” See: Žižek, Living in the End 
Times, p. 60.
68  DiPaulo, War, Politics and Superheroes, p. 182.
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Sergei Eisenstein, Leni Riefenstahl, and Michael Moore, possibly can 
shed some light upon the Trumpist Propaganda Art to come.77
Bannon’s most recent film, Torchbearer (2016), is shot as a docu-
mentary that introduces a revisionist history presented by the extre-
mely religious conservative republican Phil Robertson, who gained no-
toriety as a participant in the reality show Duck Dynasty and through a 
series of aggressively homophobic and anti-abortion statements, made 
among others during a heavily mediatized keynote lecture at the Con-
servative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in 2015. Torchbearer’s 
core narrative is American political and religious exceptionalism, pre-
senting the United States as the first country not founded on the desire 
for conquest, but by the desire of prosecuted Christians of Europe to 
create a nation of religious worship and democratic human rights. Ban-
non claims that the Christian-democratic nation has suffered increa-
sing corruption in the past decades by secular progressives, lower-class 
people of color terrorizing inner cities, and Islamic fundamentalist 
sleeper cells, and he argues that a great clash of civilizations is about 
to emerge. Accompanied by a threatening film score, a collage is pre-
sented to us of torture and executions perpetrated by the Islamic State 
and other fundamentalist groups, suggesting an ultimate confrontation 
between what the film frames as democratic American Christians and 
Islamic terrorism. In Robertson’s words: “[A]nother worldview gains 
ground, one rooted in dominance and submission: a death cult. [..] 
Violence, decadence, political anarchy: welcome to the city of man.”
Although it’s hard to believe that Trump is in any way the exam-
ple of the devout Christian-democratic leader that would head Ban-
non’s crusade, support for Trump among Christian-conservatives and 
evangelicals has been exceptionally high. Bannon’s mission to narrate 
an inevitable clash of civilizations and introduce Trump as the Chris-
tian-democratic warrior to fight it has proven successful, despite the 
fact that he no longer occupies a position in the Wghite House Ban-
non’s own cinematography seems to fully correspond with the condi-
tions of spectacular cinema and television as we have discussed so far. 
It displays an image of imminent destruction by Islamic fundamenta-
lists to forge a Christian-democratic nation under the growing autho-
ritarianism of Trump. Bannon’s artistic construction of reality is the 
one we see emerging in politics under the name of Trumpism today. 
77   With this kinetic style Bannon aims to “almost overwhelm an audience” by to sheer density 
of material and content. See: Ted Johnson, “Docmakers Get Right to the Point,” Variety, Jun. 
18, 2011, http://variety.com/2011/film/news/docmakers-get-right-to-the-point-1118038731/. 
Bannon discusses his influences in an interview from the same year, in which he explains: “I’m 
a student of Michael Moore’s films, of Eisenstein, Riefenstahl. Leave the politics aside, you have 
to learn from those past masters on how they were trying to communicate their ideas.” See: 
Anthony Kaufman, “Sarah Palin, Movie Star?,” The Wall Street Journal, Jul. 13, 2011, https://
blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2011/07/13/the-undefeated-sarah-palin-movie-star/.
important example of its impact is Mike Nichols Charlie Wilson’s War 
(2007), which tells the story of the CIA operation that engaged the 
Afghan mujahedin in fighting the Soviets. Crucial script interventions 
of the CIA’s entertainment liaison had scenes that effectively linked 
the support to the mujahedin to the September 11 attacks and the 
subsequent War on Terror removed.73 Isolating the earlier American in-
volvement in the Soviet–Afghan war is a form of historical censorship 
that prevents a vehicle of entertainment from portraying causal rela-
tions between past and present, and thus shows the power of the CIA 
as co-director of Hollywood cinema.
It might be telling for the future of spectacular cinema’s implication 
in governmental policy that the campaign of Donald Trump in 2016 
offered free screenings to Iowans of Michael Bay’s 13 Hours (2016), a 
dramatic and action-ridden interpretation of the attacks on two Uni-
ted States military facilities in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in two 
American deaths.74 Republicans and alt-right supporters of Trump 
had used the event continuously to criticize then Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Hillary Clinton for severe negligence in the protection of Ame-
rican troops, which made the timing of the film exceptionally fruitful 
for Trump.75 Heavily influenced by his former campaign manager and 
White House chief strategist Steve Bannon, who is himself a former 
producer and filmmaker of apocalyptic documentaries such as Gene-
ration Zero (2010) and Occupy Unmasked (2012), the future of govern-
ment-subsidized spectacular cinema under Trump is unsure.76 But as 
the president has quickly let go of his isolationist “America First” doc-
trine through military interventions in Syria and Afghanistan and spar-
king conflict with North-Korea, the continuous construction of reali-
ty through expanded state realism in the face of an ever-multiplying 
Them will inevitably prove detrimental as he inherits and accelerates 
the War on Terror on his own terms. Bannon’s films, developed in what 
he terms as his own brand of “kinetic” cinema inspired by the work of 
73  Matthew Alford’s research mentions the film’s downplaying of the CIA’s support for Afghan 
militants due to its focus on “moderate” rebels, which was absent in the original script. He 
also mentions the CIA’s request to remove the final scene in which Wilson hears the explosion 
of Al-Qa’ida’s attack on the Twin Towers, clearly emphasizing the historical link between US 
involvement in the Soviet–Afghan War and the beginning of the War on Terror. See: Matthew 
Alford, Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy (London: Pluto Press, 2010), pp. 
69–73.
74   Eliana Dockterman, “Donald Trump Offers Iowans a Free Screening of Benghazi Movie 13 
Hours,” TIME, Jan. 15, 2016, http://time.com/4182281/donald-trump-benghazi-13-hours-mov-
ie-iowa-screening/.
75   Different from Bay’s earlier films, 13 Hours was made without support from either the Pentagon 
or the CIA due to its depiction of a rather unfavorable event for the military. As such, the choice 
of its screening is characteristic of Trump’s clash with several government agencies, especially 
the secret agencies.
76   Ann Hornaday, “We Can Learn a lot about Steve Bannon by Watching the Films He Made,” 
Independent, Jan. 6, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/
steve-bannon-films-hollywood-executive-producer-nsc-donald-trump-us-president-a7565501.
html.
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developed during the Cold War, can inform us about the consequences 
of War on Propaganda Art in the form of what we will now discuss as 
extended performance?
These questions go beyond the scope of our sketch of an art history 
in the War on Terror, but they are central to art historian Stephen F. 
Eisenman’s 2007 book The Abu Ghraib Effect. Eisenman begins his 
analysis of the role of art in constructing the new reality of the War 
on Terror, with a series of photographs leaked from the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq, displaying the torture of women and men at the hands 
of US Army and CIA personnel, made by the torturers themselves. In 
the photos from Abu Ghraib we not only see the hooded prisoners pla-
ced in stress positions, covered in excrement, or forcefully composed 
in suggestive, erotic postures, but also the soldiers themselves, most 
infamously the soldier couple Charles Graner and Lynndie England, 
forcing the prisoners in degrading sexualized positions.
While the news of the Abu Ghraib torture was discussed widely, 
Eisenman observes how little this discussion actually altered the per-
ception of the legitimacy of the War on Terror. During the 2004 Presi-
dential campaign, the issue was hardly discussed, and did not prevent 
Bush from being re-elected: “While a Gallup Poll conducted immedia-
tely after the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs indicated that 54 
per cent of Americans were ‘bothered a great deal’ by the revelations, 
a year later the number had declined to just 40 per cent.”78 Eisenman 
explains this lack of consternation as the result of “the long Western 
history of the representation of torture that has helped inscribe an 
oppressive ideology of master and slave on our bodies and brains, ena-
bling (especially at times of fear) a moral forgetfulness or even pa-
ralysis to set in.” He call this phenomenon the “Abu Ghraib Effect.”79 
This means that Eisenman does not perceive the photographs of Abu 
Ghraib as an exceptional feature of an exceptional war, but as images 
standing in a long tradition.80
78   Stephen S. Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect (London: Reaktion Books, 2007), p. 8.
79  Ibid., p. 99.
80  Eisenman is far from the only thinker who engaged the domain of art to contextualize these 
images, although he specifically affirms his belief that the photos themselves are not art. 
Other prominent voices were Slavoj Žižek, who references the work of avant-garde artists and 
cinematographers when explaining that “recording the humiliation with a camera, with the 
perpetrators included in the picture, their faces stupidly smiling beside the twisted naked bodies 
of the prisoners, was an integral part of the process, in stark contrast with the secrecy of the 
Saddam tortures. The very positions and costumes of the prisoners suggest a theatrical staging, a 
kind of tableau vivant, which brings to mind American performance art, ‘theatre of cruelty,’ the 
photos of Mapplethorpe or the unnerving scenes in David Lynch’s films.” Slavoj Žižek, “What 
Rumsfeld Doesn’t Know That He Knows About Abu Ghraib,” In These Times, May 21, 2004, 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/747/. Through her extensive historical work on the photographic 
image, Susan Sontag wrote about the “artistic” nature of the production and dissemination of 
the images – referencing Andy Warhol and Piero Paolo Pasolini, among others: “Where once 
photographing war was the province of photojournalists, now the soldiers themselves are all 
photographers – recording their war, their fun, their observations of what they find picturesque, 
their atrocities – and swapping images among themselves and e-mailing them around the globe.” 
Spectacular cinema has actually turned into reality, or we might even 
witness a moment in which reality has reached beyond the imagination 
of spectacular cinema.
To summarize: In the case of spectacular cinema and television in the 
style of expanded state realism, we observe how War on Terror Propa-
ganda consists of a performative spectacle, in which citizens witness 
themselves being destroyed as family units (at home) or as a collec-
tive (in the cinema) while simultaneously rebuilding their nation in a 
reality that benefits the public–private infrastructures of the expanded 
state. We define performance in this context as the collective act of 
witnessing (watching) on the one hand, and in the enactment that is 
witnessed (actors simulating viewers) on the other, with the aim to 
construct reality after the interests of the expanded state.
We have discussed three domains of the dominant style of expan-
ded state realism in War on Terror Propaganda Art: theater, games, and 
television and cinema. We have seen how each of these media are formed 
by an intricate web of military-industrial and cultural institutions, but 
also how they interact with one another. In the process, we have obser-
ved that the style of War on Terror Propaganda Art in the form of ex-
panded state realism aims at creating a new reality, and that it does so 
by converting cultural industries into military ones, artists into policy 
makers, gamers into soldiers, and vice versa. Its theatrical, game, and 
cinematic spectacles might seem innocent at first due to their staged 
nature, but in actuality they form the foundation for the construction 
of reality. We thus conclude that the style of expanded state realism in 
War on Propaganda Art does not merely create art, it develops new 
forms of propaganda art and propaganda art institutions to establish 
a new reality that indefinitely separates itself from the previous one.
E X PA N D E D  S TAT E  R E A L I S M : 
E X T E N D E D  P E R F O R M A N C E
So far, we limited our exploration of the performance of power in War 
on Terror Propaganda Art mainly to citizens considered to be part of 
Us. What we will now discuss is how the creation of Us through thea-
ter, games, and cinema, is also employed against the bodies of Them: 
the non-human, the terrorist. So far we discussed the micro-perfor-
mative dimension of propaganda mainly in relation to the way that 
citizens in predominantly Western societies come to embody and enact 
its dominant narratives and value systems, but in the case of exten-
ded performance we will focus on the process in which the creation 
of reality through expanded state realism result in concrete violence 
imposed upon Them. And what other histories of art, apart from those 
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democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. Once the false gods Osama bin 
Laden or Saddam Hussein would be destroyed, the savage bodies they 
held in their power could become civilized. In this logic, violence, sub-
jection, and torture become part of an arsenal representing divinely 
sanctioned liberation. Violence and subjection, in Raphael’s aesthetic 
vocabulary, are essentially transformed into an act of mercy toward the 
“abject race.” This is how the pathos formula operated in the century 
leading up to the congregation de propaganda fide that we discussed in 
the first chapter, and this is how it reappears through the resurrected 
sovereignty of the Bush administration in the 21st century. 
In the context of Abu Ghraib, the process of inscribing an oppres-
sive ideology of master and slave into our bodies and brains, and sub-
sequently into the bodies and brains of the subjected Them, results 
in what Eisenman describes as an “intimate theater of cruelty.”84 This 
is not the conception of cruelty in transgressive theater described by 
playwright, actor, and poet Antonin Artaud in his First Manifesto for 
a Theatre of Cruelty (1931). For Artaud, the notion of cruelty did not 
entail the promotion of an act of violence against another person, but 
rather articulated an existential condition that, in all its meaningless-
ness and desperation, should be embraced and expressed collectively 
through the cathartic space that is the theater.85 Abu Ghraib’s cruelty is 
Artaud in reverse, by enacting unacknowledged, orientalizing violence 
upon another through a pathos formula that eroticizes suffering.
The photos of naked prisoners, sometimes covered with women’s 
underwear, sometimes with the heads of one prisoner forcefully pla-
ced in direct contact with the genitals of another, sometimes in piles 
of suggestive orgies, depict the “supposed, perverse desires of Islamic 
detainees” from the perspective of the torturers.86 The message is that 
while these Muslim bodies claim to strive for religious purity and fun-
damentalist devotion, their actual sexuality is not different from – or 
even more perverse than – Western subjects seeking pleasure in porno-
graphy and liberated sexual exchanges.87 The master narrative is thus 
84   Ibid., p. 101.
85   In Artaud’s words: “The theater will never find itself again – i.e., constitute a means of true 
illusion – except by furnishing the spectator with the truthful precipitates of dreams, in which 
his taste for crime, his erotic obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his utopian sense of life and 
matter, even his cannibalism, pour out, on a level not counterfeit and illusory, but interior.” 
Antonin Artaud, The Theater and its Double (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 92.
86   Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, p. 101.
87   It is also in this light that we should see the media obsession with the “discovery” of Osama 
bin Laden’s collection of pornography, presented as some form of evidence that the actual 
frustrated desires of Islamist militants would be the same as those of citizens in the “liberal” 
West. See: Spencer Ackerman, “Osama bin Laden’s Pornography Stash to Remain under 
Wraps, US Decides,” The Guardian, May 20, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
may/20/osama-bin-laden-porn-stash-remain-under-wraps-us-intelligence-decides. A similar 
case concerns current UK Foreign Minister Boris Johnson,who implied that pornography 
found in the possession of Islamic State militants would explain their violence as an expression 
of the suppression of sexual frustration, different from the liberal West that would already have 
overcome such “backward” repression. See: Frances Perraudin and Shiv Malik, “Boris Johnson: 
Eisenman’s reference to “times of fear” is crucial to understand the 
conditions for the existence of these images. The staging of fear that 
legitimates relentless revenge and punishment on the bodies framed as 
Them has been the driving force behind resurrected sovereignty, emer-
ging as a legitimate form of rogue law in the process of rehearsing our 
own destruction in the form of spectacular mass theater, games, and 
cinema. Eisenman considers this to be an inherent part of art history, 
with its own aesthetic imperative:
The expressive suffering revealed in the greatest monuments of 
Hellenistic art marks the onset of an expressive, propagandistic 
tradition that would survive more than 2,000 years. Indeed, the 
Hellenistic aestheticizing, eroticizing and rationalizing of pain and 
suffering – the insistence upon the value and necessity of basanos 
[torture] – constitutes the beginning of an artistic pathos formula.81
Eisenman recognizes this manifestation of a “pathos formula” – the de-
piction of passionate suffering – throughout art history “from Athens, 
Pergamon, Renaissance, Florence and Baroque Rome,” in which vic-
tims “were taking pleasure, or at least accepting the rationality of their 
own annihilation.”82 Possibly most telling in relation to the images of 
Abu Ghraib is Eisenman’s analysis of Raphael’s fresco Battle of Ostia 
(1514–17), a depiction inspired by the 849 naval battle between the 
Christian League of Papal, Neapolitan, and Gaetan ships on one side, 
and the Saracens (Muslims) on the other. Subjected Saracen captives 
are depicted kneeling, surrendering to Pope Leo IV who gazes to the 
heavens for Godly sanction of his subjection of the Muslim people. 
Eisenman considers this image to be the art-historical foundation of 
the Abu Ghraib photographs. In Raphael’s fresco “[t]he origin of the 
Modern Western antagonism toward Islam is […] illustrated here by 
the Vatican, in a fresco commemorating 700 years of crusades, and 
in the image of a conquered and abject race.”83 Important here is the 
fact that this subjugation of a “conquered and abject race” is not me-
rely an act deriving from a brute quest for power, but from a divinely 
sanctioned civilizational mission. In that sense, they are a historical 
equivalent to the crusades of the Bush administration aiming to bring 
Susan Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of Others,” The New York Times, May 23, 2004, http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/magazine/regarding-the-torture-of-others.html?_r=0. Film maker 
Errol Morris controversially challenged the question at what level the images from Abu Ghraib 
could operate as evidence at all, due to the very nature of photography, writing that: “What we 
see is not independent of our beliefs. Photographs provide evidence, but no shortcut to reality. 
Photographic evidence – like all evidence – needs to be seen in context. It needs to be evaluated. 
If seeing itself is belief-laden, then there is no seeing independent of believing, and the ‘truism’ 
has to be reversed. Believing is seeing and not the other way around.” Errol Morris, “Will the 
Real Hooded Man Please Stand Up,” The New York Times, Aug. 15, 2007, http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/will-the-real-hooded-man-please-stand-up/.
81   Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, p. 3.
82   Ibid., p. 79.
83   Ibid., p. 66.
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formance finally return to become part of the spectacle at home.
The transformation of the public spectacle of expanded state rea-
lism into the intimate theater of cruelty and back again is discussed 
in the book-project A Field Guide for Female Interrogators (2008) by 
performance artist Coco Fusco. Fusco expands the analysis of Eisen-
man by showing how expanded performance does not only destroy the 
bodies of Them, but strategically includes the destruction of emanci-
patory feminist and LGBTQI+ heritage at the same time by effectively 
introducing this heritage as part of torture and war techniques.
Similar to Eisenman, Fusco recognizes in Abu Ghraib a “theater of 
cruelty,”93 which manifests itself in the form of an “intercultural thea-
ter imposed upon an unwilling audience of one.”94 Carefully avoiding 
the idea that using the notion of theater could be interpreted as a way 
of softening the reality of torture, Fusco emphasizes that “torture is 
painfully real,” but that this indisputable reality does not change the 
fact that “theater and performance are crucial to make it work.”95 An 
important part of Fusco’s analysis of the mechanisms of the intimate 
theater of cruelty, is the use of female bodies in the process of tortu-
ring prisoners. When a woman enacts torture, the act becomes framed 
through motherhood and care, while it could even simultaneously be 
codified as a sexual act. It replaces the brutal image of the male tortu-
rer by “young and naïve white women,” constituting a new sexualized 
category of women in the form of “torture chicks.”96 Torture perpe-
trated by a woman can by definition not be torture, it is suggested, 
because the nature of women is incapable of torture as such.97 Rather, 
a prisoner should be delighted with free stripteases and BDSM-type 
subjection. Women become military leaders, soldiers, and torturers – 
suggesting the realization of feminist demands by showing them as 
equals to men in the war effort – but the way in which the stereotypes 
of their gender are employed shows that this formal equality is structu-
red on the inequalities of the past.98
93   Coco Fusco, A Field Guide for Female Interrogators (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008), p. 51.
94   Ibid., p. 68.
95   Ibid. On the relation between torture, art, and performance, see further: Wafaa Bilal, Shoot an 
Iraqi (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 2008); Sandra Johnson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: 
An Investigation of Doubt, Risk and Testimony Through Performance Art Processes in Relation to 
Systems of Legal Justice (Zurich/Münster: Lit, 2014).
96   Fusco, A Field Guide for Female Interrogators, p. 20.
97   With regard to the use of women torturers at Abu Ghraib, Zillah Eisenstein notes: “These 
women should be held responsible and accountable; but they also are gender decoys. As decoys 
they create confusion by participating in the very sexual humiliation that their gender is usually 
victim to. This gender swapping and switching leaves masculinist/racialized gender in place. 
Just the sex has changed; the uniform remains the same. Male or female can be a masculinized 
commander, or imperial collaborator while white women look like masculinist empire builders 
and brown men look like women and homos.” Zillah Eisenstein, “Sexual Humiliation, Gender 
Confusion and the Horrors at Abu Ghraib,” Znet, Jun. 22, 2004, https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/
sexual-humiliation-gender-confusion-and-the-horrors-at-abu-ghraib-by-zillah-eisenstein/.
98   Lindsey German, for example, notes that while first ladies Laura Bush and Cherie Blair 
actively campaigned for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as a form of women’s liberation 
that the acts depicted in the Abu Ghraib photographs are not torture, 
but a process of “emancipating” the prisoners into embracing their ac-
tual desires through the benevolence of the crusaders. Simultaneously, 
these desires are also criminalized, for homosexual in nature: the se-
xual desire of the Muslim captive body is thus not to enjoy the same 
sexuality as the crusader, but a supposedly oppressed kind of sexuality, 
which continues to be problematic in various ways within the US mi-
litary itself.88
But not only the supposedly oppressed desire of the prisoner is at 
play here. There are also the “actual, un-repressed desires of the US 
prison guards who freely wield guns, fists, handcuffs, dogs and leashes” 
at their prisoners.89 The supposed bestiality of their prisoners grants 
the guards the right – in the light of Raphael’s Battle of Ostia, even the 
divine task – to shame them, and thus to affirm their own “feeling of na-
tional and racial superiority”90 and the “naturalness and inevitability of 
[a] political, economic and cultural system – continuously under threat 
by nations on the periphery or semi-periphery – whereby the United 
States occupies the core of a global order.”91 At best, the prisoners of 
Abu Ghraib – following Ould Slahi’s writings – can gain redemption 
as slaves in their master’s house, for no torture method in the world 
could ever elevate them to the level of actual equality with the torturer. 
We thus see how the new reality of expanded state realism in the West 
are enacted by Us as cruel and divine mercy upon the bodies of those 
declared non-human in the war prisons of Guantánamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib.
Different from the theatrical spectacles discussed earlier, the inti-
mate theater of cruelty staged by the guards in Abu Ghraib was never 
meant to become public. But once it did, its underlying logic was not 
challenged, but normalized. Popular Fox talk-show host Rush Limb-
augh didn’t consider torture at Abu Ghraib to be any different from “a 
Skull and Bones initiation.”92 This proves that the intimate theater of 
cruelty thus can be easily incorporated in the performative spectacle 
characteristic of expanded state realism. Enacted at home first, the 
new reality of expanded state realism is subsequently inscribed upon 
the bodies of others, and the images resulting from this extended per-
Jihadis are Porn-Watching ‘Wankers’,” The Guardian, Jan. 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2015/jan/30/boris-johnson-jihadis-are-porn-watching-wankers.
88   Katie Miller and Andrew Clay, “The Battles that Remain: Military Service and LGBT Equal-
ity,” Center for American Progress, Sep. 20, 2013, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/09/LGBTmilitary-11.pdf.
89   Eisenman, The Abu Ghraib Effect, p. 101.
90   Ibid., p. 98.
91   Ibid., p. 99.
92   A radio interview even quoted him saying “I’m talking about people having a good time! […] We 
have these pictures of homoeroticism that look like standard good-old American pornography.” 
Ibid., p. 98.
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main far from the public view.”104 Ending with six proposals to actively 
continue the instrumentalization of feminist history as a weapon of 
cultural warfare, Fusco lays bare the intimate theater of cruelty: not as 
a site of violent excess, but as a site where macro-politics is performed 
on a micro-political scale. The use of female torturers is part of a recu-
peration of the emancipatory gestures of the feminist and LGBTQI+ 
movements, transformed into symbols of Western civilization and ex-
ceptionalism, and thus into effective weapons in a new crusade that is 
essentially antithetical to everything these movements stood for.
Through the work of Eisenman and Fusco we see how the aesthetic 
category of a pathos formula that eroticizes suffering is enacted throu-
gh extended performance in the intimate theater of cruelty, based on 
dehumanizing depictions of Them created through spectacular theater, 
games, and cinema of expanded state realism. We further note that this 
category of Them is preliminarily focused on the body of the so-called 
terrorist, but can further instrumentally include other dissident and 
critical emancipatory heritage such as that of feminist and LGBTQI+ 
movements. Engaging them as torturers or as torture instruments not 
only tortures the body of a prisoner that represents Them, but also 
tortures a culture of emancipation.
Expanded state realism thus creates performative spectacles in the 
domains of theater, games, and cinema to establish a new reality. We 
observe how War on Terror Propaganda consists of an extended per-
formance in which this reality is transposed onto bodies of those whom 
we do not define as citizens. The image of imminent destruction and 
survival is now enacted in real time, in the form of war and torture, 
establishing an imagined reality as a material one that benefits the pu-
blic–private infrastructures of the expanded state. We define perfor-
mance here as a part of the final act through which an imagined reality 
is constructed into a material one, in the form of intimate theaters of 
cruelty in the interest of the expanded state.
To finish our inquiry of War on Terror Propaganda Art, let us now 
turn to the second dominant style of expanded state abstraction, and 
see in what way it connects to and supports what we have so far discus-
sed as expanded state realism.
E X PA N D E D  S TAT E  A B S T R AC T I O N : 
VO I D S  A N D  V I S UA L  A RT
As we mentioned above, expanded state realism is but one of two in-
terrelated styles; the other is what we propose as expanded state abs-
104   Ibid., p. 99.
Enlisting herself and her students in a so-called Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape (SERE) training, Fusco attempts not just to 
analyze the employment of women as instruments of war and torture 
in the War on Terror, but also to learn to embody and enact the scripts 
in which they are implicated.99 During a 2007 symposium in the Mu-
seum of Modern Art (MoMA) entitled “The Feminist Future,” Fusco 
appeared in full army uniform, acting as a United States Army repre-
sentative addressing the importance of women in the War on Terror. 
Claiming she has for months been informing the civil population on 
the issue, Fusco introduces the importance of women and their “use of 
sexual innuendo as a crucial weapon in the fight against global terroris-
m.”100 Bypassing any use of covert language, Fusco continues:
We exploit the vulnerability that is common in Islamic fundamenta-
lists in order to get them to cooperate with us. The sexual freedom 
women gained in the twentieth century has turned out to be a hi-
ghly effective means of disarming our enemies.101
In the course of her speech, Fusco does not merely over-identify the 
role of a United State army representative. She slowly but surely be-
gins to name the ties between the military world and the world of arts. 
“Many of us in the military feel kinship with those of you in the arts,” 
she continues, “[m]ilitary intelligence involves the careful study of cul-
ture, and like you, we seek to understand people’s beliefs and learn 
how to shape them.”102 Comparing the role of the interrogator to that 
of the performance artist, Fusco turns to the infrastructural compo-
sition of both the military and art institution, observing that “[b]oth 
institutions are guardians of this country’s sacred freedoms,”103 and 
both “maintain amicable and productive relations with multinational 
corporations, and our operations run best when unsavory details re-
from patriarchal Islamist rule, equal rights at home were not granted: “[T]he US has failed to 
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment to its constitution and […] this particular president has 
repeatedly supported attacks on abortion rights and choice, as well as cutting off funding to 
international family planning organizations that were involved in abortion advice or counselling, 
the high-minded aims of liberating Afghan women by bombing them has also failed in its own 
terms.” Lindsey German, “Women and the War on Terror,” Feminist Review, No. 88: War (2008): 
pp. 140–49, at p. 143.
99   Fusco’s book includes a series of pictures illustrating sixteen torture techniques actively used 
in Abu Ghraib and later in Guantánamo Bay, such as “Dietary Manipulation,” “Use of Loud 
Music,” and “Sleep Management.” But Fusco’s book project also includes specific torture tech-
niques that are scripted specifically for women, such as “Mild Non-Injurous Physical Contact,” 
illustrated by a female interrogator touching the face of a prisoner with what is supposedly her 
underwear; “Stress Position,” which – rather than imposing durational stress on the muscles of 
a prisoner – is depicted here as sexualized contact with a woman’s body, moving in an eroticized 
striptease-like manner upon the prisoner; and “Fear Up Harsh,” in which a woman interrogator 
smears the face of a prisoner with fake menstrual blood, retrieved from her vaginal area. The 
use of the female torturer here is supposed to impact the prisoner in an amplified way, following 
the presumption that Muslims have a cultural phobia for liberal sexuality and the very idea of a 
woman-master, while simultaneously secretly desiring her at the same time.
100  Fusco, A Field Guide for Female Interrogators, p. 97.
101  Ibid.
102   Ibid., p. 98.
103   Ibid., p. 97.
4 . 1  P O P U L A R  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
2 8 4 2 8 54 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
—by Salahi, GTMO105
While we could consider Ould Slahi’s Stateless Propaganda as a form 
of contemporary social realist literature, it is here confronted with the 
subtractive art of expanded state abstraction. Two very different forms 
of contemporary propaganda work against one another on the same 
pages. The erasure of Ould Slahi’s poem shows us the iconoclastic pro-
duction of an abstract image that represents the sheer power of the 
expanded state.106 This practice of expanded state abstraction knows 
many forms. It manifests itself in government documents that area-
ppear fully censored, containing nothing more than black rectangles 
on a white sheet of paper. It manifests itself in the disappearance of en-
tire public archives that leave us behind with the blank spots of absent 
histories. It manifests itself in the erasure of actual humans, which, 
declared non-human, can be assassinated through drone warfare or 
destroyed by torture. What fuels the emergence of this expanded state 
abstraction is the notion of secrecy cultivated in an unprecedented 
manner and scale by the expanded state in the War on Terror, des-
cribed by Masco as the “theatrical performance of secrecy as a means 
to power.”107
One of the most prominent researchers of the culture of secrecy and 
105   Ould Slahi, Guantánamo Diary, pp. 359–61.
106   This notion of iconoclasm as not only the destruction of an image, but also its simultaneous 
creation, thus interrogating the very question of what constitutes an image as such, is theorized 
and problematized by Sven Lütticken, who clarifies that what appears as image sometimes 
forms its mere abstraction. This is the case with the symbol of the Twin Towers, which Lütticken 
describes as a “double abstract effigy,” an abstraction of capital in the form of hyper-modernist 
architecture “as much beyond representation as a monotheistic deity.” Thus, the “iconoclastic” 
event of September 11 was not a creation of a void, but an event that made an existing void (the 
abstraction of capitalism) visible. See: Lütticken, Idols of the Market, pp. 125–26. See also Lüt-
ticken’s exhibition Art of Iconoclasm, BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, Utrecht/Centraal Museum 
Utrecht, Nov. 30, 2008–Mar. 1, 2009.
107   Masco, The Theater of Operations, p. 124.
traction. It is an abstraction that takes the form of the black censorship 
rectangles on Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary. By bloc-
king our understanding of the world an abstraction emerges, which is 
then substituted by the images of imminent societal destruction and an 
ever-threatening Them through the style of expanded state realism. In 
this section, we will discuss case studies of this aesthetics of expanded 
abstraction, to understand how its style relates to expanded state rea-
lism and even makes it possible.
In Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary, there is a passage 
in which the author contrasts the subtlety of Arab music and poetry to 
what he perceives as the violence and rudeness of American culture. To 
prove his point, Ould Slahi adds a poem of his own, which did not pass 
the censorship regime of Guantánamo Bay. It reads as follows:
One of my poems went
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Paglen’s approach is to keep “[i]nsisting on the black world’s materiali-
ty,”114 which translates into a vast body of field work building concrete 
evidence of the secret geography’s existence, of the people it impacts 
and the sites it creates. For even a site designated as a nowhere, Paglen 
argues, “must exist somewhere.”115 For a large part, Paglen’s research 
relies on the work of activists and amateur investigators who have in 
one way or another been confronted with the expanded state. One 
example is native American activist Carrie Dann, whose native claim 
to the land Newe Sogobia failed because its history was classified as 
it was turned into a military test site. Another example is amateur as-
tronomer Ted Molczan, who came across spy satellites, and began to 
map their behaviors. Finally, there are the families of engineer Robert 
Palya and sheet metal worker Walter Kaszka, both of whom died due 
to government negligence during their work in classified government 
operations, and whose cause of death became a secret. In other words, 
Paglen allies himself with people who have observed, lived, or even be-
came part of the abstractions produced by the expanded state: bodies, 
sites, even skies turning into voids – into abstractions.
Paglen essentially juxtaposes this material evidence with the blank 
spots in military budgets. His main focus here is on what is known 
as the “black budgets,” the covert funding structures that are meant 
to keep the infrastructures of the expanded state afloat.116 Taking the 
public 2007–2009 Air Force budget of research, development, tes-
ting, and evaluation programs as a starting point, Paglen maps items 
with either cryptic indications such as “COBRA BALL” or “FOREST 
GREEN,” or items with non-descript indications such as “Special Ac-
tivities” or simply “Classified Programs,” of which allocated budgets 
are not mentioned. But taking the whole of the expenditure indicated 
in the document, the blind spots of the total budget translate into a 
concrete sum:
By adding up all of the individual items in the various parts of the 
defense budget and comparing that number to the published to-
tal, one can derive a basic sketch of the black budget’s scale. For 
the fiscal year 2009 RDT&E budget, for example, the sum of all 
the line items is about $64,091,301,000. The published total is 
$79,615,941,000. The difference between the two numbers is the 
total cost of unacknowledged programs: about $15,524,640,000. 
114   Ibid., p. 36.
115   Ibid., p. 253.
116   See also Marieke de Goede’s detailed study of on terrorist and counter-terrorist finance in the 
War on Terror: Marieke de Goede, Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Monies 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
its practice of expanded state abstraction is artist and geographer Tre-
vor Paglen. It is in his double role that Paglen has attempted to map 
what “military and intelligence insiders call the ‘black world.’”108 Map-
ping in this case means both making the infrastructures of the expan-
ded state – in Paglen’s words, the “secret state” 109 – as well as the visual 
output generated by these very same structures visible. The former 
relate to how the expanded state operates outside of public view in the 
form of secret sites, classified aircraft and corporate offices, whereas 
the second relates to how the expanded state wants to be known – how 
it wants its secrets to be visible – to the public in the form of expanded 
state abstraction. The difference between the infrastructure and the 
visual output is that the first is a secret that is to remain secret, whereas 
the second is a secret that is supposed to be publicly known as secret.110
Geography, Paglen explains, finds its origins “in Renaissance explo-
ration and the imperial mapmakers of royal courts,” while contempo-
rary geography “accommodates a wide range of research methods and 
topics all united by the axiom that everything happens somewhere, 
that all human and natural phenomena have […] a geography.”111 The 
complexity of mapping the expanded state in the War on Terror is that 
its infrastructures are by definition conceived as a “secret geography,” 
one that is not merely hidden by the state, but “designed to exist out-
side the law.”112 Paglen writes in this regard:
The black world has sculpted the United States in numerous ways. 
Creating secret geographies has meant erasing parts of the Constitu-
tion, creating blank spots in the law, institutionalizing dishonesty in the 
halls of government, handing sovereign powers – what used to be the 
unlimited powers of monarchs over their subjects and territories – to 
the executive branch, making the nation’s economy dependent upon 
military spending, and turning our own history into a state secret.113
So how does one fill in the blank spots on the map of a secret geo-
graphy that is aimed at turning our own histories into a state secret? 
Weary of his work being implicated in the domain of conspiracy theory, 
108   Trevor Paglen, Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon’s Secret World (Lon-
don: New American Library, 2010), p. 4.
109   Ibid., p. 5.
110   This is not exactly the same as what Lütticken describes as “the public sphere as a structural 
conspiracy,” with which he refers to the “silence and selectiveness in the mass media” and 
the “aversion to investigating the neoconservatives’ plan to wage war in Iraq, which existed 
even before 9/11.” In that sense, the notion of the public sphere a structural conspiracy comes 
closer to what Chomsky and Herman describe as the effect of the anti-communist filter in the 
propaganda model, which indeed structurally “conspires” against questioning the conditions of 
normative reality. See: Sven Lütticken, Secret Publicity (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2005), pp. 
194–95.
111   Paglen, Blank Spots on the Map, p. 8.
112   Ibid., p. 140.
113   Ibid., p. 275.
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through codified visual symbols. These are symbols that, in the hands 
of Paglen, become recognized as a form of art and can be analyzed as 
such, just as we have come to understand how other cultural elements 
of War on Terror Propaganda, from games to television, can be unders-
tood as part of an expanded definition of art in the context of contem-
porary propaganda.
The badges collected by Paglen suggest that the aesthetic theory of 
expanded state abstraction essentially aims at visualizing what is engi-
neered to be invisible. It represents a paradoxical visible invisibility.121 
But the visible invisibility of expanded state abstraction in the work of 
Paglen is more than an object of research, for it simultaneously struc-
tures his own aesthetic output in the form of artworks. Sometimes 
Paglen’s artworks consist of collected materials – found footage such 
as the badges – but in other cases, Paglen displays images that he has 
taken to document the infrastructures of the expanded state. A project 
such as The Other Night Sky, takes the research of amateur astronomers 
as its starting point. A work such as STSS-1 and Two Unidentified Spa-
cecraft over Carson City (Space Tracking and Surveillance System; USA 
205) from 2010 consists of seemingly abstract photographic prints 
showcasing neat red whirlpools of light. Another work, PAN (Unk-
nown; USA-207) from 2010–11, displays a diagonal set of bright rays 
set against a sky of shaded blues. Through their titles these artworks 
indicate the presumed presence of a classified aircraft or satellite, but 
the images essentially contains no information at all – not more than 
the badges of classified operations that Paglen collects. Something si-
milar is at stake in Limit Telephotography, in which Paglen shows images 
resulting from his attempt to photograph classified military bases and 
installations, varying from a blurred image of what seems to be a rec-
tangular building (Open Hangar, Cactus Flats, NV, Distance ~ 18 miles, 
10:04 a.m, 2007) to an image of a horizontal string of faraway lights 
at night (Detachment 3, Air Force Flight Test Center #2, Groom Lake, NV, 
Distance ~26 Miles, 2008).122
Despite Paglen’s crucial deconstruction of the impenetrable and 
mystical projection of expanded state abstraction, these artworks seem 
121   Somewhat equivalent to the notion of visible invisibility is Lütticken’s conception of “opaque 
transparency,” which he describes as the conscious staging of the secret by a given regime: 
“What if those who kidnap and torture today depend on public exposure and visibility as part 
and parcel of what they do? In other words, what if these things can go on today because they 
are too clearly visible, broad-cast live, entirely predictable – in fact, they have been announced 
outright in advance?” See: Sven Lütticken, “Secrets of the See-Through Factory,” Open, No. 22 
(2011): pp. 100–24, at p. 104.
122   Thomas Keenan accurately observes that in Paglen’s visual work we are not so much confronted 
with singular evidence, but rather with what he terms “evidence of evidence.” Paglen makes 
“an effort simply to establish the possibility that some of these things might exist in the public 
realm.” Thomas Keenan, “Disappearances: On the Photographs of Trevor Paglen,” in Meg 
McLagan and Yates McKee, Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism (New 
York: Zone Books, 2012), p. 47.
This number is the black budget’s cornerstone, but is only a part of 
the overall black budget.117
This secret geography funded by the black budget and operated by 
four million people with security clearances, Paglen argues, represents 
an industry of public–private character that is essentially larger than 
the civil servants operating in the “white” world: “The black world, 
then, is much more than an archipelago of secret bases,” for “[i]t is a 
secret basis underlying much of the American economy.”118 But what 
is invisible in this budget can be made visible by constructing, step by 
step, a parallel budget that shows what is designated as non-existent 
is actually materially existent. This in turn provides leads for further 
fieldwork.
In his book project I Could Tell You But Then You Would Have to Be 
Destroyed By Me (2008), Paglen further showcases the aesthetics of 
expanded state abstraction. The project is essentially a catalogue of 
badges produced by the Pentagon to be worn by operatives involved in 
classified missions which display a wide array of symbols, such as magi-
cians, dragons, eagles, aliens, swords, geometrical patterns, skulls, pan-
thers, satellites, planets, and aircraft, accompanied by short titles such 
as “A LIFETIME OF SILENCE BEHIND THE GREEN DOOR,” 
or “ALONE AND UNAFRAID.” Paglen considers these badges to 
be a “language” with its own “grammar,” whose “number of stars on 
an image might represent a unit number or an operating location; the 
symbols on a patch could be clues to the purpose of a hidden program 
or a cover story designed to divert attention away from the program.”119 
Even a classified program and its members must be recognizable in 
some way, at least among themselves. The badges thus serve both an 
internal and an external function. Internally, they provide the badge 
holder with a mystical symbolism of a secret society, which counters 
what Paglen calls the “hopeless banality” of the concrete, everyday 
functioning of the infrastructures of the expanded state.120 Externally, 
they communicate an image of mystical and impenetrable power that 
aims at keeping the likes of Paglen and his alliance of amateur geogra-
phers and activists at a distance. These badges show us how the expan-
ded state wishes to understand its own power internally and externally 
117   Paglen, Blank Spots on the Map, p. 181.
118   Ibid., p. 277.
119   Trevor Paglen, I Could Tell You But Then You Would Have to Be Destroyed by Me (New York: Mel-
ville House Publishing, 2010), p. 7.
120   Paglen, Blank Spots on the Map, p. 275. Inevitably this provokes a reference to Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the “banality of evil” from her reports of the Eichmann process in Jerusalem, in which 
she described the unbearable contradiction between the theatrical staging of Eichmann as an 
embodiment of Nazi evil, and the rather dull and bureaucratic – banal – presence and logic of 
Eichmann himself.
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rritories, and bodies, so that the former can replace it with the 
image of imminent destruction and future survival;
• War on Terror Propaganda Art aims at transforming a staged 
reality into a material one. In its final phase, this takes the shape 
of extended performance, resulting in the discrediting of eman-
cipatory political–cultural heritage and the torture or destruc-
tion of others;
• War on Terror Propaganda Art aims at transforming an imagi-
nary reality into a material one, to strengthen the public–private 
infrastructures of the expanded state.
to re-instate exactly this mysticism, a sublimation of the language of 
secrecy in expanded state abstraction. There seems to be a pleasure at 
play here, of Paglen himself having become somehow part of the secret 
geography he claims to map, his own work fetishizing the language 
of expanded state abstraction that he simultaneously aims to decode. 
Few stakeholders in the secret geography of the expanded state would 
object to these abstract photographs, which actually further amplify 
the cult of secrecy and encryption to which Paglen even adds elegance 
by means of his language of high-conceptual aesthetics. Expanded sta-
te abstraction even manages to reproduce itself through the artist that 
claims to critically research its aesthetics. This makes Paglen paradoxi-
cally both a critical researcher of War on Terror Propaganda, and a War 
on Terror Propaganda artist at the same time.
What the expanded state wants us to know needs to remain unknown. 
In that sense, former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s no-
tion of the “known unknowns” as the aesthetic paradigm of War on 
Terror Propaganda, holds for both expanded state abstraction and ex-
panded state realism. In the case of expanded state realism, the known 
unknown takes the form of an endless variety of threat projections and 
imaginaries, in the case of the expanded state abstraction it takes the 
form of blank spots and cryptic badges.
To summarize, in the case of the second dominant style of War on 
Terror Propaganda Art, expanded state abstraction, we observe the 
creation of voids, classifications, and symbols that turn our histories, 
territories, and even bodies, into abstractions. We define the role of 
performance here as the process through which the expanded state 
enacts its own symbols of secrecy (the visible invisible) with the aim to 
construct reality after the interests of the expanded state.
WA R  O N  T E R RO R  P RO PAG A N DA  A RT : S U M M A RY
Before we continue to discuss the second category of contemporary 
propaganda art in the form of Popular Propaganda Art, let us formulate 
our observations on the manifold dimensions of War on Terror Propa-
ganda Art in the following conclusions:
• War on Terror Propaganda Art is a contemporary propaganda 
art developed through the public–private infrastructures of the 
expanded state that produces images of imminent societal des-
truction and survival through the Us/Them dichotomy;
• War on Terror Propaganda Art manifests itself in the two inter-
dependent styles of expanded state realism and expanded state 
abstraction. The latter is directed at erasing public history, te-
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Through Butler’s Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly we already 
touched upon aspects of popular mass movements that relate directly 
to the sphere of the artistic, through her use of the concept of “per-
formance.” In her work, we come across a range of terms that relate 
directly to the domain of the artistic, such as “assemblage,” the “thea-
trical” dimension of the assembly, and the “morphology” of its social 
forms.123 So, while popular mass movements are not art in and of them-
selves, there seems to be a role that art plays within these movements.
There are voices that argue the contrary, such as Yates McKee, an 
activist and historian who wrote a history of art as it emerged during 
and after the Occupy movement. Yates claims that “Occupy as a to-
tality – rather than just this or that phenomena within it – can itself 
arguably be considered an artistic project in its own right, assuming we 
reimagine our sense of what art is or can be.”124 We will examine this 
claim in some more detail below. For now, we will start from the idea 
that popular mass movements themselves are not works of art, but that 
art nevertheless plays a continuous role in the overall manifestation of 
these movements. On the one hand, because there are aspects of popu-
lar mass movements that we can analyze through artistic terminology, 
as Butler has done, and on the other, because there are artists involved 
and actively working within these popular mass movements.
Evidently, this observation is not exclusive to the 21st century. Throu-
ghout this section, we will refer to historical examples of artists joining 
precarious constituents in popular mass movements, ranging from the ci-
vil rights and black power movements in the United States, antiwar move-
ments, feminist and LGBTQI+ activists, as well as environmental organi-
zations. But we do so with the aim of employing these historical examples 
to conceptualize Popular Propaganda Art as a contemporary practice, and 
to understand how it operates as a category in relation or in opposition 
to what we have previously discussed as War on Terror Propaganda Art.
123   Judith Butler, Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly, pp. 68, 85, 87. Whereas the term 
“morphology” today has significance in different domains such as linguistics, biology, and 
mathematics, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is considered to have defined the term in relation 
to the study of plants, rejecting examinations of plant organisms in the tradition of Linnaean 
taxonomy: “The close proximity of Goethe’s perception of art and his study of nature suggests 
that the choice of the same methods for both fields is based on similar intentions. In several es-
says, Goethe wrote about his aims as a scientist […]. His intensive visual examination of natural 
phenomena, his efforts to objectify empirical observations, to use comparisons, and to establish 
series of observations, formed the basis for his project of morphology. Goethe defined morphol-
ogy as ‘the science of form (Gestalt), formation (Bildung) and transformation (Umbildung) of 
organic bodies.’ Morphology was based on careful examination of forms and their modifications 
under different external circumstances, as well as on intuition in order to find archetypes (Typen, 
Urphänomene) and fundamental rules of their (trans)formation.” Johannes Grave, “Ideal and 
History: Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s Collection of Prints and Drawings,” Artibus et Historiae Vol. 
27, No. 53 (2006): pp. 175-186, at p. 183.
124   Yates McKee, Strike Art (London/New York: Verso, 2016), p. 27.
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tions, parties, and unions. With Organizational Art we refer to artists 
who establish their own alternative models of “artist organizations” 
in direct relation to popular mass movements, with the dual aim of 
exploring the artist organization as an artwork in and of itself, whi-
le simultaneously aiming to use this organization-as-artwork to bring 
about social change.
To understand what Popular Propaganda Art is or could be, we 
must first engage with the work of those who have tried to narrate 
alternative histories of art that emphasize the intersection between 
emerging forms of power and art, so that we can arrive at a more pre-
cise understanding of the political conditions that allow us to articulate 
Popular Propaganda Art as a contemporary practice. It is important 
here to emphasize that we will sometimes retrospectively apply this 
term to specific artistic practices within popular mass movements of 
the past, which themselves might not have used it. We will thus assemble 
the term Popular Propaganda Art through these different case studies 
to define its contemporary manifestation and practice.
P O P U L A R  A RT  H I S TO RY
Popular Propaganda Art, despite what its name might suggest, is not 
exactly popular; it is far from common practice within the institution 
of art at large. As artist and key proponent of the movement of Institu-
tional Critique Andrea Fraser argued in her essay “L’1%, C’est Moi” 
(2011), the art market thrived throughout the period of the 2007–8 
economic crisis rather than collapsed like many other sectors did.125 
The so-called 1%, a term coined during the 2011 international Oc-
cupy movement designating the contemporary global class that owns 
the means of production, forms the dominant segment of sharehol-
ders in the infrastructure of contemporary art.126 This brings Fraser to 
125   Institutional Critique manifested itself in the 1960s and ‘70s parallel to the growing revolts 
against normative historiographies and their institutional embedding, with the aim of inter-
rogating the conditions of production of art itself. Central questions of Institutional Critique 
were directed at the political, economic, and ideological investments made in the context of the 
institution that we call “art” – the museum, the contemporary art institution, the gallery, the 
public or private funder, the collector – and how these conditions impact the artist and the work 
of art. Artists involved in the “first wave” of Institutional Critique in the 1960s and ‘70s, such as 
Hans Haacke, developed artworks that were essentially embodiments of Émile Zola’s infamous 
declaration “J’accuse…!,” directed at the museum. “Second-wave” Institutional Critique from 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, such as the work of Fraser, instead began pointing out that the artist is equally 
an embodiment of the institution of art: “Every time we speak of the ‘institution’ as other than 
‘us,’ we disavow our role in the creation and perpetuation of its conditions. We avoid responsi-
bility for, or action against, the everyday complicities, compromises, and censorship – above all, 
self-censorship – which are driven by our own interests in the field and the benefits we derive 
from it.” See: Andrea Fraser, “From the Critique of Institutions to an Institution of Critique,” 
Artforum Vol. 44, No. 1, (September 2005): pp. 100-106, at p. 105.
126   The term “1%” is the inverse of the original Occupy Wall Street slogan “We Are the 99%,” 
which referred to the majority of population that is structurally excluded from the power and 
wealth of the “1%.” Anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber is usually referenced as 
either inspiration if not inventor of the slogan. See: Stuart Jeffries, “David Graeber Interview: 
The notion of the “popular” in Popular Propaganda emerges throu-
gh the collective demands of widely diverse precarious groups. We have 
begun to explore these demands through the inverted Chomsky and 
Herman propaganda model and its five filters of democratization, grass 
roots mobilization, public knowledge, transparency, and collectivity. It is 
through the performance of these collective demands – performance 
being, as Butler argues, the main “power” of the precariat – that a 
composition or assemblage emerges, to which we can refer as a “peo-
ple.” This composition of a people emerges through the performance 
of the popular and through the precarious infrastructures that propo-
se alternative institutions and models of (self)governance operating as 
the life-support for what we will discuss as a “people-in-the-making.” 
Important in Butler’s definition is that the concept of a “people” can 
only and always be in the making; just like the popular mass move-
ment – through its various demands – is continuously in the making. 
As such, the process of composing a people through the popular mass 
movement confronts the conditions of the Us/Them dichotomy central 
to War on Terror Propaganda Art. What we come to define as “Us” is 
redefined through a new alliance, a new composition, of precarious 
people. A people not as a fixed or universalized category but as a tran-
sitory one.
Popular Propaganda Art plays a role in both the performance of the 
popular and the composition of a people. Our aim will be to understand 
how the work of artists has been shaped through their engagement 
with popular mass movements, how they have contributed to their pre-
carious infrastructures, mobilization, and the composition of a people 
resulting from them. By means of the work of different historians we 
will begin by articulating a Popular Art History, narrating the intersec-
tion between popular mass movements and art. We will observe that 
a reoccurring aim of Popular Propaganda Art is to construct a form 
of Popular Realism, which is not so much a “style” but should rather 
be understood as an objective. We can understand this objective as the 
construction of reality structured by the demands of popular mass mo-
vements.
Subsequently, we will break down the practice of Popular Propa-
ganda Art into three organizational components. The first one is As-
semblism. This is essentially the practice of performative assembly dis-
cussed by Butler, which is characterized by and can partly be analyzed 
through an artistic vocabulary, but is not meant to be art as such. 
The second and third organizational models of Popular Propaganda 
Art are the direct result of artistic practices, namely Embedded Art and 
Organizational Art. With Embedded Art, we refer to artists who work 
directly within existing popular mass movements, political organiza-
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motivations are never genuine, but they are certainly not by defini-
tion an “opposite” force to neoliberalism. They work with, within, and 
through the increasingly global neoliberal condition. This is important 
to understand that Popular Propaganda Art, certainly in our contem-
porary condition, operates on a vastly smaller and more precarious 
scale than most of the art infrastructure. It also means that artists en-
gaged in popular mass movements are continuously forced to work “in 
between worlds.” They have side jobs or they try to benefit as much 
as possible from the art market, even though they might oppose the 
conditions of both, in order to invest these means in their practice of 
making an alternative social order possible.
Let us begin to explore examples of what we could term “popular 
art history” through the work of Upton Sinclair in relation to the in-
ternational socialist uprisings in the 1920s, followed by the work of 
Lucy Lippard, who discussed art as propaganda from the perspective 
of the feminist movement in the 1970s and ‘80s, and the work of Alice 
Guillermo, who understands propaganda art as a form of “revolutio-
nary realism” in the more than a century-long struggle of the Filipino 
underground resistance movement. We will then continue with addi-
tional, contemporary examples of art-historical writings that analyze 
artistic production parallel to popular mass movements in the work 
of Claudia Mesh and Claire Bishop. Finally, we will turn to an artistic 
engagement with a politicized art history through the work of Andrea 
Fraser, an artist–historian who opens up the possibility of a Popular 
Art History for the present day.
In the second chapter we already encountered the work of Sinclair 
and his book Mammonart, an attempt to write an alternative art history 
from the perspective of class struggle. We remember Sinclair’s radical 
claim that “all art is propaganda,” arguing that “from the dawn of hu-
man history, the path to honor and success in the arts has been throu-
gh the service and glorification of the ruling classes; entertaining them, 
making them pleasant to themselves, and teaching their subjects and 
slaves to stand in awe of them.”129 In essence, Sinclair does not focus 
on what the artist makes, but what makes the artist: which structures of 
power define the conditions of their practice. This Marxist approach, 
a predecessor to Fraser’s argument, first of all attempts to analyze the 
economic basis of society, to understand how art is constituted as part 
of the superstructure. Rather than serving the ruling classes, Sinclair 
claims that the “true purpose of art is to alter reality” – a concept, 
which, as we have seen in the previous section, is equally true for War 
129   Sinclair, MammonArt, p. 7.
the conclusion that, while she herself is a relatively precarious cultural 
worker, the outcomes of her work, if anything, only benefit the “1%,” 
and thus concludes: “the 1% is me”:
Any claim that we represent a progressive social force while our ac-
tivities are directly subsidized by the engines of inequality can only 
contribute to the justification of that inequality – the (not so) new 
legitimation function of art museums. The only “alternative” today 
is to recognize our participation in that economy and confront it in 
a direct and immediate way in all of our institutions, including mu-
seums, and galleries, and publications. Despite the radical political 
rhetoric that abounds in the art world, censorship and self-censor-
ship reign when it comes to confronting its economic conditions, 
except in marginalized (often self-marginalized) arenas where there 
is nothing to lose – and little to gain – in speaking truth to power.127
While art is often presented as the ultimate civilizational proof of en-
lightened and supposedly civilized liberal democratic regimes, the ac-
cess, validation, and circulation of art is to a large extent concentrated 
in the hands of a well-off elite. Protests of contemporary artists whose 
work has been collected by the daughter of President Donald Trump, 
Ivanka Trump, may seem progressive signals of the art world unwilling 
to legitimize the deeply racist and dangerous Trump regime, but it 
is important to pose the question how Ivanka Trump acquired these 
artworks in the first place.128 Donald Trump’s racism and sexism were 
well known before his election, and so were his daughter’s ties to his 
business empire. To discuss the role of art in the context of Popular 
Propaganda Art also means to acknowledge that even though the vast 
majority of the infrastructures of contemporary art provides lip service 
to emancipatory politics, it is at its core organized along the neoliberal 
doctrine. As Fraser argued, it may even be considered an avant-garde 
of neoliberalism. The minority of artists that do engage with popular 
mass movements often do so in a compromised condition, which does 
not by definition mean that their work cannot be effective or that their 
‘So Many People Spend Their Working Lives Doing Jobs They Think Are Unnecessary,” The 
Guardian, Mar. 21, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/21/books-interview-da-
vid-graeber-the-utopia-of-rules?paging=off
127   Andrea Fraser, “L’1%, C’est Moi,” Texte Zur Kunst, No. 83 (Sep. 2011): pp. 114–27, at p. 124.




Ben Kentish, “‘Get My Work Off Your Walls’: ‘Embarrassed’ Artists Tell Ivanka Trump to Take 
Their Work Down,” Independent, Dec. 23, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/artists-ivanka-trump-new-york-halt-action-group-donald-trump-paintings-a7491391.
html.
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over a dreary formula of futility. And I say: Break this evil spell, 
young comrade; go out and meet the new dawning life, take your 
part in the battle, and put it into a new art; do this service for a 
new public, which you yourselves will make. […] That your creative 
gift shall not be content to make art works, but shall at the same 
time make a world; shall make new souls, moved by a new ideal of 
fellowship, a new impulse of love, and faith – and not merely hope, 
but determination.136
Sinclair’s attempt to challenge the ownership of art history and ar-
ticulate a partisan Popular Art History through the rise of popular 
mass movements is taken up in the work of the American art critic, 
activist, and curator Lucy Lippard under the title To the Third Power: 
Feminism, Art and Class Consciousness (1984), and in particular her 
essay “Some Propaganda for Propaganda.” Greenbergian art theory, 
Lippard argues, has created a taboo of what she calls “literary art,” 
which “calls up content more specific and pointed than that promul-
gated by modernist doctrines.”137 But the concept of propaganda, she 
continues, should essentially be understood as nothing but education, 
which makes it possible that “art itself might escape from the ivory 
tower, from the clutches of the ruling/corporate class that releases and 
interprets it to the rest of the world.”138 Feminists, in Lippard’s reading, 
should be capable of challenging the taboo of re-inventing art as edu-
cation, as “Women artists’ historical isolation has prepared them to 
resist taboos. Our lives have not been separate from our arts, as they 
are in the dominant culture.”139
Criticizing the work of Jacques Ellul for the reduction of propagan-
da to a form of totalitarianism that can only result in enforced homo-
geneity through collective beliefs, Lippard is convinced that feminists 
can reinvent propaganda as an artistic practice able to challenge pa-
triarchal, ruling-class historiography. This is what she describes as a 
“good propaganda” in the form of a “socially and esthetically aware 
provocation,”140 whereas a “bad propaganda” is characterized by an 
“exploitative and oppressive economic control mechanism.”141 Althou-
gh the links between Sinclair and Lippard are evident, she breaks with 
the male bias that is so prominent in his historiography. As part of a 
feminist propaganda of education Lippard specifically considers “fe-
136   Sinclair, MammonArt, p. 386.
137   Lucy Lippard, To the Third Power: Feminism, Art, and Class Consciousness (New York: Dutton, 
1984), p. 114.
138   Ibid.
139   Ibid., p. 115.
140   Ibid., p. 116.
141   Ibid., pp. 116–17.
on Terror Propaganda Art.130 Sinclair argues that the artist needs to re-
ject the conditions set by the basis of society – the means of production 
owned by the ruling classes – in order to alter that basis, thus altering 
reality and changing the production, meaning, and ownership of art 
as such.
Introducing himself as a writer “that has for twenty-one years been 
carrying on a propaganda for Socialism,”131 he discusses the work of 
French writer Honoré de Balzac and his literary exposés of the mores 
of high society of the early 19th century, which he describes as the 
“most perfect type of the predatory artist that has existed in human 
history; the art for art’s sake ideal incarnate; genius devoid of cons-
cience.”132 Sinclair counter-poses Balzac’s work against the work of 
French writer Victor Hugo, who “sought remedies” to social inequality 
rather than just describing them, and “became a convert to revolu-
tionary ideals,”133 manifested most famously in his political novel Les 
misérables (1862). Sinclair reserves more nuanced descriptions for the 
Russian poet Nikolai Gogol, who on the one hand was valued by the 
czar, but simultaneously attempted to use his position of relative pri-
vilege to tell of the “misery of the serfs, and the incompetence and 
futility of the landlords.”134 In other words, it is not so easy to make an 
absolute division between reactionary and revolutionary art and cultu-
re, because works of art realized in compromised political conditions 
may still hold a political potential that manifests itself in less obvious 
ways, or in a time different from when they were initially created.
As Lütticken argues, “for Sinclair, the entire history of art was pre-
historical,”135 and throughout MammonArt he attempts to lay the foun-
dation for a possible socialist history of art to come. In 1924, Sinclair 
sees a series of revolutions sweeping across Europe and Russia. He 
witnesses, in other words, the performance of the popular in the emer-
gence of the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat – or in our 
time, the people-in-the-making we have discussed as the precariat in 
the previous chapter. And thus, Sinclair ends his exposé not with a 
historical conclusion, but by calling upon the artists of his world to 
collaborate on a new future history:
The artists of our time are like men hypnotized, repeating over and 
130   Ibid., p. 9.
131   Ibid., p. 11.
132   Ibid., p. 191.
133   Ibid., p. 194.
134   Ibid., p. 262.
135   Sven Lütticken, Cultural Revolution: Aesthetic Practice After Autonomy (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 
2017), p. 128.
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torian Alice Guillermo’s Social Realism in the Philippines (1987) and 
her major work Protest/Revolutionary Art in the Philippines (2001).147 In 
Guillermo’s discussion of protest and revolutionary art, two political 
and cultural movements are crucial when it comes to articulating the 
relation between aesthetic theory and popular mass movements. The 
first is that of (social-)realist art, as it developed in parallel to revolu-
tionary movements in Europe; and the second is the role of Maoist 
cultural theory, as it impacted a variety of liberational and revolutio-
nary movements throughout Asia, such as the one in the Philippines.148 
Through their intersection we can come to an understanding of protest 
and revolutionary art in the Philippines and the connection between 
Sinclair and Lippard.
The type of realism at stake is exemplified by Courbet in 19th-cen-
tury France, who was involved in the uprisings of the Paris Commune 
and who called himself a “partisan of revolution” and “a realist.”149 
Guillermo thus understands realism and, subsequently, social realism 
as art that aims to construct an emancipatory consciousness. It does 
not just depict what is real in the present, but what could become real 
once we confront the material reality of the present differently.150 Gui-
llermo intersects realism and social realism with the cultural theory 
laid out by Mao Zedong in the guerilla zone of Yenan, two years before 
seizing power, known today as the Talks at the Yenan Forum on Litera-
ture and Art (1948). Mao promotes the idea of expanding the artist’s 
147   The revolutionary dimension of art discussed by Guillermo specifically relates to what is known 
as the “National Democratic Movement of the Philippines,” which consists of a variety of un-
derground movements and (semi-)legal political parties and organizations with a strong leftist, 
Maoist signature that have been active in the country ever since its armed resistance against 
the Marcos dictatorship. See: Jose Maria Sison and Jonas Staal (eds.), Towards a People’s Culture 
(Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 2013).
148   The revolutionary strategy of Maoism is to base its constituency on a broad assembly of 
peasants, workers, but also petty bourgeoisie. It rejects the proletarian factory worker as its main 
constituency, starting instead from the material reality of so-called Third World Countries where 
peasants form a majority of the worker population, and industrialization has hardly been real-
ized. Different from the Chinese People’s Republic, the National Democratic Movement of the 
Philippines also included the mass involvement of activist factions in the Catholic Church. From 
the 1990s it recognized gay marriage and began to actively ally with the LGBTQI+ community. 
See: Coni Ledesma, “The New Revolutionary Proletariat of the Philippines: Building a Just and 
Democratic Society,” lecture at the 4th New World Summit, Royal Flemish Theater, Brussels, Sep. 
20, 2014,
https://vimeo.com/120105215.
149   Alice G. Guillermo, Social Realism in the Philippines (Manila: Asphodel, 1987), p. 21. Courbet 
prominently displayed workers and peasants of the lower classes in his paintings – on formats 
similar to the ones used for kings and queens – thus introducing parts of society to the public 
imaginary that had essentially been existentially censored by the ruling aesthetic doctrines. At 
the same time, Courbet’s own political orientation shows that his realism aimed to make the 
concrete struggles of lower classes visible. The workers or peasants turn into from a backdrop 
into the principal subject of art and manifest themselves in a new history, in which they become 
the historical agents.
150   Guillermo traces these ideals set forth by the French realists through the work of geographically 
dispersed movements, varying from German expressionists such as George Grosz and Otto Dix 
to American social realists such as Ben Shahn and the work of the Mexican muralists, such as 
Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros – each of whom were highly 
politicized through the labor struggles, anti-dictatorship resistance, and revolutions of their 
times, situating their work in direct relation to or even within concrete political struggles. Ibid., 
pp. 21-43.
minist influence on the art of the seventies” as manifested in what she 
describes as “the prevalence of art open to dialogue – performance, vi-
deo, film, music, poetry readings, panels and even meetings.”142 This, in 
her words, shows an alternative understanding of an “intimate kind of 
propaganda,” one that is “inherently feminist” in the manner in which 
it introduced personal and intersocial relationships as part of our lar-
ger understanding and construction of reality:
The spoken word is connected with the things most people focus 
on almost exclusively: the stuff of daily life and the kind of personal 
relationships everyone longs for in an alienated society. It takes pla-
ce between people, with eye contact, human confusion and pictures 
(memory). It takes place in dialogues with friends, family, acquain-
tances, day after day. So one’s intake of spoken propaganda is, in 
fact, the sum of daily communication.143
We can observe a relevant link between Butler’s theory of performa-
tive assembly and Lippard’s call for an “intimate propaganda,” which 
should not, however, be interpreted as a marginal activity. Lippard 
agrees with Ellul that an ineffective propaganda – a propaganda that 
does not address the masses – is simply not propaganda. Performativi-
ty, and its manifestation in what Lippard calls “meetings,” becomes a 
key term to relate the domains of the artistic and the political. Lippard 
nonetheless such practices as part of a feminist propaganda art still in 
the making, claiming that “[n]o one on the Left would deny the impor-
tance of propaganda. Yet it is a rare left-wing feminist who is interested 
in or even aware of the resources visual artists could bring to the strug-
gle.”144 This, Lippard argues, is the result of the “current lack of sparks 
between art and propaganda […] due to a fundamental polarity that is 
in the best interests of those who decide things for us.”145 That funda-
mental polarity is of course the Greenbergian doctrine: art, in order to 
be defined as such, stands either beyond power, or is reduced to a se-
cond-degree literal art of politicized or even feminized propaganda, not 
considered to be worthy of the grand patriarchal canon. Instead, Li-
ppard counters this doctrine with a feminist, intimate propaganda art, 
which she posits as the possibility of a “useful art” – a term that will 
re-occur in some contemporary writings that we will explore below.146
An example that connects Sinclair and Lippard is Filipino art his-
142   Ibid., p. 117.
143   Ibid.
144   Ibid., p. 123.
145   Ibid.
146   Ibid., p. 121.
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contemporary groups such as the UGATLahi Artist Collective, which 
develop “effigies” (protest puppetry) used in mass demonstrations 
against the ruling governments. Figures of ruling Philippine presidents 
or foreign US aggressors are sculpted in the form of enormous pu-
ppets, and are carried by thousands of members belonging to labor 
unions, progressive political parties, and sometimes clandestine un-
derground movements through the streets of Manila as a counter-act 
to the yearly State of the Nation Address (SONA) of the president in 
power. The puppets are used as targets for scorn, while the protesters 
give speeches addressing injustices in the country: essentially accusing 
the puppet in the form of a public people’s trial.155 At the end, the 
puppets are set on fire, as a theatrical act of justice staged against the 
aggressor. The enemy is identified through a sculptural and satirical 
visual language, the public is informed of its crimes through hours of 
theatrical speeches, and justice is enacted by burning.
The work of the UGATLahi Artist Collective allows us to articu-
late the practice of Guillermo’s definition of revolutionary realism 
very clearly. First, the UGATlahi collective produces within precarious 
infrastructures a protest puppet through collaborative practice, repre-
senting, through their conditions of labor, an ideal of collectivity they 
themselves wish to bring about. Second, the protest puppet becomes 
part of the process of performing the popular. It is dragged along and 
scorned by thousands of people, which, through the symbolism of the 
puppet, come to identify their common oppressor and demand an alter-
native governmentality. Third, the puppet is burned collectively, des-
troying the artwork but strengthening the collective that conquered its 
oppressor symbolically, as such contributing to assembling the pre-
sent-day Philippine precariat into a new composition of a people. This 
revolutionary realism is therefore a form of Popular Realism: the ar-
ticulation of a new reality through the enactment of the demands of a 
popular mass movement.
Lippard’s and Guillermo’s works are crucial and rare voices that 
attempt to initiate alternative historiographies and practices of art wi-
lling to engage propaganda on different terms. But while the term pro-
paganda art is largely out of use – more common are references to “pu-
blic relations,” “advertisement,” and Adorno’s concept of the “culture 
industry” – this does not mean that contemporary historians have not 
attempted to articulate alternative historiographies that show the rela-
155   The history of effigies in the National Democratic Movement of the Philippines has been 
extensively documented and analyzed by Filipino art historian Lisa Ito. See: Lisa Ito, “Protest 
Puppetry: An
Update on the Aesthetics and Production of Effigy-Making, 2005–2012,” in Sison and Staal, Towards 
a People’s Culture, pp. 127–50.
competences by having them learn from the struggle of peasants and 
workers. This results in what he terms a “struggle on two fronts,” form 
and content:
We should esteem the specialists, for they are very valuable to our 
cause. But we should tell them that no revolutionary writer or artist 
can do any meaningful work unless he is closely linked with the 
masses, gives expression to their thoughts and feelings, and serves 
them as a loyal spokesman. Only by speaking for the masses can he 
educate them and only by being their pupil can he be their teacher. 
If he regards himself as their master, as an aristocrat who lords it 
over the “lower orders,” then, no matter how talented he may be, he 
will not be needed by the masses and his work will have no future.151
The category that emerges from the overlap of social realism and 
Maoist cultural theory is what Guillermo terms “revolutionary rea-
lism,” an art that aims at popularizing revolutionary ideals through 
the broad dissemination of art and culture, and whose knowledge in 
the form of aesthetic praxis derives from the concrete exchange and 
involvement within the day-to-day struggle of peasants and workers in 
the Philippines.152 One could say that the notion of a people becomes an 
aesthetic category in and of itself. It is composed, assembled, and created 
through a montage of artistic means. This relates to Popular Propa-
ganda Art’s objective to compose a people, and we can term this the 
process in which art contributes to a people-in-the-making. In Guiller-
mo’s words:
Because of its link to the revolution, aesthetic theory is necessarily 
affected by the immediacy and urgency of the people’s struggle. As 
theory takes on the cogency of the revolution which is the praxis, 
the dialectical relationship between theory and praxis becomes vi-
tal.153
       
As a consequence, revolutionary realism developed its own particular 
traditions of “excellence” in the form of murals, theatrical interven-
tions, and protest puppetry.154 One example we find in the work of 
151   Mao Tse Tung, “Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art,” in Sison and Staal, Towards a 
People’s Culture, p. 57.
152   Luis Jalandoni, “Cultural Imperialism vs People’s Culture,” lecture at the New World Academy, 
Nov. 15, 2013, https://vimeo.com/90777555.
153   Alice G. Guillermo, Protest/Revolutionary Art in the Philippines 1970–1990 (Quezon City: Univer-
sity of Philippines Press, 2001) p. 28.
154   The popularization of revolutionary realism throughout the Philippines has taken the form of 
“posters, illustrations and comic books,” which, Guillermo emphasizes, should not be consid-
ered as “low” art. Each carries “their own standards of excellence and significant art can be 
created of them.” Ibid., p. 38.
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The ACT UP campaign included artists who effectively politicized hi-
gh-modernist visual language, most famously through the use of the 
pink triangle: once the symbol the Nazis used to designate gay and les-
bian people, now a symbol of pride, while simultaneously a reminder 
of the ongoing criminalization and existential censorship of the victims 
of AIDS. One such iconic image is the famous 1986 black poster with 
a pink triangle, with the sentence “SILENCE = DEATH,” typeset in 
white sans-serif capitals. While created two years before the ACT UP 
campaign began, it was adopted in the process as a key part of its vi-
sualized identity; a socialized form of minimalist art able to transcend 
the world of art into a popular mass movement of AIDS awareness.162 
These are but a few of Mesh’s examples, as she reads the history of art 
through the lens of an enormous variety of popular mass movements, 
further including Climate Justice activism and the alter-globalization 
movement. Although Mesh’s writing is focused on individual art works 
by artists who in some cases seem “inspired” rather than directly impli-
cated in popular mass movements, her Art and Politics is something of 
a handbook to think specific works of art through a highly politicized 
history, and as such does a service to what we are trying to articulate 
as a Popular Art History, which takes the intersections of popular mass 
movements and art as their point of departure.
This, as we will see in our next case, is a constant and important 
tension in what we are defining as Popular Art History. For what exact-
ly is it that we discuss as art or the work of art, when taking popular 
mass movements as a point of departure? Is the revolution, in which 
art might be merged, the total work of art? Or do we retain the idea 
that, although art can certainly be part of popular mass movements, 
it still articulates a reality that might not be fully conflated with its 
political demands? Exactly this tension is central to the thoroughly re-
searched alternative history of art and social upheaval discussed in art 
historian Claire Bishop’s Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Poli-
tics of Spectatorship (2016). In her work, the focus is on the concept of 
“participation art” and its relation to specific structures of power in the 
20th and 21st century. Bishop specifically connects French psycho-
therapist Félix Guattari’s notion of transversality, which he describes 
162   Jason Baumann, who is credited as the designer of the poster – although he rejects such claims 
of singular authorship – notes on the design: “We realized any single photographic image would 
be exclusionary in terms of race, gender and class and opted instead to activate the LGBTQ 
audience through queer iconography. So we reviewed the symbols already in use. We felt the 
rainbow flag lacked gravitas. The Labrys [a double-sided axe, often reoccurring in lesbian 
communities] might not be discernible to gay men. The Lambda had class connotations. And 
while we initially rejected the pink triangle because of its links to the Nazi concentration camps, 
we eventually returned to it for the same reason, inverting the triangle as a gesture of a disavowal 
of victimhood.” See: Jason Baumann, “The Silence=Death Poster,” New York Public Library, Nov. 
22, 2013, https://www.nypl.org/blog/2013/11/22/silence-equals-death-poster.
tion between popular mass movements and art. One such historiogra-
phy that we can discuss in the context of Sinclair’s and Lippard’s work 
is offered by the American art historian Claudia Mesh in her Art and 
Politics: A Small History of Art for Social Change Since 1945 (2013). The 
work follows what has been termed “New Art History” in the 1970s, 
which Mesh describes as “art historical studies that demanded that the 
discipline acknowledge the assumptions at work in how it bestowed 
aesthetic value on some artists and not on others,” leading to “a new 
interest in marginalized cultures and artists within modernism.”156 For 
example, Mesh discusses second-wave feminism in relation to artist 
Judy Chicago and her attempt to introduce a “revisionist herstory,”157 
challenging the gendered term “his-” in “history.” We see something 
similar in the case of artist Carolee Schneemann’s concept of “art is-
tory” which removes the gendered terms “his” and “her” altogether.158
Mesh traces alternative art-historical narrations through a variety 
of mass movements of the 20th century. For example, she discusses 
the reoccurring concept of “negritude” as originally theorized in Paris 
during the early 1930s “by the exiled Caribbean writers Aime Cesai-
re and Leon Damas and the Senegalese poet and statesman Leopold 
Sedar Senghor beginning in 1934,”159 which introduced the idea, in 
the words of Vijay Prashad, “that a new self had to be crafted out of 
the harshly dismissed cultural resources of Africa and a new self-con-
fidence in being black in the world needed to drive one’s visions.”160 
Other case studies include the impact of the anti-war movements in 
the period of the Vietnam War that brought about the Guerilla Art 
Action Group (GAAG), staging its protest actions not only in public 
spaces, but also in museums.161 Mesh also names the emergence of 
Queer Art, in the form of the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT 
UP) campaign, which attempted to combat the AIDS virus, while si-
multaneously confronting the censorship of the Reagan administration 
of the devastating impact of AIDS on the lives of the gay community. 
156   Claudia Mesh, Art and Politics: A Small History of Art for Social Change Since 1945 (London/New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), p. 146.
157   Ibid., p. 105.
158   Ibid., p. 113.
159   Ibid., p. 48.
160   Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York/London: The 
New Press, 2007), p. 81.
161   Mesh particularly refers to GAAG’s piece Blood Bath (A Call for the Immediate Resignation of All 
the Rockefellers from the Board of Trustees of the Museum of Modern Art) (1969), which was staged 
in the lobby of MoMA in New York. She describes how “[g]roup members Jon Hendricks, 
Jean Toche, Poppy Johnson, and Silvianna (Silvia Goldsmith) entered each museum and threw 
a text of their demands, dated November 10, 1969, into the air. They began ripping at each 
other’s own clothing, which released containers of animal blood they had concealed there, in a 
simulation of the horrors brought about by the violence of war. As this occurred, they screamed 
gibberish phrases, that included the word “rape.” They then fell to the floor, lying still. After a 
time, they silently rose and left the museum, without speaking to museum officials.” Ibid., p. 79. 
GAAG, GAAG: The Guerilla Art Action Group 1969-1976 A Selection (New York: Printed Matter, 
1978), section “Number 3”.
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Instead, Bishop is invested in a variety of art practices, which, whi-
le not denying their relation to popular mass movements, nonethe-
less continue to interrogate and challenge this relation in the process. 
While some historical examples, such as the Proletkult movement in 
the Soviet Union, appear a variety of alternative art histories – a kind 
of parallel canon in and of itself170 – Bishop is committed to introdu-
cing undertheorized case studies. In the context of the Russian revolu-
tion she discusses the work of the radical Proletkult composer Arsenii 
Avraamov and his Hooter Symphonies, which replaced traditional musi-
cal instruments with the sounds of industrial and military machinery.171 
In the context of General Juan Carolos Onganía’s 1966 coup in Argen-
tina, Bishop puts attention to the introduction of the use of “people 
as material” in the work of Argentinian avant-garde art movements, 
for example in Oscar Bony’s 1968 exhibition of an actual worker’s fa-
mily on a gallery pedestal.172 Whereas Avraamov is at the vanguard of 
the Russian revolution, Bony operates within a more institutional fra-
mework in the margins of the dictatorship. But, as Bishop argues, to 
theorize the artistic in relation to the political does not always demand 
a radical revolutionary condition, but rather conditions in which artists 
maintain a capacity to critically interrogate the relation and differences 
between the two – both in content and form. Although it would be 
hard to argue Bishop is a Maoist, she most certainly problematizes and 
actualizes Mao’s struggle on two fronts.
A substantial part of Artificial Hells deals with the notion of par-
ticipation in so-called “community art” and its co-optation by neoli-
beral regimes in the 1990s as “the commodification of human bodies 
in a service economy.”173 More relevant to our present study are the 
contemporary artists that Bishop discusses who engage in models of 
participation that seem able to distance themselves from such co-opta-
tion, such as the work Cátedra Arte de Conducta (2002–2009) by Cuban 
by the fact that he would rather consider a history of revolution without any art at all – with the 
exception of the short-lived performances and political song evenings of the Austrian anti-fascist 
anarcho-Brechtian Volxtheater. Gerald Raunig, Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the 
Long Twentieth Century (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) , 2007), p. 46.
170   Apart from Bishop and Raunig for whom Proletkult forms a key case study, another contempo-
rary example is the work of Wark, Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene, cited in the second 
chapter.
171   Avraamov’s work found its spectacular culmination in 1922 when on the occasion of a celebra-
tion of the revolution in the Baku harbor in St. Petersburg he composed a work with “sirens and 
whistles from navy ships and steamers, as well as dockside shunting engines, a ‘choir’ of bus and 
car horns, and a machine gun battery.” See: Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 65.
172   Ibid., p. 121.
173   Ibid., p. 277. The architectural collective BAVO (Gideon Boie and Matthias Pauwels) turned 
their critique of community art practices at the service of neoliberal state interests into a core 
part of their own cultural practice. A good example is their Bureau for Artist Participation (2010), 
which they proposed as a municipal agency that would operate like an employment agency, 
delivering artists that would provide participatory solutions for social and political issues. See: 
BAVO, Too Active To Act: Cultureel activisme na het einde van de geschiedenis (Amsterdam: Valiz, 
2010).
as a “militant, social, undisciplined activity”163 to French philosopher 
Jacques Rancière’s theory of the emancipated spectator, in which he 
claims that it is not the work of art that is autonomous, but the aesthe-
tic experience of a spectator as such.164 These two thinkers offer Bishop 
“alternative frameworks for thinking the artistic and the social simul-
taneously,” as she argues that “for both, art and the social are not to be 
reconciled, but sustained in continual tension.”165 Bishop historicizes 
this continuous tension between art and the social and the impact this 
tension has had on various understandings of what “participation” in 
the realm of art signifies through three particular moments. The first 
two are characterized by “revolutionary upheaval,” namely 1917 “in 
which artistic production was brought into line with Bolshevik collec-
tivism,” and 1968 “in which artistic production lent its weight to a 
critique of authority, oppression and alienation.”166 The third moment 
is the year 1989 which “marks the fall of real existing socialism.”167
With great precision, Bishop reconstructs the emergence of par-
ticipation as part of the changing definitions of art by the historical 
avant-garde, which, as we discussed in the second chapter in relation 
to the Russian Revolution, aimed in various ways to overcome the dis-
tinction between art and life. This task of the historical avant-garde 
echoes throughout the history of the 20th century up to the present, 
in what Bishop considers a near doctrinal “binary of active/passive.”168 
With the binary of active/passive, Bishop refers on the one hand to art 
practices that involve their spectators as agents in creating the work of 
art as a means of social or revolutionary change (active), while a more 
traditional reflection upon the artwork as object stands for a regressive 
bourgeois contemplative and docile counterpart (passive). The risk of 
maintaining this dichotomy, Bishop argues, is that political outcome 
stands above all other validations, disregarding specific artistic compe-
tence, among which those in the realm of the aesthetic.169
163  Guattari, quoted in Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship 
(London/New York: Verso, 2012), p. 273.
164   In Rancière’s words: “Like researchers, artists construct the stages where the manifestation 
and effect of their skills are exhibited, rendered uncertain in the terms of the new idiom that 
conveys a new intellectual adventure. The effect of the idiom cannot be anticipated. It requires 
spectators who play the role of active interpreters, who develop their own translation in order to 
appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their own story. An emancipated community is a community 
of narrators and translators.” Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London/New York: 
Verso, 2011), p. 22.
165   Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 278.
166   Ibid., p. 193.
167   Ibid.
168   Ibid., p. 38.
169   We encounter this problem concretely in Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long 
Twentieth Century (2005) by the Austrian philosopher and art theoretician Gerald Raunig. 
Raunig seeks historical moments of “daily insurrection, of continual resistance, of constitu-
ent power” that give way to “micropolitical practices that practice resistance in heterogenous 
ways against specific partial aspects of an increasingly global command and control” – a line 
of thinking similar in continuation of Guattari’s definition of the transversal. But Raunig’s 
alternative history of art in relation to revolutionary practice seems to be plagued throughout 
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yond propaganda art as a mere political instrument.178 Her final, rather 
explicitly political, statement reads as follows: “[T]he task today is to 
produce a viable international alignment of leftist political movements 
and a reassertion of art’s inventive forms of negation as valuable in 
their own right.”179 Essentially, this links to previous examples of Li-
ppard and Guillermo as well. While evidently Popular Propaganda Art 
is informed, driven, and shaped through its direct implication in po-
pular mass movements, this does not imply that it cannot contribute 
its own critical capacity and competence to it. We can understand this 
precisely through the Maoist–Bishopian struggle on two fronts.
Through the work of Sinclair, Lippard, Guillermo, Mesh, and Bishop, 
we have engaged a series of alternative historiographies that take the re-
lation between popular mass movements and artists as a starting point 
of what we have termed Popular Art History. We have discussed Popular 
Propaganda as a performance of the popular and composition of a peo-
ple with the aim of constructing Popular Realism: the transformation of 
reality based on the demands of popular mass movements. Based on our 
analysis of their work, we can make the following observations:
• Popular Art History narrates the influence of popular mass mo-
vements on the conditions of production, dissemination, and 
validation of popular propaganda art practices, materially and 
ideologically;
• Popular Art History simultaneously narrates the role and in-
fluence of art on popular mass movements in the process of 
performing the popular, composing a people and constructing 
Popular Realism;
• Popular Art History contributes to the politicization of art and 
thus to the creation of Popular Propaganda Art. From Sinclair 
to Guillermo, we observe not simply an attempt to record art 
history, but an articulation of the possibility of new forms of 
artistic practice through this narration.
Our next endeavor will be to understand more concretely the different 
practical and organizational models through which Popular Propagan-
da Art manifested itself, the first of which we will discuss as Assemblism.
A S S E M B L I S M
The first organizational model of Popular Propaganda Art is Assem-
178   Ibid., p. 279.
179   Ibid., p. 284.
artist Tania Bruguera. The project essentially comprises an alternative 
art school in the form of a two-year course embedded in the Instituto 
Superior de Arte (ISA) in Havana, which could also be considered as 
“an art school conceived as a work of art,”174 not just because the stu-
dents participating in the Cátedra Arte de Conducta produced radical 
works of art or because the school organized their exhibition, but be-
cause Bruguera’s approach to the model of the school as a compository 
model in and of itself challenges both the existing structure of the art 
school and the relation between art and the social realm at large. By 
introducing categories of studies such as “Jurisdiction” or “Trafficking 
Information” and including teachers from the field of art as well as 
lawyers and journalists, the school enacts a societal composition that 
structurally reads art through the social and vice versa, a form of prac-
tice Bruguera terms as “useful art.” Bishop, following Lippard’s work, 
explains this as “art that is both symbolic and useful, refuting the Wes-
tern assumption that art is useless or without function.175
The overall difficulty in Bishop’s attempt to write an alternative 
art history lies in her choice of “participation” as the main criterion 
for connecting different historiographies. It is a term that works only 
insofar as avant-garde movements, anti-dictatorship art collectives, or 
alternative schools-as-art-projects are connected directly to popular 
mass movements. But because Bishop also includes practices of com-
munity art, or artists involved in what is known as “relational aesthe-
tics” – a form of participation for the sake of participation, without 
much of a political signature176 – her writing runs the risk of conflating 
artistic practices that are basically incommensurable. An artist attemp-
ting to mobilize spectators as fellow revolutionaries evidently aims for 
a different mode of participation than an artist funded by a govern-
ment agency to provide cultural solace to disenfranchised communi-
ties. The risk is that what could be a politicized history of art becomes 
de-politicized by an undifferentiated gaze on participation as a cate-
gory in and of itself.
Even though Bishop is unwilling to discuss her case studies in the 
context of a Popular Propaganda Art because she considers propa-
ganda as the equivalent of “conversion”177 – a rather reductive and 
uninformed reading of the term from which many art historians suffer 
– her important contribution lies in exactly those moments in which 
she analyzes the proximity of popular mass movements and art, and 
attempts to excavate from them new “paradoxical criteria” that go be-
174   Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 246.
175   Ibid., p. 249.
176   Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Paris: Les presses du reel, 2002).  
177   Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 282.
4 . 2  P O P U L A R  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 1 0 3 1 1
district, where since 1999 – the year the alter-globalization movement 
emerged180 – weekly meetings between artists, activists, educators, and 
thinkers had been organized to rethink alternative pathways for the 
practice of art and culture in the broader public realm. The imagery of 
Occupy as a movement-to-come had been designed by the art collecti-
ve Adbusters, who created a now famous poster featuring an image of 
Charging Bull (1989), a three-ton bronze sculpture of an agitated bull 
created by Italian artist Arturo Di Modica. In an early manifestation 
of what would become known as “guerrilla art,” Di Modica had placed 
the object without permission in front of the New York stock exchange 
as a symbol of the resilience of the American people throughout the 
1987 stock market crash.181 In the Adbusters poster a ballerina is po-
sitioned on top of Charging Bull, with protesters emerging in clouds 
of smoke in the background, headed by the phrase “What is our one 
demand?,” followed by the hashtag “#occupywallstreet” and the call to 
“bring [a] tent.”182
The preliminary meetings of the 16 Beaver Group and the Adbus-
ters poster would lead to the first founding assembly of the Occupy 
movement, which began as a rather conventional series of talks on the 
economic crisis in Bowling Green Park, but would later adopt the circu-
lar form of a gathering practiced in popular mass movements in Spain 
and Greece known as the general assembly. In the period following the 
founding assembly, the movement would grow to thousands of peo-
ple in the nearby Zuccotti Park, formerly known as “Liberty Plaza,” a 
semi-public space better equipped to house the emerging movement. 
Occupy Wall Street, according to McKee, was thus initiated through 
a precarious, self-organized art infrastructure (16 Beaver Group) and 
first visualized through a poster by an art collective (Adbusters) refe-
rencing an early form of interventionist “political art” (the Charging 
Bull sculpture). McKee thus claims:
180   The alter-globalization movement emerged in the late 1990s in opposition to economic global-
ization and in support of cooperative democracy, indigenous rights, environmental protection, 
as famously narrated by Naomi Klein’s No Logo (1999). Many of the sources referenced in 
this chapter, such as the work of Raunig, McKee, and Thompson, either originate from or put 
additional emphasis on the importance of the alter-globalization movement as the birthplace of 
new forms of artistic and cultural activism in the 21st century.
181   Having become a major success among Wall Street workers, citizens and tourists, the sculpture, 
after initially having been removed, was kept and placed on the nearby location of Bowling 
Green Park. McKee, Strike Art, p. 86.
182   The iconographic status of this poster has been amplified by several other recent historiog-
raphies of art in relation to popular mass movements that referenced it. Nato Thompson, for 
example, refers to the Adbusters poster as part of the foundational moment of Occupy Wall 
Street. See: Thompson, Seeing Power, p. 151. While Thompson speaks of it in progressive terms, 
the poster is equally prominently displayed by filmmaker and Trump chief strategist Steve 
Bannon in his documentary–pamphlet Occupy Unmasked (2012), which argues that the Occupy 
movement was strategized and sinisterly run by professional activists and campaigners with the 
aim to overthrow the US government.
blism, a term we use here following our study of Butler above, to des-
cribe the practice of performative assembly. Of particular interest to us 
is the fact that Butler analyzes performative assembly through terms 
that derive from an artistic vocabulary, ranging from the “theatrical” 
to the “assemblage” and the “morphological.” Butler uses these terms 
to describe the impressive physical gatherings of bodies on squares and 
the visual collages of tents, signs, and banners that result from them. 
Visual signs indeed evoke links to visual art, and although these are 
indeed sometimes created by artists, in many cases they can also be vi-
sual expressions that do not directly have an artistic intention. Rather, 
they are part of the collective creativity that manifests itself through 
the particular popular mass movement, its performance of the popular, 
and attempts to ally a widely diverse precariat as a composition of a 
people. Following Guillermo, we can thus witness within the practice 
of Assemblism the articulation of an aesthetic vocabulary through po-
litical struggle, even though an aesthetic expression is not necessarily 
an “artwork.” But the dividing lines, as we will see, can be very thin.
Our task here will be to explore the aesthetic dimension of Assem-
blism in the work of artists and non-artists alike. We will do so by 
connecting Butler’s ideas to those of art historian and activist Yates 
McKee, theorist Athena Athanasiou, and organizer and activist Alicia 
Garza. We will begin by challenging McKee’s claim that we referen-
ced earlier, namely that popular mass movements such as Occupy Wall 
Street can themselves be considered an art project. Subsequently, we 
will focus on the role of choreography, theatricality, and spatial aes-
thetics that emerge as part of Assemblism in relation to The Outraged 
in Greece (Athanasiou) and Black Lives Matter (Garza). We will thus 
move from rebutting the claim to Assemblism as a form of art to an un-
derstanding of aesthetic expressions as part of Assemblism.
Yates McKee’s work Strike Art (2016) is a detailed narration of a 
history of art and cultural work that emerged within and parallel to 
the Occupy Movement, its aftermath, and the newly emerging popular 
mass movements that he claims stand in a certain dialogical relations-
hip with Occupy, such as the Black Lives Matters and Climate Justice 
movements. In the process, McKee, who regularly refers to Butler’s 
writings on performative assembly, walks a fine line between proposing 
Occupy as a new definition of an “art project” as such, and discussing 
the role of art and a broader notion of aesthetics within this movement.
McKee’s claim to a reading of Occupy as an “art project” starts 
from the mass movement’s first manifestation in New York in 2011. 
McKee recalls how Occupy Wall Street had been planned and strate-
gized through meetings at the alternative artistic platform known as 
the 16 Beaver Group, an artist-run space located near the Wall Street 
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system,” while on the other aiming for the “reinvention of art as direct 
action, collective affect, and political subjectivization embedded in ra-
dical movements working to reconstruct the commons in the face of 
both localized injustices and systemic crises that characterize the con-
temporary capitalist order.”185 What we can take from his arguments is 
that the precarious infrastructures arising from the emerging powers of 
the assembling precariat challenged the role and definition of art and 
aesthetics to the point that we could indeed think of the popular mass 
movement in terms of Assemblism: not as an art work or “art project” 
itself, but as an emerging power within which art plays a continuous 
role as part of a larger aesthetic vocabulary of the popular mass mo-
vement.
In Butler’s work, two concrete examples stand out that are relevant 
for understanding the aesthetic component of Assemblism in terms 
of its scripting, choreography, performativity, and theatrical staging, 
namely the hunger strike and the aforementioned “general assembly.” 
In the first case, we are dealing with a form of Assemblism enacted by 
bodies that cannot occupy the same space due to the prison regiment. 
When prisoners engage in common hunger strikes, albeit each in their 
own cells, their simultaneous choreography re-affirms that no matter 
how much the prison divides them physically, they continue to co-
llectively enact a script, a series of planned gestures. They continue to 
compose themselves as a people.
This is a different morphology from the one enacted by bodies 
that have the relative privilege of gathering in public in the general 
assemblies of movements like Los Indignados, Occupy, or Gezi Park 
– although all three have also been confronted with different levels of 
police violence. What connects these examples of Assemblism is the 
imaginary that they invoke: the surplus of presence they bring into 
being. Encountering one prisoner in a hunger strike while knowing 
that others are performing similar gestures creates the re-enforced 
experience of an unlimited number of people standing with a single 
individual. The synchronicity of the gestures in this form of Assem-
blism allows for a larger sense of collectivity to be invoked. Something 
similar happens in the circular assembly on the square. The people 
who call themselves the “99%” are factually a minority, but they act 
as if they were a majority. Assemblism, in this case, lays the foundation 
of a people yet to recognize itself: they are a people-in-the-making. 
The collective imaginary of this people-in-the-making is the result of 
Assemblism. And as we saw with both of Butler’s examples, while an 
artistic vocabulary can help to clarify the aesthetic dimensions of its 
185   McKee, Strike Art, pp. 5–6.
Like the camp itself that would be set up in the following month, 
the founding assembly might be understood as a kind of embodied 
collage, transposing an alien political form into both the ossified 
landscape of the New York Left and the symbolic heart of global 
capital itself.183
The notion of the assembly as an “embodied collage” reflects Butler’s 
description of performative assembly as “assemblage,” describing the 
process of a people-in-the-making. The question here is if the reso-
nance of these terms – collage, assemblage – with artistic discourse is 
enough reason to discuss them as art. In this respect, it is important 
to take note of an article written by the collective of artists, theorists, 
and activists called Not An Alternative, who themselves were highly 
active in the Occupy movement and argue that people’s response to 
the Adbusters poster was not at all accidental, but the result of the pre-
vious manifestations of the Arab Spring and especially the M15/Los 
Indignados Movement in Spain, Catalunya, and the Basque Country. 
Because the possibility of such a manifestation was already engrained 
in the collective consciousness, the poster could have such a mobilizing 
effect. “[T]he idea already made sense to them” because “[t]he form of 
Occupy wasn’t created – it was given.”184
Not An Alternative emphasized that Occupy Wall Street gained mo-
mentum because of this pre-existing mobilization, and not necessarily 
because of the involvement of artists within it. Similarly, the 16 Beaver 
Group had been shaped strongly by the alterglobalization movement. 
This does not mean that the artistic efforts mentioned by McKee are 
unimportant, but that following Not An Alternative we should consider 
them as only one artistic component within a larger aesthetic manifes-
tation that made Occupy Wall Street a reality. It is not just artists who 
shape the popular mass movement, it is the popular mass movement 
and its own particular aesthetics that forms the artist just as much. This 
is a core feature of Assemblism: the artistic imaginary is part of the 
larger aesthetic and social “collage” or “assemblage” through which 
the popular is performed and the composition of a people takes shape.
More important than McKee’s provocative claim of Occupy as a 
new definition of an “artistic project” are his considerations of the pro-
cess through which the popular mass movement forms artists, resul-
ting in what he describes as the “unmaking of art as it exists within 
the discourses, economies, and institutions of the contemporary art 
183   McKee, Strike Art, p. 93.
184   Not an Alternative, “Counter-Power as Common Power: Beyond Horizontalism,” Journal of 
Aesthetics & Protest, Issue 9 (Summer 2014),
https://www.joaap.org/issue9/notanalternative.htm.
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te’s sovereign monopoly on the police. Athanasiou’s “self-poietics,” the 
choreography and spatial motives enacted through Assemblism, does 
not only perform the popular, the emerging power of the precariat. It 
also forces an existing power to articulate itself as its opposing force. A 
very theatrical example of this is the “book block,” which Athanasiou 
describes in the context of a variety of different popular mass move-
ments. The book block consists of shields carried by protestors in the 
form of enlarged hand-painted book covers, which feature works of 
writers and philosophers such as Theodor Adorno, Samuel Beckett, 
and even Butler. When Athanasiou describes a photo of “a policeman 
[who] raises his baton against a protestor who carries a book shield of 
Derrida’s Specters of Marx,”189 we again encounter two radically con-
flicting performativities made visible through the practice of Assem-
blism: books as symbols of knowledge and social transformation ca-
rried by the assembled precariat to protect themselves versus the baton 
as a symbol of monopolized violence carried by the police to attack 
others. Here, spatiality does not only relate to the placement of the 
bodies of the assembled precariat, but also to the space that they are 
creating through Assemblism: their bodies and book blocks articulate a 
different domain of knowledge and being, beyond the one represented 
by the regime of the baton. They embody an emerging power, perfor-
med through a people-in-the-making.
Such Assemblist articulations are strongly present in the popu-
lar mass movement known as Black Lives Matter. The movement 
was founded by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi in 
the form of a social media hashtag “#BlackLivesMatter,” in response 
to the acquittal of George Zimmerman for murdering the unarmed 
black seventeen-year-old Trevor Martin. Black Lives Matter quickly 
developed into a movement on its own right, following the historical 
aims of the civil rights and black power movements, currently coun-
ting “more than 45 chapters around the world.”190 Garza speaks of the 
movement specifically in terms of a “herstory,” connecting the struggle 
of black women’s liberation movements to a wide spectrum of pre-
carious constituents in the black community. She argues that “Black 
Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled 
folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all 
Black lives along the gender spectrum.”191 The structural racism, mass 
incarceration, and police violence disproportionately affecting black 
189   Ibid., p. 189.
190   Alicia Garza, “Under Siege,” transcript from a keynote lecture at Creative Time Summit: Occupy 
the Future, Washington DC, Oct. 14, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUNzJ-DKmrE.
191   Alicia Garza, “A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement,” The Feminist Wire, Oct. 7, 
2014, 
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/
manifestation, this does not mean that they are artworks as such.
The aesthetic dimensions of Assemblism is what Butler and the 
Greek theorist Athena Athanasiou discuss in their book Dispossession: 
The Performative in the Political (2013) as “self-poietics.” “Poietics” bo-
rrows the ancient Greek term for “creation,” which, Athanasiou exp-
lains, “emerges as a performative occasion in an ongoing process of 
socially regulatory self-formation, whereby under different circum-
stances the self struggles within and against the norms through which 
it is constituted; and such struggles are only waged through and with 
others.”186 In other words, the precariat, assembled in a popular mass 
movement because of a collective threat to its systems of life support, 
articulate in Assemblism an understanding of the self that can only 
be an “interrelated self” that is articulated, supported, and sustained 
through the presence and the acts of the bodies of others. Athanasiou 
discusses embodied performance – the “intimate propaganda” that 
Lippard spoke of – as being sustained through “corporeal standing,” 
a recurrent choreographical dimension of Assemblism that manifests 
itself through the “ordinary and rather undramatic practice of stan-
ding, rather than a miraculously extraordinary disruption, that actua-
lizes here the living register of the event” and subsequently creates 
“both a space of reflection and a space for revolt, but also an affective 
comportment of standing and standpoint.”187 So the choreography of 
collective standing in Assemblism – that which Occupy calls “occupa-
tion” – also implies a spatial dimension, or better, it articulates a new 
space overruling an existing one. This becomes very concrete in one 
of Athanasiou’s examples where she discusses the movement of The 
Outraged in Athens, which planned to surround the Greek parliament 
to stop a five-year austerity plan, resulting in the police fortifying the 
entire parliament building:
The image of the blockaded parliament, defended against the peo-
ple’s demand for accountability, manifested nothing less than the 
sovereign gesture of closing the space of dissent by delegating the 
dissenters to a provisional outside.188
We witness how an existing order of power responds to the practi-
ce of Assemblism in the form of the surrounding – the bringing into 
presence of precarious bodies seeking for a composition not through 
a counter-assembly, but through a fortification: an enactment of a sta-
186   Butler and Athanasiou, Dispossession, p. 68.
187   Ibid., p. 150–51.
188   Ibid., p. 151.
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“white supremacist capitalist system.”196 In the face of the increasingly 
militarized police in the US, the casually dressed protestors, their hands 
in the air, chanting “Hands up, don’t shoot” and “I can’t breathe” 
articulate strength through a display of collective vulnerability while 
the militarized police across from them becomes the embodiment of 
those who murdered and suffocated those commemorated in the slo-
gans.197 Again, we encounter a practice of Assemblism whose choreo-
graphy, performativity, and spatial designation articulate a domain in 
opposition to the militarized and segregated domain embodied by the 
military police. As in the case of Occupy and the hunger strike, the Ou-
traged in Greece and Black Lives Matter, Assemblist practice invokes 
a new political space through the enactment of popular demands: Po-
pular Realism that constructs a reality beyond dispossession, austerity, 
indebtment, police violence, structural racism, and murder.
Through a reading of Butler, McKee, Athanasiou, and Garza we 
have come to understand Assemblism as an aesthetic manifestation 
– sometimes including artistic components – that results from the per-
formance of the popular and the process of composing a people.
To summarize, Assemblism is defined by the process through which 
a diverse precariat assembles and begins to form a social montage, co-
llage, or assemblage that articulates what we have defined as a people-
in-the-making. Art plays a role in this process of composition, but only 
as one component of the social and aesthetic texture of the popular 
mass movement as a whole. In the case of Assemblism, performance, 
the term through which we both define the power of the precariat as 
well as its enactments in the form of scripted, choreographed, and 
theatrical stagings consisting of corporeal standing, chanting, and the 
strategic use of objects such as the book block or the banner to designa-
te an alternative spatial and ideological configuration. The self-poietics 
and poetic figures of emerging power that are created in the process 
provoke established powers to engage in often violent counter-perfor-
mances, further articulating the spatial and ideological configuration 
of the mass movement. If successful, the outcome of this antagonistic 
process is the construction of a Popular Realism: a designation of a 
spatial and ideological configuration of a reality organized on the co-
llective demands of the popular mass movement.
By discussing the practice of performative assembly in the form of 
Assemblism we have already touched slightly on visual elements that 
play a role in the composing of a people. The book block seems a per-
196   Ibid., p. 188.
197   The performativity of vulnerability as an assemblist strength is elaborated by several authors, in-
cluding Butler and Athanasiou. See: Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (eds.), 
Vulnerability in Resistance (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2016).
communities, both in the US and internationally, thus forms the basis 
for a broad intersectional alliance. While Garza emphasizes the role 
of art within the movement when she speaks of the “cultural workers, 
artists, designers and techies [who] offered their labor and love to ex-
pand #BlackLivesMatter beyond a social media hashtag,”192 an impor-
tant assemblist dimension of Black Lives Matter resides in the public 
manifestation of the movement; the specificity of its name and slogans 
through which the performance of the popular is articulated:
What happens to a community under siege, a nation under siege, a 
diaspora under siege, is that those people will and must fight back. 
And this is where we hear “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” “I Can’t brea-
the,” and “Black Lives Matter.”193
      
These slogans emerged directly from murders of black people in the 
wake of the killing of Trevor Martin. “Hands up, don’t shoot” resulted 
from the 2014 killing of Michael Brown, who had robbed a convenien-
ce store and was reportedly shot by a police officer – despite the fact 
that he had already stood still with his hands in the air. Mass protests 
and riots followed in Ferguson, with banners reading these supposedly 
last words of Brown, and masses of people chanting them – their hands 
up in the air –while approaching police battalions. “I can’t breathe” 
relates to the murder in the same year of Eric Gardner , who was su-
pposedly illegally selling cigarettes, and held in a chokehold by police 
officers who arrested him. Gardner’s last words – “I can’t breathe” – 
were similarly appropriated by Black Lives Matter protestors on signs 
and in collective chants.
Although its seems more appropriate to discuss the movement in 
the tradition of the civil rights and black power movements, McKee 
discusses the Black Lives Matter movement as part of the “post-oc-
cupy condition,” emphasizing the importance of what Garza calls the 
“visibilization of black life,” which he perceives as a way of highlighting 
“the aesthetic dimension of the struggle.”194 Obviously, the slogans and 
collective chants of Black Lives Matter were not conceived as poetry or 
artistic performance, but derived directly from the brutal murder and 
radical precarization of black communities. Nevertheless, these Assem-
blist practices of a popular mass movement indeed embody McKee’s 
“poetic figures” or Athanasiou’s “self-poietics,” emerging through the 
Assemblist actions and gatherings of the movement.195 The collective 
chanting of “I can’t breathe” results into such a poetic figure of “brea-
thing in common”: a collective acknowledgement of precarious life by 
translating the loss of life of one to the possible loss of life of all inside a 
192   Ibid.
193   Garza, “Under Siege”
194   McKee, Strike Art, p. 185.
195   Ibid., p. 188.
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redistribution of capital is still in the making – and to gain recognition 
as an artist and thus achieve something of a viable income, the insti-
tution of art – from the museum to the art market – is one of the few 
options that make it possible to maintain one’s profession. This can 
easily bring on criticism from both sides; namely the abuse of art for 
political means, or the abuse of popular mass movements for artistic 
means.198 The artist thus risks becoming an agent who, rather than po-
liticizing a popular mass movement, commodifies it through the realm 
of art by selling banners and photos of protests in the white cube of art 
to gain the financial means to keep up their work within the popular 
mass movement. This defines the particular precarity of artists, which 
is both a material and an ideological precarity. Artists have the capacity 
to imagine and visualize power differently, but – apart from a small 
elite of global artist-brands such as Jeff Koons or Damien Hirst – they 
do not necessarily have power themselves. Sinclair called upon artists 
to “make a world,” but artists in popular mass movements are essen-
tially “between worlds”: between the world as it is, and the one that is 
emerging; between established power and emerging power. The notion 
of “embeddedness” in Embedded Art should thus be understood as 
taking place within different institutionalities at the same time, establi-
shed ones that they aim to change and emerging ones that they wish to 
help construct and gain power.
In the previous chapters we have already touched upon such his-
torical practices of Embedded Art, from the writers implicated in po-
pular mass movements discussed by Sinclair to the work of feminist 
artists through which Lippard proposed an intimate propaganda art; 
from the artists involved in the ACT UP campaign analyzed by Mesh 
to the work of art collectives in the Filipino underground; from the 
radical Proletkult musical practices discussed by Bishop to the artists 
and designers that contributed to the Assemblist practices of the Oc-
cupy movement. Our aim now will be to expand these case studies 
with contemporary practices of Embedded Art, which highlight the 
concrete competences that artists contribute to popular mass move-
ments and Assemblist practices, and the ways they deal with operating 
between worlds.
In this context, we will discuss four examples of Embedded Art, 
each of which operates within or in direct relation to popular mass 
movements. We will focus on artist Hito Steyerl in relation to the al-
198   A dilemma addressed by Thompson when discussing the concept of socially engaged art: “So it 
isn’t art, and it isn’t activism. It’s something else. What is that something else? Socially engaged 
art projects that do not receive outright hostile reactions tend to receive this classic dismissal: 
that they are neither art nor activism. By being outside of both categories, works that toe the 
line between didacticism and ambiguity are discarded into critical purgatory.” Thompson, Seeing 
Power, p. 34.
fect example of an aesthetic component with artistic resonance – the 
visualization of knowledge as that what is threatened by austerity, whi-
le also forming a literal and mental shield for those trying to protect 
this knowledge – which cannot be embodied, but needs an additional 
sign of sorts. The book block, as discussed, also operates as a spatial 
designation, as a highly visible cultural frontline of Assemblism arti-
culating the opposition between emerging and established power even 
more clearly. The capacity of such visual components touch upon what 
we will now discuss as the artistic component that overlaps with Assem-
blism in the form of Embedded Art.
E M B E D D E D  A RT
With the term Embedded Art, we mean to focus on the role of ar-
tists as well as art groups and collectives that operate within popular 
mass movements. In the process, we will see how their work often over-
laps with that of Assemblism, contributing to the artistic component of 
the larger aesthetics that result from Assemblism’s practice. In the case 
of Embedded Art, we are dealing with artists who, as McKee writes, 
attempt to disentangle art from its present embedding in regimes of 
oppressive power, and to re-invent it through the emerging power and 
precarious infrastructures of popular mass movements.
In the context of popular mass movements, creating an artwork in 
and of itself is not the aim. Rather, we are dealing here, following Atha-
nasiou’s use of the notion of self-poietics, with a reinvention of art as 
a practice that emerges through the interrelation of precarious bodies 
and the enactment of their demands. Guillermo described this as aes-
thetic practice emerging from the immediacy and urgency of struggle. 
Embedded art similarly emerges through artists situating themselves 
directly within the precarious infrastructures of popular mass move-
ments and its aesthetic vocabulary. This means that traditional notions 
of autonomy have to be challenged. Rather than trying to achieve ar-
tistic autonomy, artists situate themselves within a popular mass mo-
vement that aims to gain political autonomy, not just for art but for a 
variety of segments of the precariat – from workers to the undocumen-
ted. And although art is not the exclusive property of artists within 
popular mass movements, we will see how artists contribute, through 
specific knowledges and competences, to their manifestations and As-
semblist practices. With the demand of democratization in a popular 
mass movement, also comes the democratization of art as such.
Popular Propaganda Art’s practice of Embedded Art brings with 
it many challenges. Due to their own precarious conditions, popular 
mass movements generally do not pay artists – the demand for the 
4 . 2  P O P U L A R  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 2 0 3 2 1
Worker’s Party (PKK) under her nom de guerre “Ronahî.”202 Wolf was 
reportedly captured in 1998 in the Van region by Turkish special forces 
together with thirty others, beaten and extra-judicially executed after 
which her breasts were cut from her body. There was never an official 
investigation and the bodies of Wolf and her fellow fighters were never 
found.203
Thirteen years later, Steyerl returned to the site. There, the artist 
retrieves ammunition and rockets shelves from the battlefield, of which 
she begins to trace the origins, which lead her to weapon manufactu-
rers such as the American General Dynamics company, the German 
Heckler & Koch, and the British Lockheed Martin, all with headquar-
ters in Western metropoles. These headquarters, Steyerl realized, were 
all designed by some of the most highbrow “starchitects” in the world. 
Lockheed Martin’s headquarters in Berlin was developed by Frank 
Gehry, the creator of several of the most iconic art museums of the 
world, such as the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao.204 And not only 
does Gehry’s starchitecture provide Lockheed Martin with its cultural 
front, the building itself, Steyerl observes, seems to be modeled after 
the shape of the gun shells she collected on the battlefield:
So this is when I realized that missiles, once they are fired, they can 
suddenly change their form. They suddenly transform in midflight 
into a piece of cutting-edge starchitecture designed by Frank Gehry 
[…]. So how is this possible? In this case, it’s quite easy to unders-
tand, because the software that Gehry’s studio uses to produce the-
se nicely rounded organic shapes is actually a version of the same 
software on which some of the Cobra helicopters [that fired the 
missiles in Van] were developed.205
The design of contemporary architecture and contemporary weapons 
seems to arise from the same “creative” software, suggesting an intrica-
te resonance between military and cultural infrastructures not evident 
to most, as we discussed earlier on this chapter in the context of War 
202   Since its founding in 1978, the PKK has waged an ongoing guerrilla war in the south-eastern 
part of Turkey, known as North Kurdistan or Bakûr, against the Turkish regime. We will further 
discuss this history in the final part of this chapter, “Stateless Propaganda Art.”
203   Felix Kurz and Georg Mascolo, “Besonders mutige Kämpfer,” Der Spiegel, Sep. 11, 1998, http://
www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8030503.html. Wolf would appear in several of Steyerl’s works, 
such as November (2004) and Lovely Andrea (2007). Pablo Lafuente puts additional emphasis on 
the construction of the “popular” in these particular works. See: Pablo Lafuente, “For a Populist 
Cinema: On Hito Steyerl’s November and Lovely Andrea,” Afterall, No. 19 (Autumn/Winter 
2008), https://www.afterall.org/journal/issue.19/populist.cinema.hito.steyerls.november.and.
lovely.
204   Davide Ponzini, Michele Nastasi, Starchitecture: Scenes, Actors and Spectacles in Contemporary 
Cities (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2016)
205   Hito Steyerl, “Is the Museum a Battlefield?,” transcript of lecture performance during the public 
program of the 13th Istanbul Biennial, 2013, https://vimeo.com/76011774.
ter-globalization, Gezi Park, and Kurdish resistance movements; the 
collective Not An Alternative in relation to the Occupy movement and 
climate change activism in the United States; the work of artist Matthi-
js de Bruijne in relation to labor unions and the mobilization of domes-
tic workers; and the work of Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency 
(DAAR) in relation to popular mass movements in Palestine in the 
past, present, and future. Nonetheless, we will observe also many di-
fferences between these practices resulting from their specific relations 
to the specific coalitions of precarious peoples in different geographic, 
political, and cultural contexts. We thus aim to explore four different 
artistic proximities in relation to popular mass movements, resulting in 
four different understandings and outcomes of artists’ embeddedness.
Following the movement of Institutional Critique earlier exempli-
fied by Fraser, German artist Hito Steyerl further radicalizes its pre-
mise when she states provocatively: “If contemporary art is the answer, 
the question is, how can capitalism be made more beautiful?” She ela-
borates by explaining: “Contemporary art feeds on the crumbs of a 
massive and widespread redistribution of wealth from the poor to the 
rich, conducted by means of an ongoing class struggle from above.”199 
Like Fraser, she emphasizes how the “intrinsic conditions of the art 
field, as well as the blatant corruption within it […] is a taboo even 
on the agenda of most artists who consider themselves political.”200 As 
a result, Steyerl’s practice radically expanded the analysis of, and en-
gagement with, the art institution so as to encompass technology, the 
military-industrial complex, and practice of warfare, but also its rela-
tion to popular mass movements and revolutionary organizations. This 
is explicitly the case in her work Is the Museum a Battlefield? (2013), a 
video recorded as a lecture–performance, presented for the first time 
in the midst of the tumultuous 13th Istanbul Biennial. This art mani-
festation took place parallel to the emergence of a popular mass move-
ment in the city, known as the Gezi Park protests.201 In her lecture–per-
formance, Steyerl begins with the story of her friend Andrea Wolf who 
joined the women’s section of the formerly Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan 
199   Hito Steyerl, The Wretched of the Screen (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012), p. 93.
200   Ibid., p. 98.
201   The public space of Gezi Park was threatened by massive government-sanctioned real estate 
development, and civil protests quickly grew into a broad popular movement against the 
increasingly authoritarian and corrupt Erdoğan regime. The protestors were subsequently faced 
with brutal government crackdowns, with many deaths as a result. See: Amnesty International, 
Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey (London: Amnesty 
International Ltd, 2013), https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.
pdf. For further reading see: Bülent Gökay and Ilia Xypolia, Reflections on Taksim: Gezi Park 
Protests in Turkey (Keele: A Journal of Global Faultlines, 2013). A unique narration of the Gezi 
Park protests is written by Raşel Meseri in the form of a children’s story illustrated by Sanne 
Karssenberg. The story revolves around Pen the Penguin, who became a symbol of the Gezi 
Park protests after the Turkish television aired a documentary on penguins instead of covering 
the protests. See: Raşel Meseri and Sanne Karssenberg, Pen in the Park: A Resistance Fairytale 
(Tirana/The Hague: Uitgeverij, 2014).
4 . 2  P O P U L A R  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T
4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 2 2 3 2 3
of Not An Alternative and author of The Communist Horizon (2012) 
and Crowds and Party (2016). For Dean, the popular mass movement 
in and of itself does not provide an answer to conditions of precarity 
and exploitation, unless it is connected to an organizational infrastruc-
ture – such as the Communist Party – in order to translate its demands 
into a durable infrastructure.213 This militant left position informs the 
name of the collective, which rejects the very notion of the need of an 
“alternative” to current crises, but rather emphasizes a need for a more 
radical if not revolutionary change in the political and economic order. 
 When it comes to the domain of art, Not An Alternative refers to its 
work as “projects” each of which consist of a series of “tools,” empha-
sizing the importance of their approach to the artistic domain through 
concrete instruments to be used in the context of political mobilization 
and action. Occupy New York is again a primary example, specifically 
their tool Occupy Tape (2011) part of project “Occupy.” It consists of 
a yellow and black striped tape, normally used to seal off foreclosed 
homes, which in this case reads “Occupy.” Freely distributed among 
protesters, the tape became used by the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
as well as other Occupy offshoots around the country, in encampments 
and in city interventions. Together with posters reading: “Foreclose on 
banks, not on people,” the tape was used to seal off financial institu-
tions that had played a role in the financial crisis. A similar strategy 
is used in Occupy Police Blocks (2012), an intervention created a few 
days before the anniversary of the Occupy Movement. Anticipating 
a resurgence of protests, police blocked the entry to Zuccotti Park 
by placing large cement blocks reading “NYPD.” Not An Alternative 
crafted a series of foam blocks entitled Occupy Police Blocks, looking 
exactly like the cement blocks used by the authorities, but which read 
“OWS” (Occupy Wall Street) instead, followed by the sentence “Pro-
tecting the People from the Powerful.” Again, we witness an act of 
appropriation of visual signifiers normally used exclusively by ruling 
powers, but now turned against them. Not An Alternative shows that 
power has a “compository” dimension, and is manifested through vi-
sual markers that provide institutional legitimacy; signs that order and 
engineer our daily life, but that can also be turned against themselves. 
 In some sense, Not An Alternative operates as the “branding” agen-
cy of the popular mass movement, without being officially commissio-
ned, providing additional and highly professional looking signs for a 
213   Jodi Dean’s work on the concept of the “crowd” overlaps in some respects with the assemblies 
of the precariat discussed by Butler. However, Dean takes a more militant approach. In her per-
spective it is only through an organizational structure like the Community Party that the crowd 
can emerge as a people. See Dean’s lecture “If You’re Not Against Us, You’re With Us,” Former 
West Public Editorial Meeting, Hungary, May 13, 2015, https://vimeo.com/136578092.
on Terror Propaganda Art. The turning point in Steyerl’s lecture-per-
formance takes place when, while trying to trace the origin of the bu-
llets from the battlefield, she visits The Art Institute of Chicago, an 
institution strongly supported by a member of the General Dynamics 
founding family.206 There, Steyerl encounters her own work: a video she 
shot while doing her fieldwork in Van, with the caption “This is a shot.” 
The encounter links the shooting of the weapon that killed Wolf to the 
video shooting of Steyerl trying to reconstruct who killed her, bringing 
her to the question “did I shoot the bullet that I found on the battlefield 
myself?207 By tracing the overlapping of military and cultural industries, 
the artist’s claim that the museum is a battlefield takes shape. For, 
Steyerl argues, museums have been “torture chambers, sites of war 
crimes, civil war, and also revolution.”208 The storming of the Winter 
Palace was simultaneously the storming of the Hermitage Museum, lo-
cated on its premises; and the Louvre, as we saw in the second chapter, 
was declared a public museum through the French Revolution, and, as 
Steyerl narrates, stormed and occupied another five times in order for 
it to remain a public museum.209 The history of the museum has been 
that of its revolutions, or, today, of its military-industrial sponsors. 
Through Steyerl’s attempts to trace a bullet, the military-industrial 
complex turns into a cultural complex and vice versa, like a strange, 
continuous feedback loop. This brings her to a militant conclusion: 
“It seems if we are stuck in that loop, we may have to go back in this 
point in time and storm the museum again.”210 This statement was not 
without risk, as Steyerl was claiming the art institution as the extension 
of the site of the Gezi Park protests happening right outside its doors.211 
 While Steyerl’s work takes the form of pamphlets, books, essays, 
lecture–performances, and videos interconnecting the institution of art 
and popular mass movements, the work of collective Not An Alterna-
tive, founded by artists and activists in the aftermath of the alter-glo-
balization movement, puts an even greater emphasis on the scope and 
scale of embedded art practice.212 Their prominent theoretical work is 
strongly influenced by the work of philosopher Jodi Dean, a member 
206   Ibid.
207   Ibid.
208   Ibid.
209   Hito Steyerl, “Is the Museum a Battlefield?,” transcript of lecture at the Creative Time Summit: 
Confronting Inequity, New York, Oct. 12, 2012, http://creativetime.org/summit/2012/10/12/hi-
to-steyerl/.
210   Ibid.
211   Following Butler’s “assemblage” and McKee’s “collage” in relation to the composition of 
popular mass movements, Steyerl discusses the relation of art to the popular movement in terms 
of the “montage”: “What kind of movements of political montage would result in oppositional 
articulations, instead of a mere addition of elements for the sake of reproducing the status quo?” 
Steyerl, The Wretched of the Screen, p. 90.
212   Current members Beka Economopoulos and Jason Jones, and former members Ian Hart and 
Winnie Fung created Not An Alternative in the 2000s, in the aftermath of the alter-globalization 
movement.
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The real work of Occupy and related popular mass movements, so the 
authors claim, happens outside the domain of consensus, in the form 
of direct organization and action with the aim of constructing a long-
term and durable alternative form of institutionality and emancipatory 
governance:
There is nothing about democracy that necessarily goes against ca-
pitalism. Democratic processes have been coextensive with the capi-
talist mode of production and accumulation. The position that repre-
sents the threat to global capitalism is the one that refuses capitalism 
outright and insists on universal egalitarian emancipation.217
The importance of a clearly formulated political position, the or-
ganization and maintenance of infrastructure, counter-branding, and 
seizing power from existing institutions is expressed in Not An Alter-
native’s project The Natural History Museum (2014–ongoing), a newly 
declared institution that “offers exhibitions, expeditions, educational 
workshops, and public programming” through “existing institutions, 
[…] its 15-passenger mobile museum bus, and online.”218 Different 
from the existing Natural History Museum, Not An Alternative’s ver-
sion focuses on the impact of humans on climate change, the role of 
fossil fuel industries and their influence on museums, as well as the 
political system at large. Like a 21st-century propaganda train, Not An 
Alternative’s mobile museum is capable of setting up instant pop-up 
displays adorned with the colorful child-friendly imagery that we asso-
ciate with the Natural History Museum, but deeply politicized throu-
gh slogans such as “Cut Ties to the Fossil Fuel Industry: Stand Up 
for Science.” The Natural History Museum is thus presented as a new 
politicized form of institution. Different from previously self-funded 
interventions it was financially supported by “art and social justice 
foundation grants.” 219 Its aim is to partly operate through existing ins-
titutions and partly through its own channels of communication, and 
to force directors as well as visitors not merely to be informed on cli-
mate change, but to recognize their own implication within it and take 
a position in relationship to it.
In a 2015 op-ed in The Guardian, Not An Alternative members 
Steve Lyons and Beka Economopoulos pushed the Natural History 
Museum’s agenda by issuing a series of public demands: “[W]e are 
asking museums of science and natural history to drop climate scien-
ce deniers from their boards, cancel sponsorships from the fossil fuel 
217   Not An Alternative, “Counter-Power as Common Power: Beyond Horizontalism”.
218   Retrieved from the “Project” section of Not An Alternative’s website, http://notanalternative.org/
projects/.
219   E-mail exchange with Not An Alternative member Jason Jones, Mar. 1, 2017.
demarcation of an emerging power. Different from the quickly painted 
covers of the book blocks, the projects and tools of Not An Alternative 
play out a professional and sometimes corporate language for other 
means. But this investment is not limited to appearance alone, but also 
related to strengthening the precarious infrastructure of the Occupy 
movement. This is the case with their Occupy Shelter (2011), a building 
block consisting of panels through which different structures could be 
build, such as tables, backdrops, benches and shelters with the aim of 
“fortifying the physical infrastructure” of the rather fragile set-up of 
tents.214 Like the tape and blocks, Occupy Shelter could be used well 
beyond the confines of a protest camp to reclaim a diversity of public 
spaces, abandoned or foreclosed houses, and buildings. The visual li-
teracy and organizational capacity that Not An Alternative contributes 
to the popular mass movement therefore aims to reach beyond the 
rather spontaneous patchwork of tents and signs that are characteristic 
of the protest encampment. Instead, Not An Alternative looks at these 
emerging social forms as pre-figurative institutions: the possibility to 
re-imagine and establish new models of civil forms of governance and 
representation. We can consider their work as both an act of commit-
ment and as a critique of the organizational and infrastructural limi-
tations of the popular mass movement. In that light, Occupy’s ideal of 
spontaneous self-governance, similar to that of the spontaneous camp, 
is challenged by the collective when Jodi Dean and Jason Jones claim 
that Occupy cannot transcend models of political representation: 
It reinvents representation as the active, self-authorizing assertion 
of division in relation to the appearance of antagonism. Occupy 
unleashes practices and incites actions, linking them together via 
the hole in Wall Street. In its new politics of representation, division 
isn’t effaced or overcome. It’s asserted and linked to capitalism’s 
fundamental antagonism, class struggle.215
In these writings a more militant politicized approach to the camp is 
articulated; not as a space of spontaneous political consensus, but a 
site of struggle where the 99% – those who claim the right to speak 
for a popular majority through assemblist practice – assert a funda-
mental division between ruling power and the precariat. Or, as Jones 
and Dean phrase it, “[a]sserting division, it represents possibility.”216 
214   Retrieved from the “Project” section of Not An Alternative’s website, http://notanalternative.org/
projects/.
215   Jason Jones and Jodi Dean, “Occupy Wall Street and the Politics of Representation,” Chto Delat, 
No. 34: In Defense of Representation (Mar. 2012).
216   Ibid.
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observed that this deep connection “between the arts and the union 
has disappeared since WW2,”224 and that the FNV instead has “evolved 
from a political movement to an insurance company” with an equally 
“corporate identity.”225 2010, however, saw a resurgence of organizing 
capacity of the cleaner’s union resulting in a successful three-month 
strike to demand less work pressure, a 2% promised increase of their 
salary, and paid sick leave. It was the largest and longest strike in the 
Netherlands since 1933.
The commemoration of their successful strike was to become the 
moment for the cleaner’s union to solidify their newly gained successes. 
Developing his insights from Argentina, De Bruijne created a project 
called the Trash Museum (2011), a mobile museum that would display 
a diversity of objects found by cleaners in their workplaces – from train 
to airport – which publicly demonstrated their often difficult working 
conditions. Following the decision-making structure of the cleaner’s 
union, De Bruijne presented his proposal to the “Parliament of Clea-
ners,” which agreed to its realization and financing.226 The Trash Mu-
seum was first presented in the hall of the Utrecht Central Station, a 
major transit point for thousands of commuters, before going on tour 
to four other Dutch cities.227 In collaboration with design group Detour, 
consisting of Marnix de Klerk and Nina Mathijsen, De Bruijne erected 
yellow walls mimicking the colors of the yellow gloves and yellow cloth 
used by the cleaners in the central hall of the station. Plastic zip-lock 
bags were attached to the wall, each containing objects found by clea-
ners: from toys and drug needles to sex toys. A sign was placed next to 
every object, providing the background story of the cleaner who found 
it, testimonies collected by De Bruijne. The yellow flags of the union, 
and its by now famous symbol of a clenched fist in a yellow rubber glo-
ve, surrounded the walls, marking the spatial claim of the museum in 
the middle of the train station. Thousands of visitors came by to see the 
objects, discuss the demands of the cleaners with the union’s members, 
and take promotional materials presented on a nearby table. Instead of 
Petrus Berlage and decorated with murals depicting the rise of the worker movement by artist 
Richard Roland Holst.
224   Matthijs de Bruijne, “Museum of the People,” lecture at the New World Academy, BAK, basis 
voor actuele kunst, Utrecht, Nov. 15, 2013, https://vimeo.com/90675280.
225   Lara Staal and Wouter Hillaert, “Centraal staat het werk,” rekto:verso No. 69: Dossier Zwart-Wit 
(Dec. 2015–Jan. 2016), https://www.rektoverso.be/artikel/centraal-staat-het-werk. Original quote 
in Dutch: “De Nederlandse bond is van een politieke beweging geëvolueerd naar een verzeker-
ingsmaatschappij. De bijhorende corporate identity-mentaliteit is mee overgenomen.”
226   According to De Bruijne, the Parliament of Cleaners is not an executive branch of the union but 
created by the cleaners themselves. Due to prominent members of the Parliament of Cleaners – 
such as Khadija Thahiri, president of the Cleaner’s Union – many of its decisions are honored 
nonetheless. One could say the Parliament of Cleaners operates in a form of dual power within 
the union as a whole. Noted from telephone conversation with De Bruijne on Feb. 11, 2017.
227   The Trash Museum afterwards toured to the Burght, Amsterdam (Oct. 24–25, 2011), the town 
hall of The Hague (Jan. 4–26, 2012), the library of Groningen (Jan. 30–Feb. 5, 2012), and the 
town hall of Heerlen (Feb. 14–21, 2012).
industry, and divest financial portfolios from fossil fuels.”220 This is an 
important aspect of the process in which Not An Alternative opera-
tes “between worlds” – between the popular mass movement and the 
artistic–cultural institution – reclaiming common resources through 
a variety of sites of struggle, and effectively overcoming the divide of 
being “inside” or “outside” a given system. They effectively enact Ste-
yerl’s call to occupy and seize the institution as part of the battlefield:
[I]nstitutional liberation isn’t about making institutions better, 
more inclusive, more participatory. It’s about establishing politi-
cized base camps from which ever more coordinated, elaborate, 
and effective campaigns against the capitalist state in all its racist, 
exploitative, extractivist, and colonizing dimensions can be carried 
out. This takeover will not happen overnight. But it is happening 
now at an international scale, accumulating force and momentum 
with every repetition of a common name and image, every itera-
tion of associated acts: red lines, red squares, arrayed tents, money 
drops, blockades, occupations.221
Similar to Not An Alternative, the work of Dutch artist Matthijs de 
Bruijne takes the form of projects and tools developed in direct rela-
tion to popular mass movements, in this case with the Federation of 
Dutch Labor Unions (FNV) at its core. De Bruijne, different from 
Not An Alternative, is directly funded by the FNV itself, and although 
he continues to involve the art institution, this is a nearly marginal 
dimension of his overall practice. It was particularly his work with the 
Argentinian cartoneros – people who make their living from collecting, 
organizing, and re-selling waste in the form of cardboard, metal, and 
glass – that brought the FNV to contact the artist for a series of on-
going collaborations in the context of their campaign Schoon genoeg!222 
which means roughly “enough already,” but can also be read different-
ly: the word schoon also means “clean.” The history of the FNV has 
a particular tradition of art and culture of its own,223 but De Bruijne 
220   Steve Lyons and Beka Economopoulos, “Museums Must Take a Stand and Cut Ties to Fossil 
Fuels,” The Guardian, May 7, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/07/
museums-must-take-a-stand-and-cut-ties-to-fossil-fuels.
221   Not An Alternative, “Institutional Liberation,” e-flux journal, No. 77 (Nov. 2016).
222   De Bruijne recorded and wrote down the stories of the cartoneros, and published these together 
with images of the collected waste on the website Liquidacion.org (2002) where online visitors 
could also purchase the objects. A crucial model from which he developed his own artistic 
methodology was the Tucumán Arde (Tucumán Burns), a 1968 exhibition in Buenos Aires and 
Rosario organized by the Grupo de Artistas de Vanguardia (Group of Avant-Garde Artists) in 
collaboration with other cultural workers, sociologists, and journalists with the aim of highlight-
ing the disastrous working conditions in Tucumán city, located in the north-western part of the 
country. See also: Sven Lütticken, “Matthijs de Bruijne,” Witte Raaf, No. 107 (Jan.–Feb. 2004), 
https://www.dewitteraaf.be/artikel/detail/nl/2758.
223   De Bruijne often references the “Burght” – “the fortress” – built in 1899–1900 as a monument 
to the labor movement and headquarters of the union that was designed by architect Hendrik 
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union, many of which have fled neocolonial oppression in their coun-
tries of origin, a final example of Embedded Art that we will discuss 
relates to the direct context of such oppression itself. This concerns 
the work of Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), an ins-
titution founded in 2008 by Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal 
Weizman – from Italy, Palestine, and Israel respectively, and each with 
a background in architecture – located in Beit Sahour, a Palestinian 
town east of Bethlehem under the administration of the Palestinian 
National Authority. DAAR combines an architectural studio and a re-
sidency program, and has involved a multidisciplinary group of local 
and international participants in their program – from artists, desig-
ners, architects to philosophers, writers, and activists – with the aim 
to “use spatial practice as a form of political intervention.”231 Spatial 
practice here relates directly to the conflictual and contested region of 
Palestine, its colonization and monitoring by the Israeli occupation, 
and the prominent role that architecture plays in the process of reclai-
ming one’s native land.232
DAAR’s focus lies on understanding the changing conceptions of 
space and property through the occupation of Palestine, and operates 
in close proximity with some of the popular movements that continue 
to struggle for their right to return to their lands of origin. But, as 
mentioned earlier, while DAAR affirms its solidarity with “the full im-
plementation of the right of return,” it simultaneously acts as a critical 
agent within the conflict by stating that “we do not believe that return 
can offer a solution to the condition of refugeeness by simply reversing 
the trajectory of time.”233 Instead, they explore the political potential of 
the spaces that arise between a site of origin and a site of exile with the 
potential of bringing forward the project of decolonization, explained 
by the group as follows:
“Decolonization” […] is not bound as a concept, nor is it bound in 
space or in time: it is an ongoing practice of deactivation and reo-
rientation understood both in its presence and its endlessness. In 
the context of Palestine, it is not bound within the 1967 occupied 
231   Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hillal, and Eyal Weizman, Architecture After Revolution (Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2013), p. 28.
232   Weizman, who is also co-conceiver of the Centre of Research Architecture (CRA) with Thomas 
Keenan and Susan Schuppli at Goldsmiths University in London, speaks in this regard of 
Israel’s settlement architecture as a form of destruction by design: “[T]echniques of destruction 
become a kind of de facto urban planning.” In this context the CRA investigates what it calls 
“forensic architecture” as an alternative take on the reconstruction of evidence. See: Yates 
McKee and Meg McLagan in conversation with Eyal Weizman, “Forensic Architecture: An 
Interview with Eyal Weizman,” in Meg McLagan and Yates McKee (eds.), Sensible Politics: The 
Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism (New York: Zone Books, 2012), p. 445. See also: Eyal 
Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London/New York: Verso, 2007).
233   Alessandro Petti et al., Architecture After Revolution, p. 39.
injecting the message of a popular mass movement into the museum, 
De Bruijne proposed to institute the museum as part of and created in 
collaboration with the popular mass movement itself.
This initial collaborative project of De Bruijne and the cleaner’s 
union brought him into contact with the domestic worker’s union, 
which represents a severely under-recognized segment of the Dutch 
labor force: “Most of the Domestic Workers in the Netherlands, es-
pecially in the big cities, are undocumented. We talk about thousands 
and most of them come from the Philippines, Indonesia, Latin Ame-
rica and Ghana, and officially they don’t exist.”228 One of the artworks 
that De Bruijne developed with the Domestic Worker’s Union was an 
enactment of their slogan “Never Ever Invisible.” It consisted of a sha-
dow play in the form of video titled No Work, No Pay! (2012), which 
was realized for a screening in The Hague at the Dutch parliament. 
The work was part of the union’s campaign to bring the Netherlands 
to ratify the International Labour Organization (ILO) convention 189 
in recognition of the rights of domestic workers.229 De Bruijne explains 
the shadow play as “a form of theatre, originally from Asia that is also 
common here in the Netherlands because of our colonial history.” He 
thus connected an aesthetics that relates both to the history of the Ne-
therlands and many migrant domestic workers, allowing us to consider 
a neo-colonial dimension of the use of cheap labour in the form of 
migrant domestic work.230 The shadow plays are realized by domestic 
workers and actors standing behind a screen, with a strong backlight. 
Therefore, the medium allows the domestic workers to be present in 
silhouette without being recognized. This is a crucial protection, due 
to the risk of the identification of undocumented workers by the au-
thorities. The medium of the shadow play through which the migrant 
workers share their stories is thus simultaneously an expression of the 
specific condition of the protagonists themselves. We could consider this 
a radical variation of what we have discussed in War on Terror Propa-
ganda Art as “visible invisibility,” in this case repurposed and enacted 
by the dispossessed.
Whereas De Bruijne works with diaspora communities in the labor 
228   Matthijs de Bruijne, “Solidarity and Unionising,” lecture at the Artist Organizations International, 
HAU Theater, Berlin, Jan. 11, 2015, https://vimeo.com/119233427. The struggle of undocu-
mented domestic workers gave rise to the campaign 100,000 Families Trust Us, which called for 
a recognition of domestic work on par with any other sector, and for the recognition of around 
70,000 undocumented domestic workers in the Netherlands. The campaign generated its very 
own lexicon relevant both for union members and outsiders to gain understanding of their 
specific conditions of struggle. As such, the publication is both a handbook and a documenta-
tion of the work and successes of the union so far. See: Matthijs de Bruijne and Cecilia Vallejos, 
Werkwoorden – Words of Labor (FNV Schoonmaak, 2017).
229   International Labour Organization, C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrument_
id:2551460.
230   De Bruijne, “Museum of the People.”
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in Dheisheh to become emptied from any construction, turning it into 
a public space in the crowded refugee camp, the circle in Miska would 
house a solid building.239 As such, the intervention articulates the reali-
ty of a third option: acknowledging Miska as the “site of origin” para-
llel to the Dheisheh as the “site of exile” as the beginning of the refugee 
community.240 While Returns is yet to be realized, another project en-
titled Concrete Tent (2015), commissioned by the related organization 
Campus in Camps, realizes part of the proposal.241 The project is situa-
ted in Dheisheh and consists of a model of a refugee tent that is cast in 
concrete, operating as a space of meeting and assembly. The structure 
represents a condition of permanent exile. Dheisheh thus becomes so-
mething between the site of exile and a space, which due to its long 
history, inevitably has become something of a “home.” Concrete Tent 
thus acknowledges the history of Dheisheh while never giving in to the 
idea that this could ever be the site of arrival: “the re-creation of a tent 
made of concrete today is an attempt to preserve the cultural and sym-
bolic importance of this archetype for the narration of the Nakba, but 
at the same time to engage the present political condition of exile.”242
As we saw in the case of both Returns and Concrete Tent, DAAR’s 
projects are speculative and literally concrete at the same time, cons-
tructing infrastructures in the present while speculating on their future 
iterations as part of a third path; the dialectical outcome of origin and 
exile. Another relevant example in this regard is DAAR’s complex re-
search project on the lines that formed the divided territories of Israel 
and Palestine in the decades following the Nakba.243 The lines that for-
med DAAR’s point of departure were the ones drawn upon a map divi-
ding the West Bank in the early 1990s, as part of the so-called Oslo Ac-
cords in Norway. DAAR notes that “[b]ecause the documents signed 
were printed hard copies in which the lines were just over a millimeter 
wide, in real space the line acquired a width of about five meters,”244 
and it was this space – the space articulated through the thickness of 
the line – which after the collapse of the Oslo Accords would remain 
239   In the case of Miska, the structure was modeled after the al-Feniq program, a cultural center 
established in Dheisheh, projecting the common cultural project emerging from the camp into 
a foundation of a future return. As such, the first building block of the return to Miska would 
be the common infrastructure that emerged from decades in exile in the camp, as DAAR argues 
that “the veritable revolution of return is fundamentally a revolution in relation to property.” 
Ibid., p. 59.
240   Ibid., p. 54.
241   Whereas DAAR is the architectural outcome of Petti, Hilal and Weizman’s collaboration, Cam-
pus in Camps is considered to be the “pedagogical wing,” led by Petti and Hilal. Cited from 
e-mail exchange with Allessandro Petti, Feb. 8, 2017.
242   Retrieved from the “Dheisheh” project section of the website of Campus in Camps, http://www.
decolonizing.ps/site/concrete-tent/.
243   The point of departure was formed by historian and former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron 
Benvenisti, who, in relation to the 1949 cease-fire lines drawn by military commanders Moshe 
Dayan and Abdullah al-Tal, asked the question “who owns the ‘width of the line’?” Petti, Hillal, 
and Weizman, Architecture After Revolution, p. 151.
244   Ibid., p. 153.
territories. Decolonization, in our understanding, seeks to unleash 
a process of open-ended transformation toward visions of equality 
and justice. The return of refugees, which we interpret as entailing 
the right to move and settle within the complete borders of Israel–
Palestine […] is a fundamental stage in decolonization.234
DAAR makes this question of decolonization concrete by focusing its 
work on the infrastructures of colonization – refugee camps, the re-
mainders of Israeli settlements, or “public” spaces – that were never 
desired by the Palestinian people in the first place. Should one hold 
onto the right of return as a “return in time” as the only possible tra-
jectory in relation to the condition of exile, or is there a third option 
imaginable in the form of what DAAR explains as “a subversion of 
the originally intended use [of such infrastructures], repurposing it 
for other ends”?235 This is at the core of what DAAR describes as an 
“Architecture After Revolution,” the title of their 2013 publication: not 
maintaining the exile/return dichotomy, but investing in a transforma-
tive third option that re-contexualizes the right to return in new future 
scenarios and re-composes people and state anew through a process 
that seeks “to decolonize a system rather than establish a State.”236 The 
possibility to establish what DAAR calls a “future extraterritorial poli-
ty” will be of crucial importance to understand their practice.237
DAAR’s project Returns (2009) is an architectural proposal for 
the village of Miska, colonized by Israel in 1948, and the Palestinian 
refugee camp Dheisheh, established south of Bethlehem in the West 
Bank in the same year, and housing more than three thousand refu-
gees. The infrastructure of the camp evidently was not desired and 
should not be considered as any kind of solution, but its historical 
role in facilitating popular mass movements such as the resistance 
groups Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), demonstrates that it also cannot be reduced to a symbol 
of mere victimhood, because “the camp continuously develops and 
rearticulates the self-conception of refugeehood in a way that main-
tains its vanguard political status. Rather than enacting normalization 
these constructions became potential agents of decolonization.”238 
Returns takes the form of two circles of the same width, one to be rea-
lized in Miska, one in Dheisheh: an intervention on the site of origin 
that mirrors the one in exile. But whereas DAAR proposes the circle 
234   Ibid., p. 18.
235   Ibid., p. 21.
236   Ibid., p. 32.
237   Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal Weizman, “The Morning After: Profaning Colonial 
Architecture,” in McLagan and McKee, Sensible Politics, p. 467.
238   Alessandro Petti et al., Architecture After Revolution, p. 50.
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embeddedness is primarily within the labor union and its decision-ma-
king structures, and although his link to the institute of art is not seve-
red completely, he institutes the role of art within the movement itself. 
In the case of DAAR, its members are embedded within civil and refu-
gee movements in the present, but aim to articulate a third option of a 
“people-in-the-making” that defines its aim for a future embeddedness 
which the present does not yet allow for. In many of these cases, we ob-
served that we are dealing with a engaged and critical embeddedness, 
whether it concerns Not An Alternative’s critique of the model of ge-
neral assembly in Occupy, or DAAR’s refusal to commit to the existing 
dichotomy of exile/return. Embeddedness as such is not the equivalent 
of a passive acceptance of political doctrine, but relates to the effort of 
actively shaping the popular mass movement while being fully part of 
it at the same time.
The performance of emerging power, central to the practice of Po-
pular Propaganda Art, manifests itself differently depending on the 
form of embeddedness. Steyerl’s work impacts the performance of the 
popular and composition of a people directly by enlarging the institu-
tion of art as battlefield and employing art to re-compose – or in her 
case, “edit” – a people by assembling the viewer with the protestor. 
In Steyerl’s work, we can define Popular Realism as a construction 
of reality that emerges through a complete erasure of the boundaries 
between the institution of art, the military-industrial complex, and the 
popular mass movement. Not An Alternative’s projects clearly contri-
bute to mobilization and civic action in the context of the performance 
of the popular, but try to widen them at the same time by moving be-
yond the spontaneous dimension of protest toward a more structured 
claim to new forms of institutional power. Not An Alternative contri-
butes to the formation of new identities through its conceptual appro-
priation of branding to contribute to the composition of a people. The 
form of Popular Realism they try to invoke throughout these works is 
one in which institutions – whether in the form of public space or a 
museum – are radically reclaimed, repurposed, and redistributed – or 
even re-instituted – among popular majorities. De Bruijne’s work effec-
tively mobilizes broad constituents, both within the union and outside 
of it, from commuters moving in train stations, to political parties that 
see his screenings. His work further contributes to the composition of 
a people by proposing a new visual identity of the Dutch working class. 
The form of Popular Realism that de Bruijne attempts to initiate is 
articulated through the demands of a broad coalition of documented 
and undocumented workers, with a strengthening and expansion of 
the union as a result. DAAR’s work acknowledges and supports the 
right to return of Palestinian refugees, but simultaneously aims to open 
“[w]ithout legal definition.”245
This example leads to the most important and challenging example 
of this research, the Common Assembly (2011) project, which deals with 
the Palestinian Legislative Council building. Constructed in 1996 at 
the height of enthusiasm about the Oslo accords, the now abandoned 
parliament was challenged by three spatial realities at the same time. 
One part belongs to the Israeli occupation, one part belongs to the 
Palestinian authorities, and a third part, defined by the thickness of 
the line, belongs to no one. The work of DAAR consisted in tracing 
the exact location of the line through the parliament, which they swept 
and polished clean. A photograph of the space shows how the line is 
now visible in the middle of the parliament, adding a new spatial level 
to the architecture and implicating the construction as part of a new 
extraterritorial reality – the material and spatial reality of the line itself. 
It was this line in which DAAR claimed to “identify a space that could 
host and embody decolonization.”246 For it is in this space, in this third 
option, that a radically new model of assembly emerges – an assembly 
of an architecture after the revolution:
It is in the heart of these unlegislated spaces that a sense of com-
munality beyond state institutions can be re-imagined. It is by re-
using these present political ruins – parliaments and borders – that 
a common extraterritorial assembly may emerge.247
Let us try to summarize the practices of Steyerl, Not An Alternative, 
De Bruijne, and DAAR in the context of Embedded Art, as well as 
their overall relation to Popular Propaganda Art and the performance 
of the popular, composition of a people, and construction of Popular 
Realism.
The embeddedness in the popular mass movement is articulated 
differently in all four practices. In the case of Steyerl, the museum 
is identified as a battlefield which includes popular mass movements 
such as the Kurds and the Gezi Park protests. As a result, her embed-
dedness in the museum expands into her embeddedness in the popular 
mass movement. In the case of Not An Alternative, members of the 
group are already embedded either in the field of activism or that of 
art. The result is a parallel embeddedness, repurposing means from the 
institution of art for the popular mass movement, sometimes leading 
to completely new institutional models. In the case of De Bruijne, his 
245   Ibid., p. 155.
246   Ibid., p. 171.
247   Ibid., p. 185.
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performance of the popular and the composition of a people. We could 
say that the alliances of artists, activists, and theorists (Not An Alter-
native) or their diverse geographic and cultural backgrounds (DAAR) 
prefigure the aim of composing a people beyond the existing Us/Them 
divide imposed through War on Terror Propaganda. In the case of Or-
ganizational Art, this aspect is pushed even further. The composition 
of an artist organization is not only aimed at prefiguring a different 
composition of a people, it should also be understood and analyzed as 
an artwork in itself. We touched on the idea of the organization-as-ar-
twork already in Claire Bishop’s discussion of Tania Bruguera’s Cáte-
dra Arte de Conducta, and in this section, we will try to deepen our un-
derstanding of such practices by defining a practice of Organizational 
Art as part of Popular Propaganda Art. In the process, we will address 
three aspects of Organizational Art. The first relates to understanding 
an artist organization as an artwork. The second concerns the artist 
organization’s relation to and impact on popular mass movements. The 
third is the infrastructure that the model of the artist organization pro-
vides to its founders and members, addressing not only the needs of 
popular mass movements, but also the precariat of artists and cultural 
workers themselves.
Whereas the practice of Embedded Art can be elucidated through a 
large variety of examples of artists involved in popular mass movements 
throughout history, the case of Organizational Art is more particular. 
An early example would be the work of Dutch anarchist-turned-fascist 
artist Erich Wichmann, who co-founded a political party in Amsterdam 
known as the Rapaille Partij (Rabble Party) in 1921. Wichmann was 
a staunch critic of parliamentary democracy and compulsory voting, 
and convinced that the presumption that uninformed citizens would 
be able to make proper decisions on issues regarding their own gover-
nance posed a grave danger.249 To prove his point, the artist did not 
only produce an ongoing wave of curious pamphlets mocking citizenry 
as spineless “milk drinkers,” but also ran with the Rapaille Partij for 
the Amsterdam municipal elections.250 Leader of the party was famous 
homeless man and street musician Cornelis de Gelder a.k.a Hadjeme-
maar (If-you-could-have-me), a ludic alcoholic that ran the political 
platform with an agenda co-authored by the artist, promising the citi-
zens of Amsterdam jenever (gin) and beer for the prize of only 5 cents 
249   Koen Vossen, Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark: Kleine politieke partijen in Nederland 1918–1940 (Am-
sterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2003), pp. 143–44.
250   The pamphlet in question was titled “The White Danger: On Milk, Milk Use, Milk Abuse and 
Milk Gluttony,” posing milk as the ultimate consumption of petty-bourgeois citizenry. See: 
Erich Wichmann, “Het witte gevaar: Over melk, melkgebruik, melkmisbruik en melkzucht,” in 
Wim Zaal (ed.), Erich Wichmann: Lenin stinkt en andere satirische geschriften gekozen door Wim Zaal 
(Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers, 1971).
a third option around which a people-in-the-making has yet to emerge. 
Its projects contribute to a broad involvement of its own members, 
residents to their program, as well as the governing structures of Pa-
lestinian municipalities and refugee camps, and as such contribute to 
the performance of the popular, albeit on the very specific terms of 
what they describe as a third option. In the process, DAAR effectively 
contributes to the formation of new compositions of identity through 
strategies of decolonization and political claims to extraterritoriality as 
a potential space of “common assembly.” The form of Popular Realism 
they try to invoke is described through their concept of a third path, a 
conception of the popular that emerges beyond a dialectic of the ori-
gin/exile dichotomy into a new extraterritorial reality.
In our analysis of Embedded Art, we have already touched slightly 
on the final organizational model of Popular Propaganda Art that we 
will discuss, Organizational Art. In the case of Not An Alternative as 
well as DAAR, we are dealing with collectives and organizations foun-
ded by artists, encompassing certain artistic dimensions of their own. 
Not An Alternative is something of a militant slogan in its own right, 
whereas DAAR contains a futuristic dimension by being an art resi-
dency of an extraterritorial domain of political and artistic practice yet 
in the making. But in neither case could we say that the organizations 
are themselves works of art. This is different with Organizational Art, 
which maintains a direct relation to the popular mass movement, but 
is itself also an artistic composition of sorts.
O R G A N I Z AT I O N A L  A RT
With the term Organizational Art we mean to focus on artists who 
work indirectly with popular mass movements, through artist organi-
zations they have founded. The artist organization is not the same as 
an artist collective, because the former considers the very notion of an 
organization as the material an artwork is made of: the organization is 
created in compository, artistic, and aesthetic terms.248
In the case of artist collectives, artist initiatives, or artist platforms 
such as Not An Alternative and DAAR we already saw how important 
the organizational dimension of artistic practice is in relation to the 
248   In 2015, dramaturg Florian Malzacher, curator Joanna Warsza, and I initiated the three-day 
conference Artist Organizations International from January 9–11, in a first attempt to theorize 
Organizational Art through the observation that “[a]rtist organizations are founded by artists; 
artist organizations choose the form of the organization; artist organizations seek for structural 
engagement; artist organizations propose social/political agendas.” These observations were 
debated by over twenty representatives of artist organizations worldwide. Congress statement 
and video registrations are archived at http://www.artistorganizations.org/, see also Andrea Liu, 
“Artists Organisations International” Afterimage Journal, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2015): pp. 2-3.; Ekater-
ina Degot, “The Artist as Director: ‘Artist Organisations International’ and its Contradictions,” 
Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context, and Enquiry, No. 40 (Autumn/Winter 2015): pp. 20–27.
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IRWIN produced posters and paintings with a strong Blut und Boden 
aesthetics, combining pagan symbols such as the deer with heroic wor-
kers and Germanic symbols. What remained absent, however, was an 
exact ideological declaration. NSK manifestos and interviews were full 
of rhetoric on anti-individualism and the need of absolute order, but 
never explain why this order was needed in the first place and whom 
this order would be benefiting. One could say that the NSK attemp-
ted to enact totalitarianism as something of a “pure form”: mobilizing 
deep human desires for unity through theatrical staging, but bypassing 
violent action. This strategy, known as “over-identification,” is essen-
tially a critique of a political regime by adopting its form and rhetoric, 
but in such an excessive way that it ridicules and undermines it.256 No-
netheless, as an artist organization, the NSK brought about semi-func-
tioning political infrastructures, most famously when the NSK trans-
formed into the “NSK State in Time,” a new state founded in 1992 
that issues actual passports, but does not exist as a physical territory, 
rather only as a geography of ideas.257 The lack of territory however has 
not stopped 16,000 citizens from joining the State in Time.258 In this 
context, one could see the 2015 concert of Laibach in North-Korea – 
the first international band to play in the highly secluded country – as 
real-time international diplomacy between the State in Time and the 
neo-Stalinist state.259
Taking these two examples into consideration, the artist organiza-
tion can already be valued on two levels. First, as an artistic composition 
that challenges the deficit of existing political models. And second, in 
terms of political effect as they operate in an actual political reality of 
upheaval and social change, and potentially bring about new changes 
themselves. Whether these changes are desirable, such as in the case of 
Wichmann, or even in control of the artists themselves, such as in the 
case of Laibach, is of course yet another discussion.
While we could discuss several historical examples of artist organi-
zations, we can observe a substantial rise of such organizational practi-
which demands members to accept that “the association denies each member his own freedom 
of choice regarding his religious persuasion, and political and aesthetic affiliation.” Neue Slowe-
nische Kunst, Neue Slowenische Kunst (Los Angeles: AMOK Books, 1991), p. 4.
256   A term defined by Slavoj Žižek. See: Slavoj Žižek, “Why are Laibach and NSK not Fascists?,” 
M’ARS Casopis Moderne Galerije, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1993): pp. 3-4. BAVO further expands the 
concept of over-identification in relation to the contemporary practices of Christoph Schlingen-
sief and Atelier van Lieshout. See: BAVO, Culture Activism Today: The Art of Over-Identification 
(Rotterdam: Episode Publishers, 2007).
257   Documented in IRWIN, State in Time (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2014).
258   Information on the amount of NSK passport holders is retrieved from a post on http:/www.nsk-
state.com, the official digital channel from the NSK State in Time, posted onJan. 11, 2016. The 
first NSK Citizen’s Congress was organized Oct. 21–23, 2010 in Haus der Kulturen der Welt, 
Berlin. See: Alexei Monroe (ed.), State of Emergence: A Documentary of the First NSK Citizen’s 
Congress (Leipzig/London: Poison Cabinet Press, 2011)
259   The event was scheduled as part of the “Laibach Liberation Tour.” See: Oliver Hotham, “Lai-
bach to Play Sound of Music covers at Pyongyang’s First Rock Concert,” The Guardian, Jul. 22, 
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/north-korea-laibach-pyongyang-concert.
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and the possibility to fish and hunt in de Vondelpark, one of the main 
public parks of the city.251 The party won 14,000 votes, amounting to 
two seats, strengthening Wichmann’s conviction that parliamentary 
democracy operated on the basis of the control and manipulation of 
public information, driving him later in his life to Mussolini’s Fascist 
Party and its sympathizing Futurist movement.252 As a consequence, 
Wichmann and his Rapaille Partij became marginalized in the art-his-
torical canon, although Wichmann undeniably had created one of the 
first models of the artist organization. The Rapaille Partij was not sim-
ply a collective of artists or a political party with artist members, but 
an organization conceived and operating as an artwork in its own right 
while achieving actual political results at the very same time.
A more contemporary example of the artist organization, including 
a similar flirt with authoritarianism, would be the Neue Slowenische 
Kunst (NSK), an artist organization founded in Yugoslavia in 1984. 
NSK consists of several “departments” formed by artist groups, among 
which the most prominent are the music group Laibach and the artist 
group IRWIN.253 Created in the Eastern European block during the 
emergence of ethno-nationalist tensions running throughout Yugosla-
via and the ongoing influence of the Soviet Union in the region, one 
could say the core work of NSK was focused on the performativity 
and morphology of totalitarianism.254 NSK members presented them-
selves as a homogeneous collective. The Laibach music group dres-
sed in what looked suspiciously like Nazi uniforms and accompanying 
hairstyles, and their manifestos were based on continuous claims on 
the necessity of unity, centralization, order, collectivism, and loyalty.255 
251   Quoted from “De Raad,” the official election newspaper of the Rapaille Party, original quotes in 
Dutch “De Jajem 5 cent, Bier ook 5 cent” and “Vrij visschen in het Vondelpark,” see: F.J. Haff-
mans (ed.), Geest, Koolzuur en Zijk: Briefwisseling van Erich Wichman (Westervoort: Van Gruting, 
1999), p. 69.
252   The work and writings of Italian futurist frontman Marinetti were an important influence on 
Wichmann. Just like Marinetti’s proximity to Mussolini’s Fascist Party, Wichmann sought to ally 
himself to Dutch Fascist movements. Nonetheless, Wichmann biographers Frans van Burkom 
and Hans Mulder have argued that, if it were not for his early death, the artist’s anarchist 
sympathies would have proven irreconcilable with later Nazi-fascism. They argue that Wichmann 
was principally a “chaoot,” a bringer of chaos. See: Frans van Burkom and Hans Mulder, Erich 
Wichmann 1890–1929: Tussen idealisme en rancune (Utrecht: Centraal Museum, 1983), p. 108–9, 
159
253   Other founding members were Theatre of the Sisters of Scipio Nasica, now the Cosmokinetic 
Cabinet Noordung, as well as the New Collectivism design department.
254   NSK member artist Miran Mohar mentions the disappointment of actual fascist groups 
attending NSK projects: “Interestingly, despite our iconography, we were not of much interest 
to ultranationalists in the long run. In fact, they were mostly quite disappointed and perplexed 
when they looked more closely at us. They attended the events of NSK and its groups because 
our iconography was apparently appealing to them, but its content did not meet their expecta-
tions and they did not know what to make of it.” Miran Mohar, “Why Neue Slovenische Kunst 
in German?,” e-flux journal, No. 57 (Sep. 2014).
255   The NSK’s “Eternal Book of Laws” lays out the “Constitution of Membership and Basic Duties 
of NSK Members.” It states, among others, that “[a] member of the NSK should be hardwork-
ing; he should respect the concepts of NSK and its history, be compliant and cooperative in 
carrying out joint decisions, and irreproachable in administering the general and secret statutory 
and moral norms of NSK.” Such principles are organized around the belief of “the hierarchical 
principle and existence of the supreme substance (ICS – the immanent, consistent spirit),” 
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activists through which laboffi develops its public carnavalesque agita-
tional actions against corporations they consider implicated in global 
climate crimes.262 Lastly, the ZPS emerged from a large collective of 
German artists and political campaigners with the aim of developing 
high-profile media actions they call “aggressive humanism” related to 
the refugee crisis, such as their highly controversial proposal to bury 
the corpses of refugees that died at sea in cemeteries in the German 
capital.263
While the very names of these artist organizations hint at the uto-
pian dimension of the endeavor of re-imagining what an organization 
is, could, or should be, they are simultaneously shaped and formed by 
popular mass movements and civil upheaval. In the case of IIPM in 
relation to social justice movements, in the case of laboffi in relation 
to climate activism, and in the case of the ZPS in relation to the stru-
ggle for refugee rights. Using the form of the organization here adds 
legitimacy, but also allows for long-term investments in specific crises 
by challenging the institution of art – and sometimes other structures 
capable of providing financial support, such as NGOs – to not just 
finance an artistic “project” with a social or political dimension, but to 
co-conceive fully functioning organizational infrastructures that provi-
de income and the capacity of long-term engagement of its members.
The first of two detailed case studies that we will discuss in the 
context of contemporary Organizational Art as part of Popular Propa-
ganda Art, will be related to the work of Tania Bruguera. We will begin 
by discussing her theoretical output on the notions of political art and 
her concept of “useful art” to understand how her practice of Organi-
zational Art came into being.
In her 2010 article “Political Art Transforms the Audience into Citi-
zens” Bruguera argues for a “difference in art between representing what 
is political and acting politically.”264 Political art, she continues, is not 
merely art that acts as an instrument of politics, which she considers – 
reductively – as a form of “art-propaganda.”265 Instead, Bruguera claims:
262   For example, labofii organized in 2016 a training day on the “Art of the Bloccade,” engaging 
participants to imagine alternative forms of protecting the ZAD, which would simultaneously 
operate as visual canvasses and sculptural interventions of sorts. Laboffi also does practical 
propaganda work, for example by producing the English translation of the Mauvaise Troupe 
Collective’s Defending the Zad (Paris: Editions de l’éclat, 2016).  
 
263   The Dead Are Coming (2015) consisted of a campaign to bury migrants who had died in the 
Mediterranean Sea in Berlin, the capital of what ZPS regards as the “bureaucratic murderers” 
responsible for these deaths. Sanctioned by the relatives of the deceased, the first burial of a 
Syrian migrant took place on Jun. 16, 2015. Chairs placed with the names of thirty-eight invited 
German politicians remained empty. Henri Neuendorf, “Controversial German Art Collective 
Buries Deceased Migrants in Berlin,” Artnet, Jun. 18, 2015, 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/art-collective-bury-dead-migrants-berlin-308975.
264   Tania Bruguera, “Politische Kunst macht das Publikum zu Bürgern,” Texte Zur Kunst, No. 80 
(Dec. 2010): pp. 134–36, translation retrieved from taniabruguera.com, section “Texts”, http://
www.taniabruguera.com/cms/458-0-Political+art+transforms+the+audience+into+citizens.htm.
265   Ibid.
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ces in the 21st century. The reason for this rise should be added as the 
third aspect of Organizational Art: the artist organization is not only an 
artistic composition or instrument to achieve a certain political effect, 
but also as system of life support for artists themselves. We should unders-
tand the rise of Organizational Art as a result of the growing preca-
riat, of which artist and cultural workers form a substantial part. Whe-
reas collectives such as the English Carrotworkers Collective or the 
German Haben und Brauchen are contemporary examples of artists 
and cultural workers who attempt to unionize in their struggle against 
unpaid labor and a general absence of social security in the art field,260 
the artist organization could be considered to be a similar response to 
a lack of infrastructure for the cultural precariat. It is far more effective 
to negotiate salaries and long-term funding when one presents one’s 
practice as an organization rather than as an individual artist-entrepre-
neur. Nevertheless, the primary objective of artist organizations is not 
to secure better funding for the artistic precariat, but the exploration 
of the organization as artwork and the mobilization of the artist orga-
nization to achieve political effect, to which the structural funding and 
social protection of its initiators and members is inherent.
In the case of contemporary Organizational Art, we can think of 
artist organizations such as the International Institute of Political Mur-
der (IIPM), The Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination (labofii), 
or Zentrum für Politische Schönheit (ZPS), each of which operates 
as an actual organization and provides income to its respective foun-
ders or members, while simultaneously exploring the organization as 
artistic composition and as a tool to achieve political change. IIPM 
was founded by the Swiss theater maker Milo Rau, and its main aim 
was to challenge the international judicial order through re-enacting 
historical trials and manifestos, exploring the theatrical and visual di-
mensions of evidence.261 Labofii, founded by John Jordan and Isabelle 
Frémeaux, operates mainly from the French Zone A Défendre (ZAD) 
nearby Nantes in France: an autonomous communal camp of climate 
260   The Carrotworkers Collective consists for a large part of interns and former interns in the 
cultural field, and organizes monthly assemblies, symposiums, workshops, and publications to 
weaponize cultural workers against exploitation. Being something between pamphlet, question-
naire and – surprisingly – photo-romances that narrate the struggles of female cultural workers, 
their guide Surviving Internships (2009) documents their analysis of precarious labor in the 
cultural realm. Carrot Workers Collective, Surviving Internships: A Counter Guide to Free Labour 
in the Arts (London: Hato Press, 2009). Haben und Brauchen focuses particularly on the city of 
Berlin, calling attention to working conditions of artists through pamphlets, petitions, debates, 
and lectures, while simultaneously calling for recognition of the unique alternative artistic and 
cultural sphere of the city in the face of gentrification and neoliberal politics.
261   One of the most controversial examples in this regard is IIPM’s production Five Easy Pieces 
(2016), in which child actors aged eight to thirteen narrate the story of the Belgian child 
molester and serial killer Marc Dutroux, as a form of public “evidence” of the changed Belgium 
national identity after the fact, while simultaneously forming “evidence” of the tricky ethics of 
Rau’s own use of minors for his piece, described by Rau as “connecting the idea of, as an adult, 
working with children, and this crime against children.” Kunstenfestivaldesarts, “Milo Rau / 
Five Easy Pieces / Interview,” May 16, 2016, https://vimeo.com/166817332.
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useful more beautiful, but on the contrary aims to focus on the beauty 
of being useful.”271 Useful art, she argues, remains art insofar as “it is 
the elaboration of a proposal that does not yet exist in the real world 
and because it is made with the hope and belief that something may 
be done better, even when the conditions for it to happen may not be 
there yet,” but it can only be termed as fully useful when it is capable 
of transforming “affection into effectiveness.”272
To understand the concrete outcome of Bruguera’s definition of 
political art and practice of useful art, we turn to her artist organiza-
tion Immigrant Movement International (IMI), which resulted from 
Bruguera’s collaboration with the New York-based public arts organi-
zation Creative Time and the Queens Museum.273 Demanding nothing 
but minimum wage, Bruguera lived together with an immigrant family 
in the city, and opened a storefront in a former beauty salon in Coro-
na, a neighborhood in Queens, from where numerous activities were 
organized: ‘English lessons, classes on immigrants’ rights and how to 
acquire legal documents, music lessons for children, […] workshops 
that sought to create a manifesto on behalf of migrants, and a works-
hop on what could be meant by useful art.”274
This modest community center that ran for five years, had an agen-
da as pragmatic as it was radically imaginative. On the one hand, it 
operated as a practical space of empowerment and community buil-
ding for immigrants, politicizing them by giving concrete insight in 
their juridical status and by unifying those often hidden in informal 
economies because fear of arrest or deportation. At the same time, 
Bruguera positioned this tiny space as the first building block of a ra-
dically new transnational organization, a movement of immigrants to 
be organized throughout worldwide community centers and undocu-
mented political parties that claim the immigrant as a new “global 
citizen.”275
This endeavor to challenge artistic authorship by turning into an 
“artist-initiator” or “artist-convener” who invites a broader coalition 
around an artist organization becomes most concrete in the 2011 
IMI-issued International Migrant Manifesto, collectively written by “im-
migration academics, activists, politicians, and community members” 
271   Ibid.
272   Tania Bruguera, “Reflexions on Arte Útil (Useful Art),” in Nick Aikens et al. (eds.), What’s the 
Use? Constellations of Art, History and Knowledge (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2016), p. 316.
273   Bruguera first conceptualized IMI while in residence in Paris during the 2005 riots in the ban-
lieus, articulating the notion of useful art and being-immigrant as part of the same paradigm: “It 
was at this time that I first identified as an immigrant. I felt impotent and realized I had no other 
resource but art to address this situation; therefore, art had to be useful.” See: “Tania Bruguera,” 
Artforum, Dec. 6, 2011, https://www.artforum.com/words/id=29724.
274   Thompson, Seeing Power, pp. 98–99.
275   “Tania Bruguera,” Artforum.
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Political art has doubts, not certainties; it has intentions, not programs; 
it shares with those who find it, not imposes on them; it is defined while 
it is done; it is an experience, not an image; it is something entering the 
field of emotions and that is more complex than a unit of thought.266
Over time, Bruguera has begun to rethink the notion of propaganda as 
a potentially progressive form of practice. Relevant in this particular 
text is the clarity with which Bruguera discusses the aims of what we 
have discussed so far as Popular Propaganda Art. For example when 
she writes that “[p]olitical art (which is not more artistic than it is 
political) is not comfortable because it speaks from a position of de-
mand.”267 This relates directly to what we have discussed as the impor-
tance of “demands” in the formation of a Popular Mass Movement 
through the inverted propaganda model. This intersection between 
popular and artistic demand is the result of what Bruguera defines as 
a “new people’s political language,” similar to what we have discussed 
as the role of art in the process of composing a people, the aesthetic 
and morphological construction of a new collectivity in the making.268
In order for art to act politically, Bruguera confronts the question 
how exactly to define the “use” of art. Her answer comes in the form of 
her “Introduction to Useful Art” (2011) and “Reflexions on Arte Útil” 
(2012), in which she essentially focuses on art as a tool of politicized 
civil society, rather than an established political class. The difference 
lies between what she calls “art-propaganda” as a tool of the state, 
versus a useful art – what we term Popular Propaganda Art – as a tool 
of politicized civil society.269 Different from Steyerl, Bruguera argues 
that “[w]e do not have to enter the Louvre or the castles, we have to 
enter people’s houses, people’s lives, this is where useful art is,” indeed 
emphasizing the civic and not the statist as the political dimension of 
political art.270 Starting from historical examples such as the “Manifes-
to de Arte Útil” (1969) written by Argentinean artist Eduardo Costa, 
Bruguera argues that the “utilitarian component” that she is seeking in 
the civic usages of art “does not aim to make something that is already 
266   Ibid.
267   Tania Bruguera, “Political Art Statement,” 2010, http://www.taniabruguera.com/cms/388-0-Po-
litical+Art+Statement.htm.
268   Ibid.
269   Stephen Wright, with whom Bruguera collaborated intensively to develop the implications of 
transforming the notion of spectatorship into usership, writes: “usership […] names not just a 
form of opportunity-dependent relationality, but a self-regulating mode of engagement and op-
eration. Which makes usership itself a potentially powerful tool. In the same way that usership is 
all about repurposing available ways and means without seeking to possess them, it can itself be 
repurposed as a mode of leverage, a fulcrum, a shifter, and as such, a game-changer.” Stephen 
Wright, Toward a Lexicon of Usership (Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum, 2013), p. 68.
270   Tania Bruguera, “Introduction on Useful Art,” transcript from a conversation on Useful Art at 
the Immigrant Movement International headquarters on Apr. 23, 2011, New York, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=MKPPmmNVuAs.
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pective of NGOs and humanitarian work they are rather short-lived. 
In the meantime, Bruguera has continued to set up a variety of new 
institutions, such as the The Hannah Arendt International Institute of 
Artivism (2016–ongoing) and a campaign to participate as a presiden-
tial candidate in the next Cuban elections while calling upon fellow 
Cubans to do the same, all of which limit her capacity to continue the 
endeavor of IMI.279 Artist James Bridle notes that we are dealing with 
what could be considered a progressive variation of the use of a “front 
organization,” such as deployed by both intelligence agencies as well as 
blacklisted organizations.280
The trail of organizations founded by Bruguera seems to suggest 
that at the moment the artist, after a long-term investment, decides to 
move on, the feasibility of the infrastructure is put at risk. This touches 
on a paradox of the “usefulness” of useful art. While it most certainly 
has a concrete effect on a given community at the moment of its con-
ception, its radical imaginative capacity seems to be its most durable 
and lasting outcome. While this might be hard to quantify, it is most 
certainly “useful,” but possibly on slightly different and more parado-
xical terms than the artist intends it to be.
The second case study that we discuss in the context of Organiza-
tional Art as part of Popular Propaganda Art, is related to the work of 
Turkish-Kurdish artist Ahmet Öğüt. We will briefly explore his ideas 
on the relation between the artistic and the political, and what he ter-
ms the “currency of collective consciousness,” the role of art in articu-
lating alternative models of validation that go beyond those of financial 
currencies.
Öğüt’s explains the roots of his politicization in his essay «CCC: 
Currency of Collective Consciousness» (2015), in which he narrates 
his time growing up in the Turkish civil war, in a town patrolled by 
tanks where speaking one’s mother tongue was in itself considered a 
crime: “I am coming from a place where I learned the importance 
of consciousness – more importantly, collective consciousness – when 
279   The Hannah Arendt Institute for Artivism (Instar) was conceived at the occasion of the 
re-opening of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States, with the aim to “create 
peaceful tools for policy change and civic literacy.” The school is organized in four departments, 
“Useful Art,” “Behavior Art,” “Applied Arts,” and “AEST-ethics.” It operates through a three-
step methodology: “Think Tank,” focused on rethinking policy and constitutional transforma-
tion; “Do Tank,” in which policy/constitutional performances are translated into popular public 
performances; and “Wish Tank,” consisting of residencies of artists, activists, and others with a 
socially engaged practice that feeds back into the “Think” and “Do” Tanks. Retrieved from the 
“Mission” section of the Instar website, http://artivismo.org/english/#mission. Bruguera’s pres-
idential bid was announced on Oct. 16, 2016 by the artist during the three-day Creative Time 
Summit in Washington entitled “Occupy the Future.” Victoria Burnett, “Artist Asks Cubans to 
Imagine They Are Running for President,” The New York Times, Oct. 14, 2016, https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/10/15/arts/design/tania-bruguera-cuba-creative-time-summit-video.html?_r=0.
280   From personal conversation with Bridle on the concept of the artist organization, Athens, Apr. 
23.
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at the IMI headquarters in Corona.276 The manifesto claims migrants 
as global citizens and an “engine of change.”277 Rather than victimizing 
the figure of the migrant, the manifesto attempts to politicize them, 
claiming for immigrants “the same privileges as corporations and the 
international elite, as they have the freedom to travel and to establish 
themselves wherever they choose,” while demanding that “the func-
tionality of international borders should be re-imagined in the service 
of humanity.”278 The transnational dimension of IMI took the form of 
the short-lived Migrant People Party (MPP), founded by Bruguera to 
participate in the 2012 elections in Mexico, not as an electable party, 
but as a party that organized public events and interventions in public 
space to put migrants rights’ on the agenda of existing political parties. 
Bruguera’s migrant as global citizen is the foundation of her particular 
strand of Popular Realism that emerges from her practice of Organi-
zational Art.
The tension of IMI is located in the ambiguous nature of Organi-
zational Art. On the one hand, IMI is a radical imaginative structure 
that attempts to redefine immigrants around the world as a vanguard 
of a new transnational world order to come. On the other, IMI is a 
real-time community center capable of providing modest support to 
its often highly precarious community, which – operating in the grey 
and black economy – face the daily threat of abuse, incarceration, and 
deportation. The outcome of IMI should be evaluated through this 
very duality, between the possible and the real. And while the artistic 
dimension is crucial here for opening up a radical imaginative capaci-
ty of what an organization could be, it is simultaneously the cause of 
IMI’s fragility. Bruguera’s capacity for gaining funding for her work is 
strongly connected to her name as an artist, and her projects operate 
for as long as she is able to allocate funds from the institution of art to 
her own artist organization. When financing comes to an end, projects 
such as IMI or the MPP are added to her project archive, with a refe-
rence of them being “courtesy” of the artist.
From that perspective, we can question to what extent existing im-
migrant rights organizations that are not conceived as artworks are not 
far more effective in their long-term work, and far less dependent on 
the investment of a single person. In the NGO world directors come 
and go, but the organization, in principle, lives on. While for art-world 
standards Bruguera’s Organizational Art is long-term, from the pers-
276   Tania Bruguera et al., “Migrant Manifesto,” Immigrant Movement International, Nov. 2011, 
http://immigrant-movement.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/IM-International-Migrant-Mani-
festo2.pdf
277   Ibid.
278   Ibid.
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Today, the artist organization SU has been or continues to be active in 
London, Stockholm, Hamburg, Ruhr, Amman, and Athens, in each case 
originating from the same principle, to create a para-university through 
the domain of the arts providing recognition and work for asylum see-
kers, refugees, and immigrants with a predominantly academic back-
ground, harboring their knowledge and skills in the society of arrival.
Although the point of departure remains the same, the implemen-
tation of the SU has been different depending on each context. In 
London, it was created through the financial support of two art ins-
titutions, and launched in Tate Modern with a series of presentations 
by the lecturers of the SU free for all to attend. These first presenta-
tions were delivered by “a pharmacist from Syria, an accountant from 
Congo, a marketing manager from Zimbabwe and a calligrapher from 
Iraq,”285 some of which decided not to speak at all, such as the Eritrean 
Mulugeta Fikadu who delivered a lecture on transmittable sexual di-
seases in front of empty colored slides standing in total silence.286 As 
such, the founding event of the Silent University was situated between 
artistic performance and an actual university. Knowledge was trans-
ferred, but in some cases an audience might be listening to informa-
tion they had no necessary interest in, but remained in their seat to 
witness an artwork by Öğüt. And in some cases, silence itself became 
the knowledge transmitted as a way of forcing the audience to ack-
nowledge the silencing of the SU lecturers as holders of knowledge. 
This theatrical use of silence in the SU also relates to the investment 
of this para-institution into new currencies of collective consciousness. 
Rather than asking attendees for payment, the SU instead aims for an 
exchange of knowledge and skills. Seeing that in the case of Fikadu 
this exchange had not yet taken place – only he was expected to deliver 
knowledge – staging silence was also a means of addressing this funda-
mental inequality between audience and speaker.
In other words, SU is not only a platform for the recognition of the 
skills and knowledge of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants, it 
is also a structure that challenges the very idea of what a university is, 
could, or should be. The SU is free of charge on a monetary level, but 
attempts to reintroduce alternative currencies as a means of building 
common consciousness. In some cases, the use of such alternative cu-
rrencies also solves the problem of members of the SU’s faculty which 
are undocumented or in the process of asylum application, and as such 
University.”
285   Ahmet Öğüt, “The Silent University,” Frieze No. 149: New Schools: The Silent University (Sep. 
2012): p. 139, at p. 139.
286   Florian Malzacher, Ahmet Öğüt, and Pelin Tan (eds.), The Silent University: Towards a Transversal 
Pedagogy (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016), p. 76.
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one is isolated both culturally and politically.”281 Such collective cons-
ciousness, Öğüt argues, is a crucial currency to develop in the do-
main of politically engaged contemporary art, whose internal economy 
is plagued by corrupt finances and sponsors, as became evident in a 
variety of boycotts of large-scale art biennials in which Öğüt was in-
volved.282 What Öğüt claims is needed, are strategies of sabotage and 
para-sitic practice in order to break art’s bonds to ruling corporate and 
political interests, so as not to abandon but repurpose the infrastructu-
re of art with the aim of social transformation. Concretely this means 
that the artist becomes an “intervenor,” an agent who challenges and 
rearticulates the relation between the institution of art and the larger 
social realm.
Although written as a proposal, Öğüt’s “CCC: Currency of Collec-
tive Consciousness” should rather be understood as an artist manifes-
to after the act; he himself is the intervenor that institutes, in between 
worlds, the para-institutions that introduce new forms of currency of 
collective consciousness that we are theorizing as Organizational Art. 
This is most particularly the case in his Organizational Art practice, 
taking the form of The Silent University (SU, 2012–ongoing). Öğüt 
conceptualized the SU as part of a collaboration with the Tate Mu-
seum and the Delfina Foundation in London, as well as the political 
organizations Southwark Refugee Communities Forum, Migrants Re-
source Centre, and the United Migrant Workers Education Project. SU’s 
aim was to create a para-institution that Öğüt called an “autonomous 
knowledge platform” in order to recruit “asylum seekers, refugees and 
immigrants with a professional background in their country of origin 
who, due to systemic social exclusion and discrimination, are unable to 
put their knowledge to professional use in the countries where they cu-
rrently live.”283 A core focus lies on asylum seekers, refugees, and immi-
grants with an academic background that are not recognized in their 
country of arrival, something the SU considers as a destruction of capi-
tal that can be countered by activating “the all too often unrecognized 
knowledge of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants that have been con-
demned to silence in their new countries of residence.”284
281   Ahmet Öğüt, “CCC: Currency of Collective Conciousness,” e-flux journal, No. 62 (Feb. 2015).
282   Öğüt was one of five artists who began a widely mediated boycott of the 2014 19th Biennial of 
Sydney due to the role of Transfield Holdings, one of the event’s main sponsors, which holds 
a contract with the Australian government to provide security and welfare services to asylum 
seeker detention centers on nearby islands. See: Joanna Warsza and Salzburg International 
Summer Academy of Fine Arts (eds.), I Can’t Work Like This: A Reader on Recent Boycotts and 
Contemporary Art (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017), pp. 258–326.
283   Ceren Erdem (ed.), Ahmet Öğüt: Tips and Tricks (Milan: Mousse Publishing, 2014), p. 114.
284   Ahmet Öğüt, “The Pitfalls of Institutional Pedagogy,” World Policy, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter 
2016/17), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/12/pitfalls-institutional-pedagogy. The 
notion of “silencing” is crucial in the name of the project, which refers to the work of writer and 
educator Anna Eliot Ticknor, who in 1873 initiated the Society to Encourage Studies at Home, 
a network in Boston that literary scholar Harriet F. Bergmann recently described as a “Silent 
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In the case of subsequently established SU para-institutions, Öğüt 
attempted to counter this dilemma by negotiating long-term funding 
with partner institutions beforehand. This was most successfully the 
case in Öğüt’s collaboration with Tensta Konsthall and the Worker’s 
Educational Association (ABF) with whom the SU Stockholm was 
founded in 2013, and the artist’s collaboration with Impulse Festi-
val, Theaterhaus Ringlokschuppen Ruhr, and Urbane Künste Ruhr 
with whom the SU Ruhr was founded in 2015. Whereas in the case 
of the SU Stockholm the para-institution operates within the building 
of Tensta Konsthall, the SU Ruhr runs in a former shop unit in the 
center of Mülheim with a coordinator hired for a three-quarter posi-
tion to make sure its activities are maintained on a structural level. It 
is worthwhile to note that the successes of SU Stockholm and Ruhr 
also led to abandoning the SU London’s experiment with alternative 
currencies. The aim for a more solid university subsequentially im-
pacted the more experimental artistic-pedagogical nature of the SU. 
Nevertheless, the SU has continued to be discussed, analyzed, and 
theorized in all of its artistic potentialities, especially at the SU Stoc-
kholm due to its integration in an existing art institution.290 And while 
the alternative currencies might have lost their immediate priority, the 
day-to-day practice of the Silent University brought about new dimen-
sions and aims, such as a parallel language school in Stockholm, which 
was not part of the original setup. The SU, in other words, started 
on the basis of principles but developed into new forms and modules 
in practice. Sometimes practice also meant the end or suspension of 
the artist organization, such as the case of SU Hamburg (2013), whe-
re existing universities started to provide similar services,291 or in the 
case of SU Jordan (2015), where the faculty encountered difficulties 
to guarantee the security of its lecturers.292 The most recent SU itera-
tion in Athens (2016), founded by independent activists and cultural 
workers with support of the non-profit art institution State of Con-
cept, is partly operational but struggles with the overall “drainage of 
resources by austerity measures and memoranda since 2012,” which 
have turned Athens into the scenery of an ongoing “economic war.”293 
 When compared to other artist organizations Öğüt’s SU has an im-
pressive track record with regard to the para-institution’s scale and 
scope, but its different iterations also show a series of reoccurring di-
290   Director Maria Lindt pledges to continue to Silent University at least for the period of her 
directorship at Tensta Konsthall, and writes that the language café is currently taking place 
twice a week, with additional monthly excursions throughout Stockholm. From personal e-mail 
exchange with Lindt, Mar. 5, 2017.
291   Malzacher, Öğüt, and Tan, The Silent University, p. 105.
292   Ibid., pp. 122–23.
293   Ibid., p. 137.
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not allowed to do any paid labor. Embracing alternative currencies ob-
viously does not mean that the SU is not itself vulnerable to financial 
pressures within the existing system. In the case of the SU in London, 
after initial investments of Tate, Delfina, and a money prize in the form 
of the Visible Award, financial means were exhausted by 2014 after 
a final collaboration with the Oxford Migration Studies Society, the 
Refugee Centre at the University of Oxford, and The Showroom. Exis-
ting institutions did not “adopt” the para-institution within their own 
infrastructure.
According to the surprisingly self-critical publication The Silent 
University: Towards a Transversal Pedagogy (2016) issued by the SU, this 
lack of funding resulted in a question what to do with the assembled 
faculty of lecturers, consultants, and advisors as well as “students,” 
comprising two hundred individuals registered through the SU website 
pledging more than a thousand hours in total in alternative curren-
cies.287 Increasingly infrequent gatherings of the SU faculty proposed 
the possibility of registering the SU as a charity to retrieve more struc-
tural funding – with the risk of the artist organization being forced into 
the organizational regiment of already existing NGOs. Another issue 
raised by the faculty dealt with their own sense of limited ownership 
over the SU. The latter point is rather crucial here, when it comes to 
the stated intention of Organizational Art to operate not only as an 
artwork that deals with the model of the organization as material, but 
equally invests in the concrete political outcomes and capacity of the 
organization to operate autonomously after its conception. In this case, 
the reoccurring question “Where is Ahmet?” among faculty indicates 
a difficulty of the SU’s aim to move from an artist project to a fully 
operating institution,288 in spite of Öğüt’s own statement that “artistic 
pedagogical practices need to be emancipated from commonly used 
terminologies such as ‘projects’ and ‘workshops’ referencing them as 
‘tests’ or ‘short-term engagements.’”289 This is an issue we also encoun-
tered with Bruguera’s IMI. Funds can be repurposed only for as long 
as the artwork maintains a certain novelty, and the artist signature 
remains continuously present for the art institution to legitimize why 
it would invest in a body with such a clear political purpose. In other 
words, the institution of art is willing to finance Organizational Art 
for as long as it can clearly been described as art through the artists’ 
authorship, leaving the possibility of a long-term organizational work 
in the hands of NGOs and the like.
287   Ibid., pp. 79–80.
288   Ibid., p. 81.
289   Öğüt, “The Pitfalls of Institutional Pedagogy.”
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expand its work.
The performance of emerging power, central to the practice of Po-
pular Propaganda Art is similar in both practices as well. IMI’s output 
is located between the real and the possible, between concrete labor 
in service of immigrant communities through the center that existed 
for five years, and an investment in a transnational campaign that po-
sits the migrant as global citizen. IMI is therefore clearly invested in 
contributing to the performance of the popular through the work of 
its community center, while simultaneously investing its imaginative 
capacity in re-composing a transnational people through the politi-
cization of the immigrant subject. IMI’s Popular Realism is aimed at 
the construction of a possible reality based on this fundamental para-
digm shift. Like Bruguera, the SU’s output is located between the real 
and the possible: between concrete labor in service of the struggles 
of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants through the different in-
carnations of the para-institution, while investing in the possibility of 
developing alternative currencies and horizontal pedagogical models. 
The SU as such is clearly invested in contributing to the performance 
of the popular through the work of its various international iterations, 
while simultaneously using its imaginative capacity to recompose a 
people through the politicization of refugees, asylum seekers, and im-
migrants in the context of the radical pedagogy of the para-institution. 
The SU’s Popular Realism is aimed at the construction of a possi-
ble reality through this process of politicization; creating a common 
knowledge in which citizens and non-citizens co-exist on a principle of 
fundamental equality.
Although we have seen that the political aims of Organizational 
Art in many ways overlap with those of Embedded Art, it differs in 
its investment in the concept of the organization as artwork. We can, 
however, observe a particular surge of artist organizations in the 21st 
century as a result of the precarious position of artists and the desire to 
invest in long-term engagement with popular mass movements.
P O P U L A R  P R O PAG A N DA  A RT : S U M M A RY
Before we continue to discuss the third and final category of contem-
porary propaganda art in the form of Stateless Propaganda Art, let us 
summarize our observations on the manifold dimensions of Popular 
Propaganda Propaganda Art through the following conclusions:
• Popular Propaganda Art is contemporary propaganda art that 
operates by means of the emerging precarious infrastructures of 
popular mass movements through which it aims to contribute 
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lemmas, which are mainly related to the long-term funding and institu-
tional back-up necessary to turn it into a durable reality. The difficulty 
of the artist organization model is that while it suggests the appearance 
of an organization proper – including logo, website, business cards, 
and the like – it does not have access to even a fragment of the financial 
resources that are normally attributed to actual universities. We en-
counter here again the duality of Organizational Art in the form of the 
real and the possible. The SU encompasses modest, sometimes more 
and sometimes less successful attempts to recognize the knowledge 
and capacities of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants through 
conferences, lecture programs, and language cafes. At the same time, 
the SU claims the concept of a para-institution as a space where tra-
ditional currencies are abandoned, pedagogical hierarchies radically 
overthrown, all languages are spoken equally, silence is recognized as 
an alternative form of knowledge transfer, border politics are aboli-
shed, and extraterritoriality considered the given space of action. It 
is the SU’s own thorough self-critique that makes it possible for us to 
identify Organizational Art’s dilemma between what is real and what is 
possible more clearly, creating the possibility of overcoming its contra-
dictions. In this regard Öğüt stands at the forefront of theorizing and 
establishing a practice of Organizational Art as a lasting para-institu-
tional reality in the 21st century.
Let us try to summarize the practices of Bruguera and Öğüt in the 
context of Organizational Art as well as their overall relation to the 
performance of the popular, the composition of a people and the cons-
truction of Popular Realism.
The artist-organization’s relationship to the popular mass move-
ment is articulated similarly in the two different practices. In the case 
of Bruguera, IMI operates clearly in direct relation to popular mass 
movements, specifically in the realm of immigration rights and mo-
bilization, connecting to local communities, civil organizations, and 
NGOs in the process of drafting its manifestos and programs. The re-
lation to the institution of art is maintained, albeit by challenging it to 
invest in a parallel artist-run infrastructure in the form of the artist or-
ganization, proposing a long-term engagement beyond the usual tem-
porary political art “project.” In the case of Öğüt, the Silent University 
relates directly to popular mass movements in the form of struggles 
of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, connecting to a variety 
of local communities, civil action and advocacy groups, but also to 
universities and other educational institutions. The relation to the ins-
titution of art is manifold and international, with a shifting focus on 
accepting temporary commissioned work (London) to a demand for 
long-term investment in the SU (Stockholm, Ruhr) to maintain and 
3 5 0 3 5 1
4 . 3  S TAT E L E S S  P R O PAG A N DA  A RT
The stated – those recognized, administered, and living in the sphere 
of relative protection provided by the state – cannot but observe the 
condition of statelessness. The knowledge inherent to statelessness can 
only be acquired by those who have been forced into the condition 
of living without or outside the state. In this final section, instead of 
merely analyzing the condition of statelessness, we will have to embark 
on a different endeavor, by trying to learn from the specific knowledge 
generated by the experience of statelessness.
This is what we have tried to do in the Stateless Propaganda sec-
tion in the previous chapter vis-à-vis the work of Mohamedou Ould 
Slahi, who lived through a particular experience of statelessness in the 
lawless structures of the War on Terror. His book is an act of self-re-
cognition of the stateless community while at the same time providing 
the stated the possibility of understanding how the very structures that 
define their relative privilege and protection simultaneously enforce 
the condition of statelessness upon others. In Ould Slahi’s proposal to 
make the stated hear beyond what they are able to hear, an assembly 
between the stated and stateless, as embodied in his alliance with Ho-
llander and Siems, becomes imaginable. We defined the dual outcomes 
of Ould Slahi’s Stateless Propaganda as self-recognition and recognition 
by others.
In this final segment, rather than defining Stateless Propaganda Art, 
we will seek to draft a series of observations, based as much as possible 
from primary sources produced by the political and cultural practices 
of different stateless actors themselves.294 At this point, propaganda re-
search cannot be separated from my own implications in the domain 
of propaganda work. To draft a definition of Stateless Propaganda Art, I 
must return to the work of my own artist-organizations, the New World 
Summit, and its school, the New World Academy, which I mentioned in 
my introduction to this thesis. The particular examples in this chapter, 
namely refugee collective We Are Here in Amsterdam, the National Li-
beration Movement of Azawad in Northern-Mali and the Democratic 
Self-Administration of Rojava in Northern-Syria, were collaborators in 
both of these organizations. Interviews that I conducted with its repre-
sentatives referenced throughout this segment, are the result of field 
294   Many of the cited sources are the result of my project New World Academy (2013–15), co-found-
ed with BAK, basis voor actuele kunst in Utrecht, which I also referred to in my introduction. 
An art project in the form of a school, the New World Academy invited stateless and blacklisted 
organizations to teach artists and students about the role of art and culture in their political 
struggles. This gave me the opportunity to conduct field research and interviews in, among oth-
ers, Azawad (northern Mali) and Rojava (northern Syria), and work with the Amsterdam-based 
refugee collective We Are Here. Transcripts of these interviews form the basis of a five-part 
reader series, which are also primary sources for this section on Stateless Propaganda Art.
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to the performance of the popular and the composition of a 
people;
• Popular Propaganda Art subverts the Us/Them dichotomy of 
War on Terror Propaganda by building alliances between a di-
verse precariat, identifying common oppressors and recompo-
sing the notion of Us – a people-in-the-making;
• Popular Propaganda Art manifests itself through three diffe-
rent organizational models: Assemblism, Embedded Art, and 
Organizational Art. Assemblism as a practice of performative 
assembly includes artistic components and comprises an aes-
thetic vocabulary, but as a whole should not be considered art 
as such. Embedded and Organizational Art focus on the parti-
cular competence of artists within or in relation to popular mass 
movements: the former as individual artists or artist collectives 
and artist groups, the latter in the form of organizational mo-
dels that operate politically, and simultaneously as artworks in 
their own right;
• Popular Propaganda Art aims at transforming the collective de-
mands that emerge from popular mass movements through the 
performance of the popular and the composing of a people into 
the construction of Popular Realism: the transformation of rea-
lity after the interests of precarious popular mass movements.
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We will note some differences between Stateless Propaganda Art 
and Popular Propaganda Art. One of the main differences we have 
discussed in the previous chapter relates to the extreme difference of 
precarity between a member of politicized civil society and a stateless 
person, and the way that these different scales of precarity impact the 
capacity for political organization. The other difference is that while we 
may understand Stateless Propaganda partly as an “emerging power” 
when it brings about new structures of organization and governance, it 
starts first of all from a process of self-recognition of the stateless as an 
already existing collectivity. In this segment, we will take the stateless 
as our point of departure, and the specificity of their condition and 
struggle vis-à-vis the stated.
We will place an emphasis, however, on the third condition of sta-
telessness, which is the demand to recognize statelessness as an alter-
native to the state. This will allow us to understand statelessness not in 
mere opposition to the state, but as a condition – a state of being – that 
introduces a construction of stateless reality, or a “reality according 
to the stateless.” And the construction of reality, as we have observed 
throughout this thesis, is the aim of all propaganda.
S TAT E L E S S  P R O PAG A N DA S  A N D  S TAT E L E S S
P R O PAG A N DA  A RT
As we have mentioned, the term statelessness can refer to a variety of 
different conditions. Let us begin with stateless people who demand 
recognition and protection by an existing state, such as undocumented 
migrants, refugees, or individuals persecuted as terrorists. Here we 
speak of people who once had passports, or should have them, but are 
denied such recognition. We can think for example of refugee collec-
tive We Are Here in Amsterdam, a group of more than two-hundred 
undocumented migrants and refugees – some of which have resided 
in the Netherlands for more than fifteen years – but whose procedural 
options have been “exhausted” (uitgeprocedeerd). They cannot return to 
their country of origin due to safety issues or because their countries 
no longer recognize them, while the Dutch state simultaneously refu-
ses them citizenship.296 This condition of limbo forces them into the 
domain of statelessness, or more precisely, “between states.” Neither 
the state of origin nor the hosting state is willing to provide them with 
crucial structures of life support. In the case of Ould Slahi, we saw the 
296   Martijn Stronks, “The Paradox of Visible Illegality: A Brief History of Dutch Migration 
Control,” in Jonas Staal and We Are Here (eds.), Collective Struggle of Refugees. Lost. In Between. 
Together. (Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 2013), pp. 65–76.
work in stateless regions but also of collaborations taking place at the 
very same time. Prominent voices in Stateless Propaganda referenced 
here, such as Yoonis Osman Nuur (We Are Here), Moussa Ag Assa-
rid and Mazou Ibrahim Touré (MNLA/Artist Association of Azawad), 
Abdullah Abdul (Tev-Çand) and Şêro Hindê and Diyar Hesso (Artist 
Association of Azawad), are not merely “sources” or “case studies” but 
collaborators and most of all, artists that are directly implicated in the 
struggle of instituting the very concept of Stateless Propaganda Art. In 
this context, my own propaganda work is both source and objective, 
defined by the process of narrating and creating alternative histories – 
and possibly future practices – of propaganda art.
We will expand on the notion of statelessness developed through 
Ould Slahi’s work by adding brief historical examples of other forms of 
statelessness and Stateless Propaganda. These examples, all of which 
result from my own propaganda work, include the model of the refugee 
collective, the national liberation movement, and an alternative model 
of stateless democracy. Our particular focus will be the role of Stateless 
Propaganda Art within each of these examples.
There is no single condition of statelessness but rather a variety of 
different conditions, depending on the demand of the stateless to be 
recognized by an existing state; the demand of the stateless to create 
a state of their own; and the demand of the stateless to define state-
lessness as an alternative to the state altogether. Within each of these 
conditions there are certain grey zones. For example, a member of a 
separatist “stateless” movement might still hold a passport of the state 
they are fighting against, while receiving no protection from it what-
soever. On paper, they are still “stated,” although in the cases we will 
be discussing throughout this section, this statedness is symbolical at 
best, and barely functional in reality. Instead, we might have to think of 
the difference between the stated and the stateless in the way that phi-
losopher Rastko Močnik spoke of fascism, considering that there is hardly 
ever complete or no fascism at all, and that the question is rather: “How 
Much Fascism?”295 In this light, we would have to ask ourselves: How much 
state? Or how much statelessness?
Our aim here will thus be to explore how our earlier proposition 
of a definition of Stateless Propaganda – a performance of the radical 
precarity of a community of stateless peoples – relates to such different 
conditions of statelessness, and how these define different stateless pro-
pagandas and equally different forms of Stateless Propaganda Art.
295   Rastko Močnik, Extravagantia II: koliko fašizma? (Ljubljana: Insitutum studiorum humanitatis, 
1995).
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that we are here and that we are lost in between. And because this 
is unacceptable, we came together.”298 Similar to Butler’s reading of 
Assemblist practice, Nuur emphasizes the unchosen composition of 
the We Are Here collective. The members of the group, coming from 
different parts of the African continent, are characterized by different 
political, educational, and religious backgrounds; they are “one” only 
in so far as each of them is confronted with the oppressive conditions 
of statelessness. Similar to Ould Slahi’s assembly with Hollander and 
Siems, Nuur addresses the importance of the alliance between docu-
mented and undocumented peoples – between the stated and the sta-
teless: “[C]hanges will come about through the people who are protes-
ting with us. We have to bond with them because we need the support 
of Dutch citizens.”299
On the one hand, Nuur recognizes that the performative power of 
We Are Here is both defined and limited by the stateless condition of 
its members, exemplified by the name of the group, which is simulta-
neously its slogan – We are here – a recognition of the unchosen dimen-
sion of this political collective. On the other, an alliance needs to be 
initiated that includes those who are holding relative positions of power 
within the existing state while opposing its policies to achieve greater 
impact upon reality. This led to the collaboration between We Are Here 
and Christian activists as well as anarchist communities came about, 
which helped to squat and organize a variety of temporal spaces for 
the collective to reside. It also facilitated donations in the form of food 
and material support from Dutch citizenry, which allowed the group 
to survive up until today. The recognition of their own performativity 
as stateless bodies and the capacity of these bodies to become visible 
to each other and to those who are stated, is exactly what forms the 
preconditions for the group’s existence and its enactment of Stateless 
Propaganda. The strength of the state lies in its capacity to make the 
stateless invisible; the strength of the stateless is to make themselves 
visible. First to civil society and subsequently, through civil society, to 
the state. As Nuur explained in an interview, “[b]y calling attention 
to the fact that we are living on the streets and in temporary shelters, 
we made visible the problems that we are confronted with on a daily 
basis.”300
In the case of We Are Here, this process of visibilization has taken 
on particular artistic and cultural forms, which are the direct result of 
their legal – or rather, “illegal” – status. Whereas statelessness preclu-
298   Yoonis Osman Nuur, “We Exist,” in Collective Struggle of Refugees, p. 43.
299   Ibid., p. 45.
300   Yoonis Osman Nuur interviewed by Jonas Staal, “We Are a Political Group,” in Collective Strug-
gle of Refugees, p. 57.
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consequence of being labelled as terrorist. His rights as a Mauritanian 
citizen were revoked and he was subsequently imprisoned as a stateless 
individual. It is important to mention here how the examples of undo-
cumented migrants and refugees, as well as alleged terrorism suspects, 
have become increasingly interrelated, for example when Western sta-
tes refuse to provide resident status or citizenship to refugees out of 
fear that terrorists or potential terrorists would be among them.297 The 
stateless subject can thus become a screen of orientalist projection and 
the target of War on Terror Propaganda. No matter their background 
or reasons to migrate, a suspicion of terrorism can come to completely 
define their status. What connects all these examples is that each aim 
at recognition by an existing state, whether that is the state of origin or 
the state of arrival, whether it is as a refugee or as a terrorist suspect.
As we discussed previously under Stateless Propaganda, the claim 
to power of stateless peoples often does not reach beyond the – limi-
ted – use of their bodies. This is the primary “power” that is available 
to those who are forced to exist outside any form of state recognition. 
This is the reason why the hunger strike, mentioned by both Butler 
and Ould Slahi, forms one of the recurring models of Assemblist prac-
tice through which the stateless can organize the extremely limited 
powers at their disposal. It was in this light, that we observed that the 
performance of Stateless Propaganda is characterized by a nearly com-
plete separation of the stateless from existing power and their claim to 
an oppositional construction of power. In the case of Ould Slahi, we 
saw how this translated into Guantánamo Diary, in which he perfor-
med a form of self-recognition of the stateless community on the one 
hand while initiating an assembly of the stated and the stateless on the 
other. The case of the We Are Here refugee collective allows us to add 
some other examples to the domain of Stateless Propaganda. Although 
members of We Are Here are not allowed to travel outside the Nether-
lands, their limited freedom of movement allows for additional stra-
tegies of Stateless Propaganda which were unavailable to Ould Slahi.
Yoonis Osman Nuur, one of the key representatives of the We Are 
Here collective, emphasized the importance of the group’s name du-
ring a speech on the occasion of the collective’s first anniversary: “We 
didn’t want to be invisible any longer. We wanted the world to know 
297   Žižek observes about an attack in Paris perpetrated by the Islamic State in 2015: “With the Paris 
terror killings on Friday 13 November, however, even these ideas (which at least still involve 
large socio-economic issues) are now eclipsed by the simple opposition of all democratic forces 
caught in a merciless war with forces of terror – and it is easy to imagine what will follow: the 
paranoiac search for ISIS agents among the refugees, and so on. The greatest victims of the Paris 
terror attacks will be refugees themselves, and the true winners, concealed behind the platitudes 
in the style of je suis Paris, will be simply the partisans of total war on both sides.” Slavoj Žižek, 
Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Trouble with our Neighbours (London: Allen 
Lane, 2016), p. 110.
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on the perverse legislative reality of stateless peoples facing the stated. 
The radical role reversal in which the stated enter is an attempt to fur-
ther the cause proclaimed by Nuur; to strengthen the assembly of the 
documented and the undocumented, the stated and the stateless. To 
assemble those in whose name immigration policies are enacted toge-
ther with those who are subjected to those policies. The stated cannot 
understand what it means to be stateless, but they can to some degree 
learn about its consequences, and about their own implication in them.
The methodology of Labyrinth shows a strong overlap with Brazi-
lian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire’s definition of a Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed (1968), in which he argues: “[T]he oppressed must not, 
in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), be-
come in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the 
humanity of both.”304 Interestingly enough, in the case of Labyrinth, We 
Are Here seems to challenge and simultaneously follow Freire’s script. 
They temporarily “oppress” the participants in their play by placing 
them into a state of subjection, although – very different from the ac-
tual asylum procedures that We Are Here members are subjugated to 
– the stated participants can walk out of the procedure at any time. The 
fact that visitors grant the members of We Are Here temporary power 
over them, is a performance of the power of the stated over the state-
less. Nonetheless, the power of the oppressed, We Are Here, lies in the 
fact that they, in Freire’s words, “unveil the world of oppression and 
through […] praxis commit themselves to its transformation.”305 We 
Are Here decides the dominant “theme” of Labyrinth, and involves the 
audience as co-investigators of the oppression they are co-responsible 
for, with the aim of changing this reality through praxis in the form of 
an assembly between the stateless and the stated. It is this praxis of 
mutual liberation – instigated on the conditions of the oppressed, not 
the oppressor – that Freire claims fundamental to the pedagogy of the 
oppressed.306
Although described as “agitation propaganda” by some,307 Labyrin-
th had an enormous impact, both by involving audience participants to 
its cause – many of which were policy makers – as well as through its 
broad visibility in Dutch mainstream media. Together with many other 
cultural projects this effectively led to the creation of a history for We 
Are Here members in the Netherlands, creating grounds to argue that 
304   Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London/New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 26.
305   Ibid., p. 36.
306   It is important to point out Freire’s reservations regarding what he calls the “false generosity” of 
the oppressor as an expression of their sense of guilt. In a more negative reading, stated collab-
orators and participants to Labyrinth might – in Freire’s words – aim to “preserve an unjust and 
necrophilic order” while simultaneously “buy peace for himself.” Ibid., p. 127.
307   Simon van den Berg, “Schrijnende rolverwisseling met vluchtelingen,” Theaterkrant, Jan. 21, 
2015, https://www.theaterkrant.nl/recensie/labyrinth/we-are-here-cooperative-frascati/.
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des its members from working, gaining access to social security or edu-
cation under the threat of incarceration or instant deportation, it does 
not limit them from creatively expressing themselves. In other words, 
creative expression – art – is not considered to be labor, and thus does 
not threaten their status in their quest to obtain citizenship.301 As a 
result, the artistic community of the Netherlands and We Are Here 
assembled to organize a variety of exhibitions, concerts, and even thea-
ter pieces as a means to gaining further visibility and thus leverage as 
“stateless citizens” of the Netherlands, to the point of which Nuur 
even joined forces with Öğüt to declare We Are Here an “undocumen-
ted political party.”302 As the We Are Here Manifesto (2013) states: “We 
enhance our visibility through unification, protests, a media campaign, 
lobbying, and other means.”303
We Are Here’s main output as Stateless Propaganda Art, is the 
theater play Labyrinth (2015), created in collaboration with German 
theater maker Nicolas Stemann and Frascati Theater in Amsterdam. 
Initiated through the We Are Here Cooperative – an assembly of artists 
in the Netherlands and members of We Are Here, founded in 2013 – 
Labyrinth is based on a radical reversal of roles. Visitors are handed 
a file of the Somalian refugee Mohammed Hassan Abdi, born in the 
Bay region where the fundamentalist Al-Shabaab organization is in 
control. After being asked to leave their personal belonging at entry, 
visitors are moved through a labyrinth of rooms created from a pat-
chwork of fabric, similar to the improvised residences of the We Are 
Here members. In each room, they encounter a key “actor” from the 
asylum procedures that each of the We Are Here members have been 
subjected to countless of times, but now reenacted by the members 
themselves. The audience is subsequently interrogated on the limited 
information at their disposal about their new identity as Mohammed 
Hassan Abdi. Representatives of the Dutch Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, the Dutch Repatriation and Departure Service, as well 
as police officers and judges, each of which are played by We Are Here 
members, make the audience of Labyrinth keenly aware of the level of 
internalization of the immigration script each of them has been sub-
jected to. Any contradiction in a statement, a wrong answer or joke can 
mean expulsion from the labyrinth. The script of the play is structured 
301   Something elaborated from a juridical perspective through the work X and Y v. France: The Case 
for a Legal Precedent (2007–present) by French artists Patrick Bernier and Olive Martin. See: 
Audrey Chan in conversation with Patrick Bernier and Olive Martin, “Artists at Work: Patrick 
Bernier and Olive Martin,” in Collective Struggle of Refugees, p. 91–101. For further reading on 
the political, economic, and juridical paradoxes of artistic practice of We Are Here, see Ellen C. 
Feiss, A Critique of Rights in We Are Here (Amsterdam: We Are Here Cooperative, 2015)
302   Yoonis Osman Nuur and Ahmet Öğüt presented their resolution “Political Representation Be-
yond Citizenship” during the Beyond Allegories conference, Amsterdam Town Hall, May 9, 2014.
303   We Are Here, “We Are Here Manifesto,” in Collective Struggle of Refugees, p. 23.
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grated into the post-colonial state of Mali. To different degrees, the 
term statelessness here thus designates a lack or complete absence of 
rights within an existing state or occupation and simultaneously, the 
demand for their own independent state.
The case of Azawad is of particular interest here, as it relates to a re-
latively recent achievement to create a newly independent nation-state. 
Nevertheless the state of Azawad has existed only for four years and 
has never been recognized by any other existing state in the world.309 
Although the Kel-Tamasheq people revolted against the French oc-
cupation from the end of the 19th century onward, and opposed, in 
alliance with other people from the region like the Songhai and Fula, 
their integration into the new French-backed state of Mali, their de-
mand for their own independent state through armed rebellion in 
1960, 1963, 1990, and 2006, followed by the actual – albeit temporary 
– realization of an independent state of Azawad, is more recent.310 In 
2012 the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA) decla-
red Azawad’s independence, backed by highly trained Kel-Tamasheq 
fighters that left the crumbling Ghadaffi regime, effectively expelling 
the Malian army from their lands in the Sahara and Sahel. This caused 
a crisis, as the power vacuum resulting from the revolution was quickly 
filled by radical Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine and Al-Qa’ida in 
the Islamic Maghreb, which resulted in the return of the French and 
their allies to the region to support the Malian state in stabilizing the 
conflict.311 Our main focus now though, lies on the Stateless Propagan-
da of a stateless people in its few years of independence.
During the first years of Azawadian independence Moussa Ag As-
sarid, the international representative of the MNLA, explained that 
“the peoples organized in the MNLA are still hesitant about the idea 
of independence, the idea of a state, for it is a form that we have never 
known to be ours.”312 This is of particular relevance, as it explains the 
changing understanding of statelessness for the Kel-Tamasheq people. 
As mentioned before, the Kel-Tamasheq were originally a nomadic 
people. In that context, the notion of “statelessness” did not mean 
309   Representatives of the Malian government and the Azawadian rebel groups signed the Accord 
for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali that emanated from the Algiers on May 15, 2015. This 
effectively ended the MNLA’s demand for an independent nation-state, with the MNLA agree-
ing upon relative autonomy and humanitarian development aid in the region. See: Gaudence 
Nyirabikali, “Mali Peace Accord: Actors, issues and their representation,” Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, Aug. 27, 2015, https://www.sipri.org/node/385.
310   See for a historical account of the colonial history and uprisings in the region: Berny Sèbe, “A 
Fragmented and Forgotten Decolonization: The End of European Empires in the Sahara and 
their Legacy,” in Moussa Ag Assarid and Jonas Staal (eds.), The Art of Creating a State (Utrecht: 
BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, 2013), pp. 113–42.
311   For a detailed reconstruction of the Azawadian revolution and its crises, see May Ying Welsh’s 
three-part documentary Orphans of the Sahara (2014).
312   Moussa Ag Assarid interviewed by Jonas Staal, “We Inhabit the Horizon,” in The Art of Creating 
a State, pp. 41–42.
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they have become so rooted in a society to which they have made subs-
tantial and visible – cultural – contributions, that for some citizenship 
has come in reach.308 This was for example the case for Nuur, who was 
granted residency status in 2017. Different from the work of Öğüt and 
Bruguera, which we discussed in the context of Popular Propaganda 
Art, this case study of Stateless Propaganda Art originates from the 
initiative of stateless people themselves, seeking alliances with stated 
artists and cultural workers. Their performance is defined by severely 
limited access to power, their bodies being among the few tools avai-
lable to articulate the claim that they are “here.” But by effectively 
deploying them they achieve to establish a political collective with one 
another (self-recognition) and engage in assembly with the stated (re-
cognition by others), thus increasing their limited power through fur-
ther visibilization. This assembly is the basis for the articulation of a 
new community – a new reality – performed through Labyrinth, in the 
form of a Stateless Propaganda Art.
Having briefly touched upon the condition of statelessness with re-
gard to a demand to be recognized by the state, and the subsequent 
impact of this claim on a specific practice of Stateless Propaganda and 
Stateless Propaganda Art, let us move to the second condition of state-
lessness; namely of those who demand the establishment of an independent 
state of their own. Such examples are the Basque Country in Spain, the 
Palestinian people still living under Israeli occupation, or the Azawa-
dians in Mali. These are peoples that through different degrees of 
oppression, are stateless within a state, or stateless as a result of the 
occupation by another state. Although the Basque people have gained 
regional autonomy in Spain with their own language and parliament, 
there remains a strong popular movement that considers its particu-
larity as a nation unrecognized without full statehood. In the case of 
the Palestinians, we are dealing with an actually occupied people that 
was about to achieve their own independent state before they were 
massacred and forced to migrate during the Nakba – as we discussed 
earlier on in the context of Popular Propaganda Art. In the case of the 
Azawadians, we are dealing with a nomadic people, predominantly the 
Kel-Tamasheq, who did not desire a nation-state in the first place, but 
were forced to articulate their claims to independence through such 
terminology after being colonized by the French and forcefully inte-
308   Other notable projects are the We Are Here Academy (2014–ongoing), which provides free educa-
tion by invited academics, artists and activists in the form of an artwork to members of We Are 
Here; We Are Here Occupying the Border (planned for 2017), which takes the form of a “refugee 
parliament” at the borders of Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, allowing each refugee 
to participate legally, as long as they remain exactly within the border of the country where they 
filed their asylum request. Retrieved from the website of Here to Support, http://heretosupport.
nl/.
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French – should not to be underestimated. And different from what 
an outsider might presume, this Stateless Propaganda is not aimed 
primarily at outsiders to gain recognition for the Azawadian project. 
As Touré explains:
The first thing is not to wait until others recognize you — other 
states, in this case. The first thing is to be confident of oneself, to 
understand that you represent something, because if you have not 
accepted and internalized that, then others will never recognize 
you. The recognition of others, Inshallah [God willing], will come 
as result of our belief.315
Touré’s double role as radio maker and agitator at rallies of the MNLA 
forms a crucial part of the choreography in which this process of 
self-recognition takes place. Music is an important part of this process 
as well; the work of the Kel-Tamasheq band Tinariwen (Deserts) can 
be heard constantly on the radio channel, and is distributed through 
Bluetooth from the phone of one MNLA militant to another. Having 
achieved world fame with its liberation songs, Tinariwen unifies not 
only the Azawadians on their land, but also its diaspora, and builds 
greater knowledge of Azawadian language, history, and struggle throu-
gh its own strand of cultural diplomacy.316
The diverse practice of Touré and his Artist Association of Azawad, 
whose work, different than Tinariwen, consciously limits itself to the 
Azawadian territory, is aimed at a collective self-performance, an en-
actment of a state to come, or better, a state that is present insofar 
its diverse peoples can imagine, recognize, and enact it. To become 
stated in this context does not mean to be recognized by others, but to 
recognize oneself as a citizen of Azawad and not as a second-degree ci-
tizen of Mali. Touré’s Stateless Propaganda Art is aimed at creating the 
symbols, slogans, and monumental landmarks that allow this process 
of assembly and self-recognition of a new community to be performed 
collectively, with the aim to establish a new reality, the state of Azawad. 
In this case, the self-recognition of the stateless is the foundation for a 
new condition of statedness.
This process of self-recognition, the creation of a new “national 
culture” vis-à-vis the oppressor culture, is a key aspect of the writings 
of Martinique-born anti-colonial resistance fighter, psychiatrist, and 
writer Frantz Fanon, in particular in his work The Wretched of the Earth 
315   Ibid., pp. 94–95.
316   See Tinariwen member Abdallah Ag Alhousseini’s conversation with Banning Eyre on the 
Azawadian revolution, “Tinariwen’s Abdallah Ag Alhousseini Talks about Mali,” in The Art of 
Creating a State, pp. 51–68.
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much, as there was nothing to call a “state” in the first place. It was 
rather in the process of French colonization and the creation of the 
state of Mali, that the terms “stateless” and “state” became relevant 
as a terminology that could articulate their demand to regain some 
of the freedom it held before colonization. As Ag Assarid explains, in 
2012 the very conception of an Azawadian state – especially in the 
harsh conditions of the scarcely populated region of the Sahara and 
Sahel – still had to be imagined by its population. A striking photo by 
Ag Assarid from his series The Revolution Is Without Frontiers (2014) of 
a hand-painted sign displaying the yellow, green, red, and black colors 
of the new Azawadian flag, embodies the challenge of state creation in 
the region. In his photo, we witness the brownish yellow sand of the 
open horizon of the desert, not a person or building in sight, only the 
sign that attests to a “bare state” in construction.313 Here, Stateless 
Propaganda operates without a vast communication network or inter-
connected urban infrastructure, but through small cities and villages 
often at great distance from one another, and through limited radio 
signals and satellite phones. To construct the imaginary of a new state 
in this environment is a severe challenge.
In this context, the work of artist Mazou Ibrahim Touré, an MNLA 
militant of Songhai and Kel Tamasheq descent, proves crucial. As the 
founder of the Artist Association of Azawad, the artist, calligrapher, and 
radio maker has been in charge of all banners, slogans, and symbolic 
depictions of the new state since the start of the Azawadian revolution. 
Explaining his formation simply by stating that “I saw the situation of 
my people, and I realized that they needed an artist,”314 he has adorned 
the streets of the MNLA-controlled city of Kidal with his slogans – the 
most famous one being “Azawad, Mali No!” – murals of the Azawadian 
flag and peace signs, as well as public monuments constructed from 
the limited amount of available scrap metal, among which remnants of 
weaponry. In some cases, existing infrastructures are re-appropriated 
by the artist, for example in the form of road signs which used to refer 
to Malian cities, but are now repainted to direct only to the state of 
Azawad. Touré uses a similar strategy with old monuments and roun-
dabouts installed by the Malian government, which are repainted in 
the colors of the Azawadian flag, and have been transformed into new 
monuments and landmarks of independence.
Within the sober environment of Azawad, the impact of Touré’s co-
lorful trilingual work – all slogans are written in Tamasheq, Arabic, and 
313   Cf. Agamben’s previously discussed notion of “bare life.”
314   Mazou Ibrahim Touré interviewed by Jonas Staal, “I Was Needed, so I Became an Artist,” in The 
Art of Creating a State, p. 92.
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tive and seeks to become recognized by others to create an alliance 
between the stateless and the stated. In the second example, we saw 
how Touré and his Artist Association of Azawad enacts a process of 
self-recognition first, to become stated on their own terms. The third 
and final example, which will be of our particular interest in this final 
segment, concerns the demand of the stateless to define statelessness as an 
alternative to the state altogether.
We will discuss those who identify the very model of the state as 
inherently oppressive and opposed to forms of egalitarian governan-
ce. We find rare examples of this model throughout different histories 
of anarcho-libertarianism, or libertarian-socialism, the most known 
example being the 1936–37 Spanish Revolution, in which a communa-
list “stateless” project of self-governance emerged in Catalonia during 
the civil war.322 A contemporary and sustained example is the Rojava 
Revolution, resulting in the autonomous Kurdish-led region in Nor-
thern-Syria that declared its model of “democratic confederalism” or 
“stateless democracy” in 2012, during the second year of the Syrian 
civil war. Highly critical of the colonial history of the nation-state in 
the Middle-East, the Rojava revolutionaries claim statelessness as the 
necessary precondition for their model of stateless democratic self-go-
vernance. Statelessness in this context is no longer a counterpoint to 
the state, but as a state of being, the precondition for a radically diffe-
rent stateless reality to emerge in the face of the existing geopolitical 
stated system.
Considering the profound role of art and culture in the Rojava Re-
volution that I was able to research on location through a direct co-
llaboration with the autonomous government starting in 2014, we will 
dedicate the next part of this segment to understanding in more detail 
what brought this revolution and its political model about, and how 
its Stateless Propaganda produces a distinct model of Stateless Propa-
ganda Art.
R O J AVA ’ S  S TAT E L E S S  P R O PAG A N DA  A N D
S TAT E L E S S  P R O PAG A N DA  A RT
In Kurdish Rojava means “West” and refers to the western part of 
Kurdistan, the northern part of present-day Syria. The partition of the 
region after the First World War led to the fragmentation of the Kur-
322   On the 1936 Spanish revolution, see Murray Bookchin, To Remember Spain: The Anarchist and 
Syndicalist Revolution of 1936 (San Francisco: AK Press, 1994). For a more extensive historical 
examination of the concept of libertarian socialism, see Alex Prichard, Ruth Kinna, Saku Pinta, 
and David Berry (eds.), Libertarian Socialism: Politics in Black and Red (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012).
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(1961). An important inspiration to Freire, Fanon argues: “[C]olonia-
lism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and empt-
ying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted 
logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigu-
res and destroys it.”317 The erasure of native culture in the form of lan-
guage, symbols, social and political organization, and self-sufficiency is 
subsequently aimed at “driv[ing] into the natives’ head the idea that if 
the settlers were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, 
degradation and bestiality.”318 It is in this light that we might gain a 
better understanding of Ag Assarid’s explanation of a hesitancy among 
his fellow people to demand a state of their own, and Touré’s invest-
ment in the process of collective self-recognition through his artistic 
and cultural work. Without the confidence and understanding of one’s 
own cultural history, a culture that needs to be translated into a new 
national culture, the endeavor of independence cannot succeed. It is 
this transition from cultural history to colonized culture and to a new 
national culture that is at stake in the struggle of decolonization and 
independence. In Fanon’s words:
A national culture is not a folklore, nor an abstract populism that 
believes it can discover the people’s true nature. It is not made up 
of the inert dreg of gratuitous actions, that is to say actions which 
are less and less attached to the ever-present reality of the people. A 
national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the 
sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through 
which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence.319
In Touré’s work we thus encounter an attempt to both re-construct 
pre-colonial history and to construct a new national culture. He takes 
up a role that Fanon describes as an “awakener of the people,” reco-
vering the colonized past, constructing a liberated presence.320 Tou-
ré’s self-described “poetry of the revolution” aims at both to imagine, 
self-recognize, and enact the cultural body that is the desired Azawa-
dian nation-state.321
We have briefly discussed two conditions of statelessness so far, first 
the demand to be recognized by the state, and second the demand to 
construct a new state. In the first example, we saw how We Are Here, 
similar to Ould Slahi, performs self-recognition of the stateless collec-
317   Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London/New York e.a.: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 169.
318   Ibid., p. 169.
319   Ibid., p. 188.
320   Ibid., p. 179.
321   Mazou Ibrahim Touré interviewed by Jonas Staal, “I Was Needed, so I Became an Artist,” p. 91.
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tory328 and the writings of eco-anarchist Murray Bookchin,329 Öcalan 
declared in 2005 the struggle for an independent nation-state to be 
over. Instead he proposed a new political paradigm named “democra-
tic confederalism,”330 which he explained as “a democracy without the 
state.”331 The core principles of Öcalan’s stateless democracy are based 
on local self-governance, gender equality, communal economy, and the 
right to self-defense: a new and crucial 21st-century paradigm of Sta-
teless Propaganda. Instead of starting from the conditions dictated by 
the opponent – the existing Turkish state – Öcalan now began working 
from the concrete conditions of statelessness, the fact that they have no 
state at all. This particular state of being now was no longer a weakness, 
but could be claimed as the strength of the movement: statelessness 
was both its condition and its objective.
When in 2011 the Assad regime was forced to the south to fight 
the Islamic State, the Kurds in Bakûr and Rojava seized their chan-
ce. Together with Assyrian and Arab allies they declared their original 
part of West Kurdistan autonomous. Subsequently, three autonomous 
cantons of Rojava – Afrin, Kobanê, and Cizîre – were founded by what 
was now called the new Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava. 
The political project was officially announced on January 29, 2014, 
as part of “The Social Contract” – referring to Rousseau’s famous 
text from 1762 – co-written by all peoples living in the region: Kurds, 
Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmens, Armenians, and 
Chechens.332 This Social Contract was the translation of stateless de-
328   Öcalan’s most elaborate attempt to articulate a social, historical, cultural, and political analysis 
of the roots of the Kurdish Question, narrating the birth of subsequent tribalism, statism, capi-
talism, and patriarchy to provide a viable scenario for an autonomous and democratic Kurdish 
movement can be found in his Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation (London: Transmedia 
Publishing, 2007).
329   Particularly Bookchin’s elaboration of non-state confederalist structures of political organization 
were of Öcalan’s interest. Bookchin poses that “[a] free ecological society – as distinguished 
from one regulated by an authoritarian ecological elite or by the “free market” – can only be 
vast in terms of an ecologically confederal form of libertarian municipalism. When at length free 
communes replace the nation and confederal forms of organization replaces the state, humanity 
will have rid itself from nationalism.” Murray Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies 
and the Promise of Direct Democracy (New York: Verso Books, 2015), p. 138.
330   Within the concept of democratic confederalism Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden distinguish 
three interrelated projects: “A democratic republic, democratic autonomy and democratic con-
federalism. The democratic republic seeks to redefine the Republic of Turkey, by disassociating 
democracy from nationalism; democratic autonomy refers to the right of people to decide on 
their own priorities and policies, to determine their own future; and the project for democratic 
confederalism is to serve as a model for self-government, its concrete realization sought through 
the political organization of society at four different levels, namely, communes in villages and 
districts, the organization of social groups (such as women and youth), organization on the 
basis of cultural and religious identities, and civil society organizations.,” Marlies Casier and 
Joost Jongerden, “Understanding Today’s Kurdish movement: Leftist Heritage, Martyrdom, 
Democracy, and Gender,” European Journal of Kurdish Studies, No. 14 (2012), http://ejts.revues.
org/4656.
331   Abdullah Öcalan, Democratic Confederalism (Cologne: Transmedia Publishing, 2011), p. 21.
332   “In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy and led by principles of equality and 
environmental sustainability, the Charter proclaims a new social contract, based upon mutual 
and peaceful coexistence and understanding between all strands of society. It protects funda-
mental human rights and liberties and reaffirms the peoples’ right to self-determination. Under 
the Charter, we, the people of the Autonomous Regions, unite in the spirit of reconciliation, 
pluralism and democratic participation so that all may express themselves freely in public life.” 
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dish nation across four different states – Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran 
– in each of which the Kurds faced severe oppression, leading to the 
foundation of the Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 
1978 in Bakûr, North Kurdistan (south-eastern Turkey), led by Abdu-
llah Öcalan. The PKK declared Kurdistan as an “inter-state colony” 
and called for revolution to “establish an independent, united and de-
mocratic Kurdistan.”323 The mountains of south-eastern Turkey formed 
the perfect terrain for a guerrilla war, and from an elite cadre the PKK 
transformed into a mass movement. 
Of particular importance for the Rojava revolution – often refe-
rred to as a “women’s revolution” – is the emergence of the Kurdi-
sh women’s movement within the highly disciplined and hierar-
chically structured PKK. Co-founder Sakine Cansız explained her 
party had been “giving an ideological struggle from the very begin-
ning against denial, social chauvinistic impression, primitive and 
nationalist approaches.”324 As a result, in the 1990s the women of 
the PKK, encouraged by Öcalan, started to actively organize them-
selves to put their liberation from patriarchy within the party on 
the agenda.325 This development ran parallel to a series of crises wi-
thin the PKK due to Turkey’s massive military operations leading 
to Öcalan’s arrest in 1999. He has remained in prison ever since.326 
 From prison, Öcalan continued to theorize about the future of the 
Kurdish liberation movement. Öcalan argued that “[t]he male mono-
poly that has been maintained over the life and world of woman throu-
ghout history, is not unlike the monopoly chain that capital monopo-
lies maintain over society.” He concludes that “women [are] the oldest 
colonised people who have never become a nation.”327 The critique of 
patriarchy thus brought Öcalan to redefine the relation between fa-
mily, state, and capital. Combining the ideas of the Kurdish women’s 
movement with his own mythological strand of Mesopotamian his-
323   Amil Kemal Özcan, Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 87.
324   “The Foundation of the PKK in the Words of Sakine Cansiz,” Kurdish Question, Nov. 27, 2014, 
https://www.kurdishquestion.com/oldarticle.php?aid=the-foundation-of-the-pkk-in-the-words-
of-sakine-cansiz.
325   The fact that it was a male leader who called upon women to liberate themselves has often been 
observed as the great paradox of the movement.
326   “By 1995, Ankara was spending as much as $11 billion a year to fight the war […]. Turkey also 
deployed some 220,000 troops in the region – tying up a quarter of NATO’s second largest 
army in a domestic battle.” Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for 
Independence (New York/London: New York University Press), 2007, p, 249.
327   Abdullah Öcalan, Liberating Life: Woman’s Revolution (Cologne: International Initiative Edition/
Neuss: Mesopotamian Publishers, 2013), p. 35.
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state paradigm as such.
What is at stake is not merely a military and territorial struggle, 
but an ideological one, which the Rojavans refer to as the importance 
of “changing mentality.”334 The revolution is not aimed at just seizing 
power, but at re-articulating the very notion of power through stateless 
democracy. The power of the stateless – those who have rejected the 
state – demands not only a new administrative and political system of 
self-governance, but also a different educational and scientific para-
digm. The endeavor of Stateless Propaganda is thus both to educate 
and perform the specific power paradigm that Öcalan recognized as 
being inherent to the condition of statelessness. That is the case for the 
political, economic, and educational system, but is possibly expressed 
most strongly – or at least, most visibly – in the context of Rojava’s 
Stateless Propaganda Art.
In many examples of Rojava’s Stateless Propaganda Art, the overlap 
with the work of Touré and his Artist Association of Azawad is striking. 
Similar to Azawad’s state-in-the-making, we encounter in Rojava’s sta-
teless democracy the continuous presence of the yellow-red-green co-
lors of its flag, often painted on discarded barrels to define the borders 
of its cantons, or checkpoints for its people’s army. Old monuments, 
fountains, and statues of Hafiz al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father, have 
been thrown off their pedestals, repainted in the colors of Rojava and 
adorned with images of Rojavan martyrs.335 Essentially, we witness here 
visual and artistic strategies of repurposing the structures of the old 
regimes into new ones to create the symbols and reference points of 
a new political space in the form of stateless democracy. Just like in 
Azawad, popular slogans such as “Resistance is Life,” “Women, Life, 
Freedom,” and “Martyrs Never Die” – the latter one echoing the fa-
mous slogan of the Palestinian liberation struggle – cover former regi-
me buildings. The trilingual representation of the slogans in Kurdish, 
Assyrian, and Arabic bring to mind Touré’s trilingual banners as well.
What the Artist Association is for Azawad, is the network of Tev-
Çand cultural centers for Rojava – although the latter has far more 
means at its disposal. The network reaches from Rojava’s small cities 
to its villages, providing cultural education to its youth in the field of 
music, theater, and visual art. In another similarity to Azawad, mu-
334   As Janet Biehl, partner of Öcalan’s inspiration Murray Bookchin, noted during her travel to Ro-
java: “Aldar Xelîl, a member of the council of TEV-DEM [Movement for a Democratic Society], 
explained to us, Rojava’s political project is “not just about changing the regime but creating a 
mentality to bring the revolution to the society. It’s a revolution for society.” Janet Biehl, “Revo-
lutionary Education: Two Academies in Rojava,” in Stateless Democracy, p. 213.
335   When I travelled to the canton of Kobanê, I witnessed how in only recently liberated territories, 
the Islamic State had appropriated old monuments and roundabouts for its own purposes as 
well. Painted in black and white, they were used for public executions or for the public display of 
prisoners in cages.
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mocracy into practice, investing powers predominantly in the local 
self-governing communes within the cantons instead of its overarching 
administration, implementing a quota of forty percent women’s parti-
cipation in political life, establishing male–female co-presidencies for 
all political organizations, and recognition of a plurality of languages 
and religions within a secular system of self-governance. Front lines 
were set against the Assad regime and the Islamic State by the People’s 
and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/J) which are independently orga-
nized by the Kurdish women’s movement.
Most important for our endeavor of gaining an understanding of 
Öcalan’s proposition of a new model of Stateless Propaganda are the 
alternative institutions founded throughout the revolution in the Roja-
va autonomous region. Educational institutions are at the core of disse-
minating the ideas of stateless democracy, to politicize and mobilize its 
communities to carry out the project of self-governance. Women civil 
servants and militia are to follow mandatory education in the women’s 
academies before being allowed on the battlefield. An example is the 
Star Academy in Rimelan, organized by the Yekîtiya Star, the umbre-
lla group of the women’s movement in Rojava. In an extension of the 
rejection of the nation-state and its patriarchal foundations, the main 
task of the academy is to break the ties between the state and science, 
not as a rejection of science as such, but of the specific power structure 
underlying it. The alternative takes the form of “jineology,” meaning 
“women’s science,” -logy referring to the Greek “logos” (knowledge) 
and jin referring to the Kurdish word for woman.333 Jineology is an 
attempt to re-write history from a perspective of colonized classes – 
women, stateless peoples, minorities – through the Rojava Revolution. 
Here we see Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed translated into a Pedago-
gy of the Stateless: the academy transformed into a space in which the 
very conditions of knowledge production and dissemination are re-in-
vestigated by the stateless, in favor of a history that is founded on their 
particular condition of being. Oppression here is no longer identified 
through the lack of the state, but identified as an inherent part of the 
Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava, “The Social Contract,” in Stateless Democracy, pp. 
131–58. We note the radical reversal of what Masco described as the negative social contract in 
War on Terror Propaganda to the emancipatory claim expressed through Rojava’s social contract 
in the context of Stateless Propaganda Art.
333   Journalist and representative of the women’s movement Gönül Kaya writes that “in history, 
rulers and power holders have established their systems first in thought. As an extension of the 
patriarchal system, a field of social sciences has been created, which is male, class-specific, and 
sexist in character.” Based on this analysis, Kaya calls for a “women’s paradigm,” described as a 
rejection of the relation between the woman-object (slave) and the male-subject (master), which 
she considers inherently intertwined with modern science and which has in turn had a severe 
impact on social life, with nurture or domestic work – framed as part of feminine “nature” – not 
considered “labor,” but instead articulated in terms of “service” to the masculine master. Gönül 
Kaya, “Why Jineology? Re-Constructing the Sciences Towards a Communal and Free Life,” in 
Stateless Democracy, p. 86.
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his words: “We, Kurds, care a lot about our history, yet we do not have 
a museum here. All museums are in Damascus and Aleppo. We do not 
have access to our own history, but I would like to learn about it and 
see its images.”339 As a consequence, he uses the Tev-Çand as a space to 
exhibit his clay and stone sculptures, modeled on actual archeological 
findings, in part on Mesopotamian mythology. He argues:
Everybody knows that our culture and history are stolen, but I do 
not want to visit empty museums and cultural centers. That is why 
I make these sculptures. We [Abdul and his fellow artist, Masun 
Hamo] donated these sculptures to the Tev-Çand, so everybody 
who visits here can be reminded of our heritage.340
Using materials often recuperated from the surroundings of Urkesh, 
Abdul’s work is hard to distinguish from archeological findings. His 
red clay relief King of Urkesh (2013), for example, takes the form of 
a broken fragment from a pot or vase, with the image of the former 
king sculpted upon the surface. Abdul’s scratching and sanding of the 
clay, suggests a long passing of time in between the creation of the 
original object and its present-day exhibition. This is even more so in 
the case of Abdul and Hamo’s collaboration entitled A Woman from 
Rojava (2014), which from a distance looks like a stone, placed soberly 
on the floor, leaning against a wall of the Tev-Çand. On closer inspec-
tion, the contours of a woman’s face appear upon the surface, which, 
similar to King of Urkesh, has been scratched and sanded to give it an 
ancient appearance. Abdul’s marble sculpture A Woman from Mesopota-
mia (2015) goes even further, by showing a female figure without legs 
or arms; suggesting it has been damaged by the passing of time.
The resemblance of Abdul’s work with archeological findings is so 
striking, that his pieces cannot leave the Rojava region. Iraqi border 
patrol and customs would confiscate the materials, suspecting them 
to be actual historical objects.341 This exemplifies the complex layering 
of his work. One could argue that his works are archeological falsifica-
tions, but it is actually the staging of history that forms the core of his 
artistic endeavor. The aesthetic representation of history in the form of 
archeological heritage defines his conceptual approach, material, and 
style. Simultaneously, being a Kurd from the region, it is hard to argue 
that his work would not be an actual continuation of a Mesopotamian 
339   Ibid.
340   Ibid.
341   In 2015, contemporary art center BAK, basis voor actuele kunst requested me to aid in the loan 
and transport of Abdul’s work, but quickly the Rojava administration confirmed that this would 
be impossible, due to the likeliness of his work with archeological findings.
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sic is particularly present in the curriculum. Since Kurdish culture 
was long suppressed, clandestine songs had been the carrier of Kur-
dish history, struggle, and language. With several radio and satellite 
TV channels at Rojava’s disposal, music is also a popular means to 
communicate the ideals of stateless democracy and mobilize Roja-
van constituencies for the ongoing fight at the front lines. As Nes-
rin Botan, a vocalist for the musical group Koma Botan explains: 
We have an important role in the revolution. […] This revolution gi-
ves us the opportunity to express our culture, art, and folklore that 
used to be suppressed. We are now working hard for our culture and 
identity. […] Like a musician receives education from school, our 
fighters learn the art of fighting in the People’s Protection Units. 
Like a teacher of art, our warriors show performance on the batt-
lefield.336
Botan’s use of the notion of performance describes the direct relations-
hip between her artistic work and the construction of a society based 
on the model of stateless democracy. Her performance as a musician is 
directly related to the larger collective performance of stateless demo-
cracy, and the defense of this model against the militias of the Islamic 
State, thus connecting the military with the cultural battlefield.
The case of the Rojavan artist Abdullah Abdul is particularly rele-
vant for the analyzis of the differences between Stateless Propaganda 
Art of those who aim to create a state of their own and those who 
reject the state altogether. Abdul’s work explores the notion of state-
lessness through his construction of a contemporary museum of a lost 
history. Working from a small studio next to a Tev-Çand center in Amu-
de, a substantial part of Abdul’s source material relates to the nearby 
archeological site of Urkesh, the remnants of an ancient kingdom.337 
Formerly under the control of the Assad regime, Abdul explains that 
the Rojavans for a long time “did not know whether [Urkesh] was 
part of our history or of another civilization.”338 Under the Democra-
tic Self-Administration of Rojava, the site is recognized as heritage of 
Hurrians, Kurds, and other peoples that lived in the Mesopotamian re-
gion. With many of Urkesh’s treasures residing in Assad’s museums or 
in museums overseas, Abdul endeavors to reconstruct this heritage. In 
336   Interview with Nesrin Botan conducted in the Mitra Hasake cultural center, Dec. 20, 2014.
337   In 1995, researchers in Syria reported Urkesh “to be the capital of a fabled kingdom and the 
most sacred religious center of the Hurrians, an obscure people who were contemporaries of the 
Sumerians in the south and the Semites of Ebla in the west.” John Noble Wilford, “Lost Capital 
of a Fabled Kingdom Found in Syria,” The New York Times, Nov. 21, 1995, http://www.nytimes.
com/1995/11/21/science/lost-capital-of-a-fabled-kingdom-found-in-syria.html.
338   Interview with Abdullah Abdul conducted in the artist’s studio in Amude, Dec. 18, 2014.
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the main organizers of the Rojava Film Commune explains: “The first 
thing in a revolution is that society needs to reorganize itself. And this 
is how the revolution affects the arts: the arts are reorganized.”345 The 
redistribution and production of culture in the broad public realm – 
the factories, restaurants, and streets of Rojava – are its point of depar-
ture. Concretely, this happens through the four “wings” of the Rojava 
Film Commune. The first is focused on the education of the Rojavan 
population on the history of cinema, the second on the training of 
young Rojavan filmmakers, the third on the actual production of a Ro-
javan cinema, and the fourth on supporting filmmakers from abroad 
who, as the communique claims, “are tired to be captured by the ca-
pitalist modernity in their countries.”346 Hesso, further elaborating on 
the commune’s artistic approach to the notion of stateless democracy, 
argues:
If you look at the history of art from the perspective of statehood, we 
see the emergence of an art that I would call “unrealistic.” With that 
I mean that we see ourselves faced with an art that is consciously 
separated from societal developments, what is called “art for art’s 
sake.” In the context of the Rojava revolution we aim to develop a 
realistic art that is of a specific use, one could say a “useful art.”347
With this notion of “realism,” Hesso refers to what he describes as a 
“reality rooted in this society,” namely the “imagination and dreams of 
the revolution.”348 This relates to Guillermo’s definition of “revolutio-
nary realism,” a reality that is in the making through concrete political 
and cultural struggle. What Hesso calls “art for art’s sake” would in this 
framework be unrealistic as it denies such revolutionary imagination, 
instead turning into what the communique refers to as an “industrial 
tool” in support of capitalist modernity’s hegemony over present-day 
reality. With his proposition of a “useful art,” which reminds of Bru-
guera’s work, which we have to define “use” by the capacity of art to 
contribute to the construction of a new reality. Its usefulness is thus 
not literally that of a technical tool or consumable object, but the ca-
pacity to transform an imagined reality into an actual one. In Hesso’s 
words: “Our cause is society’s cause; but not the society that is already 
present, the society that we’re constructing as we speak.”349
The Rojava Film Commune’s approach to revolutionary realism 
345   Interview conducted with Diyar Hesso at the Rojava Film Commune, Derbisiye, Oct. 30, 2015.
346   Rojava Film Commune, “To the Press and Public Opinion.”
347   Interview conducted with Diyar Hesso.
348   Ibid.
349   Ibid.
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heritage. Operating between material historical findings and mytho-
logy, Abdul’s work overlaps with Öcalan’s own mythological reading 
of Mesopotamian history.342 In opposition to what Jineology defines 
as the doctrines of the statist scientific paradigm, we encounter here 
a complex entanglement of history and myth, or better, of history as 
myth.343
Using the Tev-Çand as museum, Abdul introduces a distinct model 
of Stateless Propaganda Art, which constructs and stages a cultural 
history of the stateless. The stateless not as those bereft of the sta-
te, but who – through ancient confederal structures – were from their 
very origin stateless. Abdul’s museum therefore claims Rojava not as a 
break in the history of the state, but a continuation of the history of the 
stateless. His museum is both historical and contemporary, as it displays 
the ancient and contemporary in the making.
The construction of reality through the paradigm of stateless de-
mocracy is also at stake in the work of the Rojava Film Commune 
in the city of Derbisiye. Founded in 2015, the organization consists 
of filmmakers and educators, who collectively declared in their first 
communique:
We shall not allow the cinema to be simplified to become an indus-
trial tool, or a consumable and exhaustible object. The squares of 
our villages will become our culture and art centers. Our factories 
and our restaurants will become cinema halls. Our vibrant streets 
will be our films sets.344
The Rojava Film Commune articulates an understanding of cinema 
along similar lines to the ideal of communal self-governance espoused 
by stateless democracy. In their case it is not focused on a redistribu-
tion of political power, but on a redistribution of the means of cultu-
ral representation. As Diyar Hesso, a filmmaker, teacher, and one of 
342   As David Graeber observes, there is a strong cultural dimension to Öcalan’s writings, which 
introduces ancient Mesopotamia as a mythological space in which goddess-women ruled, and 
peaceful and ethnically diverse pre-democratic confederalist structures existed. Graeber in this 
regard notes that Öcalan “wishes to speak […] about a history and social science that does not 
currently exist, but itself, perhaps, can only be imagined.” David Graeber, “Preface,” in Abdul-
lah Öcalan, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume I: Civilization, The Age of Masked Gods 
and Disguised Kings (Porsgrunn: New Compass Press, 2015), p. 13.
343   The staging of archeology is a reoccurring strategy of regimes to legitimate their native or 
indigenous origins. Whether in the case of large scale Hollywood productions in which white 
English-speaking actors retrospectively claim ancient Greece as the origin of all-American values 
in movies such as Zack Snyder’s 300 (2006), portraying Spartans fighting Persians as the pre-en-
actment of the War on Terror; or in the case of North-Korea’s hybrid “excavations” of historical 
sites, often enlarged or mixed with more contemporary styles and symbols to affirm continuity 
between past and present. In the case of Abdul, the staging of history is of course part of his 
artistic endeavor. See: Terence McSweeney, The ‘War on Terror’ and American Film: 9/11 Frames 
Per Second, pp. 186–88; Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea, pp. 105–23.
344   Rojava Film Commune, “To the Press and Public Opinion,” 2015, https://www.kominafilmaro-
java.org/english/profile/.
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The second and third branch of the Rojava Film Commune are 
directly related, in the form of educating Rojavan filmmakers and 
producing Rojavan films. In this context, Film Commune members 
like Hesso and Hindê educate their students on the importance of 
art production within revolutionary situations, with examples from 
the French to the Soviet revolutions.352 But just like Avant-Garde Pro-
paganda Art attempted to liberate art and culture from their subser-
vience to the ruling classes, the Rojava Film Commune emphasizes 
its aim of regaining control over its own means of cultural production 
and representation. In the past, the Assad regime controlled all means 
and channels of artistic production and distribution, but ever since the 
beginning of the Rojava revolution, hundreds of journalists, television 
teams, and filmmakers from abroad visited the region to report on 
the uprising, while no productions were actually in the hands of the 
Rojavans themselves. In a logic similar to the foreign looting of cultu-
ral heritage, there has been a looting of contemporary culture as well 
by those foreign actors who uphold the means of cultural production 
and representation from the Rojavans who do not. The Rojava Film 
Commune aims to reverse this process by developing a practice of film 
through the distinct condition and worldview of stateless democracy.
The Film Commune’s first major production is entitled Roza: 
Country of Two Rivers (2016), created by several of its members and 
students, with the aim of becoming the first documentary film on the 
Rojava Revolution realized by Rojavans themselves.353 Striking is the 
film’s gritty and heart-torn reality of the revolution’s losses, displaying 
images of martyr funerals and public mourning, which form a hard 
contrast with CNN reports of composed English-speaking Rojavans 
explaining the democratic aims of the revolutions. Roza embodies a 
proximity and intimacy to its subject, which demands of its makers 
to fully identify with their surroundings. Who is the one that stands 
behind the camera, who is the one that asks questions, in what lan-
guage are these questions asked. These issues define half of what a 
“documentary” can be as a testimony to, or even active participant in 
the construction of a new reality.354 Retaking control over the means 
352   Interview conducted with Diyar Hesso and Şêro Hindê at the Rojava Film Commune, Derbisi-
ye, Oct. 30, 2015.
353   Examples of foreign documentaries have been Vice’s Syria’s Unknown War (2013) and BBC’s 
Rojava: Syria’s Secret Revolution (2014). Note how in both titles signal the Western “discovery” 
of Rojava’s “unknown “and “secret” revolution. A notable exception would be The Sniper of 
Kobani (2015) of Reber Dosky, a Kurdish–Dutch filmmaker from Başûr, Southern Kurdistan 
(Northern Iraq).
354   I experienced something similar. Having conducted many interviews in the region, it quickly 
became clear that as a male subject, I was often not able to address issues of the women’s move-
ment in a relevant or accurate way, or was partly mistrusted as the person asking the questions 
due to my own implications in the patriarchal paradigm. As a result, my colleague, Renée In der 
Maur, took over this part of the research. In the Rojava context, knowledge also relates strongly 
to awareness of gender embodiment.
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and its attempt to reorganize art alongside the reorganization of Roja-
van society clarifies the role of the four branches. Let us shortly review 
their modus operandi, to map out the particular translation from sta-
teless democracy as a political proposition to an artistic one.
As we noted, the first branch is aimed at popular education. Mem-
bers of the Rojava Film Commune travel to cities and remote villages 
to mobilize children and workers to attend film screenings. This work, 
according to writer and Film Commune member Şêro Hindê, is or-
ganized “with the help of the communes and the city councils.”350 The 
aim is to educate the Rojavans on the history of popular cinema so 
that the films of the Commune are able to resonate with its popula-
tion, with an emphasis on the younger generation. The first screening 
that was organized was Charlie Chaplin’s The Kid (1921), considered 
among Chaplin’s most successful works. The film was screened throu-
ghout dozens of villages and cities, assembling squares full of children, 
parents, and workers. Journalist Chris Keulemans observed a strange 
mutation of Chaplin’s principal vagabond character, “the Tramp,” in 
the Rojavan context:
[S]uddenly, Chaplin is a Kurd. Look at him standing, with his large 
eyes full of wonder. His worn-out clothes, holes in his shoes: he fits 
his suit as perfect as the YPG in their uniform. But he is smart too. 
Homeless, no money in his pocket, the police on his heels – but he 
remains elusive. At the last moment, he always finds his way out. 
By accident or on purpose. Chaplin the Kurd always lands on his 
feet.351
What Keulemans’s observation shows is that the screening of The Kid 
in Rojava should be understood as both a form of popular education 
and as something of an artistic intervention itself. The Film Commu-
ne shows a key document from the history of cinema, which is at the 
same time part of the construction of a new revolutionary cinema. No 
longer is Chaplin a symbol of capitalist modernity, he is now a Kurd: 
one of the many actors in the construction of reality through stateless 
democracy. Just like the old monuments of Assad are repurposed, so 
is an icon of American cinema. Chaplin is “liberated” in the way the 
Rojavans are attempting to liberate democracy from the state.
350   Interview conducted with Şêro Hindê at the Rojava Film Commune, Derbisiye, Oct. 30, 2015.
351   Original quote in Dutch: “En plotseling is Chaplin een Koerd. Kijk hem nu eens staan, met die 
grote, verwonderde ogen. Kleren versleten, gaten in de schoenen: hij zit net zo strak in het pak 
als de YPG in hun uniform. Maar slim is hij ook. Dakloos, geen cent op zak, de politie op zijn 
hielen – maar hij blijft ongrijpbaar. Telkens verzint hij een nieuwe list. Per ongeluk of expres. 
Chaplin de Koerd komt altijd op zijn pootjes terecht.” Chris Keulemans, “Charlie Chaplin is 
een Koerd,” Groene Amsterdammer, Nov. 11, 2015.
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a revolutionary realism by juxtaposing stateless democracy’s culture to 
the history of cinema as it has largely been appropriated by statist ca-
pitalist modernity. In both cases, we observe an attempt to break with a 
past represented by the state, while re-engaging a neglected past in the 
form of stateless history. Although we may find certain overlaps with 
Popular Propaganda Art, Rojava’s Stateless Propaganda Art differen-
tiates itself quite evidently. Simply put, Rojava’s Stateless Propaganda 
Art does not predominantly seek to compose a people, but works from 
the recognition of a social composition already present: namely that of 
statelessness. Rojava’s Stateless Propaganda Art starts from a self-re-
cognition of the stateless community to become stateless on one’s own 
terms.
Possibly most telling in this interplay between Rojava’s stateless de-
mocracy and its Stateless Propaganda Art is the people’s parliament 
of Qamishlo. Situated in an old theater from the Assad regime, the 
stage continues to be used for musical and artistic events, while si-
multaneously serving as a platform for local communes in their daily 
practice of self-governance. The staging of a new political reality inter-
sects with the staging of its new artistic productions. The theater as a 
space of both artistic and political imaginary; a space in which the per-
formance of politics and that of art co-exist. Augusto Boal, following 
Freire, coined the concept of The Theater of the Oppressed (1974), a 
practice of theater in which passive spectators would be transformed 
into active spect-actors, embodying the politicization of the oppressed 
as actors and creators of their own faith. Calling the theater a space 
for the “rehearsal for the revolution,” Boal claimed that “truly revo-
lutionary theatrical groups should transfer to the people the means 
of production in the theater so that the people themselves may utilize 
them.”357 In the case of Rojava, we are faced with a yet unknown outco-
me of a politics and art in the making, something we – in Boalian terms 
– would have to term a Theater of the Stateless.358 A space of communal 
performance that does not use the theater to “rehearse” the revolution, 
but to concretely conduct it; a communal performance that no longer 
starts from the counter-point of state oppression, but which attempts 
to articulate the very condition of statelessness as a point of departure 
of a new reality under construction. It is through Stateless Propaganda 
Art and its revolutionary realism that we have attempted to witness 
hints of what that society and culture of the future might bring.
357   Boal, Theater of the Oppressed, p. 98.
358   In this case, a full reversal of what we have earlier discussed as the Theater of Operations in the 
War on Terror Propaganda segment and the War on Terror Propaganda Art section.
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of cultural production and representation thus also means being able 
to construct and mediate reality differently. The reality of a society in 
construction, as Hesso termed it, includes the losses that made this 
construction possible in the first place. In Roza: Country of Two Rivers 
source and mediator are implicated in the same process of construc-
ting reality anew.
The fourth branch relates to the Film Commune’s criticism of out-
siders controlling the means of cultural production and representation 
of the Rojavan reality. Foreign filmmakers are asked to propose their 
scripts to the organization for feedback first, and are asked to allow 
free screenings of their work throughout Rojava upon realization. This 
is a gesture toward filmmakers who are inspired by stateless democra-
cy and wish to “make a movie freely,”355 but also a way to confront the 
gaze of the foreign subject observing and “approprioating” the Ro-
java revolution, by demanding that “[a]t least one person from the 
Rojava Film Commune will be present during the foreigners’ films 
shooting.”356 One’s interpretation of this criterion may differ, between 
a form of educating foreigners on their own gaze or as a form of cen-
sorship of the filmmakers’ message – although it must be said that 
registration with the Film Commune by foreign filmmakers is on a 
voluntary basis.
The Film Commune’s four wings show us clearly how the reorga-
nization of culture alongside the reorganization of society takes place. 
The aim of the Film Commune is not simply to make art, but to create 
the infrastructures through which a different cultural production and 
representation becomes possible. The four wings of the Film Commu-
ne invest as much in creating a public as in regaining control over and 
redistributing the means of cultural production and representation 
among the Rojava population.
Both in the case of Abdul’s work and that of the Rojava Film Com-
mune, we witness a constant interplay between the specific conception 
of power brought about through the model of stateless democracy and 
Stateless Propaganda Art. As much as the Rojava society is in the pro-
cess of construction, so is its art. Whereas Abdul attempts to create a 
cultural continuity between stateless Mesopotamian history and sta-
teless democracy, the Rojava Film Commune attempts to re-organize 
the means of cultural production and representation in the service of 
355   Brigitte van der Sande adds a critical note: “[D]anger looms on the horizon […], that of 
censorship. Article 33, 34 and 35 of the Social Contract assure the freedom of expression and 
information, but each book to be published must pass through a committee.” Brigitte van der 
Sande, “Inside Hell We Build Paradise,” Open! Platform for Art, Culture and the Public Domain, 
Jan. 15, 2015.
356   Retrieved from the website of the Rojava Film Commune, section “For Foreigners,” https://
www.kominafilmarojava.org/english/join-us-in-rojava/for-foreigners/.
4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 7 6 3 7 7
4 . 4  C O N C L U S I O N
In this fourth and final chapter, we have explored and mapped the 
practices of Contemporary Propaganda Art in the 21st century by 
identifying three key actors, three different subjectivities, which de-
fine the conflictual theater of the contemporary, namely the neolibe-
ral public-private infrastructures of the expanded state, politicized civil 
society and its popular mass movements, and those dispossessed by the 
expanded state in the form of stateless peoples.
To understand how each of these 21st-century actors attempts to 
construct reality through different propagandas, we revisited the pro-
paganda model of Chomsky and Herman, and proposed an expan-
sion in the form of the inverted propaganda model, which replaces 
Chomsky and Herman’s “filters” with “demands.” Whereas the revisi-
ted propaganda model of Goss can be used to understand the perfor-
mance of power through the expanded state, the inverted propaganda 
model can be used in relation to the performance of power through 
popular mass movements and stateless peoples. As a result, we were 
able to diversify different contemporary propagandas: War on Terror 
Propaganda, which attempts to construct reality based on threat pro-
duction and the Us/Them divide to consolidate the interests of the 
expanded state; Popular Propaganda, which aims at constructing rea-
lity by enacting collective demands through the assemblies of popular 
mass movements; and Stateless Propaganda, which through the per-
formance of precarious power aims at different forms of self-recogni-
tion and recognition by others, in some cases with the construction of 
a stateless reality as a result.
To gain insight into how these different models of power attempt 
to construct different realities, we examined different structures of 
power and their performance as art, based on the equation propagan-
da=power+performance. As we established in previous chapters, we did 
so through a multidisciplinary approach, following from our earlier 
conclusion that propaganda art can never be understood in the form of 
an isolated artwork, but only by mapping out the process in which di-
fferent artistic forms relate to a larger interface of politics, economy, te-
chnology and industry. It is through such a interdisciplinary approach 
to propaganda art that we are able to trace what McSweeney termed 
the “master narrative” of propaganda.
In the case of War on Terror Propaganda Art, we tried to expand 
Masco’s work into a proper art discourse. Through the work of Lüttic-
ken, Dipaolo, Robb, Eisenman, Fusco, Paglen, and others, we observed 
two interdependent styles through which the expanded state performs 
and constructs the reality of the War on Terror in the form of projects 
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Before arriving at a general comparison and conclusion to our explora-
tion of categories that help us to define contemporary propaganda art 
in the 21st century, let us first provide a summary of Stateless Propa-
ganda Art based on our observations in this section:
• Stateless Propaganda Art is a contemporary propaganda art 
structured on specific conditions of statelessness, aimed at per-
forming the demands for a reality in which either (1) the state-
less are recognized within an existing state; (2) the stateless reali-
ze a state of their own; (3) the stateless reject the state altogether;
• Stateless Propaganda Art aims to different degrees at self-re-
cognition and recognition by others, starting from the– often 
severely limited – power located in the body of the stateless. In 
some cases, this power is performed as a means of visibilization 
towards the stated (those who seek recognition in an existing 
state), in some cases as a means to radically separate themselves 
from an existing state or the state altogether (those who create a 
state of their own, or reject the state in its entirety);
• Stateless Propaganda Art can be analyzed through the educa-
tional and artistic work of liberational practitioners such as Fa-
non, Freire, and Boal, whether it relates to the pedagogy of the 
oppressed enacted to create alliance between the stateless and 
stated (We Are Here), the creation of new national culture sepa-
rated from an occupying state (Touré), or a pedagogy and thea-
ter of the stateless, which starts from the liberational dimension 
of statelessness altogether (Abdul, Rojava Film Commune);
• Stateless Propaganda Art in all cases aims to construct reality 
on the basis of the condition of statelessness, whether this is a 
reality in which the stateless become equally stated (refugees, 
terrorist suspects), in which the stateless become stated in a sta-
te of their own (Azawad), or in which statelessness becomes the 
precondition of a new stateless reality altogether (Rojava).
4 .  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  P R O PA G A N D A  A R T3 7 8 3 7 9 4 . 4  C O N C L U S I O N
tical models are devised both as means to support the aims of popular 
mass movements – if not to instigate them – as well as artworks in and 
of themselves.
In the case of Stateless Propaganda Art, we shifted away from the 
overall construction of a “we” throughout this thesis, in order to ac-
knowledge the limitations for a stated writer – someone recognized, 
administered, and living under relative protection of the state – to draft 
a series of observations on stateless practices of propaganda and pro-
paganda art. Taking into account the fact that the condition of sta-
telessness embodies particular knowledges inaccessible to the stated, 
we thus shifted from a model of mere analysis, to one of learning. In 
that process, we articulated three specific conditions of statelessness: 
first the demand of the stateless to be recognized by an existing state; 
second the demand of the stateless to establish a state of their own; 
and third the demand of the stateless to reject the very model of the 
state all together. Subsequently, we examined several case studies from 
the domain of art and culture to see how these different conditions of 
statelessness translate into different models of Stateless Propaganda 
Art, and how the aims of self-recognition and recognition by others 
play out differently in each of the examples. In the case of the demand 
of the stateless to be recognized by the state, we discussed the work of 
the collective of undocumented migrants and refugees We Are Here in 
relation to Freire. Subsequently, we observed how through its artistic 
and pedagogical practices We Are Here attempts to create an assembly 
that consists of citizens and refugees/undocumented migrants, a com-
position that introduces the stated and stateless as part of a collectivity. 
In the case of the demand of the stateless to create a state of their own, 
we discussed the work of Touré and his Artist Association of Azawad 
in relation to Fanon’s work. Subsequently, we observed how through 
his artistic and agitational practice, Touré attempts to bring about a 
process of collective self-recognition for a diverse stateless people to 
recognize itself as part of a new collective state in the making. Finally, 
we discussed in more detail the demand of the stateless to reject the 
state in its entirety through the work of Öcalan and his proposition of a 
“stateless democracy,” a radical proposal to separate democracy from 
the state by engaging the condition of statelessness as an alternative 
liberational paradigm, rather than as a condition of oppression. We tra-
ced the impact of this alternative model of self-governing power in the 
domain of Stateless Propaganda Art through the work of Abdul and 
the Rojava Film Commune, which attempt to historicize statelessness 
on the one hand, and aim to organize the notion of a stateless reality 
through artistic means on the other. Referencing the work of Freire 
and Boal, we have presented the possibility that these practices could 
of imminent destruction structured on the Us/Them divide. We de-
fined these styles as that of Expanded State Realism and Expanded 
State Abstraction. Whereas the latter is directed at erasing public his-
tory, territories, and bodies, the former aims to replace these with the 
image of imminent destruction and future survival. These two styles 
manifest themselves through different interrelated media. In the case 
of Expanded State Realism, we discussed theater, games, cinema and 
television in particular, to trace their impact in extended performances 
in the forms of the actual torture and destruction of those designated 
as Them. In the case of Expanded State Abstraction, we approached 
the creation of abstract voids in public records and even geographies as 
an aesthetic practice, and showed how even a critical art practice such 
as that of Paglen, is affected and altered through them.
In the case of Popular Propaganda Art, we started from alternative 
historiographies of art which examine the relation of artists to popular 
mass movements and its precarious constituents. Through the work of 
Sinclair, Guillermo, Lippard, Bishop and others, we saw how throu-
ghout history Popular Propaganda Art has been the product both of 
the impact of such movements on the way artists understand reality, 
and of how artists contribute to the construction of reality as aimed 
for by these movements. In the process, we defined the aim of Popular 
Propaganda Art as the contribution to the performance of the popular 
and the construction of a people, the former describing the enactment 
of popular demands as we traced them in the inverted propaganda mo-
del, the latter relating to assembling a collectivity as an outcome of the 
enactment of these demands. We articulated the overall aim of Popular 
Propaganda Art as the objective of Popular Realism: the construction 
of reality structured by the demands of popular mass movements. We 
further discussed how these aims of Popular Propaganda Art translate 
into different models of artistic practice, namely in the form of As-
semblism, Embedded Art, and Organizational Art. Through the work 
of Butler, Athanasiou, McKee, Garza and others, we defined Assem-
blism as the term through which we describe the aesthetic dimension 
of popular assembly in popular mass movements: not necessary as a 
form of “art,” but rather as the artistic and aesthetic component that 
emerges in the process of devising alternative social forms. Through 
the work of Steyerl, Not An Alternative, De Bruijne, and Decolonizing 
Art Architecture Residency, we defined Embedded Art in terms of art 
practices that directly relate their artistic competences to or operate 
within popular mass movements, and who re-invent their artistic vo-
cabulary in the process. Finally, through the work of Bruguera’s Immi-
grant Movement International and Öğüt’s Silent University, we defined 
Organizational Art as an artistic practice in which organizational poli-
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be understood as a Pedagogy and Theater of the Stateless.
In the 21st century we have so far avoided to engage actively with 
the term propaganda in a more complex manner. In popular discourse, 
the term propaganda continues to be used predominantly to descri-
be the output of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. While the 
Trump administration in some cases is confronted with the accusation 
of using propagandist means to achieve its goal using terms such as the 
“alternative fact” and the designation of mainstream media as “fake 
news,” the propagandistic notion that democracy stands in opposition 
to propaganda remains largely intact. This is even the case in key pro-
paganda studies, such as Ellul’s and Chomsky and Herman’s, as they 
are only capable of understanding alternative approaches to construc-
ting reality as forms of “non-propaganda,” or “counter-propaganda” 
at best.
Instead, through our historical exploration of Modern Propaganda 
and Modern Propaganda Art in the first two chapters of this thesis, we 
have approached propaganda as a performance of power, and conclu-
ded that the practice of propaganda is inherent to any society impacted 
by modernity – even when described as “advertisement” or “public re-
lations.” To that end, we have emphasized that we should diversify the 
performance of different structures of power in the form of different 
propagandas. In this fourth and final chapter, we have tried to do so 
by showing that even emerging powers or extremely limited forms of 
power still show themselves capable of propagating alternative reali-
ties. We did so to gain insight in the plurality of realities that are cons-
tructed through propaganda, simultaneous to one another: sometimes 
in conflict, sometimes in overlap, but all define our existence in the 
21st century.
Let us now, based on this chapter, propose the following definition 
of contemporary propaganda art in general:
• Contemporary propaganda art is the performance of power as 
art in contemporary society
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In this thesis, I have tried to narrate how modern and contemporary 
propaganda art have shaped and constructed the manifold competing 
realities in which we find ourselves today. I have laid out a different 
canon, not that of the great masters, but of actors of our time, from 
the War on Terror to popular mass movements and stateless peoples – 
those who make our world as we speak. As different as their objectives 
might be – from Steve Bannon to Judith Butler and Abdullah Abdul 
– they follow Judith Balso’s dictum to “present ourselves to the pre-
sent.”1 
I have narrated the history of propaganda art as a performance of 
power from modernity to the 21st century. And contrary to what the 
stakeholders of power would like us to believe, I have argued that al-
though propaganda art has a history, it does not belong to the past. 
Contemporary propaganda art is and has always been an art of the 
present, as it is an art of the world we inhabit and make. Now, our 
challenge I believe is what conclusions we can draw from our own 
implication in the performance of power and construction of our pre-
sent-day reality. Propaganda studies is among the least innocent forms 
of research. As we have seen throughout these chapters, the way pro-
paganda is defined often implicates how it is practiced. But it can also 
mean that realizing how propaganda operates makes us ask ourselves 
how to practice it differently.
Currently, as far as the term propaganda is still in use, we are presen-
ted with what I consider a false choice between propaganda or coun-
ter-propaganda, the latter meaning as much as “non-propaganda.” But 
an absence of propaganda would suggest an absence of power. And 
power is everywhere, even though that doesn’t tell us anything about 
the kind of power we dedicate ourselves to. Democracy, as we have seen 
throughout this thesis, is often framed as the opposite of propaganda. 
But not only is democracy the birthplace of modern propaganda, the 
use of the term itself says little to nothing about an egalitarian distri-
bution of power. From the regimes of Trump and Duterte to those of 
Erdoğan and Orbán, elected dictatorships are ruling many parts of our 
world. And so-called “secular” and “liberal” Western society is far from 
immune to them; rather, it seems to be the ideal breeding ground for 
such new contemporary forms of violent ultranationalism and autho-
ritarianism: it might even be worth a new term, “democratic fascism.” 
Nonetheless, democracy as a word that could uphold a different ideal 
of power and a different distribution of power is re-invented in the sta-
1  Judith Balso, “To Present Oneself to the Present. The Communist Hypothesis: a Possible Hy-
pothesis for Philosophy, an Impossible Name for Politics?,” in Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek 
(eds.), The Idea of Communism (London/New York: Verso), p. 32.
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to power does not by definition mean that it always succumbs to it. 
Even in Sinclair’s militant reading of art history as a site of class stru-
ggle, we still encounter a variety of artists which, in the most compro-
mised of situations – and one could ask what situation is not compro-
mised in one way or another – were able to challenge or even change 
the powers that be, sometimes at great personal risk. So, the paradox 
here is that art cannot be understood outside of power, but that art at 
the same time is something else or “more” than the sum of the powers 
that be. Power shapes art, but art also shapes power. That brings us to 
the question, what exactly is this “more,” this surplus of some kind, 
that the competences of artists bring about? Or, phrasing the question 
differently: is this “more” a kind of power that art itself lays claim to?
Even though the definition of art is subject to continuous change, 
as we have seen from examples from the French to the Russian Re-
volution, from the War on Terror to Stateless movements, there are 
nonetheless re-occurring competences that characterizes the work of a 
wide array of artists. Visual literacy – whether visual artist, film maker 
or architect – is possibly one of the most important competences if 
we wish to articulate some continuity between them; the capacity to 
“read” form, and thus the acquired competence to think and act the 
world through a morphological perspective. We touched on such mor-
phological readings of the world when we discussed some case stu-
dies of Popular Propaganda Art, in which we encountered artists that 
analyzed Assemblist practices in terms of a “social montage” or “social 
assemblage.” These artists’ morphological approach expands artistic 
concepts such as the assemblage or montage into a larger social realm. 
If we understand morphology as a genealogy of form, as a competence 
to “read” form and to produce form, then morphology relates both to 
how we understand the world visually, how we represent it, but even so 
how we imagine it to be changed. 
Does that mean that no one else but artists can acquire such mor-
phological competences? Certainly not. The mythology of the artist 
genius and its exceptional sensitivity and magnetic attraction to the 
sublime, looming underneath the shadows on the cave-wall of our 
ephemeral reality, is to be done with. Nonetheless, one could say that 
at least one continuity amongst the wide array of people we have ca-
lled “artists” through the ages, is that they practice a morphological 
approach to the world, training and refining this competence as their 
primary occupation. This does not mean that art is only made by what 
we traditionally define as artists. In this thesis we have seen that, throu-
gh the prism of contemporary propaganda art, the nature of the artist, 
the curator, or the art institution can radically change. While not ge-
nerally recognized as such, it is hard not to describe Philip Strub as a 
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teless region of Rojava and on our city squares. These are the emerging 
powers I believe we must dedicate ourselves to articulate our side in 
the contemporary propaganda struggle.
In my introduction, I have clarified my own stakes in this thesis, as 
a propaganda researcher and as a propaganda worker. Many examples 
and categories of propaganda art we discussed in the fourth chapter 
are ones that I have been implicated in myself, and I would not have 
been able to conceptualize them otherwise. I was a member of Artists 
in Occupy Amsterdam, an artist collective that aimed to be a Dutch 
equivalent of Not An Alternative by both challenging and supporting 
the social movement from within the protest camp. In 2015, I initiated 
the Artist Organizations International with curator Joanna Warsza and 
dramaturge Florian Malzacher, an attempt to ally artist organizations 
from all over the world, amongst which Bruguera’s Immigrant Move-
ment International and Öğüt’s Silent University. I joined Matthijs de 
Bruijne in his actions with the Dutch Unions, his collaboration with 
the Socialist Party (SP) in the former miner-town of Heerlen, and tau-
ght art students alongside him and filmmaker Rob Schröder during 
the occupation of the University of Amsterdam in 2015. And, as men-
tioned in my introduction, I worked with the artists of the Azawadian 
and Rojavan movements, amongst which Mazou Ibrahim Touré and 
Abdullah Abdul, to develop temporary embassies and the People’s 
Parliament of Rojava
In other words, my own work is situated in between the categories 
of Popular Propaganda Art and Stateless Propaganda Art, a result of 
my direct involvement in Assemblism, my practicing of Embedded Art 
and founding of my own artist-organization in the form of the New 
World Summit. That does not mean that these categories of propa-
ganda art “belong” to me, as I have myself only been able to articulate 
them by learning from fellow artists and political organizations alike. It 
is for this reason that I have not wanted to write a thesis about my own 
work, but have aimed to employ my own knowledge and experience in 
propaganda work to open the larger field of propaganda art research 
and practice. Nonetheless, that does not excuse me from clarifying the 
definition of both art and propaganda that I hold central to my own 
work, which has informed the writing of this thesis, and that I aim to 
pursue in the future.
For me, it is impossible to define art without taking into conside-
ration the structures of power through which art has been produced, 
presented, circulated, and validated. I agree with Sinclair that “all art 
is propaganda,” although that does not yet define what kind of power 
and thus what kind of propaganda art we are dealing with exactly. And 
more importantly, the fact that art must be understood in its relation 
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Throughout this thesis we have expanded the Chomsky and Her-
man propaganda model, which we discussed as a multilayered perfor-
mance that comprehends both a macro- and micro-performative di-
mension. In the case of the expanded state, we have seen how Chomsky 
and Herman’s model operates through monopolized power, in which 
the interests of the proprietors of the expanded state shape desired 
attitudes and convictions in a given population through politics, the 
economy, mass media, the military industrial complex, et cetera. But 
in the case of popular mass movements and stateless peoples, we have 
also seen how this multi-layered performance can operate differently, 
as these emerging powers depart from a collective demand for the de-
mocratization of power. Through the inverted propaganda model, we 
have analyzed how popular mass movements and stateless peoples en-
act the macro-performative dimension of propaganda departing from a 
common interest, which is furthered in the form of micro-performan-
ces of the diverse constituencies that make up a movement. In other 
words, the difference in the multi-layered performance of power that 
is propaganda between the expanded state, and popular mass move-
ments and stateless peoples, is defined through the change in distance 
between sender and receiver, between proprietor and the subject of 
ownership. In the case of War on Terror Propaganda Art, the senders 
are defined by an elite status and their subjects are not, whereas in the 
case of Popular Propaganda Art and Stateless Propaganda Art, sender 
and receiver occupy similar positions in the process in which an egali-
tarian claim to power takes shape.
In the case of the People’s Parliament of Rojava, the macro-perfor-
mative dimension is defined in the process of creating it: the assembly 
of Rojavans and my own artist-organization, that together follow the 
decision-making process of stateless democracy to conceptualize, de-
sign and construct the parliament as a morphological translation of 
Rojavan ideology. The micro-performative dimension is of equal im-
portance, namely the moment after the inauguration of the parliament, 
when different Rojavan communes will one by one occupy the space 
for the day to day practice of self-governance; the day to day perfor-
mance of stateless democracy. The decentralized model of power that 
is stateless democracy thus informs the morphology of the parliament, 
but simultaneously, this morphology contributes to further shaping of 
stateless democracy in practice. Emancipatory propaganda art is the 
result of exactly this interplay between the macro- and micro-perfor-
mative dimension of propaganda: the morphology that is art is shaped 
through a specific emancipatory paradigm of power, but that same 
power is shaped through the work of art at the very same time.
The ambiguity located in the very term performance, becomes par-
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curator when modifying scripts of film makers, and it is equally difficult 
not to understand the cultural wing of the Pentagon that subsidizes the 
films that pass Strub’s rigid curatorial criteria as an art institution – or 
at least as an art fund – in the context of War on Terror Propaganda Art. 
We have seen similar changes in what defines art and the role of artists 
in Stateless Propaganda Art, for example in the case of the Rojava 
Film Commune, in which the meaning of being an artist expands into 
simultaneously being an educator, an institutor of new artistic plat-
forms, a distributor of cinematic knowledge, and a revolutionary. But 
however different these two examples are – the worlds of Philip Strub 
and Diyar Hesso undoubtedly are radically opposed – in both cases 
power changes the very definition and form of art, but the engagement 
of artists with the domain of morphology remains, whether it is by em-
ploying visual literacy to imagine ever changing threats of non-existing 
terror, or by employing such imaginative capacities to bring into being 
the revolutionary model of stateless democracy. To change the world, 
for better or worse, we will need to imagine such change first. In that 
sense, the capacity to imagine the world differently might be the most 
important aspect of the morphological practice that we call “art,” and 
it is simultaneously the reason why art, in a grand variety of shapes 
and forms, has been of continuous importance in propaganda past and 
present.
This approach to art as morphology could count as a definition of 
art in general; or at least, as a possible way to find a master narrative 
in the many different practices that have been termed as art. But it 
does not yet say anything of the kind of art, and most of all the kind of 
propaganda art, to which I dedicate my own practice. The morpholo-
gical competences of art can be applied left and right, from regimes of 
terror to liberational movements. In my case, I would say that I aim to 
contribute and help to articulate what I would term as an emancipatory 
propaganda art. 
To explain what I would like to call emancipatory propaganda art 
– a term I touched upon lightly in the introduction – I wish to return 
to the People’s Parliament of Rojava: the public parliament that my 
artist-organization, the New World Summit, was commissioned to de-
velop for the Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava. I have alre-
ady discussed some of the morphological dimensions of the parliament 
that resulted from my collaboration with Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Amina Osse, such as the transformation of the parliament from a clo-
sed hall to a public space, and the transformation of the half circle into 
a full one, denying a clear center of power. But how exactly is the par-
liament’s morphology performed as a form of propaganda, in the light 
of the idea of an emancipatory propaganda art?
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emancipatory power: the necessary coalition in which art partakes, to 
further the demand for the communal democratization of power.
The power struggles of the past have frequently been narrated to 
us as a “clash of civilizations.” But I suggest not to use that dubious 
phrase, invented by societies that considered themselves rulers of the 
earth while accelerating its global destruction more than any other in 
history. Instead, I would qualify the arena of the contemporary as a 
“clash of worlds.” On the one hand, we witness the world of endless 
neocolonial war and climate crimes on a global scale, one that will 
secure a future without human history. On the other hand, we witness 
the possibility of a “world of many worlds,” as phrased by the Zapatista 
Army for National Liberation (EZLN).3 The world of many worlds is 
a world of emancipatory propaganda. These many worlds, fierce and 
imaginative, are the domain of emancipatory propaganda art. A space 
of transformation where we defiantly reclaim the present as our true 
site of struggle. And, in the process, we might make a future history – 
future worlds – possible once again.
Now is the time to choose our sides. Now is the time to choose for 
many worlds. Now is the time to choose what kind of propaganda will 
construct our reality anew.
3  In the words of the EZLN: “Today, thousands of small worlds from the five continents are 
attempting a beginning here in the Mountains of the Mexican Southeast, the beginning of the 
construction of a new and good world, that is, a world which admits all these worlds.” EZLN, 
Zapatista Encuentro: Documents from the First Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), pp. 29-30.
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ticularly clear in the case of the People’s Parliament of Rojava. Here, 
performance is simultaneously a concrete act that leads to the cons-
truction of a material presence in the form of the parliament. But at 
the same time, it embodies an imaginative dimension which surpasses 
the process of conceiving and building a space. What defines this ima-
ginative dimension is what the parliament signifies in a future-present. 
How the parliament will be used from day to day; how its shape and 
form impacts its users who are simultaneously it’s owners; and how it 
will continue to operate as a space in which the real and the imagina-
tive co-exist. The People’s Parliament of Rojava is a space that exists 
and which – in terms of its functions – simultaneously is in the process 
of becoming; and is that ambiguity, that duality, not exactly what is 
signified by the word emancipation?
Our choice as propaganda artists is what kind of process of beco-
ming we desire to contribute to; in which performance of power do we 
partake? If our choice is that of an emancipatory propaganda art, then 
it means we choose to participate in a performance of power of which 
the outcomes are, different than War on Terror Propaganda, partially 
unknown. For “emancipation” is defined not simply by an objective 
we can set from the start; rather, it is the understanding that in the 
present material conditions that define our reality, we are limited in 
what we can desire to become. It is for this precise reason that, in line 
with Butler, we have spoken of Assemblism as a practice of a “people-
in-the-making,” as their collective demands do not define them as a 
homogeneous category, but as a transformative one. What this people 
will become we do not know, but that they must become something 
else in the present we know for sure. Emancipation thus means to alter 
the material conditions that currently stop us from becoming more.2 The 
paradox of emancipatory propaganda art, is that it is a performance 
that takes place in the limited conditions of the present with the aim 
to open a space of imagination of a future-present, in which we might 
perform differently.
What defines art in the context of emancipatory propaganda art, is 
the imaginative capacity of morphology: the ability to read the world 
through form, and the ability to imagine to change it. What defines per-
formance in the context of emancipatory propaganda art, is its twofold 
operation in between the real and the possible: to confront the material 
conditions of our world, while enacting the imaginative capacity of art 
to open the possibility for it to become more. What defines the condi-
tions for both art and performance as emancipatory propaganda art, is 
2  Becoming More was a ten-day public program that took place in the Van Abbemuseum in Eind-
hoven, from May 18 to May 25, 2017.
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This study explores the development of propaganda art from the 20th 
to the 21st century. Although it is often assumed propaganda belongs 
to the history of so-called “totalitarian” states, I show that modern 
propaganda has its origins in British democracy, and as such, is appli-
cable to all modern structures of power in the past and present.
I define propaganda as the performance of power by means of the 
equation propaganda = power + performance. Through my work as a pro-
paganda researcher and my practice as a propaganda artist, I show that 
different structures of power generate different forms of propaganda 
and therefore different forms of propaganda art.
Concerning the 20th century, I discuss the differences between 
avant-garde, totalitarian, and modernist propaganda art. I do so by 
comparing structures of power from the Russian Revolution, the Sta-
linist regime, and the Cold War with specific forms of artistic produc-
tion that they made possible. The differences between these structures 
of power and their art forms are manifold, and for this reason I argue 
that we need to define propaganda in plural: as propagandas.
Although the word propaganda has fallen out of use for some time 
in favor of terms such as “public relations” and “advertisement,” I ar-
gue that if propaganda indeed can be defined as the performance of 
power and exists both in democracies and dictatorships, there should 
be no reason not to speak of contemporary propaganda and contem-
porary propaganda art in the 21st century.
Based on theoretical research, field work in Azawad (northern-Ma-
li) and Rojava (northern-Syria), as well as my own practice as a propa-
ganda artist, I argue that propaganda and propaganda art in the 21st 
century can be understood through three specific categories, namely 
War on Terror Propaganda Art, Popular Propaganda Art, and State-
less Propaganda Art. By means of concrete examples of artists and 
artworks within each of these three categories I try to show how the 
performance of power in the 21st century translates into different vi-
sual forms, and how they shape and direct our reality.
My study shows that power and art exist in continuous interaction. 
Different structures of power create the conditions for different forms 
of art, while art simultaneously contributes to visualizing, communi-
cating, and legitimizing power. Power and art are not the same, but 
should not be examined separately to one another. Propaganda and 
propaganda art are not terms that only refer to the past, but concepts 
and practices through which we can understand the construction of 
reality in the present and, most of all, through which new realities can 
– and must – be created.
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SUMMARY  
(DUTCH)
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Deze studie verkent de ontwikkeling van propagandakunst in de 20ste en 
21ste eeuw. Hoewel vaak wordt verondersteld dat propaganda behoort tot 
de geschiedenis van zogeheten “totalitaire” staten, laat ik zien dat moderne 
propaganda zijn oorsprong heeft in de Britse democratie, en in principe be-
trekking heeft op elke moderne machtsstructuur in het verleden en heden.
Propaganda definieer ik als de opvoering van macht (performance of 
power), middels de formule propaganda = power + performance. Doch, aan 
de hand van mijn onderzoek naar propaganda en mijn praktijk als propa-
gandakunstenaar, probeer ik tevens aan te tonen dat verschillende machtss-
tructuren evenzozeer verschillende vormen van propaganda voortbrengen, 
en dus ook verschillende vormen van propagandakunst.
Uit de 20ste eeuw bespreek ik de verschillen tussen avant-garde, tota-
litaire en modernistische propagandakunst. Dat doe ik door de specifieke 
machtsconstructies van respectievelijk de vroege Russische revolutie, het 
Stalinistische regime en de Amerikaanse kapitalistische democratie tijdens 
de Koude Oorlog te vergelijken met de specifieke artistieke producties die 
zij mogelijk maakten. De verschillen tussen deze machtsvormen en hun 
kunstvormen is zodanig, dat ik argumenteer dat wij over propaganda in het 
meervoud dienen te spreken: over propaganda’s.
Hoewel het begrip propaganda lang in onbruik is geweest ten faveure 
van begrippen als ‘public relations’ en ‘reclame’, argumenteer ik dat indien 
propaganda inderdaad gedefinieerd kan worden als de opvoering van ma-
cht, en propaganda door zowel democratieën als dictaturen wordt opge-
voerd, er geen reden is waarom wij niet over hedendaagse propaganda en 
hedendaagse propagandakunst in de 21ste eeuw dienen te spreken.
Op basis van theoretisch onderzoek, veldonderzoek in Azawad 
(noord-Mali) en Rojava (Noord-Syrië) en praktijkwerk als propagan-
dakunstenaar, argumenteer ik dan ook dat propaganda en propagandakunst 
in de 21ste eeuw begrepen kunnen worden aan de hand van drie specifie-
ke categorieën, namelijk oorlog-tegen-terreur propagandakunst, populaire 
propagandakunst en statenloze propagandakunst. Middels concrete voor-
beelden van kunstenaars en kunstwerken binnen elk van deze drie catego-
rieën toon ik aan hoe de opvoering van macht in de 21ste eeuw zich vertaalt 
in verschillende visuele beeldvormen, en hoe deze onze realiteit vorm en 
richting geven.
Mijn studie laat zien dat macht en kunst in continue wisselwerking met 
elkaar moeten staan. Verschillende machtsvormen creëren de condities voor 
het bestaan van verschillende kunstvormen, maar kunst draagt evenwel bij 
aan het zichtbaar maken, communiceren en legitimeren van macht. Macht 
en kunst zijn niet hetzelfde, doch zij kunnen ook niet los van elkaar worden 
gezien. Propaganda en propagandakunst zijn dan ook geen begrippen uit 
het verleden, maar termen en praktijken waarmee de constructie van onze 
werkelijkheid in het hier en nu begrepen en ontleedt kan worden. En bove-
nal: waarmee nieuwe realiteiten kunnen – en moeten – worden geschapen.
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